Progressive decline in Hungarian population: all hope in fertility growth

The population of 9.6 million Hungarians has shrunk since the systemic transformation by nearly 8%. The decrease in the yearly population recorded in 2023 was the 3rd highest among EU countries. Since the mid-1980s, depopulation has been accompanied by demographic processes typical of modern Western societies – a low fertility rate that translates into a decrease in birth rates and an ageing population. Although Hungary is not isolated from its demographic problems, it is characteristic of the extremist pronatalist approach of its authorities. Since 2010, Viktor Orbán's successive governments have been pursuing increased household policy efforts aimed at expanding fertility and are opposed to taking migration as a tool to improve the demographic situation.

In the erstwhile decade, fertility increased from 1.23 in 2011 to 1.61 in 2021. The results of the fresh census show that, despite this, Hungary recorded a evidence decrease in population (by 334,000) between 2011 and 2020. Since 2022 less children have been born over the Danube (the fertility rate decreased to 1.38 in 2024) and the depopulation has progressed at the fastest rate so far. Although the government inactive has advanced spending on pronatalist policies, the decline in birth rates appears to be mainly influenced by macroeconomic factors and social sentiments.

Record Depopulation

According to the results of the census of 2022. The population of Hungary is 9.6 million, meaning that in the last decade it decreased by 3.4% (334 thousand). The population decline between 2 measurements, which take place all 10 years on average, has never been so large (see Figure 1). The most fresh decrease was in the 1980s (-3.1%)^[1]. A evidence of the end of the Kadarism era was so broken, which marked the strengthening of the consumerist approach to life according to the popular phrase "car or child" (coal). kicsi vagy blankets). The latest figures from 2023 indicate that the population is 9.59 million, and thus show a continuation of the downward trend. The forecast in the trendy option, which assumes that current trends will be preserved, shows that by 2050 the Hungarian population will decrease to 8.5 million, corresponding to a decrease of 13% in 3 decades.^[2].

Figure 1. Change in the population of Hungary between the censuses from 1941 to 1922

Source: Central Statistical Office (KSH).

The population population is mainly affected by negative growth (the number of deaths in excess of surviving births) – the affirmative migration balance in Hungary is not adequate to compensate for this loss. According to the current doctrine of demographic balance in this respect (i.e. the number of births corresponding to the number of deaths) which translates into the alleged simple replacementability of generations, provides fertility rates of 2.1 (expressed in relation to surviving births to the population of women aged 15-44). For Hungary, this indicator reached a critical value of 1.23 in 2011, followed by a period of successive growth to 1.61 in 2021.

Since 2022, there has been a recurrence of decline – to 1.38 in 2024 (-9.1% compared to the erstwhile year). At the same time, almost as many children were born in the utmost fertility rate of 2011 and 2022. This is due to the fact that in 2011, more women gave birth in full to a akin number of children, little women in 2022. – Hungarians have become inclined to have more offspring. In 2024, the number of births was 77,5 1000 – at least since the beginning of statistic – which means a decrease in yearly terms by more than 7 thousand.

Figure 2. Development of birth rates and fertility rates between 1990 and 2024

Source: Central Statistical Office (KSH).

Although the population decline in fresh years has besides been affected by an increased number of deaths (recordedly advanced during the COVID-19 pandemic) and by a negative migration balance, the latest data indicate, above all, the decline in the affirmative trend in fertility growth. Its uplift remains at the top of the political agenda governing Fidesz since 2010, which spared no budgetary expense on extended household policy programmes. The government cannot be denied success in this respect, in peculiar the reversal of the fertility decline trend between 2012 and 2021, erstwhile the fertility rate remained either rising or steady.

Source: Central Statistical Office (KSH).

The growth trend between 2011 and 2021 was clearly correlated with the formal request to stay married for the granting of household benefits (tax exemptions, preferential credit on the acquisition of the first flat – besides in the case of the marriage's declared childless desire to have a child). Boom married due to the fact that in earlier years the basic form of partnership life among Hungarians remained a concubinet. This provided an excess of couples ready to get married from purely pragmatic motives (receiving a benefit), which over time was depleted and so the affirmative trend in the number of vows did not prove to be lasting.

