The essence of the agreementlife sentence
The essence of the life contract is to guarantee that the seller of the property retains in specified a way that the seller does not gotta bear the basic cost of surviving – to contribute to the acquisition of funds to meet the essential life requirements (yes: ultimate Court judgement of 9 May 2008, No. III CSK 359/07). The benefits of a lifer so have its equivalent (equivalent) in the provision of the property buyer. It is not applicable to the issue of payment whether the buyer’s benefit corresponds precisely to the value of the property.
Alimentative Life Contract Function
In the light of Article 908 § 1 k.c., the life conviction is that, in exchange for the transfer of the property, the purchaser undertakes to supply the seller with a life sentence. Therefore, the primary function of the life-life contract is the maintenance function, as it ensures that the seller is maintained for life and on the terms laid down in the contract.
It should besides be pointed out that this agreement is the origin of the relation between the parties typical of maintenance relations having its origin in the law, and hence combines property and individual relations elements. Pursuant to Article 908 §1 k.c., in the absence of a different agreement, the purchaser should accept the seller as a householder, supply him with food, clothing, housing, light and fire, supply him with adequate assistance and care in the illness and give him his own ceremony corresponding to local customs.
The statutory scope of benefits so clearly indicates the desire to supply a livelihood for life, as well as the request to stay in direct contact with the parties and close individual relations (yes: judgement of the territory Court for Wrocław-Krzyków of 10 December 2013, act No I C 922/13).
Life sentence
Life can only be established for the benefit of a natural individual who remains a real property seller or close to him (Article 908 §3 k.c.). Thus, not only his relatives and relatives, but besides those with whom he has a peculiarly close relation (e.g. a concubine) will enter the ellipse of the sellers (so: E. Niezbek, in: A. Kidyba (ed.), civilian Code, Vol. 3, peculiar Part, 2010, p. 1228).
Purchaser of real property under a life contract
Both a natural individual and a legal individual may be the acquirer of the property under a life conviction contract.
The paid nature of the life conviction contract
One of the characteristics of a life contract that distinguishes it from a donation agreement is payment and reciprocity. As the doctrine rightly points out, it is not only a formal payment, which is determined by the content of the legal relationship, but besides by the substantive subjectivity of the contract entities. The life contract does not should be objectively paid, it is crucial that the parties agree to keep within the meaning of Article 908 k.c.
In order to establish that the payment is objectively substantive, which does not constitute the essential condition for the qualification of a contract as a life contract, it is crucial whether that payment has actually taken place, and so whether the transportation of the life conviction corresponds objectively to the value of the property, which, given the random nature of the life contract, cannot be assessed at the time of its conclusion (yes: ultimate Court in its judgement of 22 October 2015, Ref. Act IV CSK 743/14).
Reimbursement of maintenance costs unduly incurred by the lifer
The life conviction of the life sentence, which, according to the word of the life contract, was to be borne by the life sentence, confers on the organization liable for the life benefit without a legal basis, to which Article 405 (unwarranted enrichment) applies. Łomża territory Court in judgement of 29 August 2013, Act mention I Ca 210/13, considered in this subject that it was irrelevant that the counter that measured the energy consumed at home was recorded as a plaintiff (lifer), and the force metre for water heating – on the defendant. The Court of First Instance considered that the life conviction claim for reimbursement of expenditure incurred on electricity was justified.
Third-party care of life sentences
the benefits of the property buyer under a life conviction contract are not limited to the provision of means of subsistence. If this were the case, the life conviction would only be a form of paid pension. The acquirer of the property on the basis of a life contract outside the provision of means of subsistence shall besides be obliged to take care of the life sentence. It appears that the life-care provision may besides be fulfilled in specified a way that the acquirer of the property ensures that it is exercised by 3rd parties. This way of fulfilling a life-care benefit may correspond to the function of a life-life contract, especially erstwhile the life-life conviction requires specialised nursing and medical care, which the purchaser cannot supply in individual due to deficiency of qualifications and skills (yes: Bogusław Lackoronski in: Lifetime contract (Articles 908 to 916 k.c.) as 1 of the maintenance contracts in court practice).
Interpretation of whether a given contract is simply a life contract
The contract concluded by the parties shall be interpreted in accordance with the rules laid down in Article 65(1) of the Code and, in accordance with that provision, the declaration of will shall be interpreted as required by the circumstances in which it was lodged, the principles of social coexistence and the established customs. In contrast, paragraph 2 of that provision states that the agreements should examine what the parties’ nonsubjective and intent of the agreement was alternatively than based on the literal wording of the agreement.
The explanation of the statements of intent made on the conclusion of the contract must not be based on its text alone, even if the text is recorded in the form of a notarial act.
It must so besides be borne in head that, in the case in question, if the parties have stated in the contract that they have concluded a ‘grant agreement’, this cannot be regarded as a circumstantial ‘qualification’ of the parties themselves, and even more so having a binding effect on the court (so: ultimate Court judgement of 20 October 2006, act No IV CSK 172/06). However, this component shall be taken into account in the explanation of the declaration of will and shall not be indifferent to it, as it gives the court an indication applicable to the determination of the meaning and intent of the declaration of will. In specified a way, but only in a sense, the court should bear in head the name of the contract utilized by the parties, bearing in head that the nonsubjective agreed in the circumstantial agreement always prevails over the typical nonsubjective and that the name given by the parties does not find its nature.
