How Zelenskyy undermined Ukraine’s way to EU membership and what happens next

President Zelenskyy, full aware of the advancement made within the EU, not only continued but intensified the attack on reforms.

The dismantling of the independency of NABU and SAPO crossed the EU’s red lines. At this point, the presence or absence of Hungary’s veto no longer matters. Ukraine has done the dirty work itself alternatively of Viktor Orbán.

Promises to the EU

Close observers of the statements made by elder European officials about Ukraine’s way to EU membership may have noticed an crucial shift in speech regarding the pace of accession talks.

Towards the end of 2024 and beginning of 2025, Brussels and respective another associate states were talking openly about their aim to open all six negotiating clusters with Ukraine by the end of the year. This would have been an unprecedented pace for the EU bureaucracy, the like of which has not been seen with any another country in fresh decades. Even ahead of the major enlargement of 2004, erstwhile the EU’s structure was simpler and the obligations for candidates far fewer, the preparatory phase took longer than that.

Still, given Ukraine’s unique importance and role, Brussels made a political choice to openly set this ambitious goal. Six months ago, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen began publically reiterating this commitment.

Last spring, that promise had to be dropped from public rhetoric. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán began blocking Ukraine’s EU progress, making it the centrepiece of his election campaign. The European Commission realised the problem was very real and that there were no clear ways to get circular it.

Brussels even began to talk about decoupling the Ukraine-Moldova pair so that Moldova would not be held hostage by Hungary’s veto. Von der Leyen and respective Ukraine-friendly countries opposed the decision and managed to block it. Later, a hybrid Plan B emerged, but it never gained Kyiv’s approval, as it didn’t foresee the formal start of accession talks, only a simulation.

The process seemed to have reached a deadlock. For many in Europe, it was hard to grasp that Orbán wasn’t seeking concessions from Ukraine – the blockade was an end in itself, part of his home political strategy. But with the end of Poland’s presidency of the Council of the EU (Warsaw chaired the Council in the first half of 2025), things began to change.

Suddenly, the EU started talking about beginning “all the clusters” by the end of 2025 again.

Lithuanian president Gitanas Nausėda was the first to make this claim, on the sidelines of the NATO summit in The Hague. Then came akin signals from the European Commission, von der Leyen, and Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos. Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna besides stated that Hungary could not block the start of accession talks.

Back then, these statements were criticised in Ukraine as unrealistic, unprofessional and out of touch. But in fact, these officials were referring to a circumstantial plan – 1 that had been prepared and coordinated with key players, the details of which were intentionally kept confidential.

How they planned to sideline Orbán

The European Commission, the president of the European Council and respective key associate states had agreed on a plan to bypass Hungary’s veto, and in a alternatively unexpected way.

The thought of simply disregarding Hungary’s vote (in another words, forcing Orbán to “step out for a coffee”) was rejected. respective countries, including any of Ukraine’s close allies, saw this as an unacceptable precedent that could have had implications far beyond the case of Ukraine, possibly undermining the rule of unanimity within the EU.

Instead, Denmark and the European Commission leadership proposed not holding a vote at all. The thought was that the EU presidency would apply to the European Commission and mention both the Commission’s position and the conclusion of the June EU summit that Ukraine had fulfilled all the essential criteria.

Then the European Commission would simply announce the start of accession negotiations with Ukraine as if all the formalities had been met.

To prepare at least any legal basis for this step, the president of the European Council formally requested a legal opinion from the Commission, according to 1 source. This position can be summarised as follows: the EU’s founding treaties do not require unanimous approval for intermediate method steps specified as beginning negotiation clusters. so the European Commission is entitled to proceed on its own initiative, especially since the associate states had delegated specified authority by beginning talks with Ukraine in June 2024.

Formal closure of the negotiations and the approval of circumstantial terms, however, would inactive require unanimous consent.

Several European Pravda sources acknowledged that the plan was “legally flawed”. But Orbán would have no immediate legal tools to halt it.

Hungary will surely sue the Commission in the EU Court of Justice, and it will most likely win,” 1 European authoritative told European Pravda over a week ago, at a time erstwhile optimism inactive reigned in Brussels. “But that will take about 3 years. By then, Orbán may no longer be in power, and Ukraine will have importantly advanced in the accession process and possibly even joined the EU.”

Indeed, under EU Court rules, the effect of a ruling is not suspended even if it is appealed.

However, Brussels’ legal position in specified a case would be alternatively shaky. That is due to the fact that in June 2021, the EU Council adopted what is known as the Negotiating Framework – the paper that governs the conduct of negotiations with Ukraine. The Negotiating Framework explicitly states that unanimous votes are required to open clusters and outlines a peculiar procedure for beginning the Fundamentals cluster.

It’s actual that Orbán had exhausted nearly everyone’s patience to the point where many in the EU would have been willing to turn a blind eye. But that didn’t make the plan legally watertight. It inactive required crucial political audacity from the Danes and the Commission. Ultimately, that audacity materialised.

