Comment, "Russian disposable agents – a challenge in the light of the ABW report"

• Data from the fresh ABW study show a sharp increase in the number of cases revealed concerning espionage in Poland.
• Russia is increasingly utilizing alleged "one-off agents" – inexpensive and easy replaceable performers of single tasks.
• Recruitment takes place mainly through Telegram, and its basis is simple orders and financial motivation.
• Is the reaction of the state sufficient? The NSA is developing tools to counter this phenomenon, but the study leaves the question of the real effectiveness of the state's actions.

Introduction

When the interior safety Agency published its first public study in 12 years in May 2026, for the first time in years, abroad intelligence services in Poland were exposed. From 2024 to 2025 69 espionage investigations were launched, of which 48 were only launched in 2025. Since the early 1990s, up to 5 specified investigations have been launched annually. Since 2022, the position of fishy has been given to 91 people, 82 have heard allegations of espionage and 62 have been detained[1]. These statistic indicate a sharp increase in the number of revealed cases of spy activities. However, they can show both the increased activity of abroad services and the increased effectiveness of their detection by Polish services.

The turning point was 2022. With the simplification of Russian diplomatic and consular presence, the European states expelled any 600 Russian diplomats, any 400 of whom were recognised as intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover[2]. In consequence Russia changed its model of action. In addition to a fistful of trained and multi-annual agents, she began utilizing hundreds of random, inexpensive and easy to replace contractors – disposable agents.

How does Russia recruit?

Recruitment takes place through social media, especially through Telegram. Young people looking for seasonal work or fast income may find an announcement of a seemingly average contract. The entry threshold is very low – it is frequently adequate to take any pictures, paint graffiti or stick stickers to get a payment promise, most frequently in cryptocurrency, making it hard to identify the flow of funds. Thus he reached the grid of 22-year-old Maxim Leha from Poltava, who, after moving to Warsaw in 2022, clicked on the telegram ad "Make Hashtags and Earn". He yet began to execute tasks for the grid working for Russia, including photographing and filming the indicated objects[3]. A akin mechanics is described in the OCCRP investigation, with 2 young men recruited on the Telegram in Latvia to paint graffiti on the walls of the Estonian military complex and spy on the NATO base[4].

The classical intelligence model assumes a consciously recruited agent, and the full process frequently takes years. The spy model "gig economy" reverses this dependence – the contractor does not request to know who he works for, which is safer for the payer himself. Importantly, the analysis of cases from the Baltic Sea region states by the PISM shows that among cases where the motivation of the perpetrators was determined, the financial origin was definitely dominant – it occurred in about 96% of cases, while the ideological motive appeared in about 15%. These categories were not separate, so both motives could have performed simultaneously. At the same time, more than half of the recruited people were not full aware that they were working for abroad intelligence[5].

ABW Response

The model utilized by Russia is so dispersed, inexpensive and resistant to losses. That's why it's hard to break. Since the recruitment strategy has been so accurately identified, the natural question is: what are Polish services doing to halt it? Among the activities described in the study are 2 directions of response.

In July 2024, ABW recreated 10 delegations, expanding the terrain structure especially on the east wall. This was intended to increase the capacity to local threat identification, especially in areas exposed to intelligence and diversion. However, this decision made up for many years of negligence: the same delegations were liquidated in 2017[6]. This importantly weakened the counter-intelligence structure, additionally in the crucial period of the years preceding the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Another action undertaken by ABW was the launch of the ABW_STOPdiversion_bot chatbot. It has been operating on the Telegram since 2025 and operates in 4 languages – Polish, English, Ukrainian and Russian. It allows anonymously to study an effort to contact abroad services, including any kind of “offer” of taking photographs or reconnaissance of the site. It is notable that the same platform on which these tests are carried out is utilized to combat verbund tests. Nevertheless, the main regulation remains a advanced dependence on whether the recipient himself recognizes the threat. The tool only works erstwhile a individual is aware of the situation, and it is the deficiency of awareness that is simply a key component of the "one-off agents" model. The recruiters are deliberately formulating offers so that they don't make associations with intelligence.

However, the study lacks information on the effectiveness of this tool: how many cases have been reported, how many of them posed a real threat and what actions have been taken. erstwhile Head of the Intelligence Agency, Grzegorz Małecki, estimated that the paper was deprived of key information about how the threats described therein were actually prevented[7].

Conclusions and recommendations

In my opinion, the biggest challenge remains to counter the mass verbund of people who, for their promise to pay, sometimes even unconsciously, become a tool in the hands of abroad intelligence. The key preventive component should be to rise awareness among the most susceptible groups. This is peculiarly crucial given that a large part of the recruited people did not realize the real nature of the task they agreed to by clicking on the seemingly innocent telegram offer.

The ABW study makes a good diagnosis of the scale and mechanics of the phenomenon, but much little answers the question of how effective the state consequence is towards it. It is so worth that subsequent reports of the ABW should include measurable indicators of the effectiveness of the actions taken, specified as the number of notifications by the chatbot, the proportion of real threats among them, and the effects of information campaigns.

BIBLE

1. Internal safety Agency, interior safety Agency 2024-2025. Selected activities, interior safety Agency, Warsaw 2026.
2. B. Hall, R. Olearchyk, M. Seddon, Europe kicked out Vladimir Putin’s spies. Now they’re back, “Financial Times”, 05.03.2024, link: https://www.ft.com/content/f066d653-70e2-42e9-baac-c342417c8ef3?syn-25a6b1a6=1 [accessed 19.07.2026].
3. A. Morozova, D. Flis, I. Springe, H. Roonemaa, K. Rodak, Marionettes from Telegram. How the network of Russian saboteurs operates in Europe, FRONTSTORY.PL, 11.07.2024, link: https://frontstory.pl/Russia-spying-Sabotaz-Baltic-Polish countries/ [accessed 12.07.2026].
4. C. Huppertz, A. Izumrudov, L. Lorenz, I. Lozovsky, B. Obermayer, H. Roonemaa, F. Schmid, M. Vunš, ‘Make a Molotov Cocktail’: How Europeans Are Recruited Through Telegram to Committee Sabotage, Arson, and Murder, Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting task (OCCRP), 26.09.2024, link: https://www.occrp.org/en/investigation/make-a-molotov-cocktail-how-europeans-are-recruited-through-telegram-to-commit-sabotage-arson-and-murder [accessed 12.07.2026].
5. F. Bryjka, A. M. Dyner, A. Kozioł, White Paper on Russian Acts of Sabotage and Subversion against Members of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Polish Institute of global Affairs (PISM), Warsaw 2026, 29.05.2026, link: https://pism.pl/publications/white-paper-on-Russian-acts-of-sabotage-and-subversion-against-members-of-the-council-of-the-baltic-sea-states [accessed 19.07.2026].
6. Office of the Prime Minister, We're bringing back 10 ABW delegations in provincial cities, 01.07.2024, link: https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/restore-10-delegator-abw-in-towns-wojewodzki [accessed 14.07.2026].
7. W. Kubik, the Russians have drawn diversionary conclusions. ABW study under the eye of expert, GazetaPrawna.pl, 08.05.2012, link: https://edgp.gasetaprrawna.pl/country/security/Articles/11244391,Russians-objective-request-report-abw-pod-lupa-expert.html [accessed 14.07.2026].