THE large strategy OF THE POLISH STATE – ARMY [ANALIZ]

At the outset, I thank Dr. Luke for being so kind to be the first reader and reviewer of the working version of the text – Your comments allowed me to clarify a fewer points

For any time now, in public space, the subject of Polish safety has gained popularity, and in peculiar what army Poland needs. The subject became hot especially after the Russian attack on Ukraine. What is important, many of the participants of the debate went completely next to the question: "Will there be a war against Poland?" – taking the yes for granted – and the question: "What war should we prepare for?". This is simply a evidence to the large change in Polish society erstwhile it comes to the perception of threats. And no wonder. Vladimir Putin convinced the top infidels that safety in Europe is simply a question of debate.

However, in my opinion, the discourse went completely wrong. For any a priori they accepted that Poland would be attacked by the Russian Federation. In addition, it will be given – at least in the first weeks of the war – only on its own, so under this presumption should be prepared strategy, operational plans, defence doctrine, as well as model of the Armed Forces of Poland.

I am inactive of the opinion that the operational plans, doctrine, tactical solutions and model of the army should be developed by military and professional specialists in cooperation with the apparatus of the state administration – not by enthusiasts without adequate knowledge, qualifications, experience, access to classified documents, as well as physical capabilities (the staff of hundreds or even thousands of people). So the possible to examine the needs of the Polish SZ, as well as to item barriers to gathering these needs (e.g. budget). The presumption that a private initiative does not have a chance to make appropriate concepts in this area has simply been confirmed.

It is up to politicians, analysts and even publicists to consider which geopolitical situations (yes – plural, you should be prepared for many variants) Poland should prepare in the future. Only by answering this question will the military be more effective in developing an army model. It is apparent that the Polish elites have already had to answer the above question, although seemingly they do not want to talk out about it. However, the plan to increase the numbers and possible of the army has been implemented for years. The Homeland defence Act was not created in a period or even six months. It was most likely written for years. At the minute we are in the process of immense purchases of equipment for SZ RP. So it seems that decisions have already been taken in this area. They were surely accelerated by events and Russian aggression from February 24 to Ukraine. Polish soldiers are besides doing their homework at the moment, and on the basis of Ukrainian experience, an operational concept is being created tailored to Polish needs, as General Rajmund Andrzejczak, for example, talked about in his last interview with Defence24:

It does not change the fact that 1 inactive needs to consider what challenges will be facing Poland in the future. due to the fact that the variable dynamics of political processes, as well as circumstantial events, can completely change the perception of safety in the context of the future. This constitution convinced me to effort to answer the 2 most crucial questions:

1. What future are we preparing for?
2. What do we request an army for?

Of course, the following considerations should be taken as a voice in the discussion presented by the passionate. Within a single squad Krzysztof & Wojchal ;). You must besides be aware that the ruling and high-ranking military have much greater knowledge. At the same time, possibly not everything can be found in public documents. However, in the context of the fact that the last National safety strategy of the Republic of Poland dates from March 2020, and there is not yet an updated paper that would take into account completely fresh circumstances in the Polish environment (war in Ukraine), I think that the following survey may supply a good basis for discussion and reflection on fresh geopolitical and strategical conditions. Conditions to be taken into account in the context of the needs of Polish military potential.

The subject of national safety is highly broad and covers many levels (political, economic, industrial, commercial, energy, intelligence, information, military and many more), while this article is narrowed down to the sphere of defence and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland.

POLAND THE NEXT nonsubjective OF RUSSIA?

In light of what has already happened by 31 August 2022, 1 thing seems certain. Another war in our region cannot be ruled out in the future. And it must surely be assumed that the force policy will proceed to be an crucial component in deciding on the destiny of countries to the east of the NATO border. However, does this mean that Poland or another countries belonging to the North Atlantic Pact should besides fear military aggression? This is highly doubtful. The war on NATO, as I have raised many times on this blog, would simply not solve any problems of the Russian Federation (for Russia is and will be the most crucial regional safety challenge in the next decade). Completely different calculations and hopes accompanied Putin in the invasion of lonely Ukraine, and completely different calculations should be taken into account in the clash with NATO. I wrote this many times that Ukraine is an end in itself to Moscow. It is crucial and regaining political control of Kiev is crucial for the Russian Federation. Moreover, taking control of Ukraine would put force on the US and NATO in a wider geopolitical game, in the US-China-Russia triangle. This was to give Putin the chance to get a warrant in terms of: (a) raising capital from the sale of energy natural materials (b) access to western technology (c) consent to EuRussia's political block from Lisbon to Vladivostok.

In turn, what geopolitical benefits could people anticipate from the Kremlin in the event of a direct attack on NATO? A threatening atomic battle, but besides a war against a much stronger opponent on a conventional level? The argument is that the war would service the Russians to negociate a better deal West-Russia is completely unconvincing and without logic. Still, any inactive choice it up. Meanwhile, Americans could not let the attack on the NATO state get distant with it, due to the fact that if they had done so and made a deal – showing that they had lost to weak Russia – they would have devastated their image as well as the global strategy of alliances. Consequently, they could forget about competing with China and maintaining hegemony. I have already left out Western Europe, which, in the event of a war in Ukraine, is trying to keep distance or is slow, but in the event of a war with the EU and NATO, the consequence would should be completely different. Thus, the attacking Russia could not number on triumph in short conflict and the dictatement of favorable conditions. On the contrary, even before the war, the Russians would gotta realise that the US and NATO, even in the first situation of failures, would effort to prolong the conflict and lead to favorable settlements. specified calculations simply should be taken into account by the Kremlin, which already has a deterrent possible in itself.

It is besides worth remembering what the Russians showed in Ukraine during the war, but besides the Americans (recognition and intelligence, as well as their equipment). There is no uncertainty that if the Russians had taken military action against NATO, they would have been given a dense beating on the conventional level. The Americans had already known respective months earlier that the Russians were deploying troops to attack Ukraine. They knew precisely where the hits were. Ukrainians seem to have ignored warnings at first, at least in terms of defending directions in Kiev. The omissions were besides visible on the confederate – Crimean front. Despite this, with worse equipment than the Russians, the Ukrainian side made a very effective defence, and this in highly unfavourable conditions (vide hitting from 3 sides, and so the request to defend almost the full territory). If the Russians were preparing for the NATO war, we'd know that much sooner. The pact's troops would be decently deployed (there is no specified threat now, and NATO's presence on the alleged east flank has been greatly increased). Already at the start, the alliance would have dominance in the air and in the seas. Informational dominance, guaranteed by specified conventional means of designation (airplanes, unmanned aircraft, radars, intelligence) and thanks to satellite technologies. The combined forces of all NATO states supported by thousands of independent and anonymous hackers would besides most likely have an advantage in the CYBER domain. This would all be demonstrated to the Russians before the first shots were fired.

Conclusion? Russia simply has nothing to look for erstwhile it comes to the war on NATO. First, this war would not have political justification (no anticipation to accomplish political benefits). Second, a military conflict would gotta end in a Russian defeat. Advantage in the fields of technology, information and moral (which builds morale soldiers) They would not give large chances to win the Russian side. Counting a short winning operation even against the Baltic states is simply a deceptive calculation. The Americans know that with each next week of war they would be gaining, so even if NATO had failed in its first days, the US would have sought to win the war in a somewhat longer word to dictate conditions to the Kremlin. And win on a geopolitical level. Win peace and benefits in the global power system.

And here you can go smoothly to the second constitution. As long as the Russian Federation threatens NATO states, the United States and NATO as a full will have a tough policy towards Moscow. The Far East direction (China) will not change that. Stories about the U.S. not being able to deal with Russia due to the fact that they are incapable to wage war on 2 fronts should be hidden into the gap pockets of their pants. The U.S. does not wage any war on the 1⁄4 front at the moment. They have withdrawn from Afghanistan and minimized presence in the mediate East and at the same time increased presence in Europe. Contrary to the predictions of any commentators saying that the United States would agree to the second “reset” and leave the Old Continent (for example, Dr. Leszek Sykulski or Dr. Jacek Bartosiak suggested). Moreover, in the ongoing war against Russia, Ukrainians fight and as long as they remain, the Russians will weaken and the Americans gain. It should be borne in head that the engagement of the US and NATO in the alleged "east flank" does not weaken the U.S. military possible in the Far East. due to the fact that there is simply a very different kind of force. Mainly fleets, aviation and US Marines. In the Western Pacific region, the United States has completely different allies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), and thus another safety architecture. Not active in European theatre. The United States is not planning a land invasion of China, no, they will most likely not even gotta fight in Taiwan. For these reasons, the United States Army can focus on the Russian threat.

Which doesn't change the fact that It is in the interests of the US that European allies should have the military possible to take on any possible fight against Russia if needed.. Above all, to make it the European NATO armies a deterrent to the Russians. In this context, Americans would only like to be a supporting force, which is much cheaper for them. At the same time, a real exit of the United States from Europe should be expected if Russia ceases to pose a threat to the US and their interests.

THE POLISH SITUATION IN THE SAFETY SAMPLE

Therefore, it is clear that Poland – as NATO's strongest country bordering the possible enemy – will sooner or later gotta take work not only for itself but besides for others.. For example, the Baltic States or possibly Ukraine. Importantly, in this respect American interests overlap with Polish interests. For it is in the interests of Warsaw to build its position as the leader of the region and to warrant the safety of the states located close the Russian Federation. If it is the Armed Forces of Poland that will have the appropriate possible to respond in the area of Lithuania, the Baltic Sea (flot), or yet Ukraine, and at the same time Poland will gain the possible to take the Kaliningrad Oblast as a " hostage" (an offensive, destructive potential) then we will be able to make a loyal and unchangeable political alliance that will strengthen our position not only in the region but besides in the full European Union. An army with the possible to warrant safety is an instrument and a political argument. Of course, writing about Poland's guaranteeing safety in the context of atomic threat does not sound credible. However, if the threat of atomic impact is neutralized (e.g. through US-free guarantees, the hazard of atomic war or for political reasons), conventional possible will play a leading role. As it is during the war in Ukraine.

