On 24 July of this year, a anticipated summit took place between the leaders of the European Union and the People's Republic of China. After many turbulences not only on the lines of the EU-China relations themselves, but besides on the organisation of the event, it was possible to organise a summit in China, although the tradition of these relations suggested a gathering on the Old Continent. Unfortunately, bilateral expectations did not find a place of contact and spread almost from the very beginning. The summit was a continuation of the long-term deadlock in Brussels-Pekin relations. Despite the request for an agreement, there is no indication that this will be achieved in the immediate future on key issues.
Developments before the summit
The year 2024 did not experience a summit between the Union and the PRC, despite the fact that there was a large deal going on between these parties, culminating in the European Commission's announcement of Union duties on Chinese electrical vehicles. This event was the main point of disagreement, not forgetting China's pro-Russian attitude towards the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which besides greatly affects the improvement of relations between Brussels and Beijing.
Antonio Costa, president of the European Council, shared the first information on the organisation of the EU-China Summit. He did this through an entry on the X platform (formerly Twitter) as a summary of a telephone conversation with the PRC president Xi Jinping[1]. Then in February, at the margins of the Munich safety Conference, EU advanced typical for abroad and safety Policy Kaja Kallas and abroad Minister China discussed the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the EU and the PRC, which stricte concerning the organisation of the summit[2].
The first turbulence about the planned event began with March, erstwhile the Financial Times published an article on 16 March, in which he stated that president Xi did not intend to come to the EU-China yearly summit. The gathering was to be held in Brussels this year (according to the conventional agenda for the interchangeability of specified summits – the summit in 2023 was held in Beijing). Thus, the Chinese side would besides represent the Chinese Prime Minister Li Qiang and not the most crucial individual in the Chinese country[3].
A period later, following a telephone call between European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and the already mentioned Prime Minister Li, it was possible to learn that the summit had been planned for a more definite day of July 2025.[4]. Further information from April afraid the anticipation of carrying out this event in Beijing. On 11 April, the magazine "South China Morning Post" published an article in which it was revealed that EU leaders, i.e. Von der Leyen and Costa, plan to go to Beijing in July to meet China's president there. Information about the change of plans by EU leaders by Finbarr Bermingham was to be obtained from "five people acquainted with the subject"[5]. This situation began to show the strong request for the Union to discuss the troubling issues with China's highest leader. Furthermore, developments between the Union and the United States under the leadership of Donald Trump forced her to find counterweight in US aggressive trade tariffs activities, especially after April 2, alleged Liberation Day[6]. Therefore, ‘wanting’ to come to Beijing can be read in a category not so much a subject as a temporary inconvenience.
An crucial minute before this summit was the visit of the head of Chinese diplomacy in Europe. Wang Yi flew to Brussels to meet his EU counterpart Kaja Kallas as part of the 13th European-Chinese strategical dialog Round[7]. This gathering was a kind of foretaste before a visit to Beijing. In July Dialogue, delicate safety issues were addressed, i.e. primarily the war in Ukraine and Chinese support for Russia or a fresh problem – Chinese restrictions on the export of rare-earth metals (the EC president later spoke more about this at the G7 summit.[8]). 1 day after talking to Kallas, Wang calmed down European partners, stating that "control on exports of dual-use goods is standard practice, but Europe's needs can be met if appropriate proposals are made"[9].
However, more applicable from the position of the summit and the EU-China relations themselves were 2 statements by the head of Chinese diplomacy, which were not published but leaked to the public. First Wang was going to tell Kallas that there is no failure of Russia with Ukraine in the interest of China, due to the fact that then the United States could full focus on China and the Indo-Pacific, and so they are engaged in actions for Ukraine (despite the ambiguous approach of the American President), which gives China greater freedom to act. Secondly, in Beijing's assessment, the summit should be shortened from 2 to 1 day, showing the discontent of the Chinese administration with the European side before the summit itself.[10].
It is clear that Brussels-Pekin relations were not favourable in the period before the summit, especially for China, who suspected that president Trump's 'tariff frenzy' would lead the European Commission to greater submission. Von der Leyen, on the another hand, continued to stay a "hawk" for China, as confirmed by her speech of 8 July in the European Parliament: "We know that China's continued support for Russia causes increased instability and uncertainty in Europe. We can say that China de facto enable Russian war economy"[11]. The American issue for the European Commission is simply a precedence and European leaders will effort to mitigate it as far as possible, as it is the US and not the PRC that are strategic, fundamental and sharing values and visions of Europe as an ally in the current global system.
