In the US, you gotta remember that Trump is not Alt-Right and the US government is not Trump. So Trump can't do anything he wants or anything he wants Alt-Right to do. Trump's current U.S. word will be a turning point; I personally expected the strategy to not let Trump, but seemingly the strategy proved to be besides weak or decided to transform into a nationalist-popular form. I'd alternatively bet on it first, because, however, the rumble of planet liberals is big, so Trump may effort to redefine the identity of the US and leave something behind – if he fails, his word will only be an episode.
It is besides crucial that Trump bends against global capital (he will go on the way of Xavier Milej), or he will effort to emancipate the Yankee people from it (he will go on the way of Orbán). This dilemma symbolizes the conflict of nationalistic and libertarian wings mentioned in the erstwhile position in Trump's camp (Musk+Rasvamy vs. MAGA). planet policies besides depend on his decision.
Greenland and the Panama Canal are improbable to join, in any event, until Trump defines entirely the political axiology of the US and the West. It is not entirely impossible, but it seems unlikely. As a curiosity, however, 1 might wonder how the full conflict with Greenland will affect the results of the April elections in that country? In fact, in the long term, it could besides be a clue as to the future position of this island.
In Eurasia nothing will change. The most crucial was the failure of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It is no longer crucial for Ukraine to " capitulate", whether there will be any "compromise agreement" or whether war will proceed to wander around this country like a stench of pants. Suffice to say that Ukraine will no longer be found in the Russian Empire – at least in the foreseeable future, and that most of this country will be a Western pole stuck in the Russian World. This means that Russia will not become a planet player and that it will be attacked by the West in its own territory.(he sharpened, trespassing across the border, diversionary attacks, rebellions on the outskirts).
A small by law of contrast, presidential elections in Belarus will most likely not change anything either (which is good this time). I do not think that, despite the demonstrations in Georgia, the Liberals have akin perspectives in Belarus. I was in this country a year ago, and in my opinion, the lessons learned from the 2020 crisis were drawn there and were full protected from repetition. The liberal revolution in Belarus is improbable to happen. (In Georgia, in my opinion, the liberal opposition will besides be alternatively unloaded).
The above besides means that the prospects of the Belt and way Initiative have been crossed out. China will of course proceed to grow economically, but Europe (Germany) will not turn economically from the Atlantic to Eurasia. The most crucial branch of the BRI was to pass through Russia, Belarus and Poland, which is now impossible. Russian gas supplies to the EU were besides destroyed. Thus, the EU will be at war with the East, alternatively of turning to it at least geoeconomically.
This means that there is no pro-Russian movement in Europe – AfD will not win and National Unity will fall in Meloni's shoes alternatively than de Gaulle's. Firstly, due to the fact that under the conditions of the fresh Cold War, the pro-Russian communities will have no field for action. Secondly, due to the fact that the geopolitically degraded Russia has nothing to offer its possible allies.
W Germany is likely to win the projankean chade, France is ruled by the oligarchical exposition of global capital, Italy is the local equivalent of Bosnia and England is the second pillar of Anglo-Saxon hegemonism. This all means tightening the course of Western Europe towards Russia.
In the mediate East, the collapse of Syria marks the ruin of the influence of Iran and Russia. The destiny of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip is most likely sealed. The winner, for now, is Israel. The U.S. will most likely pass on its plenipotence in the Turkey region, and in the long word it may be a much bigger problem for Israel than Syria as a Russian-Iran protectorate. It may be, but it doesn't have to. However, I uncertainty that this issue will be resolved in 2025. We will most likely stay “open” with this problem for the following years (the geopolitical position is the position of “long duration”).
We'll see how long fresh Songhai will last in West Africa. In this region, political returns happen so rapidly and can be so unexpected that it is hard to foretell something with an average probability. The fresh Songhai is simply a tellurocracy-timocracy with almost zero economical bases and much thinner than the authoritative political maps of the territorial basis. Russia's military support is valuable, but let's remember that it's no longer Wagner from the Prigozhina era. However, large-scale entry in China could be a origin of change. Only that they are located on the margins of areas that China is curious in, and Beijing is guided in its investments by economical alternatively than political (geo) sympathies.
Political Islam will be poorly bubbling under the surface, in any countries periodically flowing to the surface, but it is apparent that respective 100 or respective 1000 people, almost without a territorial basis, will not bring much together. In the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, local muslim formations were subdued by Israel. In Syria and Iraq, Turkey will most likely avoid a collision with Israel in order to grow and strengthen its position first. In East Africa and the Sahel, Islamism is not a force capable of overcoming various local formations. In Pakistan, pro-Western oligarchy governs, fighting muslim opposition even in Afghanistan; hopefully, based on the Taliban, Pakistan will have a increasing tendency towards the muslim revolution.
The Drift after 1989 of India since its alliance with Russia towards an alliance with the US illustrates the real transformation into a world-class power strategy (i.e. the degradation of Russia). In any case, there will be no alternate currency of BRICS+ and this body will not play an crucial function in global relations, due to the fact that it is simply besides heterogeneous politically and economically – just like the EU, besides much of the "US Trojan Horses" at the moment, 1 of which is India.
The full Indo-Pacific belt is fundamentally allies or vassals of stars and belts. The exceptions are possibly Myanmar (likely disorganized as Sudan) and Laos. 1 can imagine "buy" of whether or not this archipelago in the Pacific by China, but globally the arrangement in Indo-Pacific in 2025 will not change.
In Latin America, the only interesting episode that awaits us this year is the Bolivian elections. This country is improbable to fall out of the Bolivian axis due to the depth of social changes that have taken place there, but there is besides no way to extend to another countries.
In total, I think that 2025 years at global level will be rather boring for the Anti-system and nothing groundbreaking will happen. Refunds may apply to the strategy itself (the Trump Presidency in the US).
I want nothing because, whether we like it or not, we have no influence on the processes at global level.
Ronald Lasecki