The subject of the possible establishment of the European Union's armed forces is not new, and the thought was pushed by French president Emannuel Macron in 2018. What was initially met even with the approval of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. This was during the American presidency of Donald Trump, which aroused much controversy in western Europe.
The Germans rapidly withdrew from supporting this concept, most likely due to force from Washington. At the same time, the imagination of the EU army never found knowing even in the Polish government of the United Right. In general, the thought just didn't take it.
Emannuel Macron's proposal, however, was a symptom of strategical thinking. Of course, this reasoning was directed at France's national interest. Specifically, the influence of the second in Africa. However, from the position of later events and how the French political architecture in Africa began to fall apart, it must be admitted that Macron most likely predicted the upcoming problems. And he feared that France would not be able to cope with future challenges on its own. If that's the case, he was right.
However, as part of the debate on the concept of a common European army, it cannot be assumed that this army would prosecute the interests of only 1 country. The thought would should be part of public interests. And due to the fact that Emmanuel Macron's proposal did not item it, she was doomed to fail. The second origin of the task was the US suspicion that the EU army would make the Union independent of the United States and NATO in terms of security. What the French president himself was talking about. This must have caused the U.S. reaction, but it besides caused concern in all countries that were very counting on American presence in Europe. Especially after the first Russian aggression against Ukraine from 2014.
But couldn't a European army task truly be useful? Is there no conceptual option that can meet the request of universality and service the safety of all EU members while not interfering with the NATO initiative?
Before we answer this question, we must pay attention to the fact that The subject of whether the creation of a European army would be useful and right is actually secondary. Secondary to the request to outline the European Union's safety strategy. Emmanuel Macron lost the subject of the European Army besides because, reasoning about France's interests, he went consecutive to promoting the tool that would prosecute these interests. Meanwhile, it had to be handled like a good marketer. Show the request and then come up with a solution. In another words, the debate on a safety strategy for the EU should have been launched first. Clarify threats and how to address them. The subject of the tools that the Union should usage to tackle the challenges should then be addressed.
It must besides be said that the minute erstwhile the French president presented the concept of a European army was possibly the last to prepare for the upcoming events. Until the second Russian invasion of Ukraine remained over 3 years. On the 1 hand, it is not adequate time to increase the military capacity of individual European countries, and on the another hand it gives hope to prepare strategies and procedures for action in the event of unexpected events threatening EU security. And these threats could be replaced as early as 2018.
Countries specified as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have not seen European initiatives and debates in cooperation with the US. They accelerated the pace of arms and increased defence spending. Although it is known in retrospect that more and faster needs to be done, 2014 was a serious emergency signal for the full region of Central Europe. And the region began to prepare for more dangerous times with the United States. The engagement of the second was a evidence that NATO is simply a adequate format to deter Russia and warrant the safety of the states from the alleged east flank.
However, not only the situation in Ukraine and the Russian aggressor were and are a problem for the safety of the European Union. The French saw adverse processes taking place in Africa and the mediate East. Spain, Italy and Greece have besides been affected by the adverse effects of the turmoil on the confederate Mediterranean. It was besides in the interest of these countries to have a more circumstantial safety discussion. The problem with protecting the EU from external factors was visible to almost everyone. All but Germans, who, on the 1 hand, did not want to increase safety spending, and on the another hand sometimes even contributed to expanding problems, as during the migration crisis. Nor were the effects of the crisis dealt with. alternatively of expanding spending on measures to safe the EU border, which would be preventive, it was decided to push solutions to massage problems post factum. specified as the mechanics of forced relocation of illegal immigrants, which created only another field for interior disputes within the Union.
An example of the migration crisis has shown that Brussels has only responded to threats by deciding to implement ad hoc previously unprepared and unconsulted ideas. This only made more confusion and created divisions. If there had already been a consensus on how to proceed in the event of events, then the EU consequence would have been faster, more fluid and thus more effective. And alternatively of sharing members, it would make a common sense of mission and willingness to follow established procedures to keep safety throughout the Union.