Despite the concerted gestures of the Chinese, specified as abolishing sanctions against Euro-Parliamentarians or affirmative declarations on the benefits of partnership with China and encouraging the improvement of European strategical autonomy[12], the European Commission remains distanced from its submission to China and its stronger association with the Chinese in line with its policy of reducing the hazard of dependence ("derisking"), as well as forcing Beijing to take work for supporting Russian aggression – here it can be mentioned that sanctions have been imposed on Chinese actors who interact with Russian war machine. The last example of this kind of action by the EU is the 18th sanction package and the inclusion of 2 Chinese banks in the sanction list: Suifenhe agrarian Commercial Bank and Heihe agrarian Commercial Bank – regional loaners geographically located close the Chinese-Russian border[13]. The fresh issue of uncommon earths, where the European Union refused to hold an economical gathering with China, was just as tense before the summit, which was usually the basis for the summit of leaders.[14].
It is worth looking at the objectives of individual stakeholders and what was expected after the summit. 1 of the first forecasts on this subject was divided into Alicia García-Herrero in Bruegla. It stated that the Chinese's main nonsubjective was to "remove EU tariffs on electrical vehicles or at least agree minimum price commitments and resume negotiations on CAI or another form of trade and investment agreement"[15]. However, due to the EU's cautious and impenetrable approach to China, García-Herrero predicted that no of this would take place and that the summit would end with "no greater agreement", which she considers a missed chance erstwhile relations with Europe and America motivate Brussels's relations with Beijing to stabilise[16]. According to Melanie Hart of the Atlantic Council, "Beijin desperately needs Europe to keep its markets open for Chinese electrical vehicles and another goods that it produces with overcapacity"[17] – which again shows that the European Union, voting in favour of duties on the Chinese EV, gave Beijing a painful blow. What is more, adds Hart – China besides wants to guarantee from Europe that this does not side with the United States in Washington's geopolitical rivalry with Beijing. In her opinion, the Chinese already knew that no agreement would be reached, so they did not have excessive expectations of the summit and alternatively of efforts to reduce adverse duties Beijing will effort its forces in stimulating the unity of EU associate States[18].
As far as the European side is concerned, it is right to point out to Marcin Przychodiak of the Polish Institute of global Affairs that the EU delegation wanted to tell the Chinese that "without changing China's policy there is no anticipation of more effective cooperation"[19] – this wording refers to both economical and trade aspects focused on the request for balanced trade, Chinese electrical cars or Chinese restrictions on the export of uncommon earth metals, as well as political and geopolitical aspects – this refers to Chinese support for Russian aggression against Ukraine. Etienne Höra besides mentioned the request to change China's policy for Carnegie Endowment, de facto Criticising its relevance as an EU objective: "China, dared by its comparative triumph in tariff negotiations with the US, clearly do not want to give way to many issues, including retaliatory duties on cognac; in others, specified as overcapacity in industry, even reconciled China would be limited by the immense adjustment costs, and fundamental policy change is not a realistic nonsubjective for the EU"[20]. According to Piotr Dzierżanowski of the Polish Institute of global Affairs, reasoning about any breakthrough after the July summit in Beijing was alternatively a deceptive hope than something real to achieve. At the same time, he acknowledged that the very fact that the summit was organised was "a affirmative development: maintaining open channels of communication would not harm"[21] – and this statement, despite its banality, is absolutely correct.
EU-China Summit 2025
The suspicions and speculations of experts and commentators were not missed as the summit between the leaders of the European Union and the People's Republic of China did not bring any breakthrough in bilateral relations, but only confirmed the continuing collapse in this hard partnership. The summit took place in Beijing on 24 July 2025. The European side was represented by president of the European Council Antonio Costa and president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. They were besides accompanied by the EU advanced typical for abroad and safety Policy Kaja Kallas[22]. Chinese side: president Xi Jinping, Prime Minister of the PRC Li Qiang, and (like Kallas) Head of Chinese diplomacy Wang Yi[23]. The summit was of peculiar symbolic importance as it took place in the year of the 50th anniversary of the authoritative EU relations (then as European Communities) with the PRC, but this symbolism did not aid to scope any circumstantial agreement between the parties. As part of its agenda, the European Union had 3 main issues: first the war in Ukraine, second bilateral trade and 3rd climate change[24].