The territory Court of Płock in its judgement of 20 January 2016, Act No: IV Ca 826/15, on the basis of a case to find whether a given contract was a life contract or a donation agreement, he held that the explanation of the content of the contract did not licence the parties to presume that it was the will of the parties to establish a binding bond between them in the form of a life contract. First of all, the deficiency of a clear indication in the agreement that the transfer of the object of the donation (participation on the agricultural holding together with the tractor) occurred ‘in return’ for benefits, on the contrary, it is clear that the claimant ‘gives’ the share on the holding in question.
In the act of notarial message (contractual clauses) of the suspect regarding the unpaid establishment on the acquired property of the lifelong individual service of the dwelling, the provision of life-long individual care, the right of freedom of movement after bypassing and funeral, were interpreted by the territory Court as additional contractual provisions, not an work in exchange for which the owner has undertaken to transfer ownership to the buyer. The territory Court found that it was the suspect (the alleged debtor) who expressed his will to establish them and did so in rule in a free manner, and that these were not the duties imposed on him by the plaintiff (the alleged lifer).
Secondly, the fact that the services of the obliged individual did not meet all the requirements to be considered as satisfying the needs of the seller in specified a way that it no longer had to contribute to the provision of the essential life-saving needs, since they did not include specified fundamental things as food and clothing.
Thirdly, the parties themselves have given the legal act the name ‘the donation agreement’ and have treated it so consistently, which is best demonstrated by the fact that the applicable provisions of the donation agreement are included in the agreement.
The territory Court took the view that, from the very fact that the suspect did not deny in the course of the full procedure that the parties did not combine a life contract, it was impossible to draw conclusions on the legal nature of the parties to the contract. There were so crucial grounds to presume that the donor’s benefit was free of charge in the subjective perception of the parties, i.e. independent of the benefit of these benefits, and the donor’s intention was to confer an advantage on the recipient at the expense of its own assets.
In specified a situation, according to the territory Court, since the parties have concluded a donation agreement and the suspect has charged his property with individual service to the plaintiff, it was not possible to apply the legal institution provided for in Article 913 k.c., which is characteristic of the life contract, which has not been concluded by the parties.
In the case Act II Ca 415/17which was decided by the Kalisz II territory Court civilian Division By decision of 9 November 2017, the appeal was accepted as the essence of the life contract is to supply the seller with life support. The provision of Art. 908 §1 of the Act refers to this condition as the substance of this legal relationship. It continues to specify the obligations of the buyer under the Act in the absence of a different contract. It follows that the agreement between the parties determines the scope of rights and obligations, but those rights and obligations must aim to keep the seller for life.
On the another hand, the agreement concluded between the parties to the proceedings before the territory Court did not consequence in this. This agreement speaks of delivering “meals, assistance and medical care where necessaryIt’s okay. ” Therefore, it was not about ensuring the seller's endurance (even in the part specified only in the contract) for a lifetime, but about certain benefits which did not constitute an unconditional work for the buyer, but were circumstantial in very vague circumstances which were covered by the contract under the terms ‘if necessary’. specified an agreement did not so exhaust the statutory characteristics of the contract referred to in Article 908(1) k.c.
Life contract and donation agreement
The word ‘gifts’ cannot be extended to a life sentence. There is no request for systemic or functional interpretation. Even in the event of nonsubjective disproportionate benefits, there is not even a partial donation in the life sentence.
Because of the duration and kind of benefits of the property buyer, and the global size of them depends on the random element, which is the dimension of life of the entitled individual (lifer) and the degree of his/her needs, the life contract belongs to random contracts. Pursuant to Article 908(1) k.c., the benefits of both parties shall be of a life conviction in the contract.
In accordance with Article 487(2) of the Code and the dominant view of the doctrine, the component of reciprocity is assessed from a subjective point of view alternatively than the economical value of benefits, which, by the way, is hard to determine, given the random nature of the life contract. For this reason, it is powerfully against the law to consider the qualification of contracts concluded specifically as life contracts mixed with a donation (negotium onerosum mixtum cum donatone) due to nonsubjective disproportionateity of benefits (so: the private law strategy under Z. Radwański, Volume 8, p. 618).
Life contract and custody
Value of the property transferred by the lessee to the buyer in exchange for life-long maintenance, i.e. in the execution of the life-life contract (Article 908 k.c.) not included in the retention substrate. Life is simply a common and paid contract, and it cannot be applicable from this point of view besides in the literal designation of a donation within the meaning of the provisions on custody. Even in the event of nonsubjective disproportionate benefits, there is no partial donation here. Due to the clear discrimination of life as a separate kind of common agreement, it is impossible to defend the view that, in the event of disproportionate benefits, this is simply a donation burdened with the work to supply (donatio sub modo) (yes: “Zachowek in the Polish law of succession” Paweł Ksizak, Wyd. 2, Lexis Nexis, Warsaw 2012, p. 315, and the judgement of the territory Court of Olsztyn of 11 September 2014, Act I C 738/13).
Also according to Paul Priest's view, the value of the property transferred by the inheritance to the purchaser in exchange for life-long maintenance, i.e. in the execution of the life-life contract (Article 908 k.c.) does not include the substrate of the storage. Life is simply a common and paid contract, and it cannot be applicable from this point of view besides in the literal designation of a donation within the meaning of the provisions on custody. Even in the event of nonsubjective disproportionate benefits, there is no partial donation. Due to the clear discrimination of life as a separate kind of common agreement, it is impossible to defend the view that, in the event of disproportionate benefits, this is simply a donation burdened with the work to supply (donatio sub modo) (yes: “Zachowek in Polish law of succession” Paweł Ksizak, Wyd. 2, Lexis Nexis, Warsaw 2012, p. 315, and the judgement of the Court of Appeal in Wrocław of 17 October 2013, Act mention I ACa 1068/13).
