Paszynana's historical visit to Turkey - increasingly urgent standardisation

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Analysis

Paszynana's historical visit to Turkey - increasingly urgent standardisation

Wojciech Górecki
Karol Vasilewski

On 20 June, Armenia's Prime Minister Nikol Paszynian visited Istanbul, where he met Turkey's president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The talks, followed by the press releases, focused on bilateral relations, the situation in the regions of the South Caucasus and the mediate East, and the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbejjan conflict. In addition, Paszynian saw representatives of the Armenian diaspora and the Apostolic Armenian Church. This was Armenia's first authoritative visit to Turkey since the dissolution of the USSR, so it can be called historical (in 2023). Paszynian participated in Erdoğan's presidential inauguration in Ankara.

The Armenian Prime Minister has consistently sought to normalise relations with Turkey. She would besides like Ankara, but it is limited by its commitments to Azerbaijan and by its limited impact on the country. The dynamic of the conflict around Iran was powerfully influenced by the hasty mode of organising the visit. The inaccessibility of the mediate East transport routes with simultaneous restrictions related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine importantly increased the function of the routes through the Caucasus – especially through Georgia and Azerbaijan, but besides through Armenia. In this context, the beginning of Armenia's land border with Turkey (and Azerbaijan), which has been closed for decades, depends primarily on the prior agreement between Yerevan and Baku, is of large importance not only for the countries of the region but besides for their European and Asian partners.

The position of Armenia – a hard past of relations with Turkey

After the dissolution of the USSR, Armenia and Turkey did not establish diplomatic relations. Initially, this was due to Erwanie's request that Ankara consider the Armenian slaughter, which occurred in 1915 in the Ottoman Empire, to be genocide. Then, erstwhile Erevan ceased to depend on this normalization of the relationship, the post-war Armenian-Azerbejjan conflict around the Mountain Karabach – in which Ankara took Baku's side from the beginning – prevented any advancement on the way to an agreement. Turkey closed the border with Armenia in July 1992 in order to force concessions on the Caribbean issue by economical pressure.

By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, separating the issue of normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations from the issue of the Caribbean conflict – and more broadly: the accounts of Erwania and Baku – seemed impossible. Armenia sought to diversify Russia-oriented abroad policy and to open the border, which would revive the economy. The process of intensification of the relation began with the visit of Turkey's then president Abdullah Gül in Yerevan in September 2008 (shared with his Armenian counterpart Serż Sarkisjan watched the football match of both teams). In April 2009, the parties adopted the alleged road map of standardisation, and in October both abroad ministers signed 2 protocols in Zurich on establishing diplomatic relations and on developing bilateral relations. The papers were to enter into force after their ratification by both parliaments and the border was to be opened. However, this was not due to interior opposition in both countries, and above all due to Azerbaijan's position, which feared that Turkish-Armenian reconciliation would not let for the recovery of Mountain Karabach, and threatened, among others, with the withdrawal of respective billion dollars of deposits from Turkish banks.

After reaching power in 2018. Paszynian repeatedly declared his desire to normalize relations with Ankara. This was besides served by the concept of "real Armenia", which he promoted, which must function in the future reality. He opposed her "Mythic Army", based on paradigms from the past. Despite the deficiency of diplomatic relations, both countries keep economical contacts and there are direct air connections between them. In February 2023 after the earthquake that hit Turkey, Armenia sent aid there – transport crossed the border through a specially launched land pass. Ankara, however, makes the normalisation of bilateral relations dependent on the early conclusion of a peace agreement between Yerevan and Baku. Since March this year, the Azerbaijani authorities have stated that they will sign the agreed paper after the amendment of the Armenian Constitution – in its preamble, there is simply a mention to the declaration of independence, which mentions the Mountain Karabach. Paszynian advocates specified a change, but the situation complicates distrust towards Azerbaijan and concerns that president Ilham Aliyev will search further arguments to keep the conflict with Armenia, as it allows him to keep interior stability.