The EU has again called on China not to supply material assistance to Russia, highlighting their peculiar work as a permanent associate of the UN safety Council. She besides raised the issue of Chinese possible for impact on Russia – mainly the individual relations of Chinese and Russian leaders; the Union would like Xi to persuade Putin to resign his war effort against Ukraine. During a joint press release, Costa and Von der Leyen pointed out that "the war in Ukraine goes far beyond Europe – a conflict with global implications that undermines the principled global system"[25]. As an agreement on this matter, they declared that the European and Chinese sides are compatible "as to the request to accomplish a fair and lasting peace as shortly as possible"[26]. In addition, EU representatives have highlighted the increasing engagement of North Korea on the Russian side in the conflict. They stated that the situation in the form of the Kim Jong-Un government sending troops and arms to the Russians poses a "serious threat" not only in Europe itself, but besides in East Asia.[27]. This message is as accurate as possible, since Russian-North Korean cooperation can fuel the authorities in Pjongjang to become increasingly harassed in the home region, and the victims of specified actions would primarily be South Korea and Japan, the most crucial Western partners and allies in Asia.[28].
However, it must be borne in head that the EU and China have completely different visions of "fair and lasting peace": for Europe this is simply a triumph for Ukraine, its independency and the restoration of lost territories, while for China this issue is much more flexible and the Ukrainian issue is not put in Beijing on a pedestal, as confirmed by the previously mentioned words of the head of the Chinese Ministry of abroad Affairs that it will be better for China erstwhile Russia does not lose. This may mean that China is striving to keep the ongoing conflict of "hot war" or "freezing conflict", which is characteristic of the russian area. Both options make Washington incapable to full concentrate on Indo-Pacific
The European Union is most likely aware that it is pointless to repeat to the Chinese that they should influence the Russians, but this is, among another things, a PR procedure that maintains the sense of narratives about the request for Ukraine's victory. It cannot be concealed that China could have a partial impact on Russia, but another fact is that it is not in the Chinese interest, and that maintaining a conflict in the east of Europe can be instrumentalized by Beijing to deepen divisions in the European Union, as China plays for fragmentation of the block in the name of the rule of "divide and rule".
It is worth noting that Chinese messages and notes from this event have not included any information in their content regarding talks about the Russian-Ukrainian War[29].
For Chinese, trade and economical issues that bind Beijing to Europe are far more important. Both parties stressed the importance of economical partners and the importance of this relation from a global trade perspective. According to the European Communication, in 2024 trade between Europe and China amounted to EUR 730 billion, but the trade deficit reaches EUR 305 billion.[30], which is clearly detrimental to the EU and which has besides been raised in conversation with the Chinese for a long time. The European side besides expressed its concern at "maintenance of systemic disruption and expanding overcapacity, which exacerbates unequal conditions of competition" [31], calling for the EU to regulate these problematic topics that hinder European firms to compete reasonably with Chinese companies. Von der Leyen said in this respect that "Europe has been supporting China's economical improvement for decades and has continued to do so. However, as our cooperation deepened, inequality besides deepened. We have reached a turning point"[32]. Therefore, European-Chinese relations request to be redefined and balanced, and this balance can keep benefits for both parties. Hence, "it is crucial that China and Europe recognise their concerns and propose real solutions"[33].
Importantly, however, according to Von der Leyen, an agreement was reached on the export control of uncommon earth elements and permanent magnets from China. The EC president stressed that "we have besides agreed - and this is fresh - to improve the supply chain mechanism. In another words, if there are bottlenecks, this improved supply chain mechanics can immediately detect and resolve them.”[34]. These words can be considered to be any kind of success at the summit, but much more insignificant than both sides would have wanted.
President Xi, speaking with his European partners, stressed the uniqueness of both China and the EU, identifying 2 sides of the "important players of the global community" (English version of the phrase is "big guys in the global community)[35]adding that China and the European Union should "make certain that their bilateral relations make in the right direction and work together to bring them into an even better future over the next 50 years"[36]. Moving on, he estimated that the 50-year past of EU-China relations had delivered many successes, bringing common benefits[37].
Quoting earlier the words of the EC President, the leader of the People's Republic of China has made 3 proposals to the European Union, but they are not, as Von der Leyen would have liked, "real" or, in fact, very general, which besides illustrates the July summit itself.
Firstly, he proposed common respect and partnership[38]. He stressed that China is simply a peaceful country that promotes harmony, cooperation and benefits for both parties, and that differences in history, culture, political systems and improvement stages should not be an obstacle to the improvement of relations. He further stated that China was not a threat to the EU, as there were no fundamental conflicts of interest or geopolitical contradictions. It is likely here that real reasoning by the European side would deny this thesis, as China's support for Russia is simply a fundamental conflict of interest and geopolitical contradiction. Moreover, he expressed his support for developing European integration and the strategical autonomy of the European Union. Here, in the first part of this statement, contradictions can be found, as Beijing seeks to decentralise a united Europe and as much as possible loosen existing links to individual agreements with individual European countries. Nevertheless, China surely sincerely supports the thought of European strategical autonomy, which was frequently referred to by French president Emmanuel Macron, utilizing this concept for both intra-French and European policies.[39].
