Substantive support: Sandra Krawczyszyn-Trash, Patryk Brush
Consolidation of power, even in a totalitarian regime, requires at least limited support from people. The doctrine of power, described by Max Weber[1], indicates that state management – regardless of the strategy – requires legalization of power. It does not should be legal – North Korea is an example of charismatic legitimacy of power, which, utilizing the cult of individual and its own ideology, provided the basis for long-term totalitarianism.
Kim Ir Sen consolidated power, first building his position through economical reforms, specified as agricultural improvement and the redistribution of assets that gained his support during the first period of socialist development. After the Korean War, in the face of the reduced financial support from the russian Union and the request to build a dense manufacture internally, he switched to a model based on ideology and paternalist leadership, shaping a monolithic strategy in which the dung ideology was established – proclaiming economical self-sufficiency, political independency and defensive nationalism as key values. At the same time, he made certain that his boy Kim Jong Il would make his own authority until he was given the power baton. In 1964, he began his career in the Korean labour Paria (KWP) and made a remarkable contribution to the improvement of propaganda in culture; he is frequently identified as the main maker and interpreter of the beetle ideology[2]. erstwhile Kim Jong Il took power at the 6th Congress, KWP had already developed a strong authority – placing himself as a student of the large chief.
Kim Jong Un, declared “Great Successor” after his father's death on December 17, 2011, faced a hard task of strengthening his position. He formally only assumed the position of vice-president of the Central Military Commission of the KWP, which initially weakened its power.
Unlike his predecessors, Kim Jong Un did not have full established authority and had to compete with his father's and grandfather's inheritance, which put him in a more hard position than his predecessors. Therefore, his first years of government required a return to economical issues, which allowed him to gain partial support in the country and to strengthen his position.
The question is, therefore, how Kim Jong Un consolidated power, what interior mechanisms let to keep the government of North Korea and what the everyday life of Koreans under his regulation actually looks like. The answers form the basis for analysing key aspects of the functioning of North Korean totalitarianism.
Kim Jong Un – the construction and consolidation of power
Kim Jong Il died in 2011 of a abrupt heart attack, which left the government in question. Theoretically, Kim Jong Un's authority was recognized by his father, Kim Jong Ila, as early as 2008, erstwhile the then leader suffered a stroke. However, he did not have as much time as his predecessors to decently prepare for full control of the police and social camera. In addition, strengthening interior repression and exploiting trade surpluses to make military and atomic possible left the DPRK economy in a deep recession. At the time of taking power, North Korean abroad trade in 89.1% was based on an exchange with China. According to the Polish Institute of global Affairs[4], Kim Jong Un, in order to consolidate his power, had to face a multidimensional challenge covering political-ideological, economic, military and global aspects.
The beginning of the reign of his grandson Kim Ir Sena posed medially for a chance to complete full economical isolation, and even a possible lead in the footsteps of a Chinese ally[5]. The change in power brought about the passing of the Hwanggumpjong Legal position and the peculiar economical Zones Act with the participation of the capital of the DPRK and China. Kim Jong Un besides upgraded the abroad Investment Act, thus sending a signal of beginning to stronger global cooperation. It is worth noting, however, that the economical openness did not mean a departure from the father's abroad policy – Kim Jong Un continued atomic trials since April 2012. The initiation of more developed diplomatic relations, especially against an economical background, not only strengthened the leader in the global perspective, but, above all, led to the improvement of the authority of the "Big Leader" within the country. many investments in the first years of his rule, peculiarly in the construction and infrastructure sectors, served as a demonstration of strength and support for the beetle ideology, which assumed self-sufficiency[6]. In 2024, the Government of North Korea launched the “Regional improvement Policy 20×10”, which aims to modernise 20 cities and districts each year over 10 years[7]. utilizing the state's communications monopoly, Kim Jong Un managed to present himself as a leader who would keep the "goods" in society. 1 example of the rhetoric of improving the surviving conditions of citizens was the launch by the Grand Leader of the Ryomyong settlement construction task in Pjongjangu in 2017[7]. The task aimed at creating modern housing for scientists, doctors and another professional elite representatives, creating the propaganda image of Kim Jong Un as “leaders devoted to people”.
However, hopes for a more open, liberal North Korea were deceptive. The fresh leader followed in the footsteps of Kim Ir Sena and Kim Jong Ila, utilizing the tools of totalitarianism to gradually tighten his interior policies. As in 1955, Kim Ir Sen liquidated the leaders of the opposing Ya’an faction, Kim Jong Un executed his uncle Jang Song Tek in 2013, accusing him of treason. In 2017, the authorities liquidated the half-brother of the leader, Kim Jong Nam.[4] There is no political opposition in the country of the one-fraction party, so rotational cleansing meant eliminating possible opponents inside the party. In 5 years, the purges affected about 260 elder organization representatives. This mechanics expanded fear and effectively suppressed any form of civilian disobedience.