Ankara's point of view – especially Azerbaijan

The autumn 2020 Mountain Karabach War, in which Turkey powerfully supported Azerbaijan, has negated the post-modern position quo in the South Caucasus. Ankara thus challenged Moscow's position to date and entered the function of a key external actor influencing the safety situation in this part of the world. Since then, she has made efforts to establish this position, with a view to achieving its strategical objectives – above all, the long-term stabilisation of the region (with partial displacement of Russian and Iranian influences) and greater supervision of it for economical expansion and expansion of its controlled transport routes, including to Asian countries – with Turkey's key function in trade between Europe and Asia.

In these circumstances, attempts to normalise relations with Armenia are 1 of the policy instruments for the region. After the Second Caribbean War – in late 2021. – Ankara has made efforts to rebuild relations with its neighbour, which was intended to appoint peculiar negotiating representatives. Their efforts resulted in the resumption of charter flights between Istanbul and Erwan in 2022 or the improvement of cargo services between both countries. Turkey besides appreciates Paszynian's will to improve bilateral relations, assessing it as a manifestation of the strategical reasoning of the leader of isolated Armenia. The Prime Minister's declaration that Yerevan will not treat treatments to extend the global designation of Armenian genocide as a abroad policy precedence besides played an crucial role.

However, there is inactive a peculiar bond between Ankara and Baku on the way to normalization (see besides footnote 1). (Pan) Turkish Caucasus. Baku-Ankara alliance and its regional importance). Increasingly better military relations, Azerbaijan's importance from the position of Turkey's energy policy (e.g. the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipeline, the Transanatolian gas pipeline), as well as close personnel relations between Presidents Erdoğan and Aliyev are causing it to consistently signal to Erevani that the re-establishment of contacts will not take place without prior settlement of disputes with Baku. At the same time, the Turks have a limited arsenal of expanding force on Azerbaijan – strong ties with the country advance their presence in the Caucasus. An additional barrier is the possible for Baku to affect the energy and economical situation of Turkey. Therefore, Ankara avoids specifying the conditions of the peace agreement on the Yerevan-Baku line – it seems to the second of these capitals and its position on what it considers adequate for its conclusion. As a result, the “primarily Azerbaijan” policy was the main reason why Turkish-Armenal standardisation has been limited to method arrangements so far.

Summary: Turkish game about the South Caucasus?

The situation of Armenia has more late complicated the anti-Western return of Georgia, resulting, among others, in problems with transit through this country of supplies of western military equipment to Erwania. In fresh weeks Tbilisi has besides created problems with the transport of Armenian exports to Russia. Following the Israeli attacks on Iran, Armenia faced a threat of complete isolation – to closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey and the precarious situation with Georgia came Israeli and American attacks on Iran's territory, its 4th neighbour.

Such a situation prompts Yerevan to search more urgently an agreement with Ankara and strengthens Paszynan's conviction that after the Armenians lost control of Mountain Karabach and alleged occupied territories (2020–2023) and Armenia's return to the West (see IP/10/05). Armenia: Between the West and the Threat of War), which active the actual weakening of ties with Moscow (see Armenia: a non-binding announcement to leave OUBZ), Turkey may become the only guarantor of State security.

The global context of the Prime Minister's visit, including the topics discussed during the visit, suggests that for the Turkish authorities 1 of the key reasons for its organisation was concerns about the destabilisation of the South Caucasus as a consequence of Israel's conflict with Iran. president Aliyev's erstwhile stay in Turkey is besides hard to treat as accidental. In the minimum variant, Ankara tries to prevent the escalation of Armenian-Azerbejjan disputes in specified unfavourable global conditions (Baku signals the readiness to force the beginning of the alleged Zangezrian Corridor to Nachichevan, which could consequence in a threat of military force). In the maximum option, she would like to bring about a lasting, guaranteed peace between both countries. In practice, this could mean attempts to mediate between them on the signing of an agreement agreed in March.

Turkey's "special bond" with Azerbaijan remains a fundamental challenge. Although close relations, including military, Tel Aviv and Baku, are causing expanding concern for Ankara, there is inactive small to propose that in efforts to normalise relations with Yerevan it would be willing to abandon the rule of “primarily Azerbaijan”. However, its quest to rebuild its ties with Armenia could strengthen the increase in the importance of Caucasian transport routes in the context of the long-term destabilisation of Iran and the continuing war in Ukraine, further expanding the economical benefits of standardisation.

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