For Beijing, developing this concept by Europeans is simply a wedge between the Euro-Atlantic community and undermines the foundations of the European-American alliance. The notorious emphasis on Europe's request for independency and not following the United States blindly diminishes Washington's importance in the current global system, as it undermines the US's assurance that in the possible American-Chinese conflict Europe will be on the American side. China is not counting on Europe to control to the Chinese side in this case, in which case European neutrality will be beneficial enough.
Xi's second proposal afraid openness, cooperation and the management of differences[40]. According to the PRC President, ‘history and reality show that interdependence is not a risk’[41] – on the contrary, he believes that the convergence of interests is simply a affirmative development. He raised the issue of expanding competitiveness here, saying that it should not be about creating further barriers, which is most likely a mention to the European Union's tariffs on Chinese electrical cars. Equally, this increase should not consist in "distributing" economies and breaking supply chains. At this point, there has been another mention to the European Commission's policy of decoupling, namely decoupling, as the second form of economical dependence simplification is applied with varying efficiency by the European Union. According to the Chinese Summit Communication, the European delegation stated that the EU is not seeking "to separate or break supply chains"[42], but the fact is that “derisking” means political “child” Ursuli von der Leyen, is 1 of the main tools of the European Commission for its regulation against China. The alleged "reduction of risks" is simply a fundamental issue for the independency of Europe, which is paradoxically supported by Beijing. Learning from the mistakes made in the context of Europe's dependence on Russian gas, Von der Leyen understands that Europe cannot let itself to become dependent on another dangerous actor on the global stage. Therefore, the EU stresses that they do not want to completely break the economical ties with Beijing while applying measures to reduce the hazard of dependence on Chinese natural materials or technologies.
In continuing his argument, Xi stated that ‘reduction of dependency’ should not lead to a regulation of EU-China cooperation. "Different economical and trade relations, which are inherently complementary and mutually beneficial, can indeed accomplish a dynamic balance through development"[43] – Xi added. Furthermore, the improvement and opening-up of the People's Republic of China is intended to supply fresh opportunities and possible to deepen Europe's cooperation with China. It is so crucial for Beijing that the European Union refrains from taking restrictive measures in the field of economical and trade policy, specified as anti-subsidy investigations or duties, so that Chinese companies can operate more freely on the European market. However, this want contradicts the interest of the European Union, which must safeguard the stableness of its own marketplace and guarantee the safety of European companies, especially of fair competition, which is simply a considerable challenge for the state-funded Chinese companies, as shown by many anti-subsidy investigations, specified as the Chinese PV manufacture in Romania[44], Chinese wind turbine suppliers[45] or trade in Chinese steel sheet[46].
The 3rd proposal of the Chinese leader was to call on both parties to practice multilateralism and to respect the principles of the prevailing global order. In his opinion, this multilateral approach to modern global relations is simply a suitable and realistic approach, especially in the face of specified turbulent times. Therefore, Xi continued – the request for the EU and China to jointly defend the prevailing global strategy established after planet War II. Beijing's raising of the slogan of multilateralism is already a standard communicative strategy to present China as an alternate to American uniteraryism: China is pursuing a multipolar strategy in which there will be no hegemonic power of 1 power over another members of the global community. In this way, China tries to argue the opinion that it itself plans to take over the hegemony in the United States (according to the explanation of hegemony cycles).[47]), hiding behind multilateral pursuits. Nevertheless, it can be suggested that a multipolar strategy could supply China with a circumstantial tool for achieving its own goals and interests, as without a hegemon, it would be more easy for them to make certain moves internationally, which are most likely impossible today.
The president of the PRC besides mentioned China's readiness to step up coordination with the EU in preparation for this year's UN Climate Conference in Belem (COP30), and that Beijing expressed its willingness to make greater efforts to combat climate change and to support the improvement of green transition. In addition, he added that the PRC places emphasis on cooperation with the European Union in the field of artificial intelligence, which is intended to aid the multipolar planet and inclusive economical globalisation[48].
