What game is president Donald Trump playing with Vladimir Putin? Is peace possible in Ukraine? What is the function of the European Union in peace negotiations if it has any function to play in this process? Leszek Jażdżewski talks to Piotr Buras, manager of the Warsaw office of the European abroad Affairs Council (ECFR).
Leszek Jażdżewski (LJ): What lessons should we draw from the fresh gathering of president Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Anchorage, Alaska?
Piotr Buras (PB): There are many starting points to analyse Alaska's summit. We can look at all these developments from the position of what would be essential to accomplish real advancement in the peace process. It is not essential to add that, for apparent reasons, we are focusing on relations between the United States and Ukraine, on how the Western Alliance is trying to unite and overcome the serious differences between the United States and European partners in terms of how the process works. The main question, however, is: what can truly decision the peace process forward?
We must remember that Vladimir Putin is not truly curious in the peace process, which became even more apparent after the Alaska meeting. He wants to play this game, but it seems he is inactive not ready to undertake serious peace negotiations.
To make real progress, The West must take 3 steps. The first thing that is absolutely essential to get Vladimir Putin to undertake a serious peace process is to increase the force exerted. This must be done through a credible threat of sanctions or the actual imposition of sanctions.
This is most likely the most negative effect of fresh events – in Anchorage Donald Trump fundamentally gave up the thought of imposing sanctions on Russia, even though Putin did not meet his expectations. As he clearly pointed out before the Anchorage summit, he expected Putin to gotta agree to a ceasefire and then start peace negotiations. But Putin explicitly rejected these demands. Despite this, Trump stated that there would be no sanctions due to the fact that he did not see the need. This is simply a very crucial issue.
Furthermore, after the fresh summit in Washington, we inactive do not know whether Donald Trump can change his head and whether he inactive wants or will want to take advantage of his advantage, which he could have, by imposing secondary sanctions on Russia, thus hitting the oil sector by punishing countries that inactive buy oil and gas from Russia.
This is the strongest leverage Trump could usage against Putin, but so far he has chosen not to usage it. I have doubts whether we can make any major advancement in peace negotiations without expanding Putin's pressure, which is mostly possible only through the US sanctions that were threatened before the Anchorage summit. We don't truly know if this bargaining chip will be used.
The second crucial issue concerns the conditions that the West must meet in order to bring Putin to the negotiating table and guarantee that the peace process brings results. This means safety guarantees for Ukraine, which has been discussed for a very long time, and I think that any advancement has been made on this issue.
One of the most affirmative developments in the past fewer days is that the president of the United States has signaled to any degree the readiness of the United States to engage in the peace warrant process, fundamentally ensuring Ukraine partial safety or protection ("good protection", as Trump put it). However, we inactive do not know what it will look like in practice or what it will involve. However, this is undoubtedly an absolutely essential step to make Ukraine curious in any peace agreement. Without a safety guarantee, it is clear that Ukraine will not be able to accept this process.
The 3rd condition is Europe's willingness to take on most of the burden of supporting Ukraine's safety as shortly as a peace agreement or ceasefire is concluded, and to supply Ukraine with long-term backing so that it can buy arms and invest in its reconstruction. This seems to be the easiest condition to meet, due to the fact that even if the European Union or European countries are facing financial problems, they have adequate resources to support Ukraine.
Although there seems to be political commitment or general readiness, there is inactive no clear plan. We have money to finance Ukraine by the end of this year, but there are no circumstantial commitments from European countries after 2025. And this is something to work on.
Even if there are certain safety guarantees for Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire or peace agreement, it is clear that, after the Washington Summit, it is the European Union that the European countries will gotta make the top contribution to aid to Ukraine – and this needs to be worked out.
In short, after the summits in Anchorage and Washington, the weakest point of the Western approach is the deficiency of common agreement on how to increase Putin's force to make serious peace negotiations. The best news is that the United States seems to be more active in this process than before the summit – and to a greater degree than the Europeans predicted a fewer weeks ago. This is the current situation.
LJ: Given fresh developments, is peace for Ukraine presently possible?
PB: Peace is simply a very comparative concept, due to the fact that there are different interpretations of what it might be. Donald Trump is most likely curious primarily in a very superficial definition of peace. This fundamentally means ending the war for this moment, which would let him to announce a immense negotiating success. And that is evidently the biggest hazard for Ukraine and Europe – that in order to accomplish this very superficial knowing or definition of peace, Trump would be willing to make very far-reaching compromises, or even force the Ukrainians to possibly quit part of their territory or agree to something they would otherwise not agree to.
However, after the summit in Washington, we can be a small more optimistic that this summit may have become a phase for this kind of breakthrough in this war, which would consequence in Ukraine under American and Russian force – at least that was commonly feared in Europe. This threat seems to have been resolved for the time being, and Trump has not gone far adequate to anticipate specified concessions from president Zelenski.
The peace that interests Ukraine is simply a lasting peace, provided not only for a fewer weeks, and not something that would be tantamount to a ceasefire or a ceasefire for a limited period of time, but something that would supply Ukraine with the anticipation of rebuilding and surviving as an independent state in the long term. This, of course, does not solve territorial issues, but it is simply a realistic presumption that it will be highly hard to recover the territories presently occupied by Russia.
The most crucial thing for Ukraine is to last the country as an independent state. This is besides a territorial issue, as the alleged "change of territories" (proposed by Trump in fresh days) would have changed the strategical military situation to the detriment of Ukraine to specified an degree that the future possible Russian aggression would have been even more likely and much easier to carry out for Putin due to the strategical importance of those parts of the Donetsk Oblast that Ukraine would pass on to Russia as part of this territorial exchange.
That is why, from the position of Ukraine, the issue of safety guarantees is so important. Therefore, any kind of peace that is not a real peace – which fundamentally means that war has ceased, but there is no long-term safety support from the United States and Western countries, there is no plan or structure – would only be an invitation to further aggression from Russia.
That's why we're talking about different versions of the room. Putin clearly wants what is most crucial to him – to return to the global community as a respected partner. Indeed, this could be achieved through Trump if an agreement was reached in line with Putin's expectations.
At the moment, it is very hard to foretell what kind of peace is most likely to succeed. For now, it is inactive highly improbable that any area will be reached – at least in the next fewer months. However, this crucial process has already begun and the United States is becoming increasingly active in it. due to the