Property subject to a life conviction contract
The subject of the contract may be any property (ground or local), participation in the joint ownership of the property, as well as the right of perpetual use. It is assumed in the caselaw that the existence of a life-long contract does not depend on the full property. Article 908(1) does not contain specified a requirement. There can so be no uncertainty that The subject of a life contract may besides be participation in joint ownership (Yes: ultimate Court judgement of 30 March 1998, No. III CKN 219/98, LEX No. 56814).
Therefore, the transfer to the purchaser within the meaning of Article 908 k.c. may be subject only to ownership, not to any right, including the cooperative ownership of the premises. Only the transfer of property under the another conditions laid down in Article 908 § 1 k.c. will attest to the life conviction concluded between the parties to the contract.
In its judgement of 15 October 2014 (V CSK 653/13, LEX No 1514819), the ultimate Court stated that it was possible to surrender not only property but besides another rights or things in exchange for the remainder of his life. But then specified an agreement should not be called life imprisonment, a non-named agreement (so: judgement of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw of 25 February 2015, Act No VI ACa 581/14).
Lifetime contract and the right to usage immovable property for life
The ultimate Court, in its judgement of 30 March 1998, No. III CKN 219/98, held that the subject of a life contract could besides be a participation in the property. However, it does not mean that the establishment of Service of the apartment on ownership.
It should be noted that the establishment of the service of the flat is not a mandatory component of the life conviction contract (Article 908 § 1 k.c.). In Article 908 §2 of the Act, it is only indicated that the obligations of the acquirer of the real property to establish the use, service of the dwelling or another individual services contained in specified a contract fall within the content of the right of life (such as the order of the territory Court of Gliwice III). the civilian Division of Appeal of 12 February 2014, Act III Ca 1795/13).
Form of the amendment of the life sentence
The life contract is subject to the rule of freedom of contract (Article 353 1 kc), as expressed in the wording of Article 908 § 1 k.c. of the expression “in the absence of a different contract”. However, this freedom may be exercised under the provisions of the civilian Code in force on the form of legal acts, i.e. Article 77 k.c. In accordance with paragraph 1 of the Law, the completion or amendment of the contract requires that the form provided for by the Act or by the parties for its conclusion be maintained. Therefore, the life conviction contained in the form of a notarial act required for its validity (Article 158 k.c.) can be substantially amended utilizing the same form.
The oral findings of the parties in this respect cannot have the effect of legally binding change in the way the life contract is carried out (e.g. as regards the costs of collecting eclectic energy and heating the home jointly occupied) (yes: judgement of the Łomż territory Court of 29 August 2013, Act mention I Ca 210/13).
Scope of the life sentence
The content of the life sentence, and thus the scope of the liability of the acquirer of the property to keep the seller or the persons close to him for life, should be determined in item by the life contract. The contract should specify precisely the kind and size of benefits. A decently drawn up agreement avoids frequent conflicts between the parties to a life-long contract on the basis of the definition of common powers and obligations.
The improvement of the buyer’s obligations in the life contract is of a dispositive nature and the parties are so left to find the scope of the benefits provided to the lifer. However, they must always trust on sustainable livelihoods. It besides appears that, under Article 908 § 1 in fine k.c., the work to make funerals at its own expense, different from the another obligations to supply means of subsistence, must, however, be an component of a life contract (so: judgement of the territory Court of Elbląg I civilian Division of 19 December 2018, Act mention I Ca 275/18).
In contrast, Article 908(1) of the Law contains an interpretative rule, which satisfies inaccurate contractual provisions.
District Court for Wrocław-Screaming civilian Division I in judgement of 10 December 2013, Act No I C 922/13 He ruled that there were no reasons why defendants (committed) would additionally bear the costs generated by the plaintiff (lifer), linked to gas consumption, electricity, acquisition of medicines and corrective glasses. The court noted that a lifer occupied the premises of the defendants, so it did not bear the cost of maintaining the premises, and it generated the costs of utilizing electricity and gas that would not have been there if the plaintiff had moved to the defendants. The plaintiff besides failed to prove that she had to take the medicines she wanted to charge the defendants, nor did she show that she had to buy fresh glasses.
The court pointed out that there was no justification for the life sentence, which wanted to charge the defendants with all the costs associated with the maintenance of her person, claiming that the defendants had received a property right of a dwelling of considerable value. Although the defendants were owners of the premises, they could not freely dispose of them, benefit from them due to the fact that the property was never transferred to them. specified a situation was agreed between the parties and the claimant's claim for further costs not covered by the contract, and not essential maintenance costs, in this peculiar situation, was, in the view of the court, unjustified.
The court pointed out that the plaintiff wanted to commit the defendants to pay the claimant's pension (913 kc). In contrast, the life conviction is defined by a provision which is comparatively applicable (Article 908 §1 k.c.). As part of the life sentence, the acquirer of the property is obliged to supply life support, that is, to receive him as a householder, to supply him with food, clothing, light, fuel, and to supply him with adequate aid and care in the illness. It is so the work of the acquirer of the property in that relation to meet, in principle, specified life benefits as will satisfy his or her needs in specified a way that he or she does not gotta contribute to the essential life requirements. In the opinion of the Court of First Instance, the plaintiff did not gotta get funds to meet the essential life needs due to the fact that they were provided by the defendants. Correctional glasses and medications, which the plaintiff did not specifically compose about in the lawsuit, were not, according to the Court, the essential life needs of the plaintiff.