At the same time, it should be remembered that the geopolitical situation in the 1930 ’ s may be completely different. The interior collapse of the Russian Federation, or possibly even its disintegration, is rather possible and even probable. Which does not gotta calm the Baltic States' concerns about their own safety. On the contrary, political instability, chaos, deficiency of predictability will give emergence to concerns. Concerns that can be dispelled by a local strong ally who will be ready to aid in a very short time. Furthermore, Poland, which is militaryly strong, may not only be a defender of the Baltics against Belarus, but besides a magnet for the Belarusians, especially if the Russian Federation was no longer able to keep control of Minsk (e.g. due to its own interior problems).

It should be remembered, however, that the destiny of Ukraine has inactive not been settled. If Kiev had fallen, then Poland would gotta guarantee safety in an additional direction. An army of 4 divisions would not be prepared for. Moreover, if the Ukrainians defend themselves, it will not mean that the Russians will not effort again. In this context, 2 scenarios can be outlined. The first is 1 where Putin will effort to attack again. Thus the Ukrainians will gotta keep a large army, but their state will not be able to do so (economic problems + war losses incurred). This may consequence in a weakening of the military potential, which simply the Ukrainian state will not bear (quality will fall). In the second option, Ukraine will want to focus on improvement seeing that the Russian Federation is no longer a threat, at least for many years.

In both cases Poland needs a strong but besides more many army. Firstly, due to the fact that we should have more military possible than our neighbours (if possible). Secondly, due to the fact that our armed forces may prove crucial in the context of further deterrence of Russia (we are creating Moscow a calculation in which we are moving to aid – what the Kremlin decision-makers will gotta take into account). Moreover, the Polish Armed Forces should have offensive possible capable of operating outside the state (logistics). The future presents threats, but opportunities. Therefore, it should be possible to enter a safety vacuum which Russia could leave behind on the Baltic-Black Sea bridge.

It is hard to foretell future political conditions and the emergence of various kinds of opportunities. What seems ridiculous present due to political conditions, next day may be rather a viable option. In order to do so, however, we must have the capacity to prosecute our own interests and to exploit favourable political conditions. Without the right potential, even the best opportunities can be missed.

In the 21st century, Polish elites cannot think with 20th-century schemes. We cannot see ourselves as a victim of aggression, forced to defend ourselves in our own territory.. Poland in the 21st century must think about its safety before it is straight threatened. For this, there is simply a request for possible to respond beyond national borders.

From a geopolitical and strategical point of view, attacking Poland before taking control of Ukraine and the Baltic would be highly risky and without logic. What I wrote in analysis published on 23 February 2022.

Poland cannot afford to wait for the Russians to make convenient geostrategic conditions for attacking the Polish state. We request to do everything we can to prevent this from happening, and that requires maintaining our buffer zones.

Today, this “doing everything” is revealed through material support for the fighting Ukraine. next day we may gotta do much more.

FUTURE GEOPOLITICAL CONDITIONS

In summing up the above considerations, it is concluded that the future geopolitical situation of Poland may take on 2 completely different faces. Moreover, it is possible to estimation the time frame of the situation, as well as to indicate a breakthrough minute which will change safety conditions in the context of the Polish state. 2 options can be found:

1. Russia is simply a threat to NATO and the US.

In this option, the United States will be active in our region, and so our armed forces should have the possible to usage their cooperation with an American ally (interoperability, technologies to receive and usage the information provided). This option is highly likely in the short and average term. The Polish army does not request to be independent and able to fulfill all tasks related to our security, but should strive to do so.

The presumption that the United States will not bow to Moscow is, of course, a key issue here. It has respective reasons.

1. The US cannot afford to neglect with weak Russia due to the fact that it would undermine their position and weaken alliances in the context of rivalry with stronger Chinese than Russia.
2. Russia itself has fallen into a bloody corner and is losing strength with each day of war. There's no request to get the Russians out of the swamp they moved into.
3. The United States has an advantage over Russia on all level. Economic, military, political etc. The Russians have absolutely no arguments in direct competition with the US. Of course, they have jacks on Europe, but the loyalty of the second to Washington has not only been undermined, but has been confirmed. Even Germany – although slow – helps Ukraine. Gas through the Nord Stream pipelines is not flowing. These are the facts.

The Americans know they are in a perfect position to finish Moscow as a major player on the global stage. And they have to, due to the fact that they'll never have a warrant that Putin won't abruptly change sides in a clash between Americans and Chinese.

Under specified conditions, in which we are presently located, Poland is mainly liable for its own security, but besides supports the materially fighting Ukraine. At the same time, it mostly depends on the guarantees of allies. In turn, the safety of the Baltics depends mainly on NATO as an alliance, due to the fact that the military possible of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia is very modest. On the another hand, the endurance of Ukraine hangs at the mercy of the United States and the material aid of states that are vitally curious in the result of the war.

The threat of NATO and American interests from Russia would be peculiarly visible if Ukraine lost the war and got entirely into the Russian sphere of influence. Then the rivalry and political clash on the US/NATO vs.Russia line may take longer. Under specified conditions, it will be crucial to withstand the Russian force to deploy troops across the full NATO border. In this on the Polish-Ukrainian section. In the situation of the deployment of troops by Russia along the full border with Poland – from Kaliningrad Oblast to Ukraine – the Polish Armed Forces will should be able to safe further possible directions of attack. Additional tactical relationships (brigades/divisions) may be essential for this.

If Ukraine had fallen, Russia would have gained an additional front and 2 further operational directions against Poland.

2. Russia is no longer a threat to the United States and NATO.

A situation likely to happen in the average to long term, in which the US will retreat from Europe (cutting costs and focusing in the Pacific) and so the work for safety will be borne by NATO's European allies (at that time the question will actually arise as to whether, for example, Western Europe can be relied on for safety reasons?). In this variant Poland would become a natural leader for neighbours. This position is somewhat more distant in time, but at the same time the Polish armed forces will already gotta have much greater possible and autonomy.

Due to the deficiency of danger, NATO's ties and cohesion may begin to spread. The North Atlantic Pact was created mainly due to the threat from Moscow. It includes countries in whose interest it was to halt the expansion of the Kremlin. Neutralising the Russians in this area will make the United States lose interest in Europe and Europeans themselves will have no motivation to keep NATO cohesion.

This will make fresh conditions besides for Poland, which will gotta become the leader of safety for the Baltic states and exhausted by the war of Ukraine. At the same time, the possible of losing Russia's ability to exert force outside will make fresh opportunities for our east border, but will besides increase Polish work for the safety of the region. It should be borne in head that the West of Europe may completely lose interest in east policy. Thus, Poland threatens to leave it alone to keep safety in the east of the Old Continent. At the same time, even weakened Russia can be an attractive supplier of energy resources to the west. Poland should then control independently and in a complete manner all the routes from east to west passing through its territory but besides be able to affect the sea like Nord Stream I and Nord Stream II. With a strong adequate army – which gives the basis for a more effective abroad policy – and with a strong adequate fleet supported by regional allies, Poland and Ukraine could dictate conditions for the transfer of energy resources. due to this Warsaw and not Berlin (as Germany thought) could be the intermediary and largest beneficiary of Russian exports of gas and oil to the west (which would be possible if Russia and its interior problems were exhausted). Dependence on weak Russia and politically weakened Germany from Polish consent would be highly desirable.

So, on the margins of considerations, it should be noted, which I have besides stressed many times in fresh years, that the future of Poland depends mostly on whether a strong and loyal partnership with Ukraine can be created. In order for this to happen, Poland must build its foundations today. And it does.

STRATEGIC WARKS – deterrence, defence of the full east border and local safety leader

The recognition of possible future geopolitical conditions is highly crucial for further consideration of the strategy of the Polish state as well as defence issues. For without a geopolitical context, it is impossible to find whether a strategy is feasible or not. Therefore, it is only by defining the future political environment that 1 can be tempted to draw up strategies and strategical objectives for the state and its Armed Forces. This article deals primarily with the second layer, military, but the different levels simply intersect and it is impossible to discuss the strategy and function of the armed forces completely in isolation from abroad policy or economical potential. In addition, in terms of security, I have made any kind of gradation of the strategy depending on the levels that this strategy would cover.

Polish safety strategy

Turning to the meritum, on the basis of considerations in the field of geopolitics, it can be concluded that Poland may find itself in 2 different locations in the future. 2 realities. Taking the above presented line of reasoning as correct, Poland must already build armed forces with the top possible autonomy and potential. In another words, it is essential to strive to accomplish the widest possible strategical independency in safety matters (at all levels in this military). To be ready for the possible existence of the second geopolitical option described earlier. So the subject of the following thoughts will not be the present or closest state in which we are dependent on the US and NATO, and this target. At the same time, it is worth noting that building strategical autonomy does not preclude us from operating in conditions where the US will stay in Europe and NATO will be strong and coherent. 1 does not regulation out, although in specified a situation the US may block any besides bold initiatives. However, it is crucial to strive for the widest possible autonomy or to prepare to accomplish this autonomy shortly after the Americans have given up their European direction.

In view of the above, it seems that in the framework of building up its own strategical self-reliance on safety issues, Poland should adopt the following 3 priorities in the future:

1. Preventing war on its own territory (effective abroad policy and deterrence).
2. Preventing the outbreaks of wars in their surroundings (which harm and weaken the state).
3. Create your own political-military safety architecture in the region.

Of course, all of them penetrate on different levels. any come from others. In contrast, it is worth describing in item why such, alternatively than another priorities were specified by the author of this study.

AD. 1 Preventing war on its own territory

The presumption is completely wrong, in which Poland should build armed forces in the event of war and defence. It is simply a misunderstanding to ask as the main question: “What war are we preparing for?” For in the question itself, there is already a pre-defined 1 script for which the armed forces should prepare. specified reasoning and strengthening it in society is simply harmful. Finally, national safety should be abandoned. The correct question that should be raised in the context of the construction of an army should be: “What do we request armed forces for?” For their primary function should be to deter and prevent them from conducting a defensive war.

The Polish Armed Forces should have the military possible to discourage a possible aggressor from attacking. defence war is simply a failure. If the state is forced to defend itself and in its own territory, this means that the armed forces and the political architecture created failed to fulfil their primary task of deterrence. Thus, the enemy's belief that he is incapable to accomplish political goals by military means. Thus, creating a concept and building the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland only for defence of the Polish territory in itself assumes defeat of the army in its overriding and basic task. With the attitude stricte defensive, you can only respond to the actions of your opponent. This may not be adequate to prevent him from creating conditions convenient to attack. At the same time, the willingness to defend itself may not be adequate as a deterrent.