The Union will not last without defining a common interest on a political safety level
Therefore, the European Union needs its own safety strategy, both in 2015 and 2018 and today. specified a circumstantial one, indicating not only terrorist threats, hybrid actions, cybercrime etc., but besides defining geopolitical conditions and threats. This kind of plane is fundamentally omitted in the paper EU safety Union Strategy Even in the last version released for 2020-2025.
The planet is gradually falling into chaos, which it has and will affect Europe as a whole. If so, it should be simple to find a common ground of geopolitical interests for all Europeans. It is excruciating that this has not been done at least since the arabian Spring (2010). Furthermore, if we are dealing with a political and economical creation specified as the European Union, this entity, as a whole, is and will be the subject of present and future events affecting its security, namely political cohesion or the economical situation. The improvement of an EU safety strategy in the event of geopolitical threats is so not only desirable, but besides necessary. Otherwise, the Union will not last as a coherent political and economical body and will begin to share. Without defining a common geopolitical safety strategy, it is impossible to discuss the tools for implementing it, i.e. the Common Armed Forces. No 1 will contribute to the creation of specified an instrument if he does not know precisely what it is to serve. Should Polish soldiers – and if so why and to what degree – participate in missions in Africa? Does the Portuguese have to, and if so, why and to what extent, engage in the safety of Estonia? Should the European army actively contribute to stabilising the mediate East?
First, we request to answer specified questions in order to find whether there is any chance of developing a common concept of geopolitical security. I outline compromise points that would be accepted by all EU members. This kind of initiative cannot be pushed by anyone. It must come from a common knowing of the situation in which the EU and all its countries are located. So, firstMembers of the Union must identify their national interests with the existence and safety of the Union. The conclusion that the Community serves a given local community is simply a condition sine qua non to recognise that EU geopolitical safety is simply a value to be taken care of. Only after specified a consensus – which cannot be imposed, and which must be the consequence of independent conclusions of individual nations and representing their governments – The geopolitical risks common to all EU members should be identified, which could be avoided through action by means of EU tools.
Does the EU request to specify its own geopolitical safety interests separate from NATO?
At this point, should it be determined whether it is truly essential to set a strategy for EU geopolitical security? Since NATO is functioning and seems to be as coherent as always in fresh years. However, is there a complete convergence for purposes and interests between the EU and NATO? The answer is against appearances of obvious. It's not. The North Atlantic Pact was created in the context of a threat from the russian Union. After its collapse and after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, NATO's intent of existence was redefined. It became the fight against terrorism. At the 2022 Madrid summit, priorities related to the threat from the Russian Federation were re-established, but besides paying attention to the function of the People's Republic of China in the global regime.
However, from a geopolitical perspective, European Union safety is not enough. In addition to the east border, the Union inactive has a confederate border. The 1 designated, among others, by the Mediterranean Sea. What is happening in North Africa and the mediate East straight affects the safety of Europe as a whole, and so the European Union itself. Although NATO responded in Libya in 2011, it did intervene early in Asia (Afghanistan 2003). However, these actions did not full fit into the assumptions, territorial scope and objectives of the North Atlantic Pact. They were besides any kind of anomaly. NATO did not play a major function during the war with Iraq (2003-2011), the arabian Spring (covering a number of states, not only Libya), or the civilian War in Syria (since 2011). The North Atlantic Pact does not stabilise the mediate East and North Africa, so it does not care about the immediate neighbourhood of the European Union in the confederate direction.
