What results can be expected from the upcoming parliamentary elections in Hungary? What are the chances of Péter Magyar's opposition leader winning? Will it be the end of Orbán's era? Will there be attempts to fake elections? And if the Tisza organization wins, what position will it take towards the European Union and Ukraine? And how will Sunday elections affect Europe's future? Leszek Jażdżewski talks to Dr. Edit Zgut- Przybylska, assistant prof. at the Institute of doctrine and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences and investigator at the CEU Democracy Institute.
Leszek Jażdżewski (LJ): Who will win the Hungarian elections on April 12?
Edit Zgut- Przybylska (ESP): I'm certain we got to the bottom of this. I've been getting this question for months. If these were standard elections within an established liberal democracy, analysts would simply speculate on the scale of opposition victory. Independent polling agencies, which usage reliable methodologies, point to a crucial advantage of the opposition. This would be their first major triumph in 20 years, ending the dominance of Viktor Orbán's party, which began in 2006.
However, these are not conventional elections. Hungary is now a hybrid regime; therefore, despite the polling data suggesting crucial support for the opposition and its leader, Péter Magyar, the mobilisation capacity of the government should be taken into account. This origin is hard to estimation utilizing classical polling methods. The government uses different tactics to scope people who might otherwise not have participated in the electoral process.
For example, the documentary "The Price of a Vote" meticulously shows how the government uses intimidation and force to supply votes for the Fidesz party. Those in difficulty may be forced to vote with financial incentives or basic necessities specified as food. In any cases, families are threatened with intervention by social services dealing with the protection of children if they do not support the government.
In addition, fresh changes in electoral laws favour Fidesz. Those with dual Hungarian citizenship, surviving in neighbouring countries specified as Serbia or Romania, traditionally support the ruling organization and can vote by correspondence, which is simply a susceptible process. There are even reports of deceased people on the ballots.
The electoral strategy besides includes the alleged "remuneration for the winner" winer compensation) and crucial abuses related to the division of constituencies gerrymandering). As a result, the Tisza organization needs more votes to win in a given constituency than the Fidesz party. In order to guarantee even a specified majority, Tisha most likely has to score 4 to six percent better than the Fidesz organization in the general vote. Given these distorted conditions, the opposition must show large commitment and determination to overcome this imbalance.
LJ: Will we have any final information on the results by Sunday evening or Monday morning, or will we gotta wait longer to number the votes cast abroad? In the absence of exit polls, do you think that the results will indicate a crucial advantage for Tisha, or will we witness the declaration of triumph and celebration, waiting a fewer days for the final results?
EZP: That's a legitimate and very crucial question. I am pleased that you mentioned the full number of votes from abroad due to the fact that they are highly important. This includes not only people with dual citizenship in the neighbouring countries I mentioned earlier, but besides people like me. I intend to vote as a Polish resident, but a Hungarian citizen in Warsaw, which means that my vote will besides gotta overcome any distance, as will the voices of many another people surviving in another places. That's why we gotta wait for them. The registration rate for these votes is very high, which means that the political commitment of Hungarians has reached an unprecedented level since 1989. It's been a while.
Significant mobilization besides took place on the opposition side. Given that it takes time, counting these votes may yet take respective days; it is certain that the votes from abroad will yet be counted within about a week. The results will be known on Saturday, but – and this is simply a large "but" – if attendance reaches an unprecedented level above 75 percent, it could mean a reversal of the situation in which the Tisza organization would win with a very large advantage. If that happens, we'll most likely find out more on Sunday. Although we would inactive gotta wait for all the votes cast from abroad, the situation would most likely be more obvious, which would consequence in celebration on the streets by those who voted for opposition.
However, if the race is highly balanced, it may not take a week or even a period to find what will happen. In a script of very equal competition, if Tisha wins with a tiny advantage, Fidesz will surely challenge specified a consequence – and vice versa. There would be a recalculation of votes, and possibly even a re-election in respective constituencies. In that case, the courts will be handling these cases for weeks. Not only would this hold the inauguration of the fresh government, it could yet lead to a very unstable situation.
Emotions will scope zenith and it is very hard to foretell what it will look like, but it is likely that social mobilization will occur. Let's hope this doesn't lead to street violence. I believe that the very affirmative aspect of Hungarian past after the transformation over the last 20 years is that the Hungarian society has a very low tolerance for violence. What happened in 2006, after the scandal of disclosing the recording of the erstwhile socialist government, erstwhile real political force occurred, was remembered as 1 of the worst moments in Hungarian history. This yet led to the collapse of the government, and I think both sides would like to avoid this.
