Marek Baterowicz - JANUARY INSTANCE

The uprising announced by the manifesto on 22 January 1863 did not break out in conditions that were besides favorable for Poland, due to the fact that respective years after the Crimean War, which tied Russian armies on the front of the war with England, France and Turkey. It was at that time that better conditions existed for the national rabble, unfortunately it did not happen for many reasons, and it was besides thought that Western states at the peace convention with Russia (and it was held in Paris in 1856 ) would take Polish case during the negotiations. However, after exchanging letters between Napoleon III and Queen Victoria, the powers determined that erstwhile they made peace with Russia they would not make demands as far as rebuilding the Polish state.

So in 1863 we were sentenced again to a solitary fight against many corps of the Tsaric army. A immense problem was besides the state of arms of insurgents, which can be described as poor. There was a shortage of weapons, although Mierosławski (in charge of military preparation of troops) did everything to bring arms from abroad. But these deliveries were a drop in the sea, so the request for self-sufficiency from his "Insurgency Instruction" (still from 1862) was inactive the basis for preparations for combat. It was written: “Let there be 1 shotgun in 5 irons in the villages” (i.e. a scythe, fork or lance), and it was thought that the participation of insurgents from the cities would improve these mediocre proportions. Despite the large increase in the firepower of the armies of the time, it was inactive believed that white weapons and courage frequently find battles. An example was the conflict of Solferino ( 1859), during which it decided to fight hand-to-hand, and the Austrians lost about 22,000 soldiers. This conflict was won by the French due to the fact that the allied Piemontic army did not match their courage. But Emperor Francis Joseph did not throw intact reserves at Solferino, which makes any analysis of this conflict questionable. Napoleon III's success besides resulted from political agreements: Austrians rushed to the conclusion of the treaty, due to the fact that Prussia developed a front against France, and their function could disrupt Vienna's hegemony in German countries!

Lessons from the conflict of Solferino should so not become binding on the plan of the strategy in the January uprising. another ideas of Mierosławski (such as wicker bags serving as shields or combat wagons called “mimorosławki”) were not practical, there were besides deficiency of officers. While the military school in Genoa, and then in Cuneo, trained nearly 200 officers for the uprising, this was not enough. Insurgency forces were thus formed by gunmen with most frequently hunting weapons, cossyners (called "seat mass") and squadrons riding with lancers.

Faced with specified disparity, the uprising could not succeed, and on the night of 22 January, only 18 barracks of Czarski troops were attacked into 160 localities where they were deployed. There were just over 11,000 insurgents against the 100,000 army. However, the Russians had to concentrate their forces in the main administrative centres, defending communication hubs. This only made the uprising a success, due to the fact that the insurgents got into the hands of vast areas of the country, villages and towns. In a tactical defeat, it was a strategical advantage, even later named by Piłsudski the strategical triumph of the uprising. But the uprising itself had small chance of triumph. No major city has been taken over by insurgents. Mierosławski, appointed dictator on January 25, was incapable to break through with his branch from the Kujaw border. Under the Corrupt Russians crashed it on 19 February, Mierosławski himself withdrew abroad from Prussia and then went to Paris to search aid for the uprising with Napoleon III, as well as with Italian, Hungarian friends. erstwhile he stood in Krakow after a fewer weeks, he learned that Langiewicz was the fresh dictator of the revolt. In total, insurgent forces have already exceeded 20,000, but to the Tsarist army it was inactive insufficient. The Langiewicz Corps fought with changing happiness, and on 18 March under the village of Grochowiska won thanks to the heroism of Czachowski's gunmen, the Żuaws Rochebrune, Kosakowski's cossiniers. Unfortunately, after the conflict there were no ammunition, and the Czarskie armies surrounded Poles. In this situation, Langiewicz divided his corps into troops that were to go to the guerrillas in the woods, and himself went to Galicia, where on March 20 (two days after the victory!) he was interned by the Austrians.

However, the uprising continued for 1864, with the forces of insurgent parties reaching 35 thousand. Mierosławski sent with the aid of respective 100 volunteers (mostly Italian-garibaldians, and Hungarians) under the leadership of Francesco Nullo. They were broken up, as were Colonel Sigismund Jordan's choice troops, made up of Galician youth. And the Russian forces have already exceeded 340 thousand! A full of 1.229 battles and skirmishes were fought with the Russians, but yet the uprising collapsed. The financial aid coming from many European countries, and the appeals of Pope Pius IX, who called on Francis Joseph (as a Catholic monarch) to talk for Poland, besides ordered prayers around the planet for our homeland. The Polish case touched hearts from Portugal to Switzerland, had advocates specified as Mazzini, Garibaldi, Montalembert or even Hercen, Bakunin. Among the volunteers, alongside the French, Italians, Hungarians there were Germans from Silesia, Czechs and even many Russians. Their efforts were futile, rising did not save Traugutt's dictatorship, which along with another members of the National Government was executed on August 5, 1864. “On the ground, the graves of the fires died out,” wrote the poet Ujejski...

Marek Baterovich