State Defence Laboratory

Can you get utilized to that?

A year and a half ago, erstwhile I arrived in Kiev, many people from outside said, “It seems to be a beautiful safe city.” Even naive questions arose: “Where is this war?” present the situation is reversed. erstwhile you talk to people from another cities, from Kharkiv or Sum, you hear: “You in Kiev are very difficult.” present it can no longer be said that Kiev is simply a city located in the deep back, untouched by war – due to the fact that this 1 conducted from the air powerfully annoys him. At the same time, this kind of action confirms what we already know from past – that strategical bombings are not effective in achieving triumph in war. They do not radically alter the course of conflict. If the Russians are hoping to break morale or the opposition of the Ukrainians, it's adequate to walk around town to see that nothing like this happens. Never before have bombing – even on a much larger scale – led to a collapse of defenders. It is akin for Ukraine.

Piotr Łukasiewicz, chargé d’affaires RP in Ukraine. photograph by Tomash Baranski/Reporter

Is there a peculiar Ukrainian ‘stitch’ in this social resilience?

If I were to find something circumstantial Ukrainian, possibly the war has been going on for 12 years. Ukrainians passed the way from a state that lost part of its territory due to interior inconsistencies in 2014 – Crimea, a part of Donbas – to a country that has developed exceptional immunity. They had time to get utilized to the possible of defeat and learn to avoid it. In addition, there is the realization that this is an existential war. All we gotta do is contact people from the temporarily occupied territories. Stories about filter camps, which in fact are concentration camps, about torture, cultural cleansings, prisons – all this convinces Ukrainians in areas not occupied, that it is worth defending themselves. due to the fact that Russian cruelty can scope them. These are 2 basic elements: the duration of the war and the awareness that there is no another way than to defend effectively.

What is the conclusion of this for Poland?

We must arm ourselves and draw on the experience of Ukraine. To see her as a laboratory of modern state defense. That is why we request to be here – I mean us diplomats, but besides politicians, observers, volunteers. You gotta come, watch, train, learn. We should benefit from the Ukrainian military, social, local experience of operating the state under utmost war pressure. This cannot be understood without being on the spot, nor can it be done without the support of Ukraine.

Yeah, support. Do you agree with the thesis that we are connected – Poland and Ukraine – something that can be described as “security indivisibility”?

I will admit that I avoid the word "indivisibility" due to the fact that I associate it with the Russian propaganda locket. For them, “indivisible security” was an excuse to invade a neighbour, hence my prejudices. But to get to the point, the thing is on 2 levels. On the first, most obvious, is the threat of the presence of Russian troops at the Polish-Ukrainian border. This would make our strategical situation worse, as we already have Russians on the border with the royal and Belarusian circuits. Therefore, we would have a longer line of defence, and at a phase of action below the war threshold, the Russians would have gained wider facilities for conducting diversion operations.

The second level is little palpable. Following Russian propaganda and authoritative messages, there is simply a increasing frustration and a desire for revenge. The full-scale war has already lasted 4 years, longer than the so-called. The large Patriotic War. Russia blames the West and Poland in particular. The worse Russia goes to war with Ukraine, the stronger the Russian rematch. If Ukraine were in Russian hands, the worst scenarios for Poland and the Baltic States would be fulfilled. This level of danger – mental, ideological, rematchist – is peculiarly dangerous.

The ability to carry out this most negative script depends on how the war will turn out. How do you view the current situation?

I don't think there's gonna be any breakthrough now. For 12 years, the Russians were incapable to gain the full Donbass – the region in which they supposedly cared most. Of course, we know that Russia is gaining more towns, moving forward at a certain rate, but there are no signs of a violent collapse of the front. There is no situation in which the Russians could conduct a classical operational maneuver, penetrate the group of the opponent, step out onto their wings and lead to its disintegration. But it shouldn't calm us down. We cannot say, "The Ukrainians defend themselves, so we can reduce interest in this war." Support must proceed due to the fact that Ukraine's defence is mostly dependent on external assistance.

What should be Poland's priorities in military aid to Ukraine?

As Napoleon said, 3 things are needed to wage war: money, money and money. Ukraine needs resources to buy and produce drones, long-range rockets, artillery ammunition, weapons systems. That is why financial support from the European Union and European countries is so important.
We're talking about a full-scale war. In the first 2 years quantitative support prevailed in areas specified as equipment, ammunition, fuel. Poland was 1 of the leaders of this aid. Since 2024, the nature of support has changed. It is no longer just about the amount of equipment transferred – apart from the selected categories, specified as anti-aircraft defence or aviation – but about building capacity of the Ukrainian state, its defence industry.

And this opens up opportunities for closer cooperation between arms industries, relocation of production to safer areas. Poland can – and in my opinion – play a very crucial function here. 1 of my individual challenges for the last year and a half was to realize what, where and how Ukrainians produce, under what conditions and in what area can be offered to the Polish arms manufacture co-production or relocation of parts of production to Poland.

Are we talking plans here, or are we talking about trials that are already happening?

