The European Parliament adopted on Wednesday a resolution in which it regretted that Volodymyr Zelenski gave the name “UPA heroes” to 1 of the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The resolution criticised "the recent, unnecessary and unprovoked escalation caused by president Volodymyr Zelenski". It was stressed that "this issue is delicate and painful for Polish society in the context of the estimated tens of thousands of UPA victims and families killed".
Without overestimating the importance of specified non-binding resolutions, however, they can be considered to be part of the shaping of public debate. Above all, they are a measurement of national influence, showing who can impose their communicative in the European institutions. After all, there is no uncertainty that although on the 1 hand the historical policy of Kiev, glorifying the CNS-UPA, is simply a long-term social engineering designed to make from a very diverse population Ukraine's disciplined nation, marching 1 way – the 1 the Kiev political elite points out – is besides a more immediate goal of Zelenski's move. This is primarily an effort to show, colloquially speaking, “who is in charge” and who is to give way to whom in Central and east Europe.
In this context, the resolution can be considered a 4th of success. On the 1 hand, it holds Zelenski liable for the conflict. On the another hand, it does not affect the essence of the Polish position, which is of fundamental importance to our historical identity – what in fact was the UPA and why its glorification raises our opposition. It is due not only to territorial conflict over the affiliation of Volyn and east Małopolska, but above all to the fact that UPA was a genocidal organization, and Poles murdered by it with sadistic cruelty inactive did not experience burial, which subsequent Ukrainian authorities cynically blocked. And cowardly, fearing to publicize the fact about their “hero”.
It is at this point that the real arrangement of forces within the European Union has emerged. As it turned out, members of the Baltic States have played a very active function in preventing this kind of deeper historical reflection from being included in the European Parliament's resolution. The Lithuanians were most active. This should not surprise anyone, although I have no uncertainty that in Poland, where inter-mortal, prometetic mythology has been widespread for years, it has amazed many. I wonder if the flaps of the "strategic partnership" will yet fall out of sight in the Lithuanian context too.
The Lithuanian political elite has already signaled that in the case of Polish-Ukrainian antagonism it will be on the side of Kiev. "She should have joined the EU yesterday," said Lithuanian Finance Minister Kristupas Vaitiekūnas about Ukraine in a fresh interview with the Polish editor, clearly distancing herself from the ever-increasingly articulate position in Poland that Ukraine's accession process to the European Union should be dependent on resolving historical disputes and taking into account Polish economical interests.
This is equally evident in defence policy. The Lithuanians effort to deploy a German armored brigade and attract German arms investors, including Rheinmetall. Poland has only a service function within the framework of the Baltic Air Police Air safety Mission. This belongs to the sphere of unofficial communication, but behind the scenes Lithuanians made it rather clear that they did not want Polish military presence in their territory. The political elite in Warsaw drew only the conclusion that they sent our soldiers and tanks to a more remote, isolated outpost from our territory and interests – to the Latvian Adaži.
This Lithuanian position has historical roots akin to Ukrainian. Contrary to nationalistic mythology, the Lithuanian people are a young nation. Like many another nations in Central and east Europe, it was shaped in the 19th century by a fresh layer of intelligence based on a peasant layer, which had previously no clear national awareness. The work of perpetuating specified nations must have led to extremist antagonism with old, historical nations which for centuries formed their own statehood on the given lands. This attitude of the Lithuanian 19th-century "fathers of the nation" and "awakeners" is nothing different and finds analogy not only in Ukrainian nationalism. A akin relation has arisen with the formation of the Slovak or Romanian people towards Hungary, and – and this is in fact in front of our generation – with the construction of the statehood of North Macedonia, whose elites are radically cut off from the community with Bulgaria or Montenegro, where much of the elite lacks anti-Serbian attitudes.
Such are the historical roots of the Lithuanian attitude to Poland. I'm always amazed how fewer people in our country realize them. All you gotta do is go to Vilnius museums. Even in a politically neutral Museum of Money, we are welcomed in the first area by a medal with the historical caricature of the ugly Poland taking Vilnius. I won't even mention historical museums.
In fact, the story of “the business of Vilnius by Poland” remains 1 of the central elements of Lithuanian historiography and appears on the pages of subsequent textbooks of past in schools in Lithuania. Nota bene besides in schools with Polish language of teaching, intended for the Polish minority, which is inactive the majority in many parts of Vilnius. Their students read formulas comparing the membership of Vilnius to the Second Republic with the russian and German occupations.
Lithuania has never accounted for the broad participation of its citizens in collaboration with III A Reich from 1941 to 1944 – erstwhile officials of the pre-war republic, policemen, and especially members of the Lithuanian firearm Union. The Ypatingasis būrys troops, which, at the orders of the Germans, carried out genocides of Jews, Poles and russian POWs in Ponaras, consisted mostly of the old shaulis. A reasonably popular discourse in Lithuania, on the another hand, is the presentation of the National Army as a bandit formation at least, or even making "ethnic cleansing" in Lithuania. Apparently, however, according to Lithuanian optics, they were not allowed UPA, since the image of Stepan Bandera appeared a fewer years ago on the cover of the authoritative Lithuanian army magazine.
If we add to this a discriminatory and assimilation policy towards the contemporary Polish minority, we will find it easy to find how many contact points are present in the past and current politics of Lithuanians and Ukrainians.
Nevertheless, for 36 years Poland has accepted this discrimination and satisfied Lithuania's interests on all levels, within the framework of the “strategic partnership”, “Międzymorza”, “Trimorza” or “East flank of NATO”. It agreed, although in these decades Lithuania needed Poland much more than Poland needed Lithuania.
In front of our eyes, these Promethean concepts that have ruled Polish abroad policy since the establishment of the 3rd Polish Republic, which have been professed and translated into practice by all without exception its governments, are crumbling. Especially zealous in lituanophilia was the Camp of Law and Justice, which interfered with the interior life of the Polish community of Vilnius and attempted to advance people and communities in it as comfortable as possible to Lithuanian elites. As comfortable as for decades remained the elite of the 3rd Republic of Poland.
Although possibly they're besides pathetic words. It is possible to compose that something "falls into dust and dust" erstwhile the structure is solid, strong and indeed existing – like a fortress. Meanwhile, east politics of the 3rd Republic of Poland was alternatively a Potemkinian village – an attraction sustained by ideological delusions of prometeism.
Krystian Kamiński
Member of the National Movement Authority
For X
