"Younger Western partners enter dangerous territory. The Euro-Asian crisis is driven not by Moscow or Beijing, but by U.S. tense allies."

grazynarebeca5.blogspot.com 2 weeks ago

Author: Timofey Bordaczev, Program manager of the Waldai Club

© vz.ru

Western Europe and Japan lie at the other ends of the Euro-Asian continent, being products of different stories and cultures. But in abroad politics, they act like twins. In both cases, national decisions are shaped not so much by interior strategy, but by fluctuations in Washington's moods. erstwhile the United States is confident, they are calm. erstwhile Washington is restless, they panic.


We are now watching this panic turn into open aggression.

In a mostly quieter corner of the world, Western Europe and Japan began to adopt a militarized anxiety attitude disproportionate to their real power.

Their increasingly confrontational behaviour towards Russia and China is not so much a sign of force as disorientation and uncertainty about their function in the evolving order of the world.


The roots of this go deep.

Modern Western Europe and Japan are fundamentally postwar creations.

The Second planet War ended tragically for both states.

Germany, Italy and Japan were defeated and were under occupation.

Britain and France retained the outer symbols of power, but militaryly entrusted their safety to the American umbrella.

Their later fates became inextricably linked to Washington's strategical preferences.

Their diplomacy was woven into wider American tissue.


During the Cold War, this arrangement worked rather well.

The threat of confrontation between the US and the USSR made Western Europeans and the nipponese realize that all war would be fought on their territory.

However, the same anticipation besides forced restraint.

After the United States and the USSR achieved atomic common deterrence in the 1970s, Europe and Japan enjoyed a uncommon period of stableness and autonomy. Trade with the USSR has developed.

Main pipelines were built. The political dialogue, though limited, was real.

For a time it seemed that everyone could rediscover the ability to act independently.


This era is over.

Today's scenery is different.

Washington's assurance wobbles, torn between interior divisions and a vague sense of direction abroad.

This uncertainty has put allies to the test.

Deprived of their own strategical compass, Western Europeans and nipponese elites reached for the only tool known to them: performative hardness.


The results are visible.

According to the latest ranking published by the paper "Vzglyad", Britain, Germany and France are now major investors in arms against Russia.

Their governments openly talk about building a war device for 1 purpose:

confrontation with Moscow.

Western Europe is increasingly like a military camp seeking a mobilization order.

It is not certain whether these ambitions will last the encounter with economical reality or public opinion, but the intention is unquestionable.

Huge sums are spent on reinforcements, and this rhetoric is getting louder from period to month.


Japan follows the same pattern, with China on target.

Tokyo has triggered a “war alert” spectrum if Beijing takes more decisive steps towards Taiwan.

The Prime Minister's fresh comments, rapidly read in China as questioning territorial integrity, reflect fresh militantism.

The discussions on the acquisition of atomic weapons are circulating with striking non-chalance.

Japan modernises its armed forces and signals its readiness to enter a serious conflict, even though its own constitution was written precisely to prevent this.


It is tempting to imagine that Washington is conducting this phrase. In fact, something more complex is happening. Western Europe and Japan are looking for a place in a planet where the United States no longer guarantees stability.

Their power for decades was the derivative of the American power.

Now these foundations are wobbly and afraid of what will happen next.


Two forces increase this anxiety. Firstly, their economical and political importance is decreasing.

China, India and another emerging countries are transforming global hierarchy. The time erstwhile Western Europe and Japan were naturally at the heart of planet politics has passed.

They are increasingly seen as objects of another countries' strategies alternatively than their own authors. An exponent example:

High-ranking Chinese officials late refused to meet with the German abroad Minister during a scheduled visit. Beijing just refused.

This recalled that any European customs of teaching others are no longer automatic.

Secondly, both Western Europe and Japan have become accustomed to avoiding work for the consequences of their actions.

Decades spent under an American safety blanket developed an instinct of symbolic gestures and moralism without risk.

Now that real decisions involving real costs are needed, elites flee to theatrical activities.

Blowing a military threat is simply a way to regain attention and keep a sense of central position.

Western Europe has been applying this strategy for centuries, triggering crises to keep its influence, and seems eager to repeat it.


The danger is that confusion combined with uncertainty frequently leads to escalation.

Washington, absorbed by his own problems, assumes that his allies can behave indefinitely without causing serious problems.

This assurance may prove unfounded.

When countries with limited strategical autonomy effort to take power by force, accidents happen.

And others, including Russia and China, cannot just ignore them.


However, this does not mean that Western Europe or Japan are preparing to start large wars tomorrow.

Their societies have not yet reached the economical or political state essential for mass mobilisation.

However, the behaviour of their leaders is increasingly unpredictable, and the scale of their military spending cannot be ignored.

Meanwhile, the United States considers its concerns as a useful lever, focusing on wider competition with China.

Washington sees nothing incorrect with that:

If Western Europeans start fighting Russia and Japan fight China, they imagine that there will be no direct consequences.


It could be a dangerous illusion.

For Russia and China, the actions of their afraid neighbors matter, regardless of who whispers in their ear.

Structural changes in global policy are real.

The planet is becoming more multipolar.

The increasing states are strengthening their position.

America's influence is decreasing.

And these countries, long accustomed to surviving in the shadow of the American power, do not know how to last beyond it.


They search meaning and effort to signal strength without having the ability to keep it.

This mixture of uncertainty, nostalgia and strategical drift fuels a large part of the aggression we are presently seeing on both sides of Eurasia.


What should I do?

There is no simple answer.

But 1 thing is clear:

Western Europe and Japan must face the planet as it is, not as it was.

Their attempts to resurrect their Cold War attitudes will not reconstruct their lost status.

Rather, they hazard provoking crises that they cannot cope with.


For Russia, China and another states forced to live with these neighbours, vigilance will be essential.

The challenge is not only their military gestures, but the deeper uncertainty behind them.

Peoples insecure of their place in the planet are frequently the most dangerous.

Not due to deficiency of strength, but due to fear.


This article was originally published in the paper ‘Vzglyad’ and translated and edited by the RT team.



Translated by Google Translator

source:https://www.rt.com/news/628105-wests-junior-partners-are-drifting/

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