The policy of repression besides affected freedom of movement. Kim Jong Un continued his father's policy, which, as a peculiar UN envoy to North Korea, Taj Vitit Muntarbhorn[8], exacerbated penalties for those trying to leave or for those who were sent back after escaping. Deportations and forced displacement of the population are 1 of the crimes the North Korean government has been accused of by the United Nations peculiar Commission on Crimes Against Humanity in 2014[9]. Investigative reports besides point to the existence of 4 immense political camps, to which prisoners leaving detention. Koreans are deprived of their liberty, among others, for "any harm to or demolition of the image of leaders treated as political crimes for which the most severe penalties are imposed"[10]. The wide repression mechanisms of both elites and societies consolidate the unquestionable power of Kim Jong Un and effectively block the improvement of the opposition vote.
In the face of a full subordinate society and Kim Jong Un's elite, he reached for the constitution of the DPRK to yet consolidate his function as a totalitarian leader. In 2019 he introduced a constitutional amendment according to which he was officially recognized as the ultimate typical of the nation and the state. This was both symbolic and political. In addition to strengthening his position in society, this besides gave him a formal advantage over the military and government institutions[11].
Military tools for consolidating power
Maintaining a world-closed totalitarianism in which citizens are subject to repression for offences specified as inappropriate hairstyle, inappropriate name for a kid or non-participation on national holidays requires a loyal army implementing all orders of the ultimate Leader. The introduction in 2019 of an amendment to the constitution giving Kim Jong Un even greater powers played a key function in further consolidation of the North Korean regime, peculiarly in the face of restrictions introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Secret political police are a characteristic of totalitarian regimes, as Hannah Arendt observed[12]. In North Korea, the Department of interior safety is liable for the search and convicting of "anti-government activists", while the formal police apparatus controls social life at all levels. all citizen has an work to belong to neighbourhood groups, alleged imminban, which function at local level. These are information units that collect data on residents – from income to eating habits. These groups are frequently headed by middle-aged women who study any disturbing behaviour to the authorities. This strategy effectively prevents the organization of any resistance, as residents do not trust each other. As Yeonmi Park noted, “this is simply a method of collective demolition and individual identity of citizens”.[13]
Police action, which maintains order among the public, is contingent upon a monopoly on arms and violence[13]. Kim Jong Un controls a highly disciplined army whose tradition dates back to the beginning of the North Korean uprising. Kim Ir Sen, the founder of the state, came from the army and it was in its structures that he created his organization committee. In order to avoid a military coup, the political organization and the military were closely merged, and leaders of opposing political factions – and thus military – systematically eliminated. The imagination of a strong army, securing the power of the dictator, was expressed in 1955 by the introduction of a Songun policy. expanding representation of advanced military rank in state apparatus at various levels was another step towards full control of state structures. The army is besides the foundation of the beetle ideology – representing the thought of self-sufficiency by demonstrating defence capabilities and readiness to defend the country without external support.
Internal control of the military and police affects global security. all year, arms spending accounts for more than 25% of the country's GDP. By comparison, Poland's evidence military spending plan for 2025 is little than 5% of GDP[14]. specified financial outlays are utilized to make atomic and rocket programs. Since 2006, North Korea has consistently developed its atomic potential, thus seeking to be politically independent from China and Russia. The first 2006 rocket trials were limited in range, but in 2017 the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic rocket test possibly covered the full United States territory[15]. In 2023, North Korea tested an underwater atomic drone capable of atomic attack. According to the KCNA government agency, the test was a consequence to “provokations” from the US, Japan and South Korea. In the context of the U.S. presidential election in 2024, South Korean intelligence reports that North Korea may be preparing for its seventh effort to launch an intercontinental ballistic rocket (ICBM).[16]
Each atomic test is both a demonstration of force and a consequence to global criticism and sanctions. These actions item the regime's determination to keep independency and defence capacity in the face of external pressure. A well-developed atomic programme reduces the likelihood of intervention by 3rd countries and provides a tool of advantage in diplomatic negotiations. Military successes are besides utilized in interior propaganda, strengthening the image of Kim Jong Un as a leader who protects the state from “external danger”. At the same time, they let further improvement of the beetle ideology, which strengthens its power on both the interior and global arenas.
The regular Life of Citizens Under Totalitarianism
A strong authority of the ultimate leader, constantly supported by a police and military apparatus, leaves the anticipation of full control of society and the introduction of an ideology defining all areas of the life of the average Korean. Knowing the factors behind keeping the totalitarian government alive, our analysis will now focus on showing how these mechanisms actually affect the lives of 26 million inhabitants. Although information about the actual state of the economy and social conditions is sometimes false, as it is published only by the Korean Government Central Press Agency, statements of refugees, expert opinions and reports produced by the UN Agency give us limited insight into what life looks like in the world's longest-lasting military totalitarianism.
The quality of life – access to technology, transport, food and even moving water – varies depending on the position in the social caste. The songbun class division puts on top of the military pyramid and trusted members of the administration. The mediate class is besides developing, especially in larger cities, but as UN rapporteur Tomás Ojea Quintana reports, there is no access to food adequate to lead a average life. [17]
One of the increasing problems in the DPRK society is hunger. The first feeding crisis occurred in 1995–1997 erstwhile Kim Jong Il, focusing on the improvement of far-reaching beetle ideology, weakened contacts with the crumbling USSR. As planet imagination estimates, the number of victims is about 2 million during this period.
