The conversation is led by Marcin Wandałowski, editor of the publication of the Civic Congress.
Today we are witnessing a global geopolitical breakthrough – what are its main levels?
The most visible change is the shift from a model in which the global economy was based primarily on building prosperity, growth and maximising economical benefits, to a reality in which strength is increasingly crucial – understood as both economical possible and security.
The second crucial issue is to leave the planet based, at least in principle, on rules. Although this strategy was never perfect, it mostly functioned. Today, we are becoming increasingly clear to the order where strength and the interests of the states play a greater role.
The model of the global economy based on building prosperity, growth and maximising economical benefits gives way to a reality where strength is crucial – understood as both economical possible and security.
Another crucial phenomenon is the change in the nature of globalisation. Open globalisation gives way to a more fragmented strategy – divided into blocks and groups of states. There is another crucial trend: economical dependency, which was previously seen as a origin of prosperity, is increasingly becoming a possible threat. We're talking about a phenomenon here. weaponizationofdependencies, that is, utilizing economical links as a leverage tool.
The existing order is presently falling apart, but the fresh strategy is not yet full defined. This means that both Poland and the European Union are renegotiating their position and principles of operation.
How are these changes perceived at European Union level?
They are clearly visible in the work of the EU institutions. I participate in meetings of the Trade Council and the Competitiveness Council, which are attended by economical ministers. It is clear from our discussions that the current rules are becoming increasingly blurred.
The European Union is trying to find itself in this fresh planet – on the 1 hand, trying to keep a circumstantial set of rules, on the another hand, recognizing that globalisation is gradually fragmented.
Do you think the fresh order has developed?
No, and it's very important. In my opinion, we are present in a phase of disintegration of the existing order, not at a time erstwhile the fresh strategy is already full defined. This means that both Poland and the European Union are in the process of renegotiating their position and functioning.
Will a new, comparatively unchangeable order appear over time, or are we entering an era of permanent instability?
This process is inactive ongoing. Today, it is hard to say clearly where it is going due to the fact that we are in any ways moving in the fog. We do not yet see what is beyond the horizon or what form the fresh strategy will take.
So can we at least say something about the direction of these changes?
There are more and more actors on the global phase who are either unpredictable or consciously utilizing force in economical relations. We are besides increasingly dealing with the usage of economical dependence as a tool of force – both in economical and political terms.
At the same time, there is simply a group of large players who want to keep at least the basic set of rules and rules of the game. It belongs to the European Union, but not only. We besides see countries specified as India, Japan, South Korea, Australia or Canada, and more broadly any Latin American countries specified as Brazil, Argentina and Mexico.
From the position of the European Union, it is very clear that cooperation with partners who are committed to maintaining the rules has been accelerated. Especially after events specified as the alleged Liberation Day, announced by president Donald Trump last year1, trade and strategical negotiations are intensified. A good example is the Free Trade Agreement with India, which, although evidently of itself, has an economical dimension, is indeed a much broader strategical agreement. It is besides about maintaining certain foundations of the global economical system.
Globalisation does not disappear, but adopts a more "island" character. The relations between blocks and groups of states are inactive based on rules, although the full strategy is becoming increasingly fragmented and little predictable.
It can so be said that globalisation does not disappear, but adopts a more "island" character. There are inactive rules-based relationships between individual blocks or groups of countries – although the full strategy as a full becomes more fragmented and little predictable.
However, is it possible to operate 2 parallel worlds – 1 based on rules, represented, among others, by the European Union and its partners, and the other, in which the logic of strength and interests of the top players dominate?
This is simply a very good question – and 1 to which the eventual answer will be given only by reality. However, I am convinced that for Poland, the European Union and many another countries – frequently referred to as middle power – it is crucial to keep a strategy based on rules.
Although the EU is indeed a large and strong economical bloc, its interest is to uphold the principles of predictability, openness and equal competition, alternatively than a transition to the logic of pure force.
In this situation, how do states that are committed to maintaining rules behave?
They effort to defend the existing strategy and effort to strengthen it. We see this in concrete examples. 1 of these is the said free trade agreement between the European Union and India. Another – attempts to improvement the planet Trade Organisation (WTO). These processes are difficult, but clearly show the direction of action.
On the another hand, the deficiency of crucial advancement in WTO improvement proves that it is increasingly hard to keep a single common strategy involving all major players. We are so increasingly faced with agreements between selected groups of countries.
So the future is alternatively a strategy of parallel order?
It is simply a very possible scenario, but it is not yet established. We are already seeing any attempts to build specified agreements – for example in the European Union's relations with Pacific partners, focused on the CPTPP agreement.