However, it is from North Africa and the mediate East that many members of the Community import natural gas and oil. These are key sources, especially in the context of imposing sanctions on imports of Russian energy natural materials (since December 2022). Poland besides cooperates with Qatar or Saudi Arabia. What is happening in North Africa and the mediate East, as well as in the waters surrounding the region (i.e. Persian Gulf, Red Sea) is essential for EU-wide security. However, it is not the Community that shapes the safety environment in these parts of the world. To any extent, however, the French are active – with different results – but in fact Europe has conveniently assigned work for 1 of the most inflamed regions in the United States. The problem is, the American position has changed. The US has not only become self-sufficient in gas and oil extraction and consumption, but has started competing with arabian countries on the energy natural materials marketplace as 1 of the world's largest exporters.
This fact causes the US to have sometimes even interests contrary to those of the EU. For example, it is in Washington's interest to take as much of the EU energy marketplace as possible. The cost of arabian competition. Meanwhile, it is in the interest of the EU to have as many suppliers as possible, which increases the negotiating field and reduces dependence on 1 of them. Europe's problem is that Americans are engaged, present and taking action in the mediate East and Europeans are not. However, whenever there is simply a conflict in the mediate East or North Africa, the safety of Europe, alternatively than thousands of nautical miles away, is at risk.
It should besides be stressed that NATO is simply a defensive Alliance. Which narrows down the field of action and business. Although it can be pointed out the intervention nature of the NATO air run against Yugoslavia in 1999, or the already mentioned 2011 oversight of the operation in Libya. However, in principle, NATO is not a tool for implementing the Alliance's common interests unless they are linked to the protection of members' safety. NATO did not intervene on land in the civilian war in Libya, Syria or Iraq. It didn't fight ISIS. But the Americans and the Russians did.
Russians who have their cards in the mediate East and even in Africa. Meanwhile, Since 2022 Moscow has been no longer hiding from taking action to hit the European Union as such, its unity or the interests of individual countries. Vladimir Putin attacked Ukraine, fundamentally cut himself off from the European Union on the continent, and additionally leads a dangerous game for Europe in the regions surrounding the Old Continent. On the another hand, the European Union has not even defined its own safety priorities at geopolitical level, let alone any effective consequence and countermeasures. The single French are in retreat in Africa. Only Americans and British are active in the mediate East. Paris only demonstrates interest, but does not want to bear the real cost of taking work for safety in the arabian world. This would be besides much of a challenge for France.
Nevertheless, there is no uncertainty that all time the Suez Canal is blocked, the hazard of losing a transport ship in the Bab al.-Mandab or Ormuz areas is increasing, this is simply a red signal for Europe. Of course, the Suez Canal is besides crucial for US Navywhich must be able to shift forces between the Atlantic and Indian Ocean. But is it reasonable to number on Americans to always defend freedom of movement? Is it reasonable to believe that US Navy units will defend all ships, including those coming to or from the EU? Is there any reason to believe that Americans will always go to land war where safety issues cannot be solved with the presence of ships? By doing so alone and not expecting any assistance from the most curious Europeans?
Post-view graph showing migration routes (blue) and maritime transport way (red) to EuropeThe European Union borders the war-torn Russia, with problematic and managed authoritarian Turkey (being a NATO member), as well as through the Mediterranean with a number of more or little unchangeable countries. The safety of Europe depends on energy, migration and terrorism.
If the members of the Union want the Community to survive, they must specify a common safety strategy at geopolitical level.
This does not mean that the EU should decision towards federalisation. Just look at NATO. The Alliance members have entered a circumstantial political-military framework in which no 1 imposes his own will on anyone. The aim is to carry out jointly defined safety tasks for the members covered by the Pact. It would so suffice to conclude an additional European safety Treaty which is simply a completely separate component from the existing structure of the European Union. What would be easy to do from a formal and legal point of view, easier to accept on a political level, and at the same time would give large freedom and flexibility in terms of, for example, the composition of the fresh European safety Union (UBE). J).