Amendment of the life sentence
The word of life laid down in the contract does not change. If conditions change, the parties may amend the contract. Individual life allowances may be modified. A change in life will besides happen as a consequence of the sale of things. In specified a situation, the life conviction may require a change in life to a life pension (Article 914 k.c.). In the event of the death of the obliged person, the work to execute life imprisonment passes to the heirs (yes: civilian Code. Comment. Stepien-Sporek Anna, Jędrej Kamil, Karaszewski Grzegorz, Knabe Jakub, Ruszkiewicz Beata, Nazaruk Piotr, Sikorski Grzegorz, Ciszewski Jerzy, art. 908).
Random nature of life imprisonment
The life contract belongs to common agreements (Article 487(2)(c)). In the case of a life contract, there is no classical example of equivalentity of benefits (yes: judgement of the ultimate Administrative Court of 14 March 2013, act No. II FSK 1398/11, LEX No. 1293237).
This is besides apparent if it is considered that, due to the unforeseeable life expectancy and life expectancy, a life conviction contract is simply a random contract, in which case it is not possible to find whether the benefit of the another organization to the contract corresponds precisely to the value of the property (such as the order of the Poznań territory Court of 25 March 2014, act No XV Ca 1801/13).
Duration of life
The duration of benefits to the acquirer of the property depends on the life expectancy of the life expectancy of the life-seeker or his/her loved one. It is so impossible to find in advance how long the acquirer of the property will be required to supply benefits.
Value of life benefits
Therefore, it is besides not possible to measure the global value of these benefits at the time of the contract. It cannot be excluded, for example, that the death of a lifer will happen within a fewer months after the conclusion of the life contract. The buyer’s burden on the value of the property would so be small. On the another hand, it is possible that the acquirer of the property will be obliged to supply benefits for respective or even respective decades. In that case, the full value of the benefits of the acquirer of the property may exceed the value of the property. Moreover, not all benefits to the property buyer have a measurable economical value. After all, the obligations of the purchaser may, as provided for in Article 908 §1 k.c., trust on "the admission of the seller as a householder ... to supply him with adequate assistance and care in the illness".
Ineligible life benefits
The random nature of the life-life contract allows for the anticipation of inequivalence of benefits due to the improbable duration of life of the life-ruptor at the time of the contract. It is so not possible at the time of the conclusion of a life contract which, in terms of the obligations of the acquirer of the property, corresponds almost virtually to the content of Article 908(1) k.c., to measure the equivalence of the benefits of the parties. It does not rise any uncertainty that, for the application of Article 388 k.c. (exploitation) it is crucial to establish the value of common benefits at the time of the conclusion of the contract (yes: judgement of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw of 17 September 2014, Act No VI A Ca 1851/13).
Life contract and transfer of movable or another right to the obliged
The fact that a life contract may be held for property only does not mean that it is invalid (Article 58(1) of the Code) will be any contract whereby 1 of the parties transfers to another, its right another than its right of property, in exchange for care.
The rule of contractual freedom, as set out in Article 353 1 k.c., gives operators the chance to make non-typical liability relationships. They may besides follow the agreements they have been named, but defining their binding relation to make certain modifications or additions, thus creating a more appropriate legal instrument for them. The rule of freedom of contract so means that the parties to the contract can form its content at their discretion by establishing a binding relation that suits their interests.
The limits of the freedom of contract laid down in Article 353 1 k.c. mention to the content of the contract and to the intent of the legal relation shaped by the parties (yes: judgement of the ultimate Court of 20 March 2014, act No. II CSK 290/13, non-publ. and caselaw cited therein). The ultimate Court held that the position of the merging parties to the contract was invalid as contrary to Article 908(1) of the Law would be justified only if it was accepted that a transfer agreement another than a property right in exchange for custody was not admissible and that the parties to the contract actually preferred to enter into a life contract. The ultimate Court stressed that both assumptions could not be considered right.
The first would lead to a regulation on the freedom of ownership and rights subject to unlimited turnover. According to the ultimate Court, there are no legal obstacles to a individual who does not have a real property but who has another thing or a law of defined economical value moving it to another individual who will supply the essential assistance and care. Inability to do so would lead to unequal treatment of persons who do not own the property, but have, for example, a cooperative property right to the premises (i.e. a law as strong as the property) and, given their age, wellness needs the care of a 3rd party, especially erstwhile they cannot anticipate specified assistance from members of the immediate family.
Inability to enter into a transfer agreement in exchange for the essential care would put specified persons in a worse position than property owners. They could not usage their assets to supply care for themselves. On the another hand, they could benefit from an increasingly proposed institution called reverse mortgage to supply themselves with an additional origin of income. However, this will not always be adequate assistance to them in situations where they require not so much financial support as the actual permanent assistance of a 3rd organization to whom they have assurance in matters of current operation (so also: judgement of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw of 25 February 2015, Act No VI ACa 581/14).
Lifetime allowances and the standard of surviving of the obliged
As indicated by the scope of obligations of the buyer of the property as to the maintenance of the seller and possibly his relatives should scope so far as they do not gotta search means of subsistence elsewhere (so: S. Dmowski in Commentary to the civilian Code. Book three. Commitments. Volume 2 under ed. G. Bieńka, Legal Publishing House, W-wa 1999, p. 572, and ultimate Court judgement of 9 May 2008, No. III CSK 359/07, Lex No. 453125).
However, erstwhile assessing this scope in detail, it is essential to take peculiar account of the first mentioned in Article 908(1) of the Directive. Therefore, erstwhile determining the amount of benefits, the standard of surviving of the buyer and his household should be taken into account.. Since the seller is to be a householder of the buyer, it is natural that his standard of surviving (and so what he receives) cannot separate him from another householders. The seller besides decides to enter into a life-life contract, taking care of his own interests, examining the degree of the benefits he is to receive and ensuring that they are regulated in detail. In the absence of detailed contractual regulation, it cannot anticipate that it will receive a higher level of maintenance than household members of the acquirer of the property.