It is like the disastrous effect on the defending state of her defence war that we are presently seeing in Ukraine. Historical examples in this subject could be multiplied. Losses in infrastructure, economy and people are unavoidable in this scenario.

Thus, Poland must build military possible (but besides state and political potential), which will convince the possible opponent that it is not worth deciding on strength solutions.

Political deterrence

Of course, it doesn't should be that our armed forces themselves must have more possible than the possible of a possible enemy. Building a suitable political safety architecture can multiplicate our military possible in the event of war, and make much better conditions for deterrence in peacetime. This is NATO's architecture today. However, the economic, political and military dependence of 3rd countries on Poland's possible must already be created. Within existing global structures (whether NATO or the EU). The stronger and more assured we can build a deal in the region, the easier it will be for us to accomplish safety objectives (and not only that) in the future. And even if the existing safety architecture became inefficient.

It is besides essential to realize that the possible opponent (Russian Federation) will not hit Poland in highly unfavourable political conditions. Especially erstwhile these have a negative impact on the strategical situation. In another words, it would be very unwise to attack Poland, for example, without broadening the operating base, as well as securing the flank. Hitting Poland from the territory of Belarus, without first mastering Ukraine or Lithuania, would be a very risky option. And making specified an invasion in a situation where Poland would be in NATO could be considered an effort to commit a conscious act hara-kiri.

This leads to a logical conclusion. It is in the Polish national interest to make a local alliance with the aforementioned partners, i.e. Lithuania and Ukraine (and possibly even sometime with Belarus?). However, it must be an alliance not only based on the common will to argue Moscow, but should be much more durable and placed besides on the economical (infrastructure connections allowing trade, economical activities, common business), political (International cooperation) and social foundations (culture, knowing of common past and the request to build partnerships etc). The effectiveness of the policy in this area will make an excellent deterrent advantage, while giving Poland a safety buffer. What we are observing today, for in the situation in which Ukraine was attacked, Poland and its armed forces have time to gather experience and prepare for the future.

Military deterrence

In turn, different types of methods can be utilized in military deterrence:

1. Build your own manufacture and prepare the state – besides in the civilian sphere – for possible war struggles (showing determination and that erstwhile the war started, it will not end quickly, and Poland is ready to fight until victory).
2. Create strong possible in the CYBER sphere.
3. Demonstration technological and informational advantage.
4. Show the ability to execute painful strokes in the territory of the opponent.
5. Create advanced opposition to attacks on different levels (economic, CYBER, military, i.e. rocket, naval, air, land forces, is not only about active defence systems but besides passive, specified as shelters for civilians).
6. With the political conditions created, deploy their conventional forces in 3rd countries in specified a way as to destruct the threat and pose a problem for the opponent.
7. Place your own forces in your own territory in specified a way as to show your readiness to defend yourself and the ability to origin advanced losses to the aggressor.

In order for these measures to be adequate to keep the safety of the state, the army must, of course, have advanced combat readiness, as well as real capabilities to execute individual tasks.

For this purpose, it is frequently essential to invest in expensive, but very effective weapons systems, which give advanced possible on the battlefield (or even before the war). In the army, in infrastructure, in the economy. An excellent example of this kind of weaponry is rocket launchers, i.e. HIMARSa. This kind of strategy is besides the F-35, which can supply information about the opponent and penetrate his defensive zones even before the outbreak of the conflict. Imagine the following demonstration of the ability (which actually happened recently) in which the aircraft disappears from the radar in 1 place and appears in another. Showing that we are able to strike from the air at any point chosen, behind enemy defence lines. In addition, defence systems should besides be in place, which, even before the war, will let the effectiveness of enemy destructive systems to be reduced. In another words, if the opponent knows, for example, the alternatively problematic accuracy of his rocket missiles and at the same time is aware that the defender has systems that will shoot down those missiles that will have a chance to hit the mark – then the possible rival will wonder about the sense of the impact. He will not know who will endure greater losses as a consequence of the replacement of rocket strikes. In addition, defence systems increase the cost of the attack (more launchers, more missiles, better attack management systems to be able to break through the defense). It is worth remembering that the dry conversion of the cost/effect of the systems' data, including only the acquisition prices of individual weapon systems, is simply a miscalculation, as I have explained many times in erstwhile studies.

AD 2. Preventive prevention of outbreaks of wars in its surroundings

The problem is besides complex with this priority. The political stableness of the region can be built on specified levels as:

1. Political – diplomacy utilizing the convergence of interests,
2. Economic – exploiting economical dependence between countries,
3. Military – building military alliances to deter and destruct threats.

Because the subject of the survey focuses on military topics, we will devote a small more space to it.

In order to prevent the outbreak of war in the countries of the region, military capacity to respond outside the state should be provided.. If specified possible is available, it can be much easier to influence on a political level. At the same time, the armed forces can warrant the safety of trade and the region's economies.

Stabilising its own environment and guaranteeing the safety of neighbouring countries is at the same time expanding its ability to keep its own security. Overtaking action, inactive in buffer zones, prevents a threat reaching its own borders.

Such capacity/potential Poland should acquire. reasoning only about the defence of Vistula or Warsaw is simply a manifestation of old intellectual maps based on our hard history. Poland – its political and military elites – must think further than the borders of the Polish state. If Poland wins in terms of safety in the Baltic States or Ukraine, it will besides win in the fight for its own sovereignty, independency and security.

Therefore, by translating this into a possibly future geopolitical situation of Poland, our Armed Forces must have the ability to send expeditions to neighbouring countries, without the request to weaken the forces essential to warrant their own security. Of course, in this place there is inactive – like a bad ghost – a atomic threat. However, it should be remembered that present we are preparing the Armed Forces for the 4th or even 5th decade. We do not know what the political situation will be like in 2030 or 2040. What seems to be besides ambitious or risky today, in 10 years can become something completely natural and feasible. If we have the right potential. If we want to prosecute specified an ambitious policy, we must have appropriate tactical relationships.

AD. 3. Creating your own safety architecture

Poland is presently standing for a historical minute and an chance to yet attract the countries of the region (the cost of German interests). On safety issues, the Baltic States – especially Lithuania – are very powerfully dependent on Poland. And that dependency most likely remains. economical and economical dependence and yet political dependence must besides be built. It seems to be happening. Construction of infrastructure, i.e. the Polish-Lithuania gas interconnector, or the Polish section via Caraptia which will lead to Klaipeda in the future will build a community of interests on the Warsaw-Wilno line.

Moreover, an highly crucial component of the puzzle in Polish safety is independent of Russia and free Ukraine. Ukraine, which will depend on Poland for the supply of supplies (which is already happening), but with which Poland should besides build common interests. specified a common ground could be the economical construction of Inter-Mediterranean, for example, an investment in infrastructure leading from Poland to the port of Odessa. Odessa-Tricity, this is 1 of the projects to be taken care of after the war. Of course, there are many another issues that can be started today. Economic, industrial and technological cooperation. Relocation of the arms manufacture in Poland (temporaryly, but e.g. in exchange for shares in know-how or production).

If Poland succeeds after – hopefully the winning – war in Ukraine to make a block: Poland-Baltov-Ukraine then specified a partnership will should be filled in with content. Including military force. Poland, as a country located somewhat behind, can be a safety distributor in the east. However, for this we request bigger and stronger armed forces than the ones we now have.

At the same time, military cooperation with Ukraine and the Baltic States will let to control the Polish buffer before Russia. The Russian attack on Poland, without occupying Lithuania and Ukraine, would be greatly hampered and highly risky. At the same time, it would require the Russians to mobilize their forces and resources. Russia may not be able to do so in the future.

Of course, another political solutions should besides be sought, especially on the Baltic. Any agreement with Denmark, Sweden or Finland would be added value. We should not forget partners from the south: Czech Republic and Slovakia. However, all states mentioned here may not be curious in the longer word to strengthen their relation with Warsaw and to build any stable, lasting and loyal block. For many different reasons.

However, it is worth to see a community of interests with Romania and to realize its geopolitical and geostrategic situation. Bucharest may turn out to be 1 of Poland's most valuable and valuable allies next to Kiev. So it is there, besides in the context of the construction of the triangle: Warsaw-Kijów-Bukareszt, that we should focus our attention and efforts. Investment in building relations with Romania should be a advanced precedence in Polish abroad policy.

Polish Defence Strategy

When the deterrence is ineffective, it is only then that we should consider what priorities should guide us in a war situation. And so, the Polish goal of defence war at strategical level should be:

1. Neutralizing the threat as rapidly as possible and with minimal losses.
2. Civil protection, especially in the context of an opponent capable of carrying out bloody occupation.
3. Minimising losses in critical infrastructure.
4. Political victory.

Some may be amazed that military triumph is lacking among the priorities. Yeah. due to the fact that the intent of war can never be military triumph as such. So what if the army wins on the battlefield, if the effects of the war origin the state and society to lose on an economic, humanitarian or political level, after the war?

There are examples in the past in which a given organization won a military clash, but lost peace. 1 of them is the 1973 Jom Kipur War. The Israeli army – after first difficulties – defeated the attacking Egyptians and Syrians. The Israeli army managed to counterattack and cross the Suez Canal. The armies of Egypt and Syria suffered severe, multiple losses. The aggressors' troops ended the war effort to lose control of the territories that were in their possession before the conflict. However, the political effects of the war were detrimental to Israel. The Israeli army withdrew from the occupied lands before the war, and as a consequence of the 1978 agreement the full Sinai (before the war occupied by Israel) was within the limits of Egypt.

The Polish goal of the defence war should so be to keep or increase its: security, influence and political and economical potential.

So even if the Russians attacked, won on the battlefield, but as a consequence of losses suffered, disadvantages in global politics or interior problems they would be forced to sign a peace for us – specified a script would be acceptable to Warsaw.

Describing these priorities in detail:

AD. 1. fast hazard neutralisation erstwhile minimising own losses.

Neutralisation of the threat should be understood to the maximum extent. This is not about destroying a 100 tanks on the front. The aim of the war is to undermine the military possible of the enemy so that it cannot proceed the conflict, but besides for many years forward it cannot afford to initiate the second.

At the same time, in a narrower sense, the task of massive losses to the opponent and stopping his attack and forcing him to talk peace will reduce the duration of fighting in his own territory. Which will automatically minimise material and human losses on the defense.

A completely optimal solution would be to neutralize the opposing forces even while crossing the border of our country and destroying its backside, without which it would be hard to proceed offensive operations.