At present, however, we cannot clearly measure whether these 2 worlds – based on rules and based on force – will be able to function in parallel in the long term. We'll see about that in the coming years.
Although the Union is simply a large and strong economical bloc, its interest is to keep the principles of predictability, openness and equal competition, alternatively than moving towards the logic of pure force.
So let us decision on to EU policies and actions - how should it respond to the pressures of the United States and China? Must he choose between these 2 powers?
Europe does not gotta choose between the United States and China - we request different things from both partners and both trade relations are very crucial to us.
In the case of the United States, we are talking about the most crucial trade and investment relationship, both for Europe and for the Americans themselves. Moreover, we regularly remind our overseas partners that the European Union is economically more crucial to them than China.
At the same time, however, we must be consistent in maintaining a strategy based on rules, in cooperation with the another countries we have mentioned earlier. This does not mean “let go” trade relations with the United States or China.
What is the European Union's primary concern now in relations with the US?
First of all, on predictability. And to any degree it has been achieved through the agreement concluded last year in Scotland (the alleged Turnberry Deal).
It is very crucial to us, although there have been any question marks around it – among another things, in connection with decisions of the United States ultimate Court, which affect the competence of the administration in the area of trade policy. On the European and American sides, however, there is simply a clear will to keep this agreement.
What, though, is the situation with China?
The relation with you is much more complex. The Chinese economical model is mostly based on exports, which, inter alia, results from overproduction supported by state subsidies.
This leads to an unequal competition. This missing level playing field is 1 of the main sources of tension, not only in relations with the European Union, but besides in the United States' trade policy, as was evident in the decisions to rise customs duties.
What tools does the EU have present to respond to these challenges?
The European Union is increasingly developing a set of tools to strengthen the resilience and competitiveness of its economy. This is an crucial change, since classical trade instruments prevailed earlier, and present we are talking about a much broader approach.
One specified tool is the Anti-Coercion Instrument2, sometimes referred to as ‘trade bazuki’. Although it has not yet been formally used, it has been widely debated – including in the context of trade tensions with the United States.
In parallel, fresh instruments are being developed as part of initiatives specified as the Industrial Accelerator Act. These include efforts to increase economical resilience and to build technological and industrial advantages in Europe.
So, not only does the Union focus on defence, but besides on actively shaping the conditions for cooperation?
That's right. An example is the approach to abroad investment. So far, in this context, we have focused mainly on safety aspects – that is, who takes over key infrastructure or strategical enterprises.
Today, we are increasingly emphasising investment to bring real benefits to the European economy – especially in the form of technology transfer, cognition and occupation creation. It is not so about 3rd countries building only assembly plants in the Union, for example electrical cars, and thus gaining free access to the single market.
The Union is changing its approach to abroad investment – its aim is to bring technologies, competences and know-how to Europe. In a sense, this is simply a reversal of the model that China utilized 20-30 years ago, tying marketplace access to real value transfer to its own economy.
The main presumption is that, together with investments, technology, competence and know-how. In a sense, this means reversing the model that China utilized 20-30 years ago - only present it is the European Union that wants to link access to its marketplace in a akin way to real transfer of added value to its own economy.
This approach is based on the usage of our top force, a single marketplace of 450 million wealthy consumers, as a negotiating tool in relations with external partners.
So we are dealing with a fresh model of economical openness?
Yes – but it is conditional openness, that is, 1 that is essential in the current realities in order not to weaken its own economy.
In this context, however, the question has been repeated for years: can the European Union act as a coherent full and exploit its possible for the largest single marketplace in the world?
One thing is worth noting: we request not only unity, but besides a truly single market. This means that it must be further deepened. There are ongoing discussions between associate States and the European Commission on how to make the single marketplace even stronger and more common.
When it comes to political unity, I feel that it is growing. We are increasingly seeing that inaction can lead to deindustrialisation of Europe. This is much better understood present than it was a year ago. However, this does not change the fact that there is inactive no full unity.
This can be seen from the example of circumstantial instruments specified as mechanisms for monitoring abroad investment and related technology transfer. There are countries that have already attracted large investments from 3rd countries – frequently in a model based mainly on assembly, not on the construction of technological competences. In specified cases, there are naturally differences of interest.
However, I do not think that individual countries – even those guided by their own bilateral relations, for example with China – will be able to halt the full process of change at EU level. The direction is alternatively unambiguous.
So where do you see the top challenges?
We are presently participating in a kind of economical arms race. We are not dealing with a natural, peaceful process, but with a dynamic change driven by the decisions of another global players.
It is so crucial that we are able to build a set of tools rapidly enough, which, as a whole, will let us to function effectively in a new, more demanding world.