Consequently, the assessment of the claimant's claim should be made by the prism of the agreed benefits, and the size of these benefits should be assessed by the prism of the standard of surviving of the defendant's family. The institution for life shows that the defendants are obliged to supply the plaintiff with food, clothing, housing, light and fire, and to supply adequate assistance and care in the illness. The content of the life contract is not covered by the regular service of the defendant, in peculiar laundry, cleaning. specified a defined scope is not in line with the concept of adequate assistance and care in the disease, which, in principle, is occasional and variable over time.
The life conviction cannot so be expected to supply regular service for the contract benefits. This is not due to the importance of accepting a individual as a householder, for it is widely accepted that the householders support each another according to the strength and possibilities of regular activities specified as cleaning, laundry, cooking.
Consequently, it should be considered that the life conviction claim for the reimbursement of the costs of the babysitter does not fall within the benefits resulting from the life conviction contract. Nor is the life contract covered by the work to supply the plaintiff with medicines, cleaners and gas (so: judgement of the Szczecin territory Court of 13 August 2014, Act II Ca 1316/13).
Living with a 3rd organization and obligations under a life sentence
If a lifer resides in a property transferred to the rightholder together with another person, even the nearest person, who is not covered by a lifer contract, there is no reason to charge the costs of surviving it. The benefits payable to the lifer must only respond to its needs, must not be overstated (yes: judgement of the Szczecin territory Court of 13 August 2014, Act II Ca 1316/13).
Obtaining the court’s consent to a life conviction contract by an incapacitated
The legal guardian is obliged to get approval from the court to act on behalf of a individual wholly incapacitated with respect to the disposition of the property, to undertake activities exceeding the average management of the property and that specified an activity is the sale of immovable property or to conclude a life contract that involves the transfer of property to the legal guardian. For the latter, it would besides be essential to establish a curator who would represent a individual wholly incapacitated erstwhile concluding the contract, in connection with the wording of Article 159(1)(k)(2).
the territory Court of Poznań in its decision of 25 March 2014, Act No XV Ca 1801/13, on the basis of an application from the guardian of a individual who is wholly incapacitated to consent to a life contract between a legal guardian and his/her dependant, on the basis of which, for the benefit of the legal guardian, a full incapacitated individual would have transferred the property of a built-up land under a life contract, he noted that, under the authorisation of a life contract, the applicant could not argue that he/she has been engaged in an incapacitated home for more than 20 years.
It is the work of the guardian to exercise care not only over the incapacitated person, but besides over the property of specified a individual (Article 175 of the Code in Article 155 §2 of the Code).
At the same time, the Court of First Instance pointed out the importance of the applicant’s actual usage of an incapacitated property, since he and his household live in her home without paying any fees, but for the usage of the media, and the contributions were made on the basis of their own decision, most likely due to their habitation of the property in question.
Similarly, the Radom territory Court stated in its order of 23 September 2014, Act IV Ca 182/14, stating that the situation in which the incapacitated legal guardian requests the authorisation of the Court of First Instance to carry out a legal action — the conclusion of a real property transfer agreement in return for life — requires the cumulative application by the Court of First Instance of the provisions of Articles 156 k.r.o. and 159 k.r.o. A real property transfer agreement in return for life is part of a catalogue of ‘most crucial matters that concern assets’ of the incapacitated individual (Article 156 of the General Court), but at the same time due to a group of entities to be parties to the contract, it is simply a legal act in which the legal guardian cannot represent the individual under his care (Article 159 of the General Court). This agreement would transfer property belonging to an incapacitated property to a legal guardian. It would so be a legal act ‘between these persons’ within the meaning of Article 159(1)(k).
This means that, for its validity, it is not only essential to get the authorisation of the welfare court to do so, but it is besides essential to guarantee that an incapacitated competent representation is ensured both in the performance of specified an act and in the proceedings for consent to it by the General Court.. Where a legal guardian is prevented from representing an incapacitated person, the provision of Article 157 k.r.o should be applied. specified a request exists even in the event of a possible conflict of interest between the guardian and the incapacitated.
In court proceedings to give consent to an act involving the transfer of property belonging to an incapacitated property to a legal guardian, there is simply a case of alleged ‘with itself’ legal acts. By virtue of the power cited in Article 159(1) k.r.o., the representation of the pet by the legal guardian in the performance of specified activities as well as in the application for consent by the Court of First Instance is excluded. In specified circumstances, the guardian's court should, of its own motion, appoint a probation officer for both representation incapacitated in the proceedings and in the course of the legal action in question, provided that consent is given. Thus, if the Court of First Instance has abandoned specified action, the proceedings there are affected by an error, resulting in the request to revoke the contested order pursuant to Article 386(4) of the General Court in conjunction with Article 13(2) of the General Court.
When the case is re-examined, the Court of First Instance should first of all take steps of its own motion to guarantee that the right representation in the proceedings in which the individual afraid is to take part (Article 510(1) of the Code).
Termination of the life sentence
Article 913 §2 kc provides that, in exceptional cases, a court may terminate a life conviction if the life conviction is simply a real property seller.
the territory Court of Białystok in its judgement of 2 May 2016, Act I C 1560/15 concluded that the termination of a life-long contract requires, in addition to the existence of a life-cycle relation between the life-seeker and the obliged person, that there is no direct contact between the occurrence of circumstantial circumstances justifying the classification of an accident as exceptional. The case-law indicates that the common feature of all the events that qualify for an accident as defined in Article 913(2) k.c., as exceptional, is not the specified negative attitude of the lifer to the contractors. An exceptional accident occurs erstwhile a life conviction and the bad will of a property buyer are injured.