It is worth noting that if this had worked out, the border conflict could even have been lost – in specified a sense if the opponent had won the first run, he entered Poland shallowly and had no ability to proceed the war, and consequently had to sign an adverse peace. This, of course, is simply a theoretical and desirable example to prosecute tactical and operational successes, but it should be remembered that they do not decide to win the peace treaty.

AD. 2. civilian protection

This point was included in the war priorities due to the fact that it should be remembered that the 20th-century genocidal business methods did not vanish into oblivion. For this reason, it cannot be that the army – accepting the slaughter of civilians – would search operational or tactical solutions that would give it an advantage on the battlefield. The state and its economy without citizens are nothing. An army without taxes wouldn't exist. Society is backing armed forces to warrant its own safety. The defence of the burnt and blood-filled bare earth makes no sense.

At the same time, it should be remembered that erstwhile armed forces let an opponent into the territory of the country, they may request to reflect these territories at any stage. And the enemy will surely usage civilians and civilian objects as shields for his weapon systems. In specified a situation, Polish soldiers would gotta shoot towards Polish citizens and their assets... What's the point, if we now have a reasonably convenient border defense? (Not like Ukraine in 2022 or II of Poland in 1939?).

AD. 3. Minimizing losses in critical infrastructure [REPRESENTATION]

The header precedence should besides include the protection of any facilities affecting the economical possible of the country. First of all, the aim is to get you out of the war in specified a condition that you can rapidly start rebuilding and enter the improvement path. After the war, in the event of devastation and immense material losses, the country may face famine. The task of defending the civilian population by the armed forces will then not be fulfilled, for human sacrifices resulting from the effects of the war should besides be included among war casualties.

At the same time, in the case of e.g. demolition of critical infrastructure (such as kerosene, gas, gas pipelines, power cables) the state can become dependent on its aggressor on energy safety and the economy. This effect cannot be allowed, as this will besides affect political weakness and a worse situation for the future. And returning the threat from the state that attacked.

This is why investment in costly but essential defence systems is so important. E.g. rocket anti-missile systems (e.g. Patriot or Swordfish vessels with anti-missile components). In this case, too, it is apparent that the deeper we let the enemy into our territory, the greater the failure of wealth.

AD. 4. Political Victory

Finally, the very crucial nonsubjective of war should be to keep or improve its political capacity in the post-war period. For Poland this would gotta mean (for example, modern conditions in 2022) maintaining the Baltic States and Ukraine independent of Moscow. At the same time, the political benefit would be if, as a consequence of Russia's weaknesses and losses, it could not keep Belarus in its sphere of influence.

It is besides apparent that Poland should leave the war by being in the same alliances (or stronger) as erstwhile it entered the conflict. In another words, if we were attacked as a NATO member, then the later peace could not be about leaving our country from the pact, or at all, the solution to the North Atlantic Pact. An agreement would besides be unfavourable, as a consequence of which we would gotta abandon, for example, the partnership with Ukraine.

On the basis of these assumptions, it is clear that military victories could undoubtedly aid to accomplish war priorities and objectives, but they cannot in themselves be the nonsubjective of war. If Poland – as a state, political and economical entity – emerges from the conflict stronger than the aggressor and the threat from the attacker is neutralized (high losses, interior problems, external pressure), then possible defeats in battlefields can be compensated after the war. Thus, it would be completely wrong, for example, to presume that the Polish Armed Forces would let the opponent to enter e.g. 120 km deep into the territory, to accept a rocket strike "on the chest", did not defend the coast with the aid of the fleet (a threat to the demolition of coastal critical infrastructure), to quit the defence of e.g.Bialystok and in the deployment of forces in the depth of the field would search more favourable solutions on the battlefield. In the context of possible state devastation, military triumph would not translate into improving the situation of the country after the war. On the contrary, Poland would then become weaker politically, economically and would depend again on Russia's energy supply. After we have been working so hard in fresh years to build independency in this area.

For all these reasons, it is so crucial and crucial to answer the basic question: “Why are we fighting?” It seems that the answer must be, "to not lose what we have achieved and possibly to gain something more." It deals with a wide scope of economic, political and, of course, safety issues.

Buy a book or ebook: “Third DEKADA. The planet present and in 10 years” and find out why we are in specified a minute of history, why Russia attacked Ukraine and what may inactive be waiting for us in the coming years:

Three DEKADA. planet present and in 10 years

OPERATIONAL VEGETABLES

This is where we enter the divisions that fall within the highest military competence. Therefore, the intent of this passage is not to draw up operational tasks for the Polish Army and its individual units, but to present certain conclusions resulting from pre-defined strategical assumptions. Establishments to influence the establishment of operational plans.

Thus, if the State's safety strategy is to prevent the outbreak of a defensive war by military deterrence, and as a consequence of this deterrence is to make a threat of counter-attack in the territory of the opponent, then the operational plans must include, inter alia, the conditions and course of specified a possible countermeasure. Which in turn besides forces the creation of specified a doctrine as well as an army model that will enable specified action. Consequently, the request to have adequate weapons systems must be involved.

The main function of the Polish Armed Forces, which is to prevent the outbreak of the defensive war, should be stressed here again. Thus, the model of an army and its equipment should let for prevention and deterrence. This may besides affect the request to get an costly military technique.

In addition, if we would like to stabilise the region or safe buffer zones, then our armed forces must have expeditious components capable of rapidly moving and operating abroad (logistics). There must so be plans and procedures for specified action.

On the another hand, moving on to a defensive strategy, if strategical priorities are:

• As shortly as possible to neutralize the enemy's forces,
• Civil protection,
• Protection of assets and infrastructure,

these priorities force the adoption of certain operational assumptions in their consequences. These assumptions are rather clear. In order to meet the defence strategy priorities:

1. try to destroy/neytralize enemy forces as early as possible (expression, CYBER sphere, WRE)so you may request to contact him as shortly as possible,
2. try to halt the enemy from entering his own territory profoundly to minimise war losses.

Consequently, if we agree on the priorities of the defence strategy outlined in the earlier chapter, then the consequence of this acceptance must besides be that The Polish Armed Forces must act on the attacking opponent as shortly as the Polish border is crossed, and preferably the aggressor's facilities located on his own territory should be attacked at the same time. (or territory utilized as operational basis for the attack).

In another words, the Polish Armed Forces must have the possible to defend their own borders. This does not mean that soldiers will gotta defend border posts, but possibly delicate border crossings (such as bridges via Bug next to Brest) should be in the scope of fire, for example our artillery. Whereas, given the geopolitical context, The Polish Armed Forces must have the possible to defend the full Polish east border including the Polish-Ukrainian section (vide the anticipation of falling Ukraine or the request to send its assistance).

At the same time, defensive warfare must not be confined to war activities on its own territory. The aim must be to transfer the point of gravity of the fights to buffer zones and even to the territory of the opponent, if possible (it may not be – vide atomic threat, but if it is?). This would reduce war losses on the defence side and increase the costs of the attacker.

In all this, the request for coherence between political, strategic, operational objectives, as well as doctrine, model army and its military method (equipment) should be remembered. If this coherence is not achieved and, for example, the operational objectives are separated from the strategical objectives, then it will be impossible to accomplish the latter. At the same time, if the strategical objectives do not take into account operational constraints, they will simply be unrealistic. Thus, it is undoubtedly crucial that the cognition of political and decision-making elites is intertwined with military knowledge. As the full strategy needs to be built, a systemic approach to the subject is essential – so taking into account many spheres. So political, military, but besides technological, economic, as well as social (social acceptance of arms and will to resist).

POTENTIAL/ CAPACITY OF BROTHER POWER

On the basis of the above considerations on geopolitical conditions, the adopted strategy and the general operational framework, 1 can be tempted to specify the essential possible and capabilities for the Polish Armed Forces. Of course, this is all in the context of a average to long-term perspective, and so in 1 where we should build strategical autonomy.

In order to accomplish the objectives of the safety Strategy, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland should have the capacity to:

1. tasks of the opponent of losses in critical infrastructure and attacking logistics facilities in its territory [RESTRUCTION]
2. conducting the offensive/conference into its operational base (territory) [STRENGTHENING, CAPACITY OF CONFIDENTIAL PRESSION]
3. harming the possible aggressor in the economy – e.g. by: port blockade, demolition of communication nodes, strategical facilities, naphthoports and gas-ports [RESTRUCTION, PERFORMANCE OF PRESSION]
4. Protecting your own critical infrastructure, economy and population against the actions of your opponent– Active and passive protection systems [REPLY]
5. long and persistent defence of Polish territory in the conventional war– Demonstration of the ability to win a war [POSSIBILITY]
6. deployment of own resources in the territory of allies located in buffer zones, without prejudice to its own needs in the substance of defence of the territory of Poland [PREVENTION + CONSTRUCTION OF safety ARCHITECTURE]
7. building global conflict groups based on the Polish core to increase the advantage over the opponent on the selected section – e.g. having a strong adequate fleet around which a stronger squad supported by Danes or Swedes could be built, which would operate close the Polish coast. [PREVENTION + CONSTRUCTION OF safety ARCHITECTURE]

All these capabilities would support the task of preventing the outbreak of the defensive war in Poland and in its buffer zones. At the same time, the corresponding possible of the Polish SZ would facilitate the construction of political-military safety architecture in the region.

In order to accomplish the objectives of defence strategy of the SZ RP, they should have the capacity to:

1. tasks of the opponent of large losses in the first days of war, demolition of enemy infrastructure in the back, supply warehouses, bases, airports, communication hubs etc. [NOUTRALISATION OF THE RISK],
2. a long and persistent fight [RESISTANCE],
3. guaranteeing opposition to destructive impacts (racite, cyber, artillery etc.), in order to minimise the demolition of the state and its infrastructure, the state must appear from the war in the best condition possible [MINIMINIMINIATION OF strategy IN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE]
4. the protection of national borders over the full east length, including from the Ukrainian direction, the possible to halt the enemy as shortly as possible and not let him into his own territory [GUARD OF MANY, MINE, INFRASTRUCTURE],
5. using allied territories to deploy their own forces (without prejudice to the defence of its territory) Complicating the opponent's strategical and operational situation [FIGHTING IN BUFORES, MINIMUMISING OF OWN LOSS]
6. security of supply of strategical energy resources from another directions than Russia, as well as supplies from allied countries – in the case of Poland it is mainly a maritime domain, due to the fact that almost all imports of gas/oil/carbon are already carried out through ports [THE STATE IN WAR]
7. ‘encourage” allies to participate in military operations of the Armed Forces of Poland conducted on our theatre activities – having a strong fleet, for example, that would aid the Danes or Swedes decide to support them and send their units, e.g. in the area of the Gulf of Gdańsk, which would importantly affect the safety of the Polish coast, in another words showing allies that aid is meaningful and given rapidly enough, will let for success and prevent the spread of war on allied states. [ANNOUNCEMENT OF SOYSENTS]

Universality and flexibility

As you can see, the possible needed to implement the safety strategy outlined above (averting the outbreak of the defensive war and in the neighbourhood + building the safety architecture) mostly coincides with the possible needed to defend the country in the event of aggression. In another words, the concept proposed above is consistent on both strategical levels. Thanks to this, the Polish Armed Forces can usage the same tools (systems) within the same doctrine to carry out tasks both during peace (refugee) and war (fight). As a consequence, it saves money to build an army model and choose weapons. It besides allows the creation of armed forces with a advanced universality, which can meet a wider scope of threats.

The Balanced War Doctrine

It should besides be stated that the military are primarily competent to develop, test and implement appropriate defence doctrine (war) in the armed forces. However, on the basis of geopolitical and geostrategic considerations, it is possible to indicate the general direction of solutions which the Polish Armed Forces should seek. If we anticipate changing geopolitical conditions, and strategical needs may require both attitudes stricte Defensive, but besides more active and possibly even offensive, this developed doctrine of war cannot be besides rigid and exemplary. The Army and its commanders must, on the 1 hand, have developed schemes and procedures for action, e.g. in the event of a defensive war. On the another hand, flexibility and independency in action may be necessary. Especially in unexpected, different situations, specified as those that have not been rehearsed before. It is essential to find the right balance, as Dr. Luke said in her large book, “War doctrines. past and evaluationIt’s okay. ”

For the knowing of the problem it is worth to give a concrete example, described in the above-mentioned publication. Well, to the 1973 Jom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt and Syria, both sides went rather differently by choosing utmost solutions. The Egyptians developed a rigid doctrine of war, and for years they practiced patterns of action. For example, the unit liable for building a crossing through the Suez Canal has been practicing for years only this task. This approach was due to the fact that political elites decided to enter into a limited-scale war that would bring concrete political benefits. It was assumed that Israel's forces would be attacked on the Jewish-controlled Sinai Peninsula by surprise. comparatively shallow entry into the territory controlled by the enemy. safe the east coast of the Suez Canal and adopt defensive stance (reinforcement, trenching). This was due to the experience of erstwhile wars, in which the Israeli side in the fight against the Egyptians always displayed superior military equipment, training and morale of soldiers, greater flexibility, faster maneuvering and independency of action – all of which together gave a immense advantage in the maneuvering battle. Therefore, in 1973, the Egyptians – utilizing fresh effective weapons systems in the form of guided anti-tank missiles – decided to strike with surprise besides utilizing a numerical advantage, enter comparatively shallow and then decision on to defense. Thanks to the laborious training of the army, the Egyptian army perfectly performed its task in the first days. Egypt had a chance to win on the battlefield due to the fact that individual Israeli commanders, who had large autonomy, decided to conduct immediate counterattacks against the Egyptian army, expecting small resistance, deficiency of organization on the side of the opponent (experiences from earlier wars). Single and thus weaker counter-attacks were easy for the Egyptians to resist, and Israel suffered crucial losses in the first phase of the fighting.

Egypt’s problems began erstwhile it became apparent that Israel had conquered Syrian forces on the second front. Syria desperately needed help. For political and strategical reasons, the Cairo authorities ordered a departure from the earlier plan and a strike against Israel to relieve the Syrians. The effect was that the Egyptian troops were completely unprepared for specified an event. The commanders and soldiers faced a request for improvisation that had not previously been required of them. As 1 can imagine, as a consequence of another – this time centrally prepared – counteroffensive, Israel defeated Egyptian forces in the maneuvering conflict and Israeli forces invaded Egypt on the western shore of the Suez Canal.

This example shows that well - prepared and trained doctrine and central planning can produce very good results. However, besides rigid a training and command approach is hampered by improvised actions in unforeseen situations. On the another hand, the advanced autonomy of commanders and individuals (Israel) gives many advantages, but under certain conditions, warfare has better results if coordination takes place between smaller groups of troops by staff at higher levels.

By moving this to Polish conditions, it seems essential to adopt a decently balanced doctrine of war. It must not focus on preparing and practicing 1 script (defence of the country against the Russian Federation's attack). specified a variant should be developed and impact on the training of the commanders, however, given the variability of political conditions that may happen in our region, as well as the challenges that we should take, the commanders and soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland should have the ability to act under any conditions and to make decisions independently depending on the situation. In particular, do not halt teaching and practicing offensive activities. In particular, they require much more skills, discipline, experience and an independent, fast consequence to events.

Hazard neutralizing possible – destructive

At this point, it is besides worth addressing the ability to inflict large losses on the opponent. So in infrastructure, logistics, backroom as well as in military technology and surviving power. Since we see the Russian Federation as a major threat, it is crucial to remember the circumstances and weaknesses of a possible opponent. These were highlighted during the war in Ukraine. As a consequence of crucial losses in equipment as well as shrinking supplies, the Russian Federation may have a problem in the future with the appropriate saturation of its army with military technology. This is primarily about quantitative issues. Before the war in Ukraine, it was hard to imagine that with immense Russian reserves in resources, the Polish Army could number on a possible conflict that by destroying military technology could deprive the opponent of his ability on the battlefield. However, as a consequence of massive losses in Ukraine, the Russian Federation army is moving out of resources. Even if he replaces them in the future with more modern equipment, he is improbable to be able to replace the losses in adequate quantity. In another words, the chance that the Polish Armed Forces will be able – by destroying military technology – to halt the opponent increased significantly. This is besides crucial in the context of deterrence, as demonstration of the possible of the Polish Armed Forces to inflict crucial losses on their opponent can play an crucial function in deterring them from attacking. Especially specified an aggressor who had previously suffered very large losses in another war (the intellectual aspect).

The case is akin with surviving force, or human resources. Personnel losses, especially those suffered in Ukraine among experienced and well-trained individuals, are very painful for Russians. The demography of the Russian Federation, the challenges for this country on many fronts and many another factors dictate that it will be very painful for her to inflict advanced losses on the Russian army in a surviving force, unlike in history.

At the same time, the possible adoption of the alleged doctrine active defence – a model of the RFN army from the Cold War time – may be an additional binding component of allies (i.e. USA). In the context of this kind of doctrine, the voice of Dr. Jack Bartosiak late appeared, who stated that the US could sceptically look at Polish ambitions in terms of defence of the state already from the borders at the possible of hitting into hostile territory. For these reasons, as JB suggested, there is simply a hazard that the Americans would not defend us or declare that they would not defend us. Meanwhile, the example of the Cold War Germany proves that it is precisely the opposite. Western Germany – during the Cold War – decided to defend the state from its borders. The fact is that the American people of this kind were not very responsible. They'd alternatively have time to react. They wanted to usage the German army as a bumper and start fighting the Soviets only in the depths of the RFN after recognizing the main directions of the attack. However, the German authorities have adopted a different doctrine and strategical assumptions rightly stating that the West Germany does not have strategical depth and cannot let the enemy deep into its territory due to the fact that it threatens to destruct the state.

The effects were that Americans could not leave their most crucial and strongest ally in Europe (the German Army was strong and modern at the time). Leaving the German army alone on the border against all the power of the Warsaw Pact threatened to destruct the Bundeswehr at the beginning of the war. In view of the fact that Germany decided to defend the borders of its country – despite persuasion from the US – it was the Americans who had to make a fresh doctrine that would presume aid to the Bundeswehra. As a result, the concept of the Air-Land Battle, whose assumptions function in US Army to this day, and which contributed to a large U.S. triumph in the 1991 Iraq War.

At the same time, if we presume that Poland must be ready for strategical independence, then erstwhile developing doctrine and building an army model it cannot look at allies (although they should be taken into account, especially present erstwhile we are dependent on security). It is not possible to make plans, for example, for a maximum two-week run, after which allies should theoretically come to the aid. If we are talking about strategical independence, the full Polish state, as well as its armed forces, should be prepared for a long-term war. due to the fact that a surgery planned for a short time may turn into one. As in Ukraine, for example. So we are talking not only about the structure of the Polish Army and its numbers, but besides about its resilience and logistics, as well as the back. In this industrial backroom, which should have the ability to produce, but besides to service as much as possible any equipment utilized by SZ RP. This leads to constatations that go beyond the scope of the survey but which should be mentioned. Poland must build its manufacture (especially heavy, light is easier to build) as well as take care of shelters for civilians and state administration, warehouses for wartime supplies and supply for civilian defence. Procedures that will let the state to function in war conditions.

Personnel and equipment reserves, quantity/quality ratio

On the basis of Ukrainian experience, it besides appears that the army should have many staff reserves. A full-scale war aimed at taking control of the state (Ukraine) or the destruction/neutralization of the buffer state (such a goal could be in the event of an attack on Poland) looks completely different from the image drawn by any publicists before the Ukrainian war. There is no question of limited military action in which small, well-trained troops destruct each other's precious but uncommon military method on the battlefield. It's rather the opposite. On the 1 hand, you request a mass of equipment and staff reserves (better 1000 efficient T-72 than a 100 T-90) and on the another you request costly "toys" with immense possible (like HIMARS) that make a difference. As we know, the Russians lacked mass in the first weeks of the fighting. They did not declare mobilization, did not increase their mass, so they could not handle all the directions they attacked, which cost them their defeat at the first phase of the war. On the another hand, Ukrainians have since 2014 introduced mandatory conscription and created WOT. They were able to call hundreds of thousands of soldiers to arms in a short time. The problem for Kiev was the deficiency of adequate military technology. She receives this from the west, and thanks to her human resources, Ukrainians are able to reproduce military units that suffered losses and make fresh ones. Ukraine was preparing for a long-term war to the degree of its modest budgetary capabilities. And that's how she survives and fights to this day. However, insufficient advantage in military technology (as quantitative as technological) over the opposing organization to rapidly end the conflict, neutralize the opponent and minimize their own losses.

On the basis of these experiences, it can be argued that if in the future any country wants to attack another – with a view to conquest or destruction/neutralization – it will effort not to repeat Russian mistakes. And set up an army large adequate to crush a defender. Sooner or later. This in turn leads to the next conclusion that if in defence 1 soldier is worth 3 attackers (the explanation of the request to accomplish a 3–1 or 4–1 advantage for the attacker), then if Poland is going to put out (strongly simplifying) a 100,000 army, then the opponent will request 300 1000 soldiers. If Poland exposes 300 1000 soldiers, then the opponent will request even a millionth army. Of course, it is about the advantage in the chosen direction, but if Poland must defend respective directions at once, in rule the little many army will put little forces on each of them. So it will be easier for the opponent to accomplish the required advantage.

And here we should look at the question of the ratio of quantity to quality on both sides of the coin. For if individual assumes that the 300,000 soldiers of the SZ of the Republic of Poland will be little armed than the 100,000th army, should he besides imagine how poorly the armed army of the attacker, who will exposure a million soldiers? due to the fact that attacking an army with a smaller, but more modern and more saturated military method on an army larger (but with high: morale and determination of defenders), is extremely, highly risky. What the war in Ukraine has shown so far. So, bearing the cost of issuing a larger army (of course more due to needs and abilities – request of balance – not only to be numerous) We besides multiply the cost of issuing an army of possible aggressors.

At the same time, care must be taken not only for the armed forces that are able to cope with their tasks before and on the first day of the conflict, but besides to think about maintaining their capabilities during the ongoing war. As long as possible. In order to do so, we request both equipment and individual reserves. Meanwhile, in practice Poland was deprived of reserves as a consequence of suspension of collection. The WOT has about 35,000 soldiers, who should execute another roles during the war, not just as a staff reserve as any suggest. The last 1 would be a mistake. Collected for years and acquainted surroundings in which WOT troops practice regular during the war should have their own tasks supporting another types of armed forces. From here, it seems that Staff reserve for professionals should be built separately. This is now 1 of the priorities and most hard challenges.

CAPACITY BY FLANKS

By translating the above considerations into specific, essential capabilities of the Polish Army, 1 can be tempted to give examples/situation in which the Polish army should prove itself. And so, listing individual sections applicable to Polish security:

North Flanka — Baltic Sea

Although the position of Polish interests and safety in the Baltic should be kept by the Land Army (minimum brigade to defend the coast against landing, which would be more useful for fighting on the land front) has late become a precedence issue. And it can stay that way for a long time. Therefore, the issue should be taken seriously. erstwhile cut off from Russian energy resources, Poland is 100% dependent on imports of oil, gas and even coal from Baltic ports and maritime infrastructure (Baltic tube pipeline, power line to Sweden). Furthermore, ports play an crucial function in trade and at the same time are logistics bases for possible supplies during the war. Polish critical infrastructure (LNG terminal in Świnoujście, Naftoport in Gdańsk, connect Baltic Pipe, gas and oil warehouses, and in future atomic power plant) is located on the coast. And she's susceptible to seaside attacks. And air and sea.

The facilities at sea and close the coast cannot be sufficiently secured by land systems. I wrote about this in an extended analysis in the text: ‘Why do we request a Navy?”. Tasks for the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland (mainly for the Navy) in the northern section are:

1. Safeguarding maritime transport – including supplies of energy resources [REPRESENTATION, STATE KEEPING IN WAR],
2. Security of energy infrastructure – Baltic Pipe, SWE-POL Link, drilling platforms, possible wind farms [REPLY, WAR STATE KEEPING],
3. Protection of coastal energy infrastructure – Świnoujście LNG terminal, connects Baltic Pipe, Naftoport and refinery in Gdańsk, gas and oil warehouses, future atomic power plant and floating LNG terminal,
4. Security of port infrastructure – Gdańsk, Gdynia, Szczecin, Świnoujście [REPRESENTATION, STATE KEEPING IN WAR],
5. It is possible to make an impact from the sea side to the Kaliningrad Oblast. [RESTRUCTION, fast NEUTRAISATION OF A RISK],

At the same time, the skills needed in the future should be:

6. Possibility to close and then destruct the Baltic Fleet in the Baltic port [STRENGTHENING, RESPONSIBILITY, fast NEUTRALISATION OF A RISK].
7. Potential to defeat the Baltic Fleet on the advanced seas [STRENGTHENING, RESPONSIBILITY, fast NEUTRALISATION OF A RISK].

Realizing, however, that the Northern flank is only 1 of the 4 main ones in terms of safety against threats from the Russian Federation, the last 2 abilities do not should be derived from the independent naval force of the Republic of Poland. The Polish fleet must be strong adequate to aid allies. Then a strong adequate squad of ships belonging to respective countries could be created, based on the Polish backbone.

Moreover, in peacetime, the Navy must have the ability to:

1. patrolling and maritime surveillance, reflection of what where and erstwhile it floats (radar), the ability to control vessels [CONTROLA DISCLOSURE, DISSTRUCTION, ARCHITECTURA EZP.]
2. Airspace ControlOn the Baltic, reflection of what, where and erstwhile years (radar) – deterrence of enemy aircraft from entering Polish airspace, including flights at low ceilings, [CONTROL DISGUSED, DISGUSTING, ARCHITECTURA WITHOUT SYSTEM.]
3. control and deterrencewater depth (sonar, chopper to ZOP), [CONTROL DISCLOSED, STRAIGHTING, ARCHITEKTURA EZP.]
4. demonstration of presence in the Balticand readiness to defend trade routes, transmission infrastructure – Baltic Pipe, SwePol Link, as well as strategical coastal facilities, i.e. LNG terminals, oil, refineries, ports, [CONTROLA OVERVIEW, DESTRUCTION, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION],
5. operations and exercises with alliesand partners.

Kaliningrad – Baltic States

The Russian enclave has for years been seen as a Russian indestructible aircraft carrier and operating base which constantly threatens Warsaw. However, this perception needs to be changed. Poland should effort to gain the possible to make Kaliningrad Oblast a hostage. A burden for Moscow. Therefore, in the average to long term, SZ RP should have the possible to:

1. Defence direction in Tricity, securing the border especially the Elbląg-Olsztyn-Ełk-Suwałki line [CONTROL DISCLOSED, DISTRACTING, MINIMUMISED LOSS],
2. securing the Tricity and close crucial objects against demolition – missile, anti-aircraft, anti-shipping systems [RESTRUCTION, RESISTANCE],
3. land-air-sea blockade in Kaliningrad Oblast – which requires adequate capabilities of the Navy and ground air defense, but besides additional forces that we could deploy in Lithuania in order to keep the safety of the alleged Suwałki gulf [RESTRATION, NEUTRALISATION OF THE RISK],
4. Making a destructive impact on crucial objects/backrooms – remote firing systems, i.e. barrel and rocket artillery, guided aerial missiles, marine guided rocket systems [RESTRUCTION, NEUTRAISATION OF RISK],
5. Land offensive executions at OK – in which it may be easier to deploy additional forces in Lithuania so as not to weaken the defence of its territory [RESTRUCTION, NEUTRALISATION OF THE RISK, POLITICAL WINTH],
6. sending additional forces to Lithuania, and possibly to Latvia to defend allies – having additional forces [WITHDRAWAL, CONSTRUCTION OF safety ARCHITECTURE],
7. Establishing cooperation with Sweden and Finland to defend Estonia and Latvia — For what usage a stronger fleet and already existing aeromobile forces [RESTRUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION OF ARCHITEKTURE WITHOUT EZP.]

Belarusian episode

The threat from the Belarusian side has always been the biggest, and this direction (especially Brest) is perfect for hitting the heart of Poland. It should so be borne in head that the episode should always be a precedence and, in principle, should not be weakened at the expense of others. Especially due to the fact that Poland should show its ability to carry out offensive actions in Belarus, which would automatically hinder Minsk authorities from deciding to attack Ukraine or Lithuania. At the same time, the ability to carry out an effective attack and get enemy territory as a consequence can give a large advantage at a peaceful negotiating table. The Polish SZ should so have the possible to:

1. Stopping your opponent as close to the border as possible, including setting an anti-aircraft and rocket barrier – utilizing convenient terrain conditions promoting the defence side (on the Grodno direction dense forests on the Polish side, on the Brest direction partial support against the Bug line, partial about the forest in this Belarus region – easy insight into hostile territory) [SHOOTING, fast NEUTRAISATION OF RISK, PROTECTION OF PEOPLE AND MAJOR],
2. Making destructive strokes on the aggressor's back – Artillery, Missile, Aeroplane, Unmanned [RESTRUCTION, fast Threat NEUTRAISATION],
3. Capability to execute offensive/conference in enemy territory – the offensive possible of the Land Army, demonstration of readiness to attack Brest and Grodno, if, for example, the Belarusian troops attacked Ukraine or were preparing to attack Lithuania [RESTRUCTION, fast NEUTRALISATION OF THE Adversary, THE CONSTRUCTION OF safety ARCHITECTURE, POLITICAL WIN].

Ukrainian Episode

Due to the ongoing war in Ukraine and the uncertain destiny of this country, the Polish armed forces should prepare for 2 options of events. Thus, the situation in which the territory of Ukraine may form an operational basis for Russian troops, or Ukraine will remain, but due to the exhaustion of the current war, it will request safety support for the future. Thus, SZ RP should have the ability to:

1. Stopping your opponent as close to the border as possible, including setting an anti-aircraft and rocket barrier [SHOOTING, fast NETRALISING, PROTECTION OF MANY AND PROPERTY],
2. Making destructive strokes on the aggressor's back – Artillery, Missile, Aeroplane, Unmanned [RESTRUCTION, fast Threat NEUTRAISATION],
3. Granting military support to Ukraine – additional forces that would not deplete possible on the above sections, including dense and light units, e.g. aeromobile [SURVEILLANCE, CONSTRUCTION OF safety ARCHITECTURE].

As you can see, the ability to carry out the offensive is lacking. This is due to the fact that if the Russians were able to master Ukraine and endanger our full east border, then we would gotta think only about defence. At the same time, the direction of Lviv or Kowalski is rather hard to attack from Poland. In addition, forces sent – in the second variant of events – as support for the Allied Ukraine would at worst participate in the defensive war. It is clear that the troops in this section should besides be flexible, have a dense component capable of performing strokes, flanking and conducting counter-offensive. However, the emphasis on offensive abilities is much more crucial on the flanks: Kaliningrad or Belarus.

Germany

The placing of Germany in this ranking may be surprising. However, it is the most deliberate and justified procedure, which I will effort to show below. First of all, the Polish Armed Forces must become a political tool for the authorities from Warsaw. In this context, appropriate possible gives the anticipation to control its territory and its surroundings. To decide what happens in a given area. Whether and in which direction the energy resources or J goods flow. Moreover, Germany's current military weakness should be exploited and regional safety guarantees for countries in Central and east Europe should be made available. If Poland is specified a guarantor, it will besides gain political support from local partners. However, if the Polish Armed Forces did not have the right possible to support the construction of regional safety architecture, and on the another hand Germany achieved specified capabilities – then the political function of Poland could be marginalized. Especially if, for example, in 10-15 years it turned out that Germany has an army that could easy defeat the Polish Armed Forces. German political dominance would then be complete. Thus, efforts to build and keep the Polish army must besides take into account the competitive factor. Poland must take a certain kind of game erstwhile it comes to becoming a leader in regional security. Of course, we have much little economical possible than Germany, but political conditions offer us an chance to accomplish specified ambitious goals (not to encourage Germany to arm itself and their attitude towards Ukraine while at the same time our credibility, loyalty and proving ourselves in a crisis situation – vide War in Ukraine). Therefore, SZ RP should – in this respect – be able to build local safety architecture supporting Polish political and economical interests. Thus, it is besides crucial for these reasons to have expeditionary components in the armed forces.

GOVERNING ARMY MODEL

All these considerations should be transferred to the ground of current events and current defence policy of the Polish government. With the memory of the fact that present we spend billions of PLN on building the Armed Forces, whose full possible will be visible only between 2030 and 1940 and later. In another words, we should prepare for a geopolitical situation that may happen in 1 or 2 decades. Who will present present what the planet will look like in the 2040s and give guarantees for specified a vision? This is simply not possible, and the request to build flexible armed forces with the top and widest possible should be stressed again. So that we can face many situations. Slicing an army into 1 selected script could be a disaster.

At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that any dispute about what model of the SZ of the Republic of Poland should be accepted is irrelevant. Investments made for years, and above all purchases from only 2022 alone, prove that changing the direction of model improvement of the Polish army is impossible. It can be corrected, but in rule the model has already been selected. So it is worth looking at what he might look like and whether he is able to warrant us the abilities described above.

‘300’ (thousands) Spartan in Polish version

The slogan “regards capabilities” has late been repeated by commentators and publicists on almost all subject addressing military issues. Most often, however, there are no thoughts about what capabilities Poland needs. For example, the construction of the 300 000th army is criticized, but the reason for the criticism is to be besides many. The discussion does not lead to consideration of abilities only ends with the subject of numbers and that if we build a large but poorly equipped army, it will be a deficiency of ability (no indication of which). Of course, part of the work for specified a state of discussion lies with the authorities, who simply did not specify the capabilities they want to get by expanding the army's size or making specified alternatively than another arms purchases. However, this does not mean that specified abilities cannot be highlighted on the basis of what we already know. Simultaneously The presumption is to make a larger but well-equipped and strong army. Therefore, the second subject of the discussion became doubts as to whether specified a debate could be created. However, first of all, should we answer the question of whether we request to build an army in the form proposed by the current authorities? If so, it becomes crucial how to accomplish this goal – if necessary.

To the point, why is Poland as much as 6 divisions? Assuming that, in addition to the existing four, another on the basis of the aeromobile brigades (6 and 25), our authorities have decided to form a completely from zero 1 additional division. To what end?

So far, defensive plans have assumed that Poland needs 4 divisions to defend itself against the Russian Federation attack. Northeastern (Kaliningrad) and east (Belarus). powerfully simplifying, we needed 1 division in Kaliningrad. 2 divisions in Belarusian directions (Grodno-Brześć). 1 division was to be a essential distraction.

Sixth Division

The geopolitical realities are that 1 should think of another division liable for the direction from the south-east (Ukraine). If Kiev falls, it will be a minimum. On the another hand, if the Ukrainians had defended themselves, we would have needed any kind of fast consequence force at the border. A large mobile unit with adequate logistics facilities to operate abroad. Why? due to the fact that Poland's safety condition is to keep its buffer zones independent of Russia. specified a region is, among others, Ukraine (but besides Lithuania). Today, logic tells us that specified a script would be unrealistic, but next day it may turn out that the readiness of the Polish Army to respond in Ukraine will save its sovereignty and independence. You just gotta think about it and be prepared. At the same time, if Ukraine did not request our help, then we would have the strength to decision it, for example, to the Baltic States, especially Lithuania. Without the hazard of weakening our defence possible intended to defend Poland.

So the additional division will give us crucial potential, capabilities and, above all, additional options. It will safe the border with Ukraine and at the same time let to respond abroad (in any direction). Or even let for a political game in which the argument of support of Ukrainians or Lithuanians by the SZ of the Polish Republic will should be calculated. The sixth division should be dense in my opinion. For it is yet to be full known what it might be useful for. Therefore, it must have adequate offensive and defensive possible (flexibility).

Light/aeromobile division

Otherwise, there is simply a planned "fifth" division, 1 that is likely to be a light, fast consequence division. Composed of at least 2 aeromobile brigades (which we presently have). The improvement of existing structures up to the tallness of the division will most likely affect 3 issues:

1. The creation of a divisional command which will at the same time be a circumstantial command of the HR fast consequence forces and, if necessary, may command subordinate units as is the case with the "ordinary" divisions,
2. Enhancing the possible of the aeromobile brigades by creating a squadron artillery regiment,
3. Create a 3rd brigade within the fresh division.

All this would increase the possible and capabilities of brigades 6 and 25. How? Well, so far, these brigades have been treated as a strategical retreat of the chief command. If necessary, it was possible to shift forces in an highly short time to a selected e.g. endangered section of the front. Fix a gap until dense forces are lifted into the area. The problem is that light forces could be put at a disadvantage erstwhile faced with a dense opponent backed by artillery. Therefore, they should be considered as an available solution ad hoc. Emergency and temporary.

In addition to the above, aeromobile brigades can besides service as a political tool (for this they are best suited among others). If our ally feels insecure for any reason, then you can shift your own forces to him overnight, showing political but military support. What American units appeared in Poland first, after the aggression of February 24? That's the 82nd Airborne Division.

However, given the hazard of extending the possible front to include the Ukrainian section, Poland needs more division. The Polish-Ukrainian border is longer than the Polish-Belarusian border. And to defend the other, we request 2 divisions. The impact on Poland from 2 directions can besides be brought from Ukraine. On Rzeszów and Lublin. 1 fresh division simply may not be adequate to safe this section of the border, and the terrain conditions are leading to the belief that to defend the southeast section of the front would request another two, and these are dense divisions. Where do I get them? Assuming that the sixth panzer-mechanized division would have already been created, 1 dense division could be moved from the Belarusian front (from the Białystok-Grodno section, where there are forests and hard terrain). In the resulting defensive breach, a lighter 5th light division could be deployed, which would be better suited to the defensive in hard terrain in the region of Białystok. But a light infantry would gotta have backup.

Therefore, the 3rd brigade of the alleged "fifth division" should be in my opinion a heavier brigade. Poland – even as a regional safety leader – does not request 3 aeromobile brigades. 1 is adequate to respond rapidly and support political allies. The second could inactive service as a last chance in the country. In turn, this third, heavier brigade would give the possible to usage the 5th division as any another – as part of the front defence.

At the same time, the artillery regiment would strengthen the full division and its light components. In another words, if there was a request to usage aeromobile forces in a conventional way (like any another division) then we would request to take care of the appropriate firepower and dense equipment. Without this support, a light infantry could find itself in conditions that would hinder its effective defence. This was demonstrated by experiences, for example, in fighting for the airport in Hostomelu, Ukraine. Although the Russians seized the airport there, they were incapable to defend themselves erstwhile it turned out that the dense brigade attacking the land was stuck, and in effect did not make it with the aid of the airmen.

Thus, the 5th light division (with dense component) could play a dual role. As a political tool for building safety architecture (vide the anticipation of fast relocation to local allies), and at the same time a full-fledged large division, which can be entrusted with independent work for a given section of the front.

Moreover, its light character could prove to be in more difficult, woody terrain conditions both in Poland and in Lithuania or Latvia. A new, heavier 3rd brigade could be deployed to Lithuania if essential and could act as a bully to the Kaliningrad Oblast, given its offensive potential, which is limited in light brigades.

Summary of the possible structure of the Land Forces

Of course, this should be seen as speculation. However, specified a image of the Land Forces can be imagined in the future and would give concrete potential/capacity. Furthermore, it is crucial to remember the Territorial Defence Forces, which are besides included in the SZ of the Republic of Poland, and so their numbers will affect the overall size of the army. The fact that WOT is needed – despite erstwhile controversy and doubts – has become obvious.

In the context of the above arguments, the creation of additional tactical unions in the Land Forces seems not only reasonable, but may even be necessary. Will this kind of possible be guaranteed by a 300 or 400 thousandth army? Does this new, sixth division should be professional, or is it adequate that it will be bugged and that it will benefit from conscripts? This requires analyses and decisions from the military and the government. It is surely little crucial to throw circumstantial numbers. However, these figures work on imagination and it is hard to presume that politicians will not effort to influence voters' awareness. That's why the minister speaks numbers (politically needed) and the generals talk abilities. For example, Gen. Rajmund Andrzejczak during the strategical Arc conference organized by PISM (notabene Great work and event, I urge Watch on YT) promised partners from the Baltic States to safe the alleged Suwałki pass by SZ RP. In another words, he clearly defined the task to which the Polish army is committed.

Individual hardware purchases

The Polish Armed Forces must act as a single strategy within the framework of the combined activities (common arms). As a whole, they should have the power to deter, while at the same time capable of achieving strategical objectives and fulfilling the tasks assigned to them by means of the capacity they have obtained. It should besides be remembered that in order to exploit the possible of any weaponry systems (such as F-35), a full coherent architecture will be needed. It seems that Polish command and political elite decided to take the first steps in this regard. For example, the IBCS strategy was purchased to combine the cooperation of the above-mentioned aircraft with the ground defence (Patriot, but yet Narew and Poprad/Pilica). surely it should besides be communicated with Polish frigates of the Sword. At the same time, M1A2 tanks were purchased in the latest version, which will besides be able to exchange information with F-35. The failure of this communication strategy with artillery (gun or rocket) and infantry (the “Titan”) would let to build an highly efficient fighting tool. In order to do so, of course, we request to invest in an extended and multifunctional situational awareness strategy (radio stations, reconnaissance aircraft, unmanned aircraft, satellites, etc.).

Although the subject requires a separate analysis, it is besides worth referring briefly to selected acquisition plans and already contracted arms supplies for the Armed Forces of Poland. All this in the context of the tasks and abilities described above. The classification below must, of course, be treated in a very contractual way, since part of the weaponry can execute different functions and at the same time the effectiveness of the individual systems will depend on the full defence system.

RESISTANCE

The implementation of the following programs will not only increase the efficiency of the army in the field of combat, but above all it can convince the opponent that we will not be delicate to his attack (racite, air, cyber), and an effort to break the defence may prove very costly.

1. Vistula Programme – purchase of Patriots (Middle scope OPL and above all rocket defence)
2. “Narew” Programme – purchase of CAMM and launcher projectiles – technological transfer (short-range OPL),
3. “Pilica” and “Poprad” programmes — production of own projectiles and projectiles of short scope and game barrel artillery
4. Meter Programme – purchase/production frigate – transfer tech. – OPL at various ranges and rocket defence [+NEUTRALYSIS OF THE hazard through offensive systems],
5. CYBER.MIL programme – creation of Cyberspace defence Army.

DISTRACTING/NOUTRALISING THE RISK

The implementation of the following programs will give the armed forces the possible to attack their opponent in a controlled zone. For it should be demonstrated that we are not only able to put tight defender before the coming blow (resistance), but we can besides bring our own impact.

1. ‘Homar’ – purchase of HIMARS/South Korean launcher? – medium/long scope rocket artillery,
2. Regina programme – Krabs production acquisition and transfer of K9 technology – 150 mm barrel article, a large amount of artillery will surely have a deterrent value
3. ‘Harpia’ — purchase of F-35 (multipurpose 5 generation aircraft)
4. Purchase of JASSM-ER missiles (missiles cancer. Long-range)
5. The Kruk Programme – purchase of impact helicopters (Apache?)
6. Purchase of TB2 Bayraktars – unmanned, reconnaissance + attack on ground targets,
7. The Meal Programme – again, due to the offensive possible frigate: water-water rocket launchers, water-land.
8. Orca programme – purchase of submarines, welcome possible to launch missiles for ground purposes,

CURRENCY AND MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE NEUTRALISATION

The programs listed below will, of course, increase Polish resilience, and as a full will besides be a deterrent component (strong and modern army). However, their main destiny is to fight erstwhile the war has begun. In this context, care must be taken to halt and neutralize the opponent as shortly as possible and to minimise own losses (in the population, property and infrastructure).

1. Wilk programme – purchase of M1A2 Abrams and K2 tanks with technology transfer
2. Borsuk / Buying K10? – Combat infantry wagons
3. Ottokar Birza programme – tank destroyers, production of Tactical Multipurpose Vehicles (HSW) + acquisition of Brimstone missiles
4. Production of WR-40 Langusta (Tactical rocket article 122 mm)
5. Production of RAK Fire Modules — Self-propelled mortars. 120 mm,
6. “Baobab” program – production of a overhead miner car,
7. ‘Pustelnik’ — purchase/production of light guided anti-tank missiles,
8. The program “Karabela” – purchase/production of guided anti-tank missiles,
9. “Grot” program – purchase of light anti-tank grenade launchers,
10. The program “Titan” – production of equipment for the “soldier of the future”, modern communication system, the ability to direct and mark unmanned workers, intelligent uniform, optical sensors (such as night vision),
11. Exploratory drone acquisition programmes

SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The following programmes aid to see us as a country capable of responding rapidly to events by taking action besides outside the country. They are a tool for building an allied safety architecture and give advantages in strengthening global cooperation.

1. Development of aviation
2. Fleet development
3. Purchase of reconnaissance aircraft
4. Perkoz – the acquisition of multipurpose helicopters AW149 (Leonardo-Świdnik),
5. Purchase of the Black Hawks – for peculiar forces
6. Purchase of transport aircraft Hercules.

SUMMARY

If we adopt the assumptions made in this survey as correct, it should be pointed out that the direction of improvement of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, as well as the built model of the army (as far as we see it), fits into the highlighted needs in terms of obtaining the appropriate potentials. Of course, it can be discussed whether a given execution of orders or circumstantial strategy solutions could be carried out better. The subject is not the subject of an article. Furthermore, consideration of whether the plans are besides ambitious besides requires separate analyses. However, it would seem that making specified a task without having the full administrative apparatus and the data collected by the various state institutions would be highly labour-intensive, hard to implement, and at the same time would give emergence to the hazard of over-simplification, which could lead to distortions of the conclusions. However, this should not make specified efforts and public debate unhappily.

The year 2022 (like 2014) found us unprepared for the event. It seems that more could have been done by then, as well as reasoning more widely and taking into account a longer time perspective. What would be the safety situation of Poland if the Russian plan had succeeded, president Zelenski was captured or killed in the first days of a full-scale invasion, and the Ukrainian defence would have collapsed? How, or rather, could the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland respond if Putin placed power in Kiev with his people, and would they licence the deployment of Russian forces on the Polish-Ukrainian border?

I don't think it would be besides much to say that The deficiency of direct threat to Poland from the Russian Federation is due only to the Ukrainians' war successes. If Kiev had not persisted for the first days of the invasion, Poland would most likely not have been able to do anything to keep the current safety situation. We would gotta trust on allies who, fortunately, have proven themselves in the current realities.

At the same time, thanks to the Ukrainians inactive fighting, we have the chance to respond by providing military equipment. In fact, we are playing for our own safety in the buffer zone. However, the supply of arms at the expense of the equipment of their own army should be treated as a reactionary action, post factum. The very fact that the war in Ukraine is taking place negatively affects Poland. Poland, but besides the full European Union. The sad conclusion that the full European Union has besides failed to keep stableness in its immediate surroundings and to prevent war is simply a mediocre and very bitter consolation.

At this point, it should be pointed out that the author of this survey does not usage the cognition gained in formulating lectures post factum. In December 2019, I published a text entitled: "What army does Poland need? Offensive!” . The most crucial conclusion of this article was:

"(...) Ukrainian territory is crucial to our defence, sovereignty and independency from Moscow.(...) Therefore, the Polish army should have the ability not only to effectively safe directions from Kaliningrad and Belarus, but besides the forces and means to send expeditions across our east border. To our buffer zones... It would be in our best interest to safe the east buffer zone. We must be ready to aid and address the challenge, not within our own borders, but just beyond them."

This thesis takes on additional importance in the context of the fighting in Ukraine and how this country is devastated by the advancing front. The defensive war is simply devastating. In Mariupolu alone, respective tens of thousands of civilians could have died (according to today's estimates) and the city was completely destroyed. In the text from 2.5 years ago, I pointed out that, in the absence of an advantage in artillery, it would be hard to defend the borders of the state, and the deployment of defences in the country would put Poland at hazard of taking part of its territory by the Russians. For free. On the another hand, the transition in specified a situation by the Russian troops to the defence would force the Polish SZ to undertake an offensive to reflect further cities and towns. We would devastate our own country, and at the same time the counteroffensive could be much more costly and risky than defending a position. That's why I said:

‘(..) In the game of the Baltic-Black Sea Bridge, it is not about winning the future Russian-NATO armed conflict, but about specified military swindling of the opponent that he capitulates before the right clash. What matters is the potential, possibilities and setting of troops on the chessboard”

For these reasons, I believe that the III of the Republic of Poland should have chosen a more ambitious strategy in the field of state safety than that which has been in force so far. In the context of the war in Ukraine NATO takes the test as a safety guarantor of NATO states. However, what should be seen is that NATO has failed as a tool to stabilise our nearest neighbourhood (and the EU has completely compromised in this respect). The United States besides reacted late. The outbreak of the war and the Ukrainian attitude contributed to NATO's very active attitude (equipment and information aid to the Ukrainian side), but again – this is reactive. The conflict has begun and stableness and safety (also energy and economic) Poland is in question. It is worth noting that both the United States and the NATO Pact as a full can sometimes afford to respond late. However, border countries specified as Poland have a much smaller margin of error.

If Poland had the appropriate military potential, then it would have the chance to bend sometimes decisions of NATO and the United States in its own direction. Just like the West Germany utilized to do. Of course the Americans wouldn't be happy about this. But they couldn't ignore us, they'd gotta perceive more to our voice.

Moreover, in a medium/long-term context, if the United States had lost interest in Europe and the Russian Federation would have weakened significantly, what seems impossible present and beyond our capabilities could be at hand tomorrow. However, to take advantage of the opportunity, we request to strengthen this hand and prepare for possible challenges.

I have devoted a large deal of time and space in my book to analyses of geopolitical fluctuations worldwide, but besides in our region. In my opinion, the future of the Russian Federation is very uncertain. In the event of an interior collapse in Russia, a number of options may arise. Yes, in the context of strengthening the partnership with Ukraine as well as neutralising the threat from Kaliningrad and Belarus. A chance to get another partner may arise. This time in Minsk. It is besides crucial not to lose Lithuanians who are keen to focus on Germany.

In order to become a sufficiently strong geopolitical magnet for countries located in the east, Poland needs to find more attractive planes than Germany. The economical power of the national Republic of Germany seems improbable for the moment. However, we have already gained political credibility due to our attitude towards Ukraine, but besides due to our efforts to defend even the Baltic States. In turn, the Berlin authorities have completely compromised in this regard. But that is not enough. In the future, we're gonna request a tough currency. The Polish Armed Forces can become such. Political credibility and regional military power are a perfect foundation on which dependencies can be built on another levels, especially economical ones. How can our geographical location aid us? However, we must control our own space to make geography an asset, not a burden.

The mainstream of historical events directs us in the right direction and we must build a solid, autonomous ship before we sail to the full sea. If we win in this task, it will stay only to set sail, and the planet can stand before us.

Krzysztof Wojchal

geopolitics, politics, economy, law, taxes – blog