According to European Pravda’s information, the first high-level discussion of this thought took place in The Hague during the NATO summit, where president Zelenskyy held separate meetings with Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and top EU officials. It was following these talks, sources in Brussels say, that European Commission lawyers began preparing the legal framework for the move.

Exactly 1 week later, on July 3rd, Zelenskyy travelled to Denmark on a separate visit. The journey had no publically visible outcomes: its real intent was to hold private negotiations on Plan B.

Finally, the last circular of talks with the European Commission and European Council leadership took place in Rome on July 10th. It was immediately after this that Commissioner Věra Jourová made a message expressing her assurance – ignoring Orbán’s veto – that all the chapters in Ukraine’s accession talks would be opened.

The date was agreed upon at that gathering too: the beginning of the first negotiating cluster was due to take place in Brussels on July 18th, on the sidelines of a gathering of the EU General Affairs Council.

Moldova was informed of the arrangement as well. Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister Cristina Gherasimov was reported to be not peculiarly thrilled about the idea, but she agreed to go along with it. She and Olha Stefanishyna were expected to travel together to Brussels for the ceremony.

What went wrong

So Zelenskyy was aware of this unique chance and had been personally active in discussions about it since the end of June. Yet the events that began to unfold after those agreements were reached left the Europeans asking WTF? What is going on?

In July, Ukraine’s government blatantly violated the law by rejecting the candidate who had been selected to head the Bureau of economical safety (BEB) through a transparent, EU-supported procedure backed by global experts. On July 9th, the government overturned the results of the selection process, and there is all reason to believe this disruption was sanctioned by Bankova – the President’s Office.

On July 11th, law enforcement carried out raids and searches without a court warrant at the home of Vitalii Shabunin, a prominent critic of the President’s Office. The next day saw the absurdity of the parent of a fallen Hero of Ukraine, pilot Andrii “Juice” Pilshchykov, being subjected to searches purely due to the fact that Shabunin had briefly stayed at her home.

On July 14th, it was announced that Olha Stefanishyna would be stepping down, which further undermined the prospects of beginning EU negotiations. And while her expected successor Taras Kachka has no reputational baggage, the replacement of a negotiator from Ukraine at specified a delicate minute provides a strong argument for halting the process, especially erstwhile the decision itself was inactive in limbo.

So why do all this? That question remains unanswered.

It’s possible that respective processes just happened to coincide in time (for example, the decision on BEB had a previously set deadline of July 10th). The government reshuffle was besides improbable to have been deliberately timed to clash with the EU presidency.

But it’s besides possible that the President’s Office felt untouchable, assuming that Brussels would refrain from any open criticism at specified a critical time no substance what.

And that calculation proved accurate. The EU has remained silent.

However, it has become clear that the anticipated breakthrough won’t happen either.

According to European Pravda’s information, Denmark simply refrained from putting forward the proposal that had seemingly been agreed upon. The issue of the degree to which Moldova and Ukraine are prepared for the start of accession talks wasn’t even on the agenda for the gathering on July 18th.

Several European Pravda sources keep that the main obstacles to advancement were interior EU dynamics.

Although there had been plans to open accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova without a formal vote, Brussels was eager to avoid any key EU associate state publically challenging or disputing the move. At the same time, any associate states believed the decision needed more work and should be postponed until September. “I must admit that not all efforts were made to safe the consent of key countries,” 1 origin acknowledged.

There was another complicating factor:

the preparations for the decision on July 18th were being made in secret – specifically hidden from Hungary.

Of course Budapest would have figured it out from the agenda ahead of the meeting, but EU officials were trying to hold that minute for as long as possible to give Orbán minimal time to mount an attack on already fragile EU unity. Support from another associate states was being sought bilaterally, and the plan was deliberately kept out of the public eye. For that reason, European Pravda besides chose not to study on the breakthrough being planned in Brussels.

But Budapest will definitely know about it now, and after the attacks on Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions, the full plan is now irrelevant.

Notably, in her final interview as deputy prime minister, Olha Stefanishyna confirmed that the plan from July 18th had indeed existed. She placed the work for its failure mostly on the EU and suggested that it had besides contributed to her stepping down. “We made all effort, did everything possible. But yet it became clear that the decision wouldn’t happen. I believe this episode helped the president make the final decision (…) to redirect my efforts toward US relations,” she explained.

However, the information European Pravda has seen does not support her version of events. As of July 14th, the day Zelenskyy’s decision to replace Ukraine’s chief EU negotiator was made public, sources in Brussels were inactive optimistic, saying good advancement was being made and there was all reason to anticipate a diplomatic win, namely the beginning of the first negotiating cluster, despite the BEB controversy.

Red line? Crossed!

For those closely following Ukraine’s reformers and civilian society voices, it may have seemed like all the red lines had been crossed weeks ago and that the BEB scandal was the final straw for Ukraine’s Western allies.

But that doesn’t seem to be the case.

Surprisingly, the EU took a alternatively tolerant view of the Bureau of economical safety (BES) situation. As European Pravda has previously detailed, European representatives avoided taking any clear position on the issue at the Rome conference, even going so far as to censor a photograph of EU Commissioner Marta Kos holding a reasonably neutral poster in support of the BEB.