The persistence of affirmative demographic trends in erstwhile years (especially the growth of fertility rates, but besides the number of married couples) has been a tangible demonstration for the government of the effectiveness of conservative household policies and has allowed to advance Hungarian success internationally. In the demographic period of prosperity 2010-2020 Hungary recorded the second highest rate of fertility among the 52 OECD countries, with 21% of growth giving way only to Latvia^[3]. The collapse of the affirmative trend in the last 2 to 3 years in the absence of crucial changes in the government's actions has led to the search for causes of a lower tendency for Hungarians to have offspring among factors another than the government's pro-family policy itself, which has a bearing on the standard of surviving of society, specified as GDP, consumer inflation and purchasing power of wages.

Three decades of household policy – various measures, the same objective

In contrast to the another post-socialist countries of the region where systemic household policy policies were introduced gradually, Hungary entered a fresh system, drawing from the heritage of the extended Kadarov system. advanced cash transfers are permanently included in Hungarian household policy. Although they were partially discontinued in the mid-1990s by the budget cuts programme (the alleged Bocros package) for the power of liberals and socialists, the first government of Orbán (1998–2002) restored a generous social policy – benefits for families were increased by 20% and their thirteenth wage was besides introduced^[4]. In 2000, the leader of Fidesz announced that the standard for Hungarian families should be "three rooms, 3 children and 4 wheels" (coal). három szoba, három gyerek, négy kerek), which became a later electoral slogan.

The governing left initially pursued these measures in 2002–2010, inter alia by further expanding benefits (e.g. for the birth of a kid to 225% of the minimum wage).^[5]). In subsequent years, however, it focused mainly on the activation of professional mothers, expanding the number of care and education facilities and combating kid poorness (including Roma minority, which accounts for about 6–7% of the country's population). As a consequence of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, which hit Hungary peculiarly hard, household benefits (including the key GYES benefit – see Annex) reported a decrease in real value by more than 15%^[6].

After returning to power in 2010, the conservative Fidesz–KDNP coalition became 1 of the main political objectives of achieving a fertility rate of 2.1 by 2030. The government of Orbán restored the two-year leave of GYED and the three-year leave of GYES, abbreviated earlier as part of the anti-crisis activities of socialists, while limiting the anticipation of full-time employment of mothers collecting benefits. fresh were taxation breaks for multi-children (with linear income taxation structure). Since 2016, the Hungarian authorities have besides offered a preferential credit strategy for couples declaring their desire to have offspring (coals). babavaró hitel), as well as for families with more than 2 children wishing to invest in buying the first flat or building a home under the CSOK programme (coal. családi otthonteremtési kedvezmény), which additionally assumes protection from the effects of occupation losses.

The Hungarian household policy since the transformation has been characterised by comparative generosity of benefits. At the same time, left-wing governments preferred universal benefits, and Fidesh associated them more with the activity of mothers and later besides fathers. The last 4 terms of Orbán's regulation have established a turn towards this second model, though not without modification over 15 years. Enrichment of cash benefits with taxation and credit relief and the link between support for families and housing are the main changes that have made Hungarian household policies in the current form peculiar beneficiaries of middle-class families that can benefit from more than the benefit itself and receive financial transfers in proportion to the level of earnings. To a lesser extent, the poorest families (including Roma origin) gain from them.

The instruments of family-based policy have changed over the years, but have always remained geared to expanding births, while the funds allocated to it were comparatively high. household policy was a precedence for the authorities to specified an degree that from the early 21st century onwards Hungary has become the European leader in public spending on the household in relation to GDP^[7]. By OECD data for 2019 spent 3.1% of GDP on family-friendly activities (including 0.7% in the form of taxation credits). However, these expenditures disagree in structure in that country – 3 quarters represent cash transfers (services and taxation reliefs) and the remainder of the service (e.g. nurseries, kindergartens), while in the Nordic countries, which keep full expenditure at akin levels of GDP, this proportion is reversed. According to the Hungarian authorities, the current spending on family-friendly policies is up to 5% of GDP (this is likely to be based on a different methodology than the OECD comparisons cited above)^[8].