One of the most crucial moments of the July summit, which can be considered a success, was the joint press release of the European Union and the People's Republic of China on the climate. Both parties considered that the green partnership is simply a key pillar of the EU-China relation and the improvement of cooperation between Brussels and Beijing is simply a affirmative direction in the fight against climate change. In this respect, representatives of the Union and China have presented a list of circumstantial commitments on both sides:
- joint leadership in the implementation of a global fair climate transition;
- fully implement the Paris Agreement objectives, translate commitments (NDCs) into concrete actions;
- supporting Brazil in COP30 and pursuing ambitious, fair and inclusive results of the conference;
- accelerate the global improvement of renewable energy sources and guarantee access to green technologies and products for all countries, especially developing countries;
- strengthening adaptation measures at each level (local, national, global);
- submission to COP30 of appropriate national contributions for 2035 covering all sectors of the economy and all greenhouse gases;
- strengthening bilateral cooperation in areas specified as energy transit, adaptation, methane emanation control, coal markets and low-carbon technologies.
The another issues raised in the summit are besides worth mentioning concerning human rights and the Asian region. It should be stressed that these topics have not been reported in Chinese communications and can be read from the European notes. Thus, in the context of human rights, the European Union one more time expressed its "deep concern about the human rights situation in Sinciang and Tibet, the treatment of human rights defenders and number people, and the continued violation of fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong"[49]. However, she appreciated having previously held the 40th EU-China dialog Session on Human Rights this June[50]. According to the Communication, this session gave the chance to exchange views in an in-depth manner on "several individual cases of concern"[51].
On the another hand, as far as the Asian region is concerned, the European Union reaffirmed its commitment to the "one China" policy, while expressing its concerns about the increasingly tense relations in the Taiwan Strait and the increasing instability in the waters of the East China and South China. Moreover, the EU has expressed its opposition to any unilateral effort to change the state of affairs in the region by utilizing force or threatening to usage it. She recommended that all disputes be resolved by peaceful means, in accordance with global law, citing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)[52].
Conclusions and perspectives
So it is clear that, despite the symbolism of the 50th anniversary of the diplomatic relations between the European Union and the People's Republic of China and the apparent request to regulate the strained relations, the effects in this respect have proved to be negligible. In addition to a modest agreement on Chinese uncommon earth metals and a joint declaration on climate change, no crucial agreements or breakthroughs in bilateral relations have seen daylight.
Both sides besides confirmed the strategical importance of common relations, but at the same time the deep differences were evident – especially in commercial, geopolitical and democratic values. The phrase "return point" utilized by Ursula von der Leyen underlines that the EU is considering moving from a dialog based on hope to more robust hazard management, which has been noticeable for a long time.
The EU's ongoing strategy towards the PRC assumes a three-level perception of China: tier 1 – China plays the function of a "negotiation partner" with which to find a "balance of interest"; tier 2 – China is simply a "economic competitor" aimed at technological dominance; tier 3 – China as a "systemic rival" which presents the planet with an alternate to the western "management model"[53]. But since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the axis of perception has gradually moved to the side of competition and competition, leaving the partnership as something with the current realities increasingly little attainable.
China expressed its willingness to proceed dialogue, signaled any openness on overproduction and natural materials, but avoided concrete commitments or concessions, as an example in its communications in general the issue of war in Ukraine or the subject of human rights, of which the People's Republic of China is constantly accused by the European side. erstwhile reading media messages issued by the PRC, the word "war" is never utilized in the context of the Ukraine conflict, and the Chinese nomenclature uses the word "Ukrainian crisis", thus reducing the rank of the event. But – interestingly – Justyna Szczudlik from the Polish Institute of global Affairs notes any signals of corrections in China's policy towards Ukraine, which sounds incredible erstwhile he recalls the July gathering between Kaja Kallas and Wang Yi and the words of the second about the request for Beijing to support Russia, as it is in his interest. Mr Szczudlik notes that the subtle changes in the approach of the PRC started with Donald Trump taking up the position of president of the United States and consisted, among another things, of "intensification of bilateral cooperation at low levels and increased activity of the fresh ambassador of the PRC in contacts with Ukrainian academic circles, business and administration"[54]. In her opinion, these ‘corrections may indicate that the PRC is preparing to engage more in Ukraine after the ceasefire and the conflict is frozen’[55], and this commitment should be considered in the category of simply carrying out Chinese interests, not charitable activities for peace or even more Ukraine.
In order to forecast the future of the EU-China relation further, it is not impossible to overlook the tiny number of affirmative accents. The Beijing Summit was an example of this and showed that despite the request for any crucial agreements, this is highly difficult. Going further, the deficiency of a real improvement in access to the Chinese marketplace and the restrictions on overproduction will lead to the European Union likely to proceed and grow trade defence measures specified as anti-subsidy investigations and, as a result, countervailing duties to compensate for competition between European companies and subsidised Chinese state. The Chinese hoped that the drastic crisis in Euro-Atlantic relations caused by president Trump's aggressive customs policy would force Europe to become more submissive, although the July summit showed that it was deceptive reasoning and the announcement of a political agreement on a framework trade agreement for the European Union-State The United States has only established the failure of this thinking[56].
