How You Think

Few political scientists and scholars were able to deal theoretically with the reality of the current phase of the conflict in Ukraine, which began with the Russian intervention on 24 February 2022.

This was successfully done by the American creator of offensive realism, prof. John Mearsheimer. The latest work on rationalism in global politics was just released by this 1947 postgraduate of the Military Academy at West Point, a erstwhile officer of the American Air Force, but, above all, since 1982, lecturers at the University of Chicago. Its co-author is 1 of Mearsheimer's erstwhile students, presently a lecturer at the University of Notre Dame, to whom he was associated by years Prof. Andrzej Walicki, Prof. Sebastian Rosato.

Many of our readers of John Mearsheimer's work request not be peculiarly presented. Especially due to the fact that as 1 of the very fewer scientists from the so-called. The West has consistently tried to rationalize the conflict in Ukraine, which we have been following not since 2022, but at least since the apparent occurrence of its causes, or 2014 or even 2008.

A foundational, alternatively optimistic presumption of authors who effort to prove on the cards How States Think – The Rationality of abroad Policy, is convinced of the rationality pursued by the states (they have in head and analyse powers and regional powers) of abroad policy. However, they formulate certain essential conditions for this rationality: “The state is rational if the views of its most crucial decision-makers are accumulated through a process of deliberalisation and its final policy is based on a credible theory. And vice versa – the state is irrational if its strategy is not based on a credible theory, either lacking deliberalisation, or both. An insightful analysis of historical data against these criteria indicates that countries are usually rational in their abroad policy” (p. 2). In the book, supporters of fashionable theories about the irrationality of states, primarily from school explanation of rational choice and school of behavioral-psychological.

As Mearsheimer and Rosato admit, we live in an age of uncertainty, especially in global relations. In order to navigate through its raging waves, the ruling classes in individual countries must someway identify the mechanisms governing the planet – for this intent the theories of global relations are used: "Both at individual and state level, they find the processes in the planet of uncertainty, allowing these actors to learn from their situation and to decide in consequence to emerging problems" (p. 7).

Once we have chosen a credible, empirically verified theory, we will have a certain order of order from the chaos of global politics; we will see rules governing seemingly irrational behaviors and actions. Subsequently, all existing ruling options must undergo a process of deliberalisation – conscious and mentally engaging discussions to find optimal solutions.

This is the strategical rationality. “Our definition of ‘strategic rationality’, which assumes that states are rational, provided that their policies are based on reliable theories and are the consequence of a deliberal decision-making process, includes the essence of this idea. On an individual level, which are the designs of the mind, reliable theories, they are the most appropriate tool to give meaning to a planet full of uncertainty, although in no case can they be considered perfect. However, erstwhile faced with a serious deficiency of information, they are most useful in deciding on the direction of action. At collective level, deliberalisation is an instrument for a systematic review of policy options, which is very crucial in a planet of uncertainty where there is simply a deficiency of clarity about the best strategy. It is besides a procedure for selecting from among the existing options" (p. 9), writes American political scientists.

John Mearsheimer (photo. Wikipedia)

"In view of the deficiency of information, decision-makers are condemned to have only limited cognition of how their countries' relations with another countries will take place and what their effects will be. This problem is becoming even more complex, due to the fact that sometimes unforeseen factors have a crucial impact on events" (p. 25), stressed Mearsheimer and Rosato. In this so many question marks of the world, therefore, it is impossible to guarantee that the expected results of the strategy are achieved, although, as they stress, rationality increases the likelihood of success of any plan. "Rationality concerns the process, not its results. Rational actors usage their critical senses to decide how to act in a planet of uncertainty. This does not warrant the success of their policies. External restrictions or unforeseen circumstances may prevent them from achieving their objectives, even if their policies are based on credible theories and arise from the process of deliberalisation" (p. 67) – they reserve.

Apart from strategical rationality of an instrumental nature, there is inactive rationality of objectives. The appropriate location of the point and state to which we are aiming allows for the selection of tool sets – actions. Logical, according to authors How States Think..., The nonsubjective of each country is, according to the principles formulated by the school of realism, to last the statehood itself in anarchical and chaotic competition of the system. "No 1 will deny that rational states can accomplish different goals, including security, prosperity or the promotion of their way of life in the world. However, we say that if we want to see the state as rational, it must consider endurance as its most crucial objective. Therefore, all credible explanation will place endurance beyond all another tasks. It is clearly logical and proven that endurance is simply a prerequisite for any another intent which the State may set before itself. another tasks can be hierarchicalized in any order chosen by any state citing credible theories that preach different hierarchy" (p. 16) – they write.