NATO vs European safety Union
If we consider that the EU associate States have an interest in defining a common geopolitical safety strategy for the Community, the next step should besides address the second first sin of Emmanuel Macron's initiative. circumstantial priorities in the EU's geopolitical safety strategy could not be contrary to NATO's priorities and could even overlap with them on an equal basis. due to the fact that The creation of an EU safety Pact which would weaken the unity of the North Atlantic Pact by competing would be detrimental to a number of EU countries that value the US and NATO guarantees more than those that would become an EU alternative. (why is there no wonder).
Thus, the EU's safety strategy in terms of the corresponding NATO priorities should be part of the NATO strategy, or even inferior to the latter. However, on levels beyond the North Atlantic Pact, the European safety Treaty should set its own priorities. The European Union needs a declaration that clearly clarifies its geopolitical interests and areas of interest common to all members.
Would it be possible to make specified a task without simultaneously weakening NATO? It's worth an intellectual effort to find out.
The establishment of a geopolitical EU safety strategy would not gotta lead to the creation of an EU army at all. It could be an excellent tool for expressing a common position and persuasion in NATO.
However, in situations where NATO could not, for any reason, take an crucial initiative from an EU-wide perspective, procedures and tools could be created to accomplish the objectives by the Community itself.
Europe's safety Union could be implemented in situations where, for example, the United States and Canada would not want to make a peculiar effort, but at the same time wouldn't head the EU performing the safety tasks itself. Given the convergence of interests with the United Kingdom, London could, after all, join Europe's safety Union without being in the EU. Which would give the Americans any kind of warrant and access, through a close ally, to the structures of the European Alliance. At the same time, it is not said that UBE would gotta belong to... Hungary. Which would avoid the veto utilized by Viktor Orban in all matters. This would be a perfectly sensible solution, as would Norway, Switzerland and Iceland, which are part of the Schengen area (being outside the EU) and EU members specified as Ireland, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Romania, do not belong to the Schengen area.
With this construction, if North Africa or the mediate East were to ignite again, threatening the safety of the EU and the United States would not decide to interfere, then the safety Union of Europe (UBE) could accomplish the interests of the associate States and stabilise the region. In fulfilling the function of the UN, which, in view of the permanent members of the safety Council in the form of Russia or China, may not necessarily be able to stabilise planet order in future years. The UN has failed many times so that the European Union can trust on this organisation. Therefore, creating another instrument based on a community of interests would surely be an added value.
Turkey
There is 1 non-matching component in the full layout above. It's Turkey. Turkey, which has been very far removed from the European Union in fresh years and which besides has advanced autonomy in NATO's actions and policies. The creation of a safety Union – which would conduct a policy in the area of Turkey’s interest – would be a fresh challenge for Ankara. At the same time, the creation of a fresh alliance within the NATO alliance increased the hazard of Turkey appearing from the North Atlantic Pact.
However, it should be borne in head that Erdogan has not identified the interests of Turkey from NATO for years. An unsuccessful 2016 coup effort in Turkey – for which Erdogan blamed the Washington administration – destroyed relations between the United States and Turkey. Which translated into relations within NATO. At the same time, Erdogan's profession, linked to Turkey's failure to join the European Union, completely detached Ankara from the West.
At the minute Turkey is more like a abroad body in NATO, blocking Sweden's accession to the Alliance. It seems that Erdogan has not yet resigned from NATO only due to the Russian threat. due to the fact that on all another levels, the Turkish president has already gotten into a dispute with various Alliance partners.
Recep Erdogan continues to exert force on Greece and acts on the other side of the French conflict in Libya. His actions against Kurds led to tensions with the United States. Faced with fresh developments in Israel, Ankara stands side by side with Hamas erstwhile the US and most of the West support Israel. Finally, Erdogan does not hesitate to blackmail the European Union on the migration crisis.
The question should so be asked whether the European Union should look at the Erdogan Recipe erstwhile it does what it wants and acts against the interests of the Community? Turkey is military strong and safe only due to the fact that it is in NATO. If Ankara were to leave NATO, it would be the biggest geopolitical mistake in Turkey's past after planet War II. Single Turkey would be susceptible to threats from Russia or even Iran. In turn, the deficiency of cooperation with the European Union exposes Turkey to isolation. due to the fact that the full Turkish environment in Asia is on fire or threatened with destabilisation. From Zakaukazia to Lewant.