Several diplomatic sources later confirmed this. “For us, the BEB is not a red-line issue. The situation is ambiguous,” 1 European origin told EP. The US, under the fresh administration, has shown no real interest in the substance either. The G7 ambassadors have yet to issue any message on the developments around the BEB.

In stark contrast, the consequence to the attack on NABU and SAPO has been radically different.

“The BEB issue is not a red line. The dismantling of anti-corruption institutions absolutely is. Absolutely,” another European authoritative emphasised.

Even the EU’s public reaction has been unusually harsh by fresh standards – including from Commissioner Kos herself.

Behind closed doors, the speech was even harsher.

European Pravda has learned about the content of talks between Kos and fresh Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Taras Kachka regarding the regulation of the powers of Ukraineʼs anti-corruption agencies.

Kos informed Kachka that the European Commission is firm in its conclusions regarding Law 12414. The law not only undermines the independency of NABU and SAPO; it besides contradicts the commitments set out in the Roadmaps that Kyiv and Brussels agreed on in preparation for membership negotiations. In addition, Kos said, the European Union views the passing of the law as a setback in implementing the 7 European Commission recommendations that were a condition for Ukraine’s candidate status.

Up until now, the EU had only officially acknowledged a setback in Georgia’s candidate reforms. Brussels put a frost on cooperation with Georgia within the accession process in consequence to the anti-democratic turn Tbilisi has taken.

“This step will have serious consequences for the full negotiation process regarding Ukraine’s accession to the EU. any associate states have already expressed the opinion that it would have been better not to rush into beginning the first cluster,” Kos warned.

All the another EU sources European Pravda spoke to before the law was signed had come to the same conclusion: if Volodymyr Zelenskyy signs the law (which he has now done), he is besides signing off on the suspension of Ukraine’s EU accession process.

The screening of the last cluster may be completed, but meaningful membership negotiations will be impossible.

What another consequences will there be?

Even amid the current strong private backlash, we should not anticipate a harsh public reaction from the EU that would reflect the level of frustration felt by many Ukrainians.

The EU continues to operate under a de facto moratorium on publically criticising Ukraine. And even these developments haven’t lifted it. “Even after the adoption and signing of the law, there will be no immediate consequences,” 1 EU diplomat admitted to EP on Monday morning, before immediately adding: “That doesn’t mean there won’t be long-term consequences.”

Until recently, Ukraine’s accession process was the EU’s most powerful leverage. Brussels had made enlargement a strategical precedence in Ukraine’s case, creating peculiar fast-track procedures that allowed the country to velocity through the method phases despite the sluggish advancement of reforms in 2023-2024. Simultaneous screening of all chapters, preparations for fast cluster openings, method support…

But the EU expected reciprocal advancement from Kyiv, and advancement had indeed been made. But that now seems to be in the past.

Following president Zelenskyy’s fresh decisions, any in Europe now believe that “EU accession is no longer a precedence for Ukraine”. respective Kyiv-based European officials have expressed that view to EP in fresh days. Those monitoring the situation from EU capitals tend to be even more sceptical.

That’s why the EU is preparing to apply force through another means – peculiarly financial ones.

Kyiv has received its first unofficial warnings.

The Organisation for economical Co-operation and improvement (OECD) has warned Kyiv that undermining the anti-corruption agencies will negatively affect defence investments in Ukraine and backing for reconstruction. The OECD has besides explained what steps Kyiv must take to resolve the crisis.

EU officials have besides been reminding Ukraine about its budget gap, which must be filled through borrowing. “We in the EU are willing to aid you find money. But think: how many creditors will be eager to lend to a country that’s dismantling its anti-corruption infrastructure?” Still, it’s unclear whether Bankova takes these messages seriously. Officials there are utilized to the EU making threats and not acting decisively. After all, Ukraine’s stableness and defence capability stay a precedence for the EU itself.

One thing is clear: there is no threat to Ukraine’s visa-free regime, at least for now.

In peacetime, this could have been the EU’s primary force point. The creation of an independent NABU and SAPO was 1 of the key conditions for Ukraine’s visa liberalisation roadmap. But in the current wartime circumstances, erstwhile open borders are a humanitarian necessity and the EU has no desire to punish average Ukrainians for their government’s blunders, this issue is highly improbable to resurface. Ukraine will not be downgraded to the current position of Georgia, where visa-free travel is now genuinely at risk.

What is almost certain, though, is that Ukraine will fall behind Moldova. Due to Kyiv’s actions, the decoupling of Moldova from Ukraine in the accession process is becoming inevitable. Moldova is now expected to begin accession talks while Ukraine’s dialog remains frozen.

And the blame for that will remainder entirely with Kyiv – with the MPs who passed the law dismantling NABU and SAPO’s independence, and with president Zelenskyy, who signed it and has publically defended it.

This article was republished as part of a content exchange promoted by MOST – Media Organisations for Stronger Transnational Journalism, a task co-funded by the European Commission, which supports independent media specializing in global coverage.

Serhiy Sydorenko is an editor with European Pravda.

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