The impasse of European integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Analysis

2025-07-25

The impasse of European integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Paulina Wankiewicz

On 17 July, the European Commission (EC) informed the central authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) of the simplification in the funds provided for in the EU Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. BiH lost EUR 108.4 million, or 10% of the amount allocated to it (it can inactive receive EUR 976.6 million). Objectives The plan is to integrate the Western Balkans into the EU's Single Market, deepen regional reforms and cooperation and increase financial support to accelerate their convergence with the EU. The transportation of a comprehensive improvement plan is simply a condition for receiving funds, both in the form of grants and loans. The EC has informed that if it is not delivered by 30 September, BiH may lose another 10% of its growth plan funding.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only country in the region that, due to the tense intrapolitical situation, failed to finalise the improvement plan (by the end of 2024, Albania, Montenegro, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia and Serbia did so). The central government's paralysis may proceed until subsequent elections (October 2026). To be overcome, force from the global community will be needed.

Comment

Bosnia and Herzegovina is simply a country in an organization crisis which halts its advancement on the way of integration with the EU. The enlargement process requires BiH authorities at all levels to harmonise local government with the EU, which gives emergence primarily to opposition from Bosnian Serbs. The president of the Republic of Serbia (RS, part of BiH) Milorad Dodik opposes all reforms which in his opinion mean the centralisation of the country, i.e. the shift of competence from RS to central government. Among the issues raised in the draft improvement plan is in peculiar theThe Constitutional Court of BiH (TK BiH) – see Justice dispute in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Brussels demands that the RS authorities place the vacancying positions of judges and implement the ruling of the TK BiH in the part of the country they manage. Individual political forces are besides incapable to agree on another issues, specified as the abolition of the right of veto on the distribution of aid from the state (central) fund or the harmonisation of the Bosnian visa government with the EU.
The constitutional order established in Dayton favours the notorious blockades of the central government of BiH. At the beginning of the year, there was a breakdown of the government coalition at central level, consisting of 3 Bosnian parties (the alleged "Triple"), the Croatian Democratic Community of BiH (HDZ BiH) and the Serbian Union of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), the leader of which is Dodik. The reason for the breach of the cooperation of the "Trójka" with the SNSD was the Serbian blockade of the laws required by Brussels as part of the enlargement process. This was besides influenced by the secessionist aspirations and problems of the president of RS with the law (the conviction of the court of first instance and the BOLO, see. Dodik trial: a test of forces with Serbian separatistism in Bosnia and Herzegovina). As a consequence of his agreement with the prosecution and the court (centrally) whose content has not been disclosed, the BOB's BOB for leader was withdrawn and the announcement of the verdict of the second instance was postponed in time. Bosnian media speculate that in exchange for calming down problems with the Dodik law will quit politically. The "Trójka" aims to have SNSD replace 3 opposition parties from RS in the coalition, but the Bosnian Croatians from HDZ BiH disagree. The leader of the largest Croatian group Dragan Čović remains in a tactical alliance with Dodik, which is intended to aid him prosecute his own goals, i.e. the improvement of the electoral law in BiH, the consequence of which would be de facto the separation of the 3rd Croatian entitet and, consequently, the further division of the country.
The deficiency of advancement of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the European way demonstrates the impasse of EU policy towards it. BiH remains the worst prepared candidate for membership and has not made clear advancement since the start of negotiations in 2024. The Union lacks a strategy that would drive ethnonationalist elites to implement politically costly reforms that could lead to their failure of power. In addition, the EU is characterised by a deficiency of unanimity, specified as the imposition of sanctions on Dodik, preventing it from exerting effective pressure. The punishment of the separatist leader of Bosnian Serbs is opposed, among others, to Hungary and Croatia. As a result, the enlargement process loses credibility and Bosnians, inactive most enthusiastically approaching membership (in 2024, 68% of the population would vote in favour of joining the EU), have a decline in support of integration (in 2022 the consequence was 8 pp. above). In addition, as many as 42% of those surveyed believe that the EU has no genuine intention of accepting the countries of the region into the community (according to the IRI survey of 2022 and 2024).

Annex. Specificity of the political strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is simply a multiethnic country whose current political strategy is defined within the framework of the 1995 Dayton Agreements, ending a 3 and a half year bloody war in this country. The constitution of BiH, 1 of its annexes, provides for a circumstantial strategy of power – based on the principles of territorial autonomy, cultural parity and the anticipation of utilizing a veto in defence of the interests of a given nation.

Political system

Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of 2 entities, the so-called ethitets: Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), divided into 10 cantons, and unitary and highly centralised Serbian Republic (RS). District Brczko (DB) – due to its strategical location (dividing RS to half and border with Croatia) – is simply a separate autonomous territorial unit.

BiH has 3 levels of government: Central (BiH), Entity (FBiH and RS) and Cantonal (only in FBiH). At the central level, the Bureau of BiH – the collective head of state, consisting of 3 representatives (one representative: the Bosnians, the Serbs and the Croats), elected for a four-year word in direct elections. At central level, the legislative authority belongs to the bizbic parliament, and executive power is exercised by the Council of Ministers, which has limited powers, mainly in the field of abroad and safety policy, fiscal and justice (nine ministries). Most rights applicable to everyday life of citizens, i.e. covering education, wellness and infrastructure, have been entrusted to bodies on a subject level (RS and FBiH) or cantonal level (FBiH). Each of the entities (i.e. the FBiH and RS) besides has its president and two-camera parliaments, and in the decentralized FBiH the power is additionally held by cantonal assemblies and governments.

One of the pillars of the functioning of consensus democracy in BiH is the so-called. the rule of the protection of vital national interests. In theory, it was intended to guarantee equality for all 3 nations in the country: the Bosnians, the Serbs and the Croats, but in practice it is utilized to block the political initiatives of opponents.

Roleinternational community

One of the peculiarities of political life in BiH is office of the advanced Representative (The Office of the advanced typical in Bosnia and Herzegovina, OHR), who has broad legislative and executive power. Its task is to implement the civilian Dayton Agreements, and the "Divine Entitlements" established in 1997 give it almost unlimited legislative and executive powers, inter alia, to dismiss officials in the country, establish legal acts or enforce the implementation of these provisions. In addition, the Constitutional Tribunal has 3 abroad judges appointed by the European Court of Human Rights. The European Union military operation EUFOR Althea is besides active in BiH, which aims to guarantee home safety in the country.

Main levels of disputes

Shape BiH "Boszniacy (approximately 50% of the BiH population) advocates the thought of centralisation of the state (as a maximumist version, they request the abolition of territorial autonomy of RS and cantons); Bosnian Serbs (approximately 31%) strive to maximize the self-government of RS, now, eating the thought of "the first Dayton", which guaranteed a large independency of both entities – want to keep the widest possible competence within the RS, leading to, among others, boycotts of central institutions or property disputes; Croats (about 15%) request the top possible representation at all levels of power, and in utmost cases, even the creation of the 3rd Croatian entitet.
The function of the global community – Bosnian Serbs request the end of global supervision, including the removal of abroad judges from the Constitutional Court and the liquidation of OHR institutions.
Historical policy – each of the 3 nations inhabiting BiH cultivates its own attitude towards the events of the 1990s war (and frequently besides towards planet War II).