The European Union cannot look at Erdogan. It should prosecute its interests independently of its approval or disapproval. Moreover, in negotiations with autocrats, the position of force should be taken. This position has not yet been achieved by the EU. Paying for its weakness billions of euros of ransom for migration blackmail.
The Ankaran authorities gotta decide where they want to belong. It seems that specified a decision has even been made. And by no means does Turkey intend to identify with the West. Which is to the detriment of both parties, due to the fact that the country has large potential. However, the EU cannot hold off on crucial projects just due to the fact that 1 of the NATO partners decided to play solo.
Opportunities for implementation
In view of the above considerations, the most crucial question is whether European countries can afford to address the subject of the safety Union and to make a satisfactory majority of the consensus? If the proposal of this union did not interfere with the interests of the Anglo-Saxons, and at the same time it did not pose a threat to NATO's cohesion, it is hard to make it. 1 of them would be the attitude of Germany. The Berlin authorities have been avoiding major defence spending (proportional to German potential) for decades, and at the same time are incapable to act effectively at the level of security. What he proved casus Ukrainian War.
But should we truly look at Germany? If the safety Union initiative had left Paris again and this time was welcomed in London, as well as Madrid, Lisbon, Rome, Athens or yet in Warsaw, it would have been highly probable – even certain – that Berlin would have joined it. Germany does not request to be initiators or founding fathers of this kind of project. Especially since the possible of their armed forces is in question. For years there has been information that equipment or units on paper do not actually have the combat capability. This, in turn, is an excuse for Berlin to hold the execution of abroad missions in the assumed number (vide promised brigade in Lithuania).
The problematic attitude of Germany would be beneficial to Poland, which, after expanding the size and possible of its armed forces, could play an crucial function in the fresh safety format. If the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland could delegate abroad forces in the form of a brigade and a modern ship to various kinds of missions – which would not have a large impact on defence in the assumed improvement of the Polish Armed Forces – then Warsaw could become the main French safety partner.
It should besides be pointed out that countries specified as Spain, Italy or Greece would be most interested, alongside France, in establishing a safety Union. For they are most frequently the first and top victims of events in the mediate East and North Africa. The initiative raised by 4 of the 5 largest EU countries (not counting Germany) supported by the British (who are already engaging themselves, so from their point of view, the UBE would have had a good chance of success. The Netherlands or Belgium would besides be curious in this due to its dependence on maritime trade. With this "basket" of countries, the remainder of Europe would not like to stay outside the fresh format.
Thus, in reality, there are no serious reasons to conclude that the OBE format would be politically unattainable. On the contrary, the safety of the supply of energy natural materials (and not only that) to Europe is, in principle, all concerned. Even, and possibly now especially cut off from Russian energyists Germany. It should be remembered that EU sanctions reduced imports from Russia to the EU by 90% and Germany was the largest EU importer in this direction.
The geopolitical situation in 2023 is different from in 2018 and the awareness of the request to invest in safety is much greater. The thought of the European Union of safety – well presented and conditional – would be much more attractive and better understood than the French concept of the European Army 5 years ago.
New global player
The definition of a common geopolitical safety strategy, followed by the creation of a Treaty on the Union for the safety of Europe, would supply the basis for creating appropriate: political and military tools. Imagine a situation where the destiny of Syria or Iraq is again at stake. Where Israel sets its own interests by generating chaos in the region (weakening state unity threatening its neighbours), Turkey intends to act in accordance with its own interests, Iran engages its militias, the Saudis with money, and the United States and Russia with armed forces. If 1 strong player in the form of an OBE, who through his representation (e.g. the Secretary-General), could exert force on Turkey or Israel, for example, and at the same time could jeopardise a military intervention neutralising Iranian militias or sponsored by the Sauds, then this could have a stabilising effect on the region. At the same time, cooperation with the US and OBE's own engagement could aid anchor Americans in the region. This would entail costs on the 1 hand, but on the another hand it would warrant that nothing crucial would happen in the mediate East without the cognition and participation of the OBE, which would endanger Europe's security.