As the ultimate Court pointed out in its judgement of 9 May 2009 (III CSK 359/07) that the accident may be considered exceptional within the meaning of Article 913 §2 k.c., the question of whether another measures, specified as the ruling of the debtors to execute the outstanding benefit or the conversion of benefits resulting from the life of the pension, would no longer supply adequate protection for life. Exception of an accident may occur, for example, in the event of violation of the physical integrity of a lifer or another criminal acts against him..
The common feature of all the events that qualify for the accident as exceptional in Article 913(2) is the harm to the life sentence, not the negative attitude of the life conviction to the contractors (so: ultimate Court judgement of 09 May 2008, act No. III CSK 359/07, Lex No. 453125).
The situation of permanent deterioration of relations, resulting in a deficiency of contact with the life sentence, however, is not adequate to take into account the action for termination of the life contract. The above-mentioned ‘exceptional accident’ is necessary, which, within the meaning of Article 913 §2 kc, occurs erstwhile a life conviction and bad will on the part of its contractor, the acquirer of the property (yes: ultimate Court in judgement of 15 July 2010, IV CSK 32/10, Lex No 885022).
In contrast, the creation between the parties to the contract of a life-exempting relation gives the anticipation to each of them, regardless of the reasons for specified a situation, to change the content of the contract and to replace the life-exempting rights resulting from it for the life-expiror. However, specified a change, which was not the subject of a request, cannot be ruled by the court (yes: SN in its judgement of 15 July 2010, IV CSK 32/10, Lex No 885022).
It is worth noting that, in a situation where a lifer refuses to receive benefits from the obliged person, it is crucial that they declare themselves willing to comply with their obligations to the lifer^.
Disposal of immovable property by an obliged individual from a life conviction contract
Pursuant to Article 910(1) k.c., the transfer of property under a life conviction contract shall be subject to a life conviction of the property. The provisions on limited rights shall apply mutatis mutandis to specified a burden. As a consequence of the sale of a life conviction property, the buyer enters ex lege into the erstwhile life sentence; he becomes liable for the life conviction in kind and for the benefits due at the time of the transfer of ownership besides in individual and relieves in this respect the debt of the erstwhile debtor.
However, the provision of Article 914 k.c. provides that if a individual liable for a life conviction has disposed of the property received, the life conviction may, by civilian action, require the conversion of the life conviction to a life pension corresponding to the value of that right. The right to request the conversion of the right of life to a life-long pension in connection with the sale of a property with specified a right is so subject to each life-cycle, whereas that right does not apply to the acquirer of a life-bearing property, as it is assumed that erstwhile acquiring a property with a life-bearing right to a certain content, it was subject to the work to complete the benefits resulting from that right.
It follows from the above that, in order to take into account the action under Article 914 k.c., it is adequate to show that there has been a transfer of property charged with life imprisonment to a individual another than the erstwhile debtor.
As is stressed in the doctrine, the disposal of only a condition of the property under the right of life conviction does not justify a claim under Article 914 k.c., unless the part remaining (not covered by the sale contract) represents a tiny value. However, erstwhile assessing whether there are grounds for changing the right of life to a pension, the content of the life conviction should be taken into account. For example, it is stated that it should be permitted to change life to pension in the event of the sale of a house, even though its value compared to the remainder of the property would be tiny if the life conviction included benefits specified as housing, fire, assistance and care in the illness, and the seller obliged to benefits, leaving the home sold or disposed of in another way, intended to take the life conviction with him (yes: Commentary to the civilian Code, Book 3, Commitments, Volume 2, Issue 8, Warsaw 2007, Stanisław Dmowski, commentary on Art. 914, p. 840. and judgement of the territory Court of Środa Śląska of 2 July 2013. Ref. Act VI C 66/13).
Lifetime contracta supplementary remuneration for a lifer
It should besides be noted that the life contract does not require the buyer to make any payment to the seller. He receives his wealth in exchange for his work of care. So he doesn't gotta pay anything extra. This is due to Article 908 § 1 k.c. – ‘in exchange for the transfer of ownership (...) it should ...’. You don't compose in this recipe about paying for this property. The payment here would besides be the repayment of the debt by the purchaser to the sellers of the real property (yes: Torun territory Court in its judgement of 1 March 2018, Case C-2027/15).
Life contract hidden under an apparent sale agreement
Supreme Court in its resolution of 22 May 2009. III CZP 21/09 states that a life contract hidden under an apparent real property sale contract concluded in the form of a notarial act is invalid if the substantive provisions of the life contract have not been covered by that peculiar form; a akin position was taken by the ultimate Court in its resolution of 9 December 2011. III CZP 79/11 which states that the property donation agreement hidden under an apparent sale agreement is invalid.
The ultimate Court judgement of 15 February 2017 in Case II CSK 246/16 indicates that hidden (classified) contracts do not deserve the value of validity (the other position would be an incentive to carry out apparent legal acts).
The act is simply a different legal act than an appearance. akin comments should besides be made on the life contract, which, for its effects, requires the request of a notarial act (as regards the transfer of property). In specified a situation, it is considered that a life contract hidden under an apparent real property sale contract concluded in the form of a notarial act is invalid if the substantive provisions of the life contract are not covered by that peculiar form (judgment of 12.10.2001 V CKN 631/00, adopted by resolution of 22.05.2019 III CZP 21/09).