Demographic policy in Fidesz ideology

Demographic trends in Hungary, specified as negative natural growth, which translates into a depopulation or an ageing population, are not different from those recorded in another western countries and are mostly linked to changes in the lifestyle of modern societies. In another countries of Central Europe, the fertility rate besides oscillates around values far from the simple replacement ratio of generations (in 2023 it amounted to 1.16 in Poland, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia – 1.45 and 1.49 respectively, and in Hungary – 1.51).

The circumstantial features of the Hungarian debate on demographic change are historically shaped by concerns about the "death of the nation" (coal. nemzethalál)^[9]. Collective fears arise from the “herder prophecies” formulated in the late 18th century.^[10]That Hungarians may not last as a tiny nation squeezed between Slavs, Germans and Romanians. The prophecy of the German philosopher (which on his part is alternatively a note on the margin of his research) has had a major impact on the Hungarian intellectual life in the era of self-determination of nations and has influenced the collective imagination to this day—especially given the past trauma associated with the Treaty of Trianon, which sealed the failure of 2 thirds of its territory.^[11].

In rhetoric led by the ruling continuously since 4 word Fidesz household and children are more than a conservative group. The constitution of Hungary adopted in 2011 sees the household as an institution whose support is in the interests of the state as crucial to the "survival of the nation"^[12]. These issues became more crucial after the 2015–2016 migration crisis, erstwhile the subject began to be at the centre of the narratives of the local authorities. As Orbán points out, "(...) we have demographic problems, but we do not request migrants, only Hungarian children, so we argue migration and support families"^[13]. Fertility stimulation is simply a recipe for Fidesz for the endurance of the nation, while the main remedy for "ideological threats from the liberal and multicultural West" and the only right alternate to accepting migrants from outside Europe who, in the communicative of the group, endanger "cultural integrity" of nations.

Hungary's pronatalist policy has become an ideological "export commodity" of this country over the last 15 years. Fighting the demographic crisis in Europe was 1 of the central programming issues of their Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2011 and 2024. Starting in 2015, an global Hungarian Demographic Summit is held all 2 years in Budapest. Its host to date was president Katalin Novák (2022–2024), who previously served as Minister of household Affairs. So far, successes attributed to pro-family policy – designed to translate into periodic improvement of statistic – have been recognized in global conservative circles, especially in the ideologically close to Fidesz political camp Donald Trump. The promoter of the Hungarian model is Tucker Carlson, a controversial Fox News station expo^[14], and the Republican elites addressed Hungary's approach to demographic challenges under the CPAC (Conservative Political Action Conference), which has been held for 3 years besides in the capital of that country.

politicising migration processes

Although the authorities are very powerfully opposed to immigration, this does not mean that the influx population is not desirable in Hungary. This applies first to Hungarians surviving abroad. The Fidesz government has since its first word pursued a policy towards a Hungarian number in neighbouring countries whose authoritative goal is to strengthen these communities, but paradoxically, it besides results in solutions facilitating the cultural return of Hungary to its homeland. The breakthrough on this issue was the 2001 Hungarian People's Act surviving abroad. The establishment of the Charter of Hungary can be seen as part of a strategy aimed at mitigating national demographic problems, as could the 2007 government on residence permits for third-country nationals and the introduction of simplified naturalisation and dual citizenship in 2011.

Between 1990 and 2007, more than 2 thirds of the inflow population came from neighbouring countries, where a Hungarian number (Romania, Ukraine, Serbia, Slovakia) resided; the largest group came from Romania^[15]. The 2011 government resulted in a steep increase in the number of Hungarian citizens who were born abroad until 2016 (before 2012 it was between 2 and 3 000 people per year, and nearly 18,000 were registered in 2015). In fresh years, their number has stabilised below 10,000 per year. It is estimated that without the influx of Hungarians from neighbouring countries in fresh decades, the population in the country would now be little than 1 million^[16]. It mostly offset negative demographic trends – since the 1990s more people have come to Hungary than they have left.