In the context of the outbreak of Israel's war against Hamas, which may spill across the region, safety issues in the mediate East are one more time becoming highly relevant. The anticipation of stabilising the region – even with dedicated safety forces – could be crucial for the interests of Europe as a whole.
In the context of developments in Africa too, France should be able to number on the support of the another partners of the fresh union. On the 1 hand, it should be ready to play common – not just its own – interests in this field. In another words, it is not the French flag that should fly at the time of meetings in local leaders, but the OBE flag. Represented by a typical who must not necessarily be French (which would frequently be an additional asset).
For balance, the West of Europe should become more active in the safety of the east flank in NATO format. So NATO-OBE should be the planes of penetration. In exchange for example Polish engagement in OBE, French specifics in NATO format could be expected. The problem of wishfulness and trust would vanish by the west under the North Atlantic Pact. present many Poles anticipate the “real” commitment of France from the context of the Russian threat. And this commitment should have been due to the very fact of belonging to NATO. This is, of course, a romanticist attitude. It is right or right. But why not anchor French engagement within NATO through a typical action of character realpolitik. Depending on the transactional perception of global relations?
Then neither the representatives of “realism” nor the supporters of constructivism would have the field of complaint.
The position of NATO countries from the West of Europe should besides be remembered. If NATO is realising on 1 geopolitical level only (Russia), what is the motivation for Portugal, Spain or France to proceed defending Central Europe? From the position of Lisbon, Madrid, Rome or Paris, these capitals are in NATO only as safety donors, due to the fact that they themselves do not feel a direct threat from Moscow. That is why NATO sceptics are so complaining about the deficiency of adequate engagement of the West. Meanwhile, if there is simply a tool for the West of Europe to besides be a safety beneficiary, then there will besides be an argument to require increased engagement on the east flank.
The European Union Armed Forces? What model?
The concept of a more uniform European army has so many flaws and would make so much opposition that it could indeed be unrealistic for political reasons. However, NATO does not have its own army, yet it functions. The OBE could work on a akin principle. Then, within a fresh format, countries could find and decide on their own engagement in the initiative. Of course, this can already be done on a bilateral basis. However, the existence and establishment of a common level of geopolitical interests for almost all European countries and their engagement in the OBE would make it possible to allocate costs to more stakeholders. At the same time, the creation of political and administrative structures (such as a position corresponding to the position of the Secretary-General of NATO) would give emergence to stronger political voice. It should be borne in head that an OBE typical would have much more political importance than the Secretary-General of NATO. For he would lead the work not the alliance stricte a defence and a union that allows the interests of European members to be achieved through the essential political, economical interventions (and why not? The OBE can besides penetrate the EU and the remedies developed under the OBE can be voted on in the Union itself), and yet military.
What could be introduced in the OBE and what is not in NATO is the rule of greater financial commitment of members to the common budget. In crisis situations where cost-generating measures should be taken, countries which would not choose to affect their own military forces (e.g. in stabilisation/settlement missions) should take on greater burden in the financing of OBE missions.
Certainly specified a mechanics would impede the debate on the intervention afraid and on its scope, and so on costs. However, it would warrant that all OBE members would participate to any degree in maintaining the organisation and its potential.