Determination by the court of the non-existence of a life sentence
In accordance with Article 189 of the Code, the plaintiff may require the court to establish, or not to have, a legal relation or right where he has a legal interest therein. This is the case erstwhile there is uncertainty about the legal state or the law and the parties have a civilian relationship. At the same time, this threat is required to be not only in the image and perception of the reasons, but besides objectively (yes: Court of Appeal in Warsaw in its judgement of 22 July 2010, VI ACa 1472/09). It makes sense to give a decision on the application for a uncovering only if there is simply a situation threatening a breach of a legal relation or where there is uncertainty as to its existence. The legal interest means the interest relating to legal relations in which the reason is or both. At the same time, establishing a legal or legal relation can only happen if the alleged legal relation actually exists (resolution of 25 January 1995, act No. III CZP 179/94, published in OSN 1995, No. 5, item 76).
While the criterion of legal interest in the request for a uncovering does not prejudge the admissibility of an action under Article 189 of the Code of Conduct, it decides whether that action is justified in circumstantial circumstances. The consequence of the party's failure to show the existence of a legal interest must so besides be that the action must be dismissed (yes: the ultimate Court judgement of 6.06.1997, II CKN 2016/97).
When seeking an action to establish the non-existence of a life imprisonment contract, the claimant shall bear the burden of proving the circumstances. According to Article 6 k.c., having its procedural counterpart in Article 232 k.c., the claimant must show the facts proving that the contract is invalid in accordance with the rule of adversariality. Failure to comply with the obligations in this regard, failure to prove the claim, must consequence in a dismissed action, especially since the substance of the dispute concerns private interest alternatively than public interest. Therefore, there is no basis for the Court of First Instance’s ex officio activity, especially since this would automatically lead to a breach of the balance of the parties (yes: Regional Court of Gdańsk in its judgement of 28 February 2014). Ref. Act XV C 769/13).
If the life conviction was not sedated, it was not intended to circumvent the law, nor was it contrary to
principles of social coexistence – the court has brought an action for non-existence.
In the above context, the ‘circumvention of the law’ is the conduct of a legal entity which, erstwhile faced with a legal ban on the performance of a circumstantial legal act, ‘obtains’ it in specified a way that it performs another unincorporated activities in order to accomplish an effect related to a prohibited act and thus contrary to the law (yes: ultimate Court in its judgement of 9 August 2005 No. II UK 89/05).
In turn, a legal act contrary to the law or intended to circumvent the law is invalid unless the applicable provision provides for a different effect, in peculiar that the applicable provisions of the law are incorporated in place of the invalid provisions of the legal act (Article 58(1)(c)). By contrast, Article 58(2) provides that legal action contrary to the principles of social coexistence is invalid. It follows from the above article that the legal action taken to circumvent the provisions of the Act is an act not subject to a legal prohibition, but an act taken to accomplish an effect prohibited by the law.
Proceedings to circumvent the Act contain only the appearance of compliance with the Act. The legal action aimed at circumventing the law is to form its content which, from a formal point of view (apparently) does not argue the law, but in fact (in a material sense) aims to accomplish a goal which it prohibits. It is so a question of creating an effect contrary to the law. The ‘circumvention of the law’ is the conduct of a legal entity which, erstwhile faced with a legal prohibition on the performance of a circumstantial act (yes: Gdansk territory Court in judgement of 28 February 2014). Ref. Act XV C 769/13).
Lifetime contracta inheritance
Life sentences are strictly personal. Life sentences expire with his death, so they are not part of the inheritance from the deceased for life.
Lifetime contract between spouses
In consequence to the interpelled 9257 Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Justice (response to the BM-I.0520.441.020) of 19 August 2020 indicated that erstwhile spouses with property separation enter into a life-long contract between them, the property will be transferred and the property will be subject to a life sentence. A spouse who, until the conclusion of the contract, co-owned half of the property and entered the life contract as a buyer, will then become the owner of the full property. The property will enter his individual property. A spouse entitled to life imprisonment will no longer be entitled to property ownership.
In the event of the death of the spouse referred to in the life contract as a seller, the inheritance he left will no longer enter half of the property, as he did not have it at the time of his death. After the death of the spouse – the buyer, the property will be inherited by his heirs.
Therefore, if ownership of the property is transferred through a life-long contract, it will not give emergence to claims on the current property owner. The civilian Code in the inheritance section does not let this in cases another than donations. According to Article 993 k.c., average records and orders are not taken into account in the calculation of the maintenance, but the inheritance, according to the following provisions, of donations and recovery records made by the inheritancer. Similarly, the situation is that the property at the time of the conclusion of the life conviction contract is wholly a separate property of 1 of the spouses. Thus, the life conviction contract has a crucial impact on the position of life conviction heirs.
Lifetime contract and property partnership
In the case-law, the view is presented that acquired by 1 of the spouses during the period of property union (participation in real estate) in exchange for a life conviction of joint income enters the property of the joint spouses (yes: resolution of the ultimate Court of 18 September 1989, III CZP 80/89, OS 1990, No. 10, item 357, resolution of the SN of 8 August 2001, I CKN 1123/99, not publ.).
This position is based on Article 31(2), point (2) (formerly Article 32(2), point (2)). the common assets include the proceeds of the common assets as well as the individual assets of each spouse. In his message of reasons, the ultimate Court pointed out that it was hard to imagine that, in view of the nature of the benefits to be fulfilled by the acquirer of the property in relation to the life sentence, the subject substance of the acquisition would not be covered by the statutory community. He stressed that the obligations of the buyer are the obligations of both spouses, as the life conviction is the consequence of income from the joint work of the spouses.
In specified a case, if the benefits are fulfilled from the common assets, the spouse should get the consent of the spouse to establish a life conviction (Article 37(1) of the General Court). The validity of the contract which was concluded by 1 of the spouses without the required consent of the another depends on the confirmation of the contract.