We are talking about processes that are already in progress, utilizing European and national funds.

Can we identify circumstantial projects?

If you'll excuse me, I will now make a mysterious face... Let me say in general: we are talking about mechanisms that already function. For example, production support programmes, loans granted Ukraine to acquisition equipment or mechanisms for co-production of arms for both countries. In the wider position Poland and Ukraine share a strategical future. These are the 2 largest armies in this part of Europe, the 2 regiments of the continent. If they work together, it will have a much stronger effect. To do so, we request permanent strategical anchors – and the arms manufacture is 1 of them.

Even if the war ends in a month, six months or a year, Ukraine will proceed to arm itself for another decade. The reconstruction of Ukraine will be closely linked to its security. Poland and Ukraine have convergent interests here and it is worth building these links today.

Bachmut during the fighting taking place in early 2023. There was no electricity, no heating, no water in town. The last remaining residents at the site drew from the puddle. This model of humanitarian disaster repeated in all Russian-attacked towns... photograph by Marcin Ogdowski

During planet War II, Germany's consequence to Allied bombings was, among others, devolution and descent of production underground. Can we talk about a akin situation in the case of Ukraine?

Literally so – the Ukrainian arms manufacture is already mostly underground: underground, parking lots, abandoned factories, places where no 1 suspects production activity. It's about safety. But I like to talk about models of action, not just about physical securing production. The transformation of the Ukrainian arms manufacture is crucial. Even a fewer years ago, it was 80-90% state-owned.

Within a fewer years, especially after the start of a full-scale war, there was a situation where about 60% of this manufacture is private and operates according to war marketplace rules: you produce well – you sell. This model, I don't hesitate to say, saved Ukraine. Innovation, flexibility, cost simplification – all of this made private production symbiosis with dense state industry. erstwhile the production of artillery systems is observed, it is clear which elements are made by the state sector and which are private. This flexible model of arms production is in my opinion a model – besides for Poland.

This innovation of Ukraine was forced by shortages.

That's right. Let us callback the first 2 years of full-scale war: there was inactive talk of artillery fighting. But that's in the past. The transition to drone technology was the consequence of Ukraine and later Russia to deficiencies in classical weapons. I am not saying that the exact same model of war will be recreated in a possible conflict between Russia and NATO countries, including Poland. I'm not certain about that. But I see here and now, in Ukraine, this model works. The full-scale war has been going on for 4 years. Both armies lost the momentum of conventional impact, present they are based on military masses, on technological innovations. You gotta observe this, draw conclusions and adjust them to your own conditions – do not copy 1 to one.

How do you think this war will end?

Someday it will end – but I am not a prophet and I do not want to be one. How? I believe that Ukraine will win this war, and that is what I submit to. I realize triumph as the behaviour of a state: sovereign, democratic, independent, on the way to the European Union.

How realistic is Ukraine's EU membership perspective?

Everything indicates that Ukraine is moving towards solid membership. I don't want to operate on circumstantial dates, but the beginning of the 1930s seems real. Of course, transitional periods will be negotiated.

And NATO? Is that position lost yet?

The Polish diplomat will be the last to say that Ukraine will not enter NATO. Our business is Ukraine strong – economically and militarily – as an ally and possibly a associate of the Alliance in the future. We don't know what NATO will look like in 5 or 10 years. But we must be certain that Ukraine will stay our ally – military, political, social.

And Russia? What did she gain and lose by engaging in this war?

Putin gained an extension of his power, and the Russians – an extension of their imperial fantasies plus any washing machines stolen from Ukraine. This may sound a small romanticist and unpolitological, but I believe that Russia has cut itself off from Europe. First of all, atomic blackmail has been utilized since the beginning of the war. Not to mention barbarism: Bubbling, torture, kidnapping of children. Russia closed its way to Europe for decades. Demography, technological collapse, vulgar authoritarianism, corruption – these are recipes for civilizational defeat. Europe, China, the United States, India have the future. Russia has no future. Russia will be a country – or its remnant – subordinate to China.

Is there any reflection in Russia, or is there a tendency to proceed to commit harakiri?

There's an imperial hallucination. There's inactive time for harakiri.

Finally, I will ask about individual experience with Kiev, which shaped your view of this war.

Contacts with veterans. I am an officer of the Polish Army reserve, this is an crucial subject for me personally. I am pleased to see that triumph for Ukrainians is not only territorial issues. In public opinion polls erstwhile asked “What is triumph for you?” first comes the recovery of people from slavery and the recovery of kidnapped children. Man is most important. Furthermore, veterans become the backbone of Ukrainian society – not a threat, as any imagine. Local structures are built around them, volunteer fire departments, social organizations.

There is simply a cult of veterans in Russia...

...that nobody truly cares about. There, a man incorporated into the army is simply a cannon meat and then a password on the poster. And that's the basic difference.

Piotr Łukasiewicz– Colonel of the Reserve of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland (service ended in January 2012), a associate in the mission in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. From 2012 to 2014, the Polish Ambassador to Afghanistan, from 1 September 2024 chargé d’affaires in Ukraine.