Summary
In consequence to the title question: no, the European Union does not request a common European army, which was only meant to draw attention to a more crucial aspect. due to the fact that Europe needs a common safety format for most countries. Tools to stabilize their neighbourhood, especially in the confederate direction (In the east, the burden of work lies with NATO). This kind of format – nevertheless we call it – would be possible to create. Provided that it is designed in specified a way that it does not hit US interests and does not interfere with NATO's functioning. At the same time, the safety union should be created in isolation from the treaties on the European Union and should be based on a alternatively flexible formula. akin to the North Atlantic Treaty. The NATO format has survived nearly 75 years and has so far fulfilled its main assumption. It is worth the experience.
Europe is losing its importance in the context of global governance security. The comparison of the influence of European countries 100 years ago with those present is devastating to modern times. Meanwhile, we live in a planet where the Old Continent is highly dependent on external imports. Of the regions that are 1 of the most inflamed in the world. Widely understood European safety should not only be put into the hands of external powers or stronger states specified as Russia, China, Turkey, Israel or Iran. Europe, now firmly united on a political and economical level, must take work for its own fate. Not just trust on the United States, whose capabilities are limited. And that's what discourages Washington from engaging in individual regions.
The existence of the European Union requires, on the 1 hand, reasoning about geopolitical conditions in the context of the interests of the Community. On the another hand, united as never before, Europe can, through collective action, make safety possible capable of pursuing its interests. due to the fact that the current strength of individual European countries is besides low to be able to stabilise the regions of interest themselves.
Of course, there can be a reservation of moral nature to the above concept. Whether we are creating a format specified as the OBE described above, we are not returning to a planet in which the West forcefully imposes its will on another members of the global community. This question would possibly have been justified a fewer years ago. present it is visible to the bare eye that authoritarianly ruled states specified as Russia, China, Turkey and others are trying to impose their own will on others. And either Europe will find itself in this situation, or it will gotta accept a abroad order. Which does not necessarily correlate with our values. It's time to get up and halt apologizing for the past, due to the fact that if the Europeans don't shake off, they'll stay on those knees. Only that this symbol of repentance can transform into a symptom of dependence, helplessness, and submission.
To this end, it is worth reconciling constructivism and collective initiatives with mechanisms for conducting global policies consisting in the real defence of common interests. To outline the limits of interest whose infringement would consequence in a European response. Only in this way will it be possible to stabilize the environment and to defy those who would be willing to break the order built by the West. The order, which has served almost all so far, including those who have chosen to challenge it (i.e. Russia) or may effort to do so in the future (like China).
How do we do that?
Of course, in the above-mentioned scope Poland has limited opportunities. At the same time, it was alternatively impossible for the governments of the United Right to initiate specified a concept, and if the Polish government had proposed it, due to its earlier skeptical attitude, it would not have been taken seriously. However, the change of government in Warsaw can give a kind of fresh opening. And fresh levels of dialogue. The fresh government could usage this chance by presenting to the French a concept that would have a better chance of success than the erstwhile one. Then the Paris authorities themselves would take work for the logistics of the project. Poland could be the first to present the thought publically after agreement with France. Which would make him credible by blurring the memory of Macron's 2018 fatal proposal. The companying of specified a task by the most previously skeptical Poland would give a chance to scope more capitals.
At the same time, this script would surely increase the prestige of Poland internationally. What the French could agree to, knowing their own interests in the concept.
The question is: will the fresh government be able to run an ambitious, although surely different from the previous, abroad policy? Now is simply a good time to ask these kinds of questions. And now put social demands on fresh power. due to the fact that we Poles must be ambitious and manifest this quality in public life. So that force on this level is associated in the electoral context and is simply a real motivation for our political class.
It is besides worth remembering that we do not gotta make the same mistake as the West of Europe, which ignored the Russian threat. It would be good for Poland and Poles to show that they think strategically in the future years and even decades and can see the interests common to all Europeans. In this context, the risks posed by Africa, and especially the mediate East, should be analysed and addressed no little than the threat posed by Russia, although the latter, of course, should be the top priority.
Krzysztof Wojchal
geopolitics, politics, economy, law, taxes – blog