The number of emigrating citizens of this country over the years shows a slow emergence in the outflow of the population after 2007 and a highest in the emigration wave in 2011 and 2014-2015, followed by a decline since 2016. Between 2000 and 1923, the balance of abroad migration per 1 000 inhabitants in only 3 years was negative – in 2013, 2014 and 2016, more people left the country than they came to. It should be noted that national statistic on emigration of Hungarian citizens are importantly lower than mirror statistic (host countries). According to Eurostat, around 370 000 lived in the EU at the end of 2021. Hungary and this number have barely changed in years. The largest population was in Germany – around 190 000 (the UK took first place before brexit); in Austria, the number of Hungarian citizens reached 100 000 in 2021.

Figure 4. Migration balance in Hungary from 2000 to 1923

Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH).

The harsh anti-immigration rhetoric of the Hungarian government was formulated in the wake of the severe migration crisis in 2015, erstwhile the country over 400,000 refugees over a fewer weeks (a large majority went to the more prosperous countries of Western Europe). Faced with the immigration wave, Budapest sought to present as a defender of the Schengen area. Shortly thereafter, it was decided to build a 175 km long barrier along the border with Serbia, which became a symbol of the Hungarian government's opposition to the adoption of "illegal" immigrants and the application of EU asylum government (as a consequence, the EU Court of Justice imposed a fine of EUR 200 million on Hungary in June 2024 and a regular punishment of EUR million for each day of hold in adapting the rules). Authorities regularly organise anti-immigration billboard campaigns and propose a direct link between immigration and terrorism, crime and rising unemployment in media communications.

Despite the harsh anti-immigration rhetoric of the ruling Hungary, it is increasingly a destination country for immigration. This is due to the increasing shortage of labour, which has become a pressing problem in fresh years for many sectors of the economy (especially construction and transport) and a brake on manufacture – according to forecasts, the local labour marketplace will request an additional 300 000 people by 2035. According to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (CSO) in 2024, nearly 251 000 citizens of another countries were present in the country, of which 139 000 were from Europe and 92 000 from Asia, respectively, 144,000 and 65 000 a year earlier, indicating a dynamic increase in the inflow population from the Asian continent as compared with a decrease in the number of visitors from Europe. The Act on the temporary residence of third-country nationals passed in December 2023 regulates the influx of immigrants from 15 non-EU countries. Their arrival in Hungary will not solve the problem of depopulation but will supply labour – for example, for the creation of Chinese lithium-ion batteries and electrical cars. specified action is evidence of the authorities' reaching for pragmatic solutions, even if they conflict with the earlier narrative, in this case of rejecting migration from another cultural circles.

Isn't that the way? Perspectives

The attractiveness of the parental benefit strategy in force in the country is comparative and should be assessed in the context of current economical realities. From the point of view of active beneficiaries, it is crucial to stay at home with the kid – the degree of replacement of earnings depends not only on their amount, but besides on inflation and the associated real purchasing power of money. The continued advanced inflation in Hungary since 2022 has led to a decrease in the real value of the benefits and programmes related to the acquisition of properties under precarious economical conditions are no longer adequate for many families.

The years 2012-2019, erstwhile a steady or rising fertility rate persisted in Hungary, were at the same time a period of economical prosperity expressed in rising GDP and fast improvement of the mediate class. As an economical indicator which has a clear effect on fertility on a negative correlation basis, price increases should be considered. Low inflation is accompanied by a higher fertility rate and vice versa - 2022, erstwhile the affirmative trend in fertility was broken, was a year of fast inflation in Hungary to an average yearly level of 14%.