And they add that “States may have many goals, any of which are obvious. endurance is especially important. States aim to preserve the integrity of their physical foundations and keep the ability to decide their political fate. The physical base of the State is composed of its territory, population and resources within its borders. It may manage its interior and external affairs provided that it retains control of its national institutions, in peculiar the executive, legislative, judicial and public administration. States besides have another crucial goals, specified as expanding their prosperity or spreading their ideology. (...) endurance is the most crucial and all another goals must be subject to it” (p. 213).

Mearsheimer so represents a view focused on state institutions. He recognizes that it is the highest value for man as a social being. In this way, the Prof. James Fearonwhich claims that under certain conditions the endurance of a separate state may simply not be profitable, even from the point of view of GDP growth, which is easier to accomplish in larger structures through economies of scale and integration. At the same time, prof. John Mearsheimer does not respond in any way to the notion of a nation which, even in the absence of its own statehood, can make within a larger entity, as evidenced by the national autonomy existing in the empires. The abolition of state values so appears to disagree Mearsheimer from any supporters of national thought putting first the improvement of a cultural or cultural community, not necessarily within their own state body. "Unlike existing companies to make money for their owners, political actors be to exist. The merger with others and the inclusion of a fresh entity, which can be an attractive solution for companies, are not considered by the states at all" (p. 215), writes the American scholar. To illustrate the truthfulness of this thesis, we find it rather contemporary and increasingly up - to - date: “The Chinese leaders point out that they consider independent Taiwan a threat to China’s survival, as it symbolizes the permanent failure of national territory, to which no Chinese would virtually agree. Beijing has stated that it is ready for war if Taipei declares independence, despite the economical consequences that Thomas Friedman described as “a mutually guaranteed economical destruction” (p. 216).

Since countries are the most crucial subject of global relations, Mearsheimer must argue those scholars who put another social formations first. So he clearly criticizes the concept of the collision of civilizations. Samuel Huntington, writing: “It is simply a fact that nations, not civilizations, are the largest social groups that manage intense loyalty. The most powerful political ideology on our planet is not civilizationism (whatever it may be), but nationalism. Therefore, it is not amazing that empirical data do not supply much evidence for the thesis that conflicts in the modern planet would erupt under the influence of civilizational differences" (p. 55). Let us add that this is simply a view that clearly distinguishes it from Alexander Dugin.

So what are they, according to the authors How States Think..., credible theories on which the rational states can base their abroad policy? This is, of course, primarily realism, not only offensive, but besides defensive and hegemonic, but besides criticized for years by Mearsheimer himself, liberalism (mainly 3 of its pillars—the explanation of democratic peace, institutionalism and the explanation of commercial ties), to which the American political scientist adds social constructivism.

Washington has been guided since the end of the Cold War primarily by liberal theories. "The United States, after the rivalry of superpowers ended and the planet became single-polar, chose a policy of liberal hegemony. This policy was based on the ‘great three’ liberal theories of global relations: liberal institutionalism, economical interdependence explanation and democratic peace theory’ (p. 43) – Mearsheimer and Rosato write.

There are besides incredible theories, incorrect ones, leading to irrational politics. This is above all the mentioned civilizationism, neoclassical realism, the explanation of unconsolidated democracy, the explanation of image costs, the explanation of imposing democracy by force, the explanation of atomic blackmail, the explanation of snowball, and the explanation of domino. In addition, improper and irrational policies may besides arise from reasoning alienated from theory, primarily utilizing analogies based on besides fewer examples, heuristics, yet emotions, although the latter, according to fresh studies, may be an crucial part of the rational reasoning process.

The authors of this book summarize the necessity of explanation as follows: “Rational politicians are homo theoreticus: they usage reliable theories to give the planet meaning and decide how to behave under certain circumstances. Irrational politicians defy the challenges facing them on unreliable theories, or do not usage theories at all" (p. 63). And how briefly do they specify these theories? "Theories are explanatory statements that revolve around causal logic telling us why the planet functions in specified a way alternatively than in another way" (p. 93) – they write.

Their approach inseparably combines with a certain position in the area of philosophical anthropology. “The concept that human beings are inherently irrational is in sharp contradiction with the very name of our species, homo sapiens, or reasoning man. Nor does he endure the trial of Aristotle’s widespread belief that we are not average animals but rational animals. If people would never behave rationally, then who or what would behave like that?” (p. 96) – they ask.