Although the food shortages were a consequence of Kim Ir Sena's policy, which cut off the world's access to information about the state of the economy and possible humanitarian support, he inactive claimed to be the Father of the Nation, who provided the Koreans with prosperity. With the onset of the crisis, a card strategy was introduced, and residents were encouraged to limit food intake to 2 per day. Even in the face of global aid provided by the United Nations planet Food Programme, food aid was highly limited as the authorities neglected to distribute it. The inability to supply food straight to the residents has caused humanitarian organizations specified as Borders, Oxfam or CARE to retreat their assistance in the region permanently. The DPRK authorities have besides utilized the famine crisis to blame the United States and middle-level officials, thereby maintaining a flawless image. [18]
The fact about the food crises, as well as the humanitarian aid offered, does not scope most North Koreans due to the monopoly of power over the media and limited access to information. In order to keep the strong function of the dung ideology, representing the narrow elite of the DPRK as self-sufficient, the influence of South Korean or Western culture is strictly prohibited. This does not necessarily mean that citizens of the DPRK do not have developed awareness of themselves, but are deprived of freedom of speech, and that prison sentences and death affect the creation of social attitudes. all day they only deal with the severely censored Kwangmyong computer network. Since the 1960s, televisions and radios produced in the country have been equipped with receivers preventing the reception of abroad stations, which was linked in that period to a run of mass demolition of abroad books. The exchange of information is besides effectively restricted by strict monitoring of movements between municipalities and provinces. Authorities besides restrict access to information for the outside world. The only channel is the Korean government Central Press Agency. [12]
The influence of state propaganda involves not only censorship in everyday life, but besides shaping views on leaders and government from primary socialization, that is, utilizing education. 11-year school education includes learning about the past of the Kim dynasty, in which the heroic conflict for independency is described. Older students learn in depth the Kims' “golden thoughts” and students with the top abilities are recruited by the state apparatus to work in the improvement of the atomic program. This means that even the school is part of a military device serving the thought of the nation's self-sufficiency. Although North Korea has signed the Convention on the Rights of the kid [19], the conditions in schools are far from perfect – deficiency of heating, mediocre schoolroom equipment and hunger among students are everyday. This highlights the gap between propaganda declarations and the reality of citizens' lives, showing the failure of the system.
Ideological education goes beyond the walls of schools. all worker undergoes ideological training at their workplace. Despite the facade function of Article 68. The Constitution, which guarantees spiritual freedom “religion cannot become an excuse for action aimed at the state” which, according to Human Rights Watch, severely restricts actual spiritual freedom[20]. The worship of the Kim dynasty is practiced in homes. Each citizen is obliged to have portraits of leaders in his home and participate in cultural events specified as mass gymnast shows or celebrations commemorating the anniversary of the Kim family. all 15 April is celebrated, among others, a sunday celebrating the birthday of Kim Ir Sena[21].
Non-participation in state propaganda has severe consequences, as information on all actions of citizens is regularly collected by local groups of imminban. The threat of a forced labour camp or even a simplification in class-sharing position effectively forces citizens to keep a image of obedience. Another, inactive highly crucial origin that determines obedience within the state is collective responsibility, a strategy known as yeon-jwa-je. According to Park Yeon-mi, “The question of the government may end in prison or death for all members of our household up to and including the 3rd generation.” [22]
As Oskar Pietrewicz points out, "North Korea is not necessarily a meek nation, but the constant fear of breaking rules that are not always known, and the problem of collective work prevent opposition"[23]. In this way, ideology becomes an integral part of social life, and North Korea meets all the criteria of full totalitarianism.
A series of 3 articles show how the North Korean government maintains power, combining interior control with an global strategy of isolationism and the improvement of atomic potential. Inside the country propaganda, censorship, ideological education and repression apparatus effectively destruct opposition. Fear and a strategy of collective work strengthens the subjection of society, and a strong military consolidates power and implements the beetle ideology. Outside, the improvement of the atomic programme serves both as a defence tool and a consequence to sanctions, strengthening the regime's position in global relations. In this way, North Korea connects autarka with political isolationism, avoiding destabilisation that another totalitarian regimes have experienced.
However, the past of the government shows that these processes are profoundly embedded in a unique North Korean road – from the birth of a strategy supported by russian and Chinese patrons to the construction of autarkia and defensive nationalism. Unlike another historical totalitarian regimes, specified as the 3rd Reich or the USSR, the collapse of North Korea would not end the global crisis, alternatively it could initiate it, leading to destabilisation of the region and escalation of global tensions.
Given the improvement of the atomic programme and the possible impact of the U.S. presidential election results in 2024, the question remains as to how long the government will be able to keep its position. Will the future Kims be able to hold personalized power, or will North Korea become a model of collective authority? How will further sanctions and global force affect the sustainability of the system? The answers to these questions will be crucial to knowing the future of 1 of the world's most closed regimes.
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