The war in Ukraine, Taiwan and human rights in China will stay issues of non-lethal injury to the correct relations between Brussels and Beijing. The pro-Russian position of the PRC in relation to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the aggressive policy towards the Republic of China will produce an ever-increasing distance from the European side towards the Chinese, as these actions will hurt the fundamental interests of united Europe, especially those related to the war in Ukraine. It should be suspected that the EU will proceed diplomatic pressures, but without advanced expectations of changing Chinese attitudes.
The European Union will search to harmonise its policy first within its structures, i.e. among the associate States, in order to preserve the coherence of the transmission lines and activities, and secondly with non-European partners.
The coordination of EU policies towards the PRC is crucial for the safety and future of the European bloc itself. The Chinese, as has already been mentioned, will divide the associate States by encouraging the conclusion of universal agreements and arrangements - the Union does not prohibit this due to the fact that each of its members is simply a sovereign state, but breaking any countries out of the line taken by the European Commission creates gaps in which China will want to drive its wedges to break European unity. Coordination of policies and narratives towards China is besides crucial in terms of the solidarity of the members of the community. The fresh Minister of Economy and Innovation of Lithuania Lukas Savickas spoke about this last December. He said about the request for a common EU strategy towards China: "My view is that it is better to act together with the EU and another strategical partners and to keep a common position with them. specified a policy is surely more effective"[57]. The case of Lithuania is circumstantial in this context, as it has been in the line of fire with the People's Republic of China since 2021, which is simply a political conflict regarding Taiwan's "ambassade". Savickas claimed that Lithuania was acting alone most of the time, most likely counting on the solidarity of another block states[58]. This subject can besides be extended to include the request to construct not only cohesion towards China, but besides a fresh European Union strategy to replace or update the current 2019 strategy.
In turn, coordination with non-European partners is part of a strategy to fight for the global position of the European Union and to reduce the hazard of dependence on China and diversify the sources of commercial goods, mainly natural materials and technology. Here a clear example can be the EU-Japan summit held the day before the gathering with the Chinese[59]. The choice of date and state was not accidental – firstly, it was to show China that they were not irreplaceable, and secondly, that Japan – China's rival – was a key partner and an ally for Europe. "The strategical partnership between Japan and the European Union has never been stronger than it is now and is more crucial than always before"[60] – gives a joint message from the Tokyo summit. It should be added here that the focus of the community of interests with countries outside Europe is no longer just on trade and economical issues, and is besides moving towards safety issues, which were discussed widely in the Tokyo meeting. Equally, safety and defence issues were raised with smaller players on the indo-pacific stage. We are talking about the Philippines and the EU advanced typical for abroad and safety Policy Kaji Kallas in Manila in early June to establish a fresh format for dialog between the Philippines and the EU on safety and Defence[61]. The Philippines and China are powerfully conflicted – the dispute concerns the ownership of islands in the South China Sea and maritime zones. In this case, the Union has silent support for the Philippine side, especially as Manila unilaterally supported Ukraine in the war against Russia[62], which besides facilitates dialog with Brussels and underlines the community of interests with Europe.
In conclusion, the EU-China Summit may and may not have brought crucial breakthroughs, but has set a course for the future improvement of EU-China relations. Namely, the Union will focus on careful cooperation while at the same time reducing the hazard of strategical dependence – that is, a stalemate will proceed in these relations with the possible for deterioration, as it shows small that the situation of relations will improve. In this case, much depends on China itself whether they will provoke a tightening of Brussels' approach. The EU has clearly signalled that the era of asymmetries and unilateral concessions is ending and the future of relations will depend on concrete actions, not declarations.
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[2]China: advanced Representative/Vice-President Kaja Kallas met with abroad Minister Wang Yi, European External Action Service, 14.02.2025, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/china-high-representativevice-president-kaja-kallas-met-foreign-minister-wang-yi_en [accessed 3.08.2025].
[3] A. Bounds, B. Moens, J. Leahy, Xi Jinping snibbs EU-China anniversary summary, “Financial Times”, 16.03.2025, https://www.ft.com/content/1ed0b791-a447-48f4-9c38-abbabbf5f2837a6 [accessed 3.08.2025].
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[5] The president EU leaders plan journey to Beijing in July for summary with Xi Jinping“South China Morning Post”, 11.04.2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3306066/eu-leaders-plan-trip-beijing-july-summit-xi-jinping [accessed 3.08.2025].
