Firstly, before the attacks on Iran began, the United States partially or wholly evacuated its bases in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United arabian Emirates. This was considered a temporary measure, which lasted only a fewer days – a maneuver that had already been applied in 2025. However, there is no certainty that these bases will work again after the conflict: they can be damaged or destroyed and their reconstruction would require the approval of local authorities. These countries have realised that the United States is incapable to defend them from Iran; and they are improbable to do so in the future. The presence of U.S. bases in their territory makes these countries the mark of Iranian retaliatory action.
Secondly, the Iranian regime, having survived the blows, will most likely strengthen its position both in the country and abroad. There's besides a atomic issue we'll discuss later.
Finally, Israel will fiercely argue American attempts to retreat from the war. It is clear that Israel has drawn Trump into this conflict, hoping for a definitive solution to the Iranian issue through the actions of individual else, full aware that specified an chance may not arise under another administration. This means that Israel is determined to keep the United States active in the war at all costs, even by resorting to bloody provocations if necessary.
In this context Netanjahu is to Trump what Zelenski was to Biden – a classical example of waving the dog through the tail.
Endless War
The White home may want to retreat from the conflict, but events seem to push him to proceed the war until the complete collapse of the Iranian regime. However, this is not possible without a land invasion. As we mentioned earlier, relying on replacement forces (such as Iraqi Kurds or Azerbaijan) to accomplish this goal seems almost impossible. No 1 wants to be the first to decide: the Kurds declared neutrality, and the president of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev withdrew after talking to his Iranian counterpart.
Therefore, only a direct land invasion remains, but this seems to be a distant prospect, given the current state of the US armed forces.
In the meantime, in the face of common raids, the conflict is likely to focus on the Strait of Ormuz. Its blockade is Iran's main strategical advantage and its only means of influencing the outside world, including the US and Israel. If the strait is reopened for tankers and cargo ships, Iran will be isolated. Hypocrisy calls for peace from Europe will rapidly quiet down, and the Persian Gulf monarchs will likely again be under US wing. Although support from Russia and China can continue, it will most likely be minimal – adequate to keep Iran on the surface a small longer.
The decisive unlocking of the strait would constitute Trump's crucial symbolic victory, allowing him to announce that he had pushed the Persian beast back into her hiding place—and that would be mostly true. The conflict would then lose global significance, transforming itself into another local skirmish that could overwhelm with varying strength for years. The Gulf states would learn to live under regular bombings, and this smoky war would become a fresh norm for the region.
Moreover, if the Strait of Ormuz were unblocked, Trump could announce a decisive victory, even without formalising a ceasefire with Iran.
He could then offer the arabian Gulf states the chance to acquisition missiles and drones from the US to attack Iran, as well as rocket defence systems to defend against Iranian attacks – then wash their hands from the full case. Sheiks can do as they wish: fight the Ayatollahs, negociate or redeem themselves.
Two options for Iran
In addition to the military task of reopening the Strait of Ormuz and Israel, which would clearly argue this scenario, there is besides an Iranian factor. Iran's persistent and courageous opposition gave him 2 options: to proceed fighting, exhausting the forces of the US-Israel coalition, or negociate peace in the close future. Each option has its disadvantages and advantages.
1. A Prolonged War to Destroy
Advantages: Iran presently enjoys a temporary advantage in military potential: enemy rocket defence systems are severely weakened, radar and communications systems have been breached, and there is no effective defence against Shahed drone swarms. The Persian Gulf Monarchies are amazed and at the brink of panic, without real military force. However, this situation will not last forever; in the end, all countries of the region will learn to track and shoot down Shahed's drones, and the Arabs will adapt and gain the advantage. That's why it's worth forging iron while it's hot. If Israeli air defence is importantly weakened, there is simply a advanced probability that regular drone attacks can origin strategical harm and long deter Israel from further action.
Disadvantages: It is not certain that Iran will be able to wage war on destruction. The dominance of the US and Israel over a large part of Iran's airspace, combined with the request to keep a advanced level of military production (if at all possible under continuous raid conditions), is simply a major challenge. Importantly, due to the cut-off of Tehran oil exports, it loses its main origin of income, which in just a fewer months could mean disaster or full dependence on Moscow and Beijing. Unlike Russia, Iran lacks strategical depth to last this kind of situation.
2. Pat like last summer.
Advantages: This strategy offers a chance for a temporary truce and the chance to prepare for the next circular of conflict.
Disadvantages: If Iran focuses only on rebuilding its rocket and drone potential, the component of surprise will vanish in another conflict. Firstly, there is no warrant that Iran will be able to effectively block the strait; secondly, both Israel and the Persian Gulf monarchs will undoubtedly take action to counter the threat from Iran's drones. This means that Iran will not be able to defy effectively in its next confrontation.
Nuclear Option
As mentioned earlier, if the Strait of Ormuz is reopened, the conflict will transform into a local war, mostly air.
The only chance for Tehran to reverse the situation is to rapidly make atomic weapons.
There are rumors (although hard to verify) that the dead Ayatollah Ali Chamenei was a major obstacle to the Iranian atomic program. If this is the case, and his boy and successor have disagreements, it is rather possible that in the next year or 2 Iran could carry out a atomic weapons test. The exact deadline will depend on the state of his production capacity, which may have been affected by US and Israeli raids. The muslim Revolutionary defender Corps already has transfer systems in the form of ballistic and hypersonic missiles against which there is no defence guarantee.
Following Iran, Saudi Arabia is likely to besides gain atomic weapons, which will prompt Saudis to begin taking over another Persian Gulf monarchies. They can say, “You want protection from the Iranians and their drones?” Don't you want your sea exports cut off again? Join us under our wing.
As the arabian Peninsula is consolidated, the influences of this fresh atomic power can extend to the full arabian world, and atomic weapons can possibly appear in Turkey and Egypt.
This is not an encouraging script for Israel, which has itself messed up in all this.
Translated by Google Translator
source:https://www.rt.com/news/634640-cant-win-and-cant-end/