The ultimate Court in its judgement of 22 October 2015. Ref. Act IV CSK 743/14 stated that the right time to measure whether a life-long contract would be charged to the common assets should be the minute of legal action. The fact that the mass, according to the content of the legal act, is to be fulfilled will be decisive.
The obligations arising out of a life contract are closely linked to the legal title to the right to life in immovable property. Where a property is acquired under a life contract by spouses as a subject of common property, they shall be jointly and severally liable for the benefits related to that right (Article 910 §2 k.c.). After the cessation of the statutory partnership, the spouse who, during the period of his life, was entitled to life benefits by covering them with individual property may, pursuant to Article 45(1) and (3) of the General Court, require the return of their value.
Thesis referring to the position of judicature, according to which the temporary failure of the obliged spouses to execute benefits for life-seekers may be a decisive condition for the ownership of the property acquired by 1 of them by that contract to the common or individual property does not find grounds both in the resolution of the SN of 18 September 1989, III CZP 80/89 and in the order of the SN of 8 August 2001, I CKN 1123/99.
Judgment of 8 May 2014 in Bydgoszcz Act II Ca 735/13 He argued that Article 33(2) of the Code provides that each spouse's individual property includes assets acquired by inheritance, evidence or donation, unless the heir or donor has otherwise decided. Since the life conviction is not a contract under the title of darmy, this does not consequence in the entry of the property into the defendant's individual property. specified reasoning is legitimate, however, provided that, in a circumstantial factual state, the actual life contract is charged to the common assets.
The ultimate Court in its decision of 20 July 2020. Act IV CSK 136/19 indicated that odrawing up the belongings of the property in question to the property of the spouses, it is first and foremost essential to find whether circumstantial provisions apply. In the absence of specified regulation, mention should be made to the provisions of the household and Care Code governing the property relations of spouses who stay in the statutory strategy (yes: resolution of the ultimate Court of 7 July 2016, III CZP 32/16, OSNC 2017, No 5, item 57). The case law emphasises that the provisions of that Code, which find the affiliation of property rights to the property of spouses, are mandatory (with consideration being given to the anticipation of concluding a matrimony contract – Articles 47 et seq.), which means that their explanation should be strict.
Article 33 k.r.o. number clausus the assets of individual spouses. This means that only those items that are explicitly mentioned in that provision may belong to these assets. The another assets are part of the property of the spouses (Article 31 of the Code), and are so covered by the marital law. Importantly, in the light of the uniform view of the ultimate Court, any doubts as to the belonging of the property to the spouses must be settled in favour of the common assets (e.g. resolutions of the ultimate Court: of 24 July 1997, III CZP 26/97, OSNC 1998, No 1, item 3, of 11 September 2003, III CZP 52/03, OSNC 2004, No 11, item 169 and of 13 March 2008, III CZP 9/08, OSNC 2009, No 4, item 54; order of the ultimate Court of 16 January 2013, II CSK 193).
At the same time, it is established that there is simply a presumption of fact that the property acquired by 1 of the spouses during the word of the matrimony union is part of the property of the spouses; this presumption may be overturned by demonstrating that the acquisition was made from funds constituting the individual assets of 1 of the spouses (e.g. judgments of 17 May 1985, III CRN 119/85, OSCIKA 1986, No 9-10, item 185, of 11 September 1998, I CKN 830/97, of 9 January 2001, II CKN 1194/00 and of 16 April 2003, II CKN 1409/00, OSNC 2004, No 7-8, item 113; resolutions of SN: of 6 February 2003, IV CKN 1721/00, of 17 October 2003, IV CKN 283/02 and of 18 January 2008, V CSK 355/07; resolutions of SN: of 29 June 2010, III CZP 42/10, OSNC-ZD 2010, No D, item 124 and of 7 July 2016, III CZP 32/16, OSNC 2017, No 5, item 57).
Thus, since a associate in the proceedings claims that a peculiar asset was not part of the property of the spouses' common property (said for life on individual property), it should prove this fact (in accordance with the rule of Article 6 k.c.). The ultimate Court, in its judgement of 9 January 2001, II CKN 1194/00, held that the presumption of fact that the property acquired by 1 of the spouses during the course of the matrimony relation constitutes his individual property, and thus does not form part of the common property, the spouse may overturn by demonstrating that the acquisition was made from the financial assets of his individual property.
The actual failure to execute the life conviction and the individual property of the spouse
Due to the disposition of Art. 31 §1 k.r.o., it does not substance that only 1 of the spouses did legal acts and was entered in the land registry as the property owner. besides in specified a situation, the asset shall be part of the property of the spouses if the situation referred to in Article 33 k.r.o has not occurred.
In household law, situations of acquisition of property by both spouses and 1 of them are treated identically, even if in the second situation the spouse declares that he acquires it for individual property (previously: separate). Consequently, the actual non-execution of a life conviction contract by an obliged individual does not consequence in the ‘exit’ of that component from the property of the spouses and the ‘transit’ to the individual property of 1 of the spouses (The ultimate Court in its order of 20 July 2020). Act IV CSK 136/19)
Life contract as a form of dismissal of the heir from inheritance
A life contract as a legal act is provided for by law. Even if the life conviction seeks to exclude a property component so that the right does not include a composition of the inheritance, there is no provision that would prohibit specified action. The heir may, on a voluntary basis, hold his or her property, may include donations, life contracts or sale to any individual (yes: Regional Court of Gdańsk in its judgement of 28 February 2014). Ref. Act XV C 769/13).
For more information on the conversion of a life-long contract to or termination of an pension – read here