When you look at it from a broader perspective, you can see how immense this challenge is. The European Union is 27 countries, each with its own interests. The communicative besides shows that in moments of crisis, the first instinct is to close and focus on 1 another – like at the beginning of a pandemic. Do you think that Europe, as a community and as decision-makers, matures to deal better with these situations?
Yes, we are definitely gaining specified maturity – although I do not want to paint besides optimistic image. The key is that we have more in common present than conflicting interests.
However, as I mentioned, the most crucial of these is the fact that the failure to respond to the challenges we are talking about would lead to the deindustrialisation of Europe. This is simply a common hazard for all associate States – there is no script in which any people will manage and others will not.
The EU associate States present have more common interests than conflicting interests. The most crucial of these are the fact that the deficiency of consequence to the current challenges will lead to the deindustrialisation of Europe. It's a common hazard – there's no script in which any people manage and others don't.
Is this the common diagnosis that is pushing Europe towards greater cooperation today?
Yes, exactly. expanding consensus on diagnosis makes it easier to build common answers. This does not mean that it is simply a simple process – on the contrary.
The interest of Poland and the Union in maintaining the rules, predictability and economical safety are mostly converging today.
Negotiations are hard and solutions seldom black and white. They have many shades and details that disagree from 1 country to another. However, as far as direction is concerned, it is clearly shared today.
Poland has been 1 of the largest beneficiaries of an open globalisation model in fresh decades. How will we find ourselves in a fresh architecture?
For me, the answer is rather clear, but it is worth starting with the basic question: the discussion about SAFE or – more broadly – the fresh economical architecture and safety leads us to talk about Poland's place in the European Union and the value of our membership.
In a time of decaying globalisation, we would not be a power ourselves. We wouldn't even be Middle power. Without anchoring in the Union, we would simply be a medium-sized country, in practice based on what others will determine.
Therefore, it is worth looking at current processes from the position of the Polish interest realised through the European Union. This is the basic point of mention for us. The interest of Poland and the Union in maintaining the rules, predictability and economical safety are mostly the same today.
What does this mean from an economical policy point of view?
This means, above all, building resilience, but besides strengthening industrial and technological policy in Poland so that we can benefit from these changes.
Today, we are the fastest increasing large economy in the European Union. This gives us a very good starting position, but in order to keep it, we request more investment in the country and more investment in investigation and development. In another words, we must build fresh growth engines within the Union.
One of the main tasks of Poland should be to actively form EU policies in order to respond to fresh realities. At the same time, we should strive to keep as many elements of the current open economical governance as possible – of course in cooperation with partners who inactive want to base relations on rules.
Although the planet is changing, it is our business to keep as much of this order as possible, which has served Poland so well over the years.
What is Poland's position in the European Union today? Are we already among the countries that truly form politics, or are we inactive the recipients?
We are definitely among the countries that truly form European policies today. I see this very clearly in my regular work – especially in cooperation with ministers liable for trade and economy from another countries.
There is simply a spectrum of approaches in the debate on the future of European manufacture – frequently associated with differences between France and Germany. Poland is between them and our vote is actively sought by both sides. This shows how crucial our position is present and how real our impact on the form of EU solutions is.
A good example is the discussion around the instrument Made in Europewhich forms part of the Industrial Accelerator Act. At first glance, it may seem to be a method issue, but in reality it is simply a strategical one, due to the fact that it concerns what part of the production, in which sectors and under what conditions it will be implemented in Europe. In another words, these are decisions that straight affect the future of European industry.
Poland has a very crucial position in this discussion. On the 1 hand, we share the direction of this policy as 1 of the largest economies in the Union, and on the other, we are a country whose position can tip the scales 1 way or the other.
In a simpler way, there is simply a certain spectrum of approaches in this debate – frequently associated with the differences between France and Germany. Poland is between them and our vote is actively sought by both sides. This shows how crucial our position is present and how real our impact on the form of EU solutions is.
The times erstwhile decisions were taken over the heads of Poland are already behind us?
I think so. I do not now associate with issues in which key decisions would be made without Poland. And we're doing everything we can to keep this from happening in the future.
1 On April 2, 2025, the president of the United States announced a wide import tariff package – this date he called "The Day of Liberation" (ed.).
2Anti-Coercion Instrument is applicable in the EU from 27 December 2023 a legal instrument to defend the Community and its associate States against economical blackmail by 3rd countries. It allows rapid, proportionate retaliatory measures, specified as customs or trade restrictions, to be taken erstwhile another countries are trying to force changes in EU sovereign decisions. See more. Protecting against coercion [Online access] (p. ed.).