At the same time, it's hard to go back. We've been seeing utmost toxic polarity for years. We see a country where more than 90 percent of Hungarians will vote for either Tish or Fidesz. This is an unprecedented situation; it is not even in Britain, which is simply a conventional two-party system. I want to stress that we have achieved a boiling point of hyperpolarization, which is not only unprecedented, but besides unbearable. Emotions are very strong and it is so highly hard to foretell the result of elections. On the shoulders of these 2 leaders there is simply a large work not to fuel this, but alternatively to calm emotions. Otherwise, no 1 will truly be able to foretell what will happen on the streets of Hungary.
LJ: Do you think that these last-minute interventions will affect the result of the election, or is the electorate so polarized that the majority of voters have already decided who they will vote for, which will besides make these elections a referendum in practice over the 16 years of Fidesz's rule?
EZP: This is simply a combination of all the factors mentioned by the Lord; they are not mutually exclusive. It is surely actual that we are witnessing an unprecedented paradigm shift. Russia is clearly interfering in the elections in Hungary, utilizing a number of intelligence, information campaigns and misinformation that we have not observed on specified a scale. This shows serious problems for the regime. Earlier specified extended interference was not essential due to the fact that Viktor Orbán could easy have won, especially in fresh elections in which there was no competitor capable of weakening the effective "machine to win votes" of the regime. This device uses dependency structures and incentives to convince people to vote on them – a mechanics that I describe in my book on informal power in Hungary and Poland.
However, in the last fewer years something has broken. The appearance of a actual rival made external interference more visible. Although it is hard to measurement the exact impact of these actions, government desperation is obvious. We have witnessed the tactics of the national hybrid war, which were previously unthinkable, specified as the capture of the Ukrainian "convoy with cash" by the Hungarian authorities a fewer weeks ago. It was like a bad action movie. Although there are ongoing investigations into this convoy—which has reportedly travelled the country for decades for the cognition of various beneficiaries—the government has utilized this event to advance the communicative that Ukraine steals Hungarian money to fund the Tisza party. There was no evidence of this, but it served their main narrative: that Ukraine is simply a corrupt government threatening Hungary's safety and voting for opposition means that "all will die for Ukraine".
Earlier, the message was simply that 1 had to vote for Viktor Orbán as a “man of peace” in order to avoid being drawn into the war by the opposition. The government most likely realized that this communicative is no longer so effective; the polls show that the Hungarian society is experiencing “war fatigue”. As in the erstwhile run in Poland, where the Law and Justice organization (PiS) lost power, Hungary's concerns moved towards a standard of living, weakening the quality of public services and expanding isolation of the country in Europe. There is increasing concern for complete isolation and transformation into “new Belarus”.
The current propaganda does not coincide with social sentiments. People are increasingly afraid of a corrupt government that deals with Moscow and China while constantly fighting the European Union. This pushes Hungary on the periphery of the EU concept of "many speed", so that diplomats in NATO and the EU are reluctant to engage with the Hungarian government. This isolation fuels the gilded opposition and the sense of rejection we observe. The government seems to have lost contact with reality, continuing to push the same narratives about Ukraine. Whether these last-minute interventions will have an effective impact on the result will prove to be in 2 days, but so far polls propose that government efforts are inconsistent and much little effective than in the past, as the public is looking more closely than only at Ukraine.
LJ: Given the state's ownership, do you believe that the Tisza organization will be able to keep its promises, or there is simply a hazard that the government without a constitutional majority will be short-lived and will not be able to prevent the organization from returning You're going to power in 4 years?
EZP: That's another good question. The consequence truly comes down to how large the majority of the fresh government will be. If it is very small, it will be a tough fight and it will be highly hard for many reasons. 1 of the main issues is the owning institutions and the environment, but that is not all. It will besides be much more hard to unlock European Union funds, which is simply a precedence for the Government of Tisha. They would focus intensively on unlocking and bringing this money back to the country due to the fact that the national budget is empty; mathematically, without these funds, it would not be possible to keep promises or rise the standard of living.
If they can get the constitutional majority, things will go much smoother. This would let them not only to push ahead with decisions and start the process of reinstitutionalisation of democratic institutions, but besides to make a ‘change of value’. The most hard part will be dealing with the European Union. Comparing the situation with Poland, the Polish government had much more time to take action. In order for the Tisha government to safe these EU funds and not lose them forever, it must do so by August. If we presume that the fresh government will take office in May, it will have only 2 and a half or 3 months to execute the same "magic trick" for which Donald Tusk's government had over a year.
Moreover, unlike Poland, where the government had to face the President's veto law, the conditions here are unique. Viktor Orbán's government blocked the most crucial regulations as "Cardinal Acts" in the Constitution, which can only be amended by a constitutional majority. I have late reviewed them and found references to cardinal laws seventy-two times in thirty-two areas, including property rights, political organization financing and media control. These are areas that the fresh government must change to show that Hungary is simply a decently functioning state of law.
Without a constitutional majority, the fresh government would gotta find ways to keep "accurate compliance" by possibly seeking solutions in lower courts. I am not a lawyer, so I will not deal with the issue of legal measures – it would be good if these circumstantial mechanisms were explained by a legal expert. However, the success of these procedures will surely depend on how large the majority of the fresh government will be, and we will shortly see how this goes.
LJ: Given Péter Magyar's past as a individual associated with the Fidesz organization and his controversial promotion, accompanied by the publicisation of his ex-wife's private recordings, to what degree does his charismatic but power-seeking personality represent both an chance and a threat to the restoration of Hungarian democracy? Do you share your concerns that this may be an exchange of 1 non-liberal leader for another who will usage all the essential means to gain and then keep power?
EZP: You rise a question that concerns many Hungarians who initially hesitated to support it. The way he built his current majority is rather unique; his supporters frequently call it "the hammer". Despite an intense and unprecedented propaganda run – which for over 2 years 80% of the media presented him as a traitor, perpetrator of force and abroad agent – his image remained mostly intact. People are so desperate for a figure that will effectively hit the government on corruption, mediocre public services and poorness that they ignore the controversy surrounding him.
The government effectively broke its social contract. Earlier, voters accepted corruption due to the fact that they felt they were besides beneficiaries of the system; now they see the country becoming 1 of the poorest in the European Union, while the elite is inactive making profits. It was this communicative that Péter Magyar successfully used: that the strategy no longer works in favour of the average citizen.
As regards the hazard of him setting up a fresh autocratic version of the regime, there are crucial restrictions that can prevent this, even if it were tempting. Its main nonsubjective is to reconstruct Hungary to the mainstream of Europe and unlock EU funds. In order to be re-entered into the European household and to receive this financial support, it must take a fundamentally different strategical approach. Maintaining an informal power structure or further "destruction" of the regulation of law would be a bad strategical decision to accomplish these objectives.
In addition, the Tisza organization is basing its election programme on the restoration of democracy. Magyar has promised respective reforms, specified as the introduction of restrictions on Prime Minister's word of office – limiting to 2 terms of office – and granting veto rights to ministers to decentralise power. Even before Viktor Orbán's word of office, the Hungarian system, by its nature, had gathered power at the Prime Minister's office. Although the current government has distorted this even more, Magyar has expressed a clear intention to act differently. We will see whether he will keep his word, but in the current situation, continuing the same authoritarian way would be contrary to the necessity to lead Hungary out of the European Union's periphery.
LJ: Is there any way Viktor Orbán could manipulate election results or prevent Péter Magyar from taking power if he lost?
EZP: I started our conversation by discussing how people in difficulty are forced to vote for the government. We do not know the exact number of people who are exposed to specified practices; we will not know this until Sunday. From a methodological point of view, this is very hard to measurement due to the fact that people are reluctant to admit that they are being forced to vote for a government against their will.
I stress this due to the fact that we can face a script in which the Tisza organization will win a popular vote on the organization list, and yet Fidesz will supply himself with more seats in parliament due to the system's design. As I mentioned, the strategy of "compensation for the winner" and manipulating the borders of constituency make it easier for the government to allocate additional mandates. They have more constituency in agrarian areas with less residents, where they enjoy popularity, while the opposition is concentrated in denser populated districts. This may lead to a terrifying script on Monday, in which the public will see that the Tisza organization has won the popular vote, but Fidesz inactive has more parliamentary mandates. People will not be able to realize it; they will claim that the elections have been rigged.
Such a situation would be different and would likely lead to considerable tensions on the streets, as society would have difficulty accepting specified a result. I sincerely hope we can avoid this scenario. Another likely script is an highly levelled rivalry, resulting in continuous legal disputes in individual constituency as Fidesz will effort to tip the balance of the majority in his favor. Their courts and state agencies supply an organization environment that could surely hold the transfer of power.
Ultimately, if a vast majority is obtained, the president will gotta appoint the leader of this majority as Prime Minister. Even if the president initially elected Viktor Orbán, Parliament could immediately retreat his vote of assurance and elect another leader. It will be highly interesting to observe the improvement of the situation, and I hope that within a week we will know the final result.
LJ: Let us hope that democracy will win on Sunday in Hungary.
This podcast was produced by the European Liberal Forum in collaboration with the Movieno Liberal Social and the Liberté Foundation!, with the financial support of the European Parliament. Neither the European Parliament nor the European Liberal Forum are liable for the content nor for any usage of this podcast.
Podcast is besides available on platforms Sound, Apple Podcast, Stitcher and Spotify
Dr. Olga Łabendowicz translated from English
Read English at 4liberty.eu
