The acquisition of a given weapon strategy in instalments, i.e. first its effectors – e.g. guns, launchers or tanks, and only after any time the equipment essential for them, i.e. command, ammunition and method support, is not beneficial for the military. Firstly, it means that soldiers, alternatively of having a comprehensive combat strategy in the line, must, in terms of logistics, command and recognition, sometimes for a very long time, support themselves with indirect solutions. Secondly, it is much more costly than buying a comprehensive package right away, erstwhile you can negociate much better financial and industrial conditions than with a fewer or even a twelve smaller contracts.
Early November Armed Forces Agency signed from a consortium of 2 companies – Polish Armed Forces Group SA and Huta Stalowa Wola SA – worth over PLN 1.3 billion contract for transportation between 2027 and 2028 of respective twelve support vehicles – i.e. command and relay trucks, command vehicles, ammunition trucks and arms repair workshops – designed for 3 multi-guided modules of WR-40 Langusta rocket launchers.
I will not hide that this contract gives emergence to my ambivalent feelings – on the 1 hand, joy and on the another hand sadness, anxiety and discontent. I'm in a hurry to explain. I'll start with the positives. Almost all contract for fresh equipment and weapons for the Polish Army is good news. The modernisation needs of our army are enormous, and all seemingly tiny agreement means that we are adding a brick to its modernisation, or strengthening our security. Though I say this rather often, it won't hurt again. The fact that at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s we exchanged military equipment comprehensively means that 4 to 5 decades later we are "on the music" and we must do it on a akin scale again, otherwise we will be in line sometimes with “museum specimens”.
The acquisition of vehicles of support for Langust divisions is undoubtedly very good information not only for artillerymen to whom they will go, but for the full Polish Army. Thanks to these vehicles, Langust subunits will be able to make full usage of their combat potential. And here we contact on the dark side of the contract and the causes of my “sadness” – or alternatively “disappointment” due to the signing of this agreement. What does this contract actually mean? It is simply a kind of admission that for almost 20 years our army has utilized these rocket systems (the first Langusts were tested at the turn of 2005 and 2006; I remember perfectly well their trials at the training ground in Drawsk and Ustka) we did not have the essential support cars for them. Indeed, sub-units equipped with WR-40 were able to carry out combat tasks, but based on half-measures, outdated solutions that allowed to exploit launcher capabilities only to a limited extent.
Unfortunately, many another weapons systems have been affected by akin situations in fresh decades. Not looking far away, in the same kind of troops, or artillery, in the case of 155-mm cannonohaubic Krab only a fewer years after they were introduced into service, soldiers had received the first support vehicles – command and ammunition, and 2 years ago a framework contract was signed for the supply of over a 1000 different types of logistics and command vehicles. Another example are Roomak wheeled armored transporters, which on command wagons – absolutely essential for the smooth operation of motorized infantry sub-units – waited over a decade and any of the contracted more than 21 years ago (sic!) specialized versions were not available in the line until today.
Such a method of purchase, i.e. obtaining a given weapon strategy in instalments, i.e. first its effectors – e.g. guns, launchers or tanks, and only after any time the equipment essential for them, i.e. command, ammunition and method support, is not beneficial for the military. Firstly, it means that soldiers, alternatively of having a comprehensive combat strategy in the line, must, in terms of logistics, command and recognition, sometimes for a very long time, support themselves with indirect solutions. Secondly, this is much more costly than buying a comprehensive package at once, erstwhile you can negociate much better financial and industrial conditions than with a fewer or even a twelve smaller contracts.
Of course, I realise that with any solutions introduced to the service there is no another way than the "small steps" method, e.g. erstwhile combat equipment is just being developed and the support wagons are inactive in the investigation and improvement phase. This is the case for example Badgers and their command cars. But I truly find it hard to realize the situation erstwhile we buy solutions from abroad “from a shelf”, specified as cannonhaubice K9 is K2 tanks, and we do not get right distant licenses for the production of logistics trucks or command wagons in Poland, since the Korean partner has the right solutions. Doing so later, in separate contacts – apart from combat effects – truly does not pay us, due to the fact that all the arguments in the negotiations are on the supplier's side.