[6] B. Harithas, K. Meng, E. Brown, C. Mouradian, “Liberation Day” Tariffs Exploined, Center for strategical & global Studies, 3.04.2025], https://www.csis.org/analysis/liberalization-day-tariffs-explained [accessed 3.08.2025].
[7]China: advanced Representative/Vice-President Kaja Kallas holds EU-China strategical dialog with abroad Minister Wang Yi, , European External Action Service, 2.07.2025, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/china-high-representativevice-president-kaja-kallas-eu-china-strategic-dialogue-foreign_en [accessed 3.08.2025].
[8]Statement by president von der Leyen at Session II – working lunch of the G7, 'Economic growth, safety and sustainability', European Commission, 16.06.2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorn/detail/en/statement_25_1522 [accessed 3.08.2025].
[9]China’s abroad Minister dismisses European wars over uncommon earths, Reuters, 3.07.2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-foreign-minister-dismisses-european-worms-over-rare-earths-2025-07-03/ [accessed 3.08.2025].
[10] The president China tells EU it does not want to see Russia lose its war in Ukraine: sources“South China Morning Post”, 4.07.2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3316875/china-tells-eu-it-cannot-afford-Russian-loss-Ukrainian-war-sources-say?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article [accessed 3.08.2025].
[11] The president Von der Leyen deepens globe over China-EU summary with attack on Beijing’s Russia stance“South China Morning Post”, 8.07.2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3317442/von-der-leyen-deepen-gloom-over-china-eu-summit-attack-beijings-russia-state [accessed 3.08.2025].
[12] M. Clinic, Illusion of Chinese proposals for the EU, Polish Institute of global Affairs, 3.04.2025, https://www.pism.pl/publications/lulusia-Chinese-proposals-for-ue [accessed 3.08.2025].
[13] The president European Union sanctions 2 Chinese banks over aid to Russia‘South China Morning Post’, 18.07.2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3318793/european-union-sanctions-2-chinese-banks-over-aid-russia [accessed 3.08.2025].
[14]EU Refuses China Meetings Over Trade Spat Before Leaders SummitBloomberg, 17.06.2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-17/eu-refused-meeting-with-china-on-lack-of-trade-progress-ft-says [accessed 3.08.2025].
[15] The president Towards an EU-China non-summit?, Bruegel, 9.07.2025, https://www.bruegel.org/first-glance/towards-eu-china-non-summit [accessed 3.08.2025].
[16] Ibid.
[17]What the EU and China want from the summary that never seems to want, Atlantic Council, 21.07.2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-the-eu-and-china-want-from-the-summit-that-neither-seems-to-want/ [accessed 3.08.2025].
[18] Ibid.
[19] M. Clinic, EU-China Summit in Beijing – Communication without concrete effects, Polish Institute of global Affairs, 25.07.2025, https://www.pism.pl/publications/hence-ue-chiny-w-pekinie-communication-without-specific-effects [accessed 3.08.2025].
[20] R. Montaz, Taking the Pulse: Does the EU-China Summit Show a Weakened European Hand with Beijing?, Carnegie Endowment, 14.07.2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2025/07/taking-the-pulse-does-the-eu-china-summit-show-a-weakened-european-hand-with-beijing?lang=en [accessed 3.08.2025].
[21] Ibid.
[22]25th EU-China summit – EU press release, European Commission, 24.07.2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorn/detail/en/ip_25_1901 [accessed: 4.08.2025].
[23]Xi Jinping Meets with president of the European Council António Costa and president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, Ministry of abroad Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 24.07.2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/zyxw/202507/t20250725_11677160.html [accessed: 4.08.2025].
[24]EU-China summit, European Council/Council of the European Union, 24.07.2025, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2025/07/24/ [accessed: 4.08.2025].
[25]Remarks by president António Costa at the joint press conference with president von der Leyen following the EU-China Summit in Beijing, European Council/Council of the European Union, 24.07.2025, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/24/remarks-by-president-antonio-costa-at-the-joint-press-conference-with-president-von-der-leyen-following-the-eu-china-summit-in-beijing/ [accessed: 4.08.2025].
[26] Ibid.
[27]25th EU-China summit..., op. cit.
[28] M. Wozniak, Close-up on the Pjongjang-Moscow line. Kim and Putin – friends for longer or for a while?, Institute of fresh Europe, 16.02.2024, https://ine.org.pl/abbreviation-on-line-pjongjang-moskwa-kim-i-putin-friends-on-long-whether-on-second/; W. Rodkiewicz, Russia enters into a military alliance with North Korea, Mark Karp East Studies Center, 20.06.2024, https://www.osw.waw.pl/publications/analysis/2024-06-20/Russia-includes-military-z-korea-polnocna [accessed: 4.08.2025].
[29]Xi Focus: Xi calls on China, EU to supply more stability, certainty for planet through stealy, sound bilateral relations, Xinhua, 24.07.2025, https://english.news.cn/20250724/9bcda7e024ef4b5f9530e08a0f838993/c.html; Xi Jinping Meets..., op. cit., [accessed: 4.08.2025].
[30]25th EU-China summit..., op. cit.
[31] Ibid.
[32]Opening brands by president von der Leyen with president Costa and Xi Jinping, president of the People’s Republic of China, European Commission, 24.07.2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorn/detail/en/statement_25_1899 [accessed: 4.08.2025].
[33] Ibid.
[34]Statement by president von der Leyen with president Costa following the EU-China Summit, European Commission, 24.07.2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorn/detail/en/statement_25_1903 [accessed: 4.08.2025].
[35] L. Zhou, A. Chen, China, EU needed to make the right choice as ‘2 large guys’ on planet stage: Xi“South China Morning Post”, 24.07.2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3319367/2-big-guys-world-stage-china-and-europe-must-work-other-xi [accessed: 4.08.2025].
[36] Ibid.
[37]Xi Jinping Meets..., op. cit.
[38]Xi Focus: Xi calls on China..., op. cit.
[39] L. Buttermilk, Battle recognition: EU strategical autonomy in France's policy, Polish Institute of global Affairs, 23.03.2021, https://pism.pl/publications/Recognition_fight_autonomy_strategic_EU_in_politics_France; E. Koch, European strategical Autonomy after Macron’s journey to China, Wilson Center, 9.55.2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/european-strategic-autonomy-after-macrons-trip-china [accessed: 4.08.2025].
[40]Xi Focus: Xi calls on China..., op. cit.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] F. Y. Chee, Exclusive: EU investigates Chinese bidders over Romania solar trender, Reuters, 3.04.2024,
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/eu-opens-investigations-into-foreign-subsidies-solar-sector-2024-04-03/ [accessed: 4.08.2025].
[45] S. Lau, EU launches probe into Chinese wind turbinesPOLITICO, 9.04.2024,
https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-launches-probe-into-chinese-wind-turbines/ [accessed: 4.08.2025].
[46]EU launches trade investment into Chinese tinplate steel, Reuters, 16.5.2024, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/eu-launches-trade-investment-intto-chinese-tinplate-steel-2024-05-16/ [accessed: 4.08.2025].
[47] The president Changing the geopolitical position of China from the position of Hegemonic Cycles explanation and power transit theory, ‘The Geopolitical Review’, 2018, No 26, pp. 95-114.
[48]Xi Focus: Xi calls on China..., op. cit.
[49]EU-China summit..., op. cit.
[50]China: 40th Human Rights dialog with the European Union takes place in Brussels, European Union External Action, 14.06.2025, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/china-40th-human-rights-dialogue-european-union-takes-place-brussels_en [accessed: 4.08.2025].
[51]25th EU-China summit..., op. cit.
[52] Ibid.
[53]EU-China – A strategical outlook, European Commission, 12.03.2019, https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2019-03/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf [accessed: 5.08.2025].
[54] J. Rat, Signals of Corrections in China's Politics towards Ukraine, Polish Institute of global Affairs, 28.07.2025, https://www.pism.pl/publications/signaly-correct-in-politics-chin-to-Ukraine [accessed: 5.08.2025].
[55] Ibid.
[56] The president Agreement on a European Union-US trade agreement, Polish Institute of global Affairs, 30.07.2025, https://www.pism.pl/publications/agreement-in-the-trading-Union-European-usa [accessed: 5.08.2025].
[57]Lithuania should allign its position on China with partners – Minister-designate, LRT, 12.12.2024, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/2437293/lithuania- Should-align-its-position-on-china-with-partners-minister-designate [accessed: 5.08.2025].
[58] Ibid.
[59]EU-Japan summit, European Council/Council of the European Union, 23.07.2025, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2025/07/23/ [accessed: 5.08.2025].
[60]Joint message following the EU-Japan Summit 2025, European Commission, 23.07.2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorn/detail/en/statement_25_1890 [accessed: 5.08.2025].
[61]PBBM thanks EU for continued support, Office of the president of the Philippines, 2.06.2025, https://pco.gov.ph/news_releases/pbbm-thanks-eu-for-continued-support/ [accessed: 5.08.2025].
[62]Zelenskyy thanks PBBM for PH support to Ukraine, Office of the president of the Philippines, 3.06.2024, https://pco.gov.ph/news_releases/zelenskyy-thanks-pbbm-for-ph-support-to-Ukraine/ [5.08.2025].
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