In addition, the authorities in Budapest are facing an economical downturn (twice in the last 2 years a method recession occurred) and a large budget deficit (5.4% of GDP in 2024) which could make them cut social expenditure in the short term. So far, it's been announced restrictions under the strategy to co-finance housing for multi-children families of CSOK (only in agrarian areas) and the strategy of preferential credit for married women expecting a kid (the advanced limit of the beneficiary age from 41 to 30 years has been lowered). From the point of view of the scale of the household policy on the Danube, these are not crucial limitations, which means thatneither the breakdown of trends nor the economical turbulence has so far influenced the change in the Hungarian government's course in household policy. On the contrary, in the State Message of 22 February, Prime Minister Orbán announced as part of the electoral promises For life, the income taxation exemption of mothers at least 2 children. In the face of the upcoming parliamentary elections in the spring of 2026 and the increasing strength of the fresh opposition, the ruling organization will search to keep the current scale of direct support for families as a jone of the most crucial social programmes and ways to keep public support.

Figure 5. Development of fertility rate and price index of goods and services (CPI) in 2010–2023

Source: É. Anita, Született még ilyen Kevés magyar gyerek – ezért pukakdt ki az orbáni családpolitika, Válash Online, 11.11.2024, valashonline.hu.

In view of the social policy model, Hungary is recognised as a state of "early prosperity", where social services were designed during the period of growth. This causes insufficient economical possible of the country to be felt during stagnation and decline, which in turn affects the decision to have children^[17]. The global financial crisis of 2007 had a akin effect–2009 which not only pushed the state towards the brink of financial collapse, but besides negatively affected demographic indicators. From this perspective, the current condition of the Hungarian economy and its accompanying social sentiments are surely not conducive to fertility, and the government's actions to date have ceased to be a adequate incentive for Hungarians to grow families.

The exhaustion of the current model of household policy in the realities of the economical crisis makes us look for another solutions. A remedium on the progressive decline in population could be migration for Hungary. To a lesser extent, it may be the Hungarian population from neighbouring countries, as its migration possible has mostly been exhausted. Budapest would gotta open itself to accepting immigrants from outside Europe. While this does not seem likely in the case of the mediate East migration due to ideological opposition from the authorities, this is becoming increasingly real for contract workers from China and the countries of Southeast Asia (mainly the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia), which Hungary is increasingly taking on.

ANNEX

Family support strategy in Hungary

The extended strategy of parental leave and benefits remains the foundation of the Hungarian household policy aimed at both parents. Families have 3 main types of support, namely CSED (formerly TGYAS), GYES and GYED. The first was CSED (coal. csecsemőgondozási díj) – this is the equivalent of maternity leave, it lasts 24 weeks and women who are entitled to receive 70% of the previously earned wage are covered by social insurance, i.e. who work at least 1 year in the 2 years preceding the birth of the child. After maternity leave, 1 of the parents is entitled to usage GYES. gyermekgondozást segítő ellátás) or GYED (coal. gyermekngondozási díj).

The GYES benefit is granted to uninsured persons up to the age of 3 years of the kid (longer in the case of duplicate pregnancy or disability) and amounts, regardless of income, to 28.5 1000 forints per period (about 71 euros) per child. This benefit package can besides be utilized by the grandparents of a kid aged between 1 and 2 years. In turn, GYED is intended for insured parents and is entitled to 1 of them after maternity leave until the second year of age of the child. The benefit in this case is 70% of earnings (with a limit of up to 407,000 gross forints per month, i.e. approx. 1 000 euro).

Hungarian families are besides beneficiaries of an extended taxation credit strategy – the jointly settled spouses can benefit from a credit of 10 000 forints (about 25 euro) per period with 1 child, 20 000 forints (approx. 50 euro) with 2 and 33 000 forints (approx. 83 euro) with 3 children (by 2026 these amounts will be raised in 2 stages – up to 20,000, 80 1000 and 66 1000 forints respectively); and mothers of 4 or more children were exempt from taxation for life income (from October 2025 they will besides be mothers of 3 children and from 2026 – twos). An interesting solution can be considered to be the link between the pension strategy for mothers: Hungarians who have raised 5 or more children are entitled to early retirement (maximum 7 years).