After these considerations, Mearsheimer and Rosato go on trying to describe different models of decision-making in abroad policy. They conclude that there are 3 main things that can be highlighted: “The first – key politicians, including the final decision-maker, sit behind the table with the same credible theories in their heads and, after discussing the situation, they easy come to a consensus on the best way. The second – crucial decision-makers happen with different theories, but after a lively and unfettered discussion they agree on a leading strategy based on a credible theory, which is then approved by the final decision-maker. 3rd – after a lively and unfettered debate, key politicians are incapable to scope an agreement and at this point the way is chosen by the final decision-maker" (p. 102).

As we can see, in the opinion of the authors, this “final decision-maker” plays an crucial role, which is the highest placed in the political hierarchy. It is not surprising, then, that “the key issue is whether the final decision-maker is simply a mediator or dominant. If he is simply a mediator, there are different theories debated in a lively and unspoiled way; the process is deliberalized. erstwhile he's a domino, deliberalization fails. There is no debate about the right explanation at the time, and alternatively the subordinates are forced to accept the dominant leader's view" (p. 209).

U.S. political scientists are rather thorough in examining concrete historical examples to support their approach. First, they consider rational strategical decisions. Here they characterise Germany's policy towards the Tri-Agreement on the eve of planet War I, which was to undertake a completely logical effort between 1912 and 1913 to bridge the breach of the balance of forces by expanding its own armed forces in the face of the increased military force of France and Russia. Berlin was correct at the time to believe that as shortly as possible the outbreak of the armed conflict was in his interest.

Japan's policy towards the russian Union in the years preceding planet War II was besides rational, consisting in an effort to get economical autarkia through expansion in a resource-rich Manchuria. According to Mearsheimer and Rosato, the policies of the French authorities prior to planet War II can be likewise assessed, though interior divisions and ideological fear of rapprochement with Moscow have limited its rationality. Strangely, authors How States Think... they besides consider the United States policy to be rational in a short single-polar minute after the First Cold War, including NATO enlargement (but they mention rather extensively the criticism of this decision not only by George Kennanbut besides the then Secretary of Defense, William Perry) and the decision to exercise liberal hegemony.

Mersheimer and Rosato besides test the rationality of decisions taken by states in crisis situations. The examples given by them are Germany's final decision to start planet War I, which 2 authors consider to be a match for continental hegemony; Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor; the attack of the 3rd Reich on the USSR in 1941; as well as the Cuban crisis of autumn 1962 and the russian intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Authors How States Think... they are trying to prove that the behaviour of individual countries in these cases was consistent with the criteria of rationality that they had previously designated. As their opposite, they discuss the cases of decisions and policies not responding to these criteria: a plan for the improvement of the German Navy adm. Alfred von Tirpitz, the resignation of the expansion of land forces by Britain on the eve of planet War II, prepared by the CIA landing in Cuba in 1961 and the American decision to attack Iraq in 2003.

According to the authors themselves, their thesis on the rationality of the abroad policy of the states has highly far-reaching consequences. "In the academic world, realism and liberalism can be considered up-to-date and are doing well. In the planet of politics – countries gain hard ground to conduct abroad policy” (p. 224), they write. And they're right. Their presumption is rather optimistic, with all the reservations about the information deficit they have mentioned. It means that we can foretell certain reactions and processes in global policy with a certain degree of probability. We can so prevent the most dangerous of them. Another thing is that the example of conflict in Ukraine shows that sometimes decision-makers in the planet usually do not only want to prevent tragic scenarios, but even go to them with all their might. This can besides be rational or irrational. The criteria proposed by Mearsheimer and Rosato let us to make specified an assessment in any subsequent case.

It is hard to say whether their consideration and conclusions can apply to countries of average size or tiny non-powerful status. It is likely that in their case it is impossible to talk of a adequate level of sovereignty, so that decisions taken by them can be regarded as subjects of investigation for their rationality. However, this does not change the fact that all abroad policy decision-makers, including Polish, should be acquainted with the latest work of American politicians. For example, to learn from it about the anticipated behaviour of the powers in the evolving multipolar world.

How States Think...not yet published in Polish. Let us remind you that 3 translations of prof. Mearsheimer's work are available on our market: Israeli lobby and US abroad policy (with Stephen Walt, fresh Confederation Publishing House, Warsaw 2023 – last edition), Big illusion. Liberal Dreams and global Reality (Universitas, Kraków 2021), The Tragism of Power Politics (Universitas Publishing, Warsaw-Kraków 2019). In anticipation of the publication of the latest book briefly discussed here, it is worth looking for and after it.

Mateusz Piskorski

Photo. connect2mason.com

John J. Mearsheimer, Sebastian Rosato, How States Think – The Rationality of abroad Policy, Yale University Press, fresh Haven & London 2023, p. 280.

Think Poland, No. 1-2 (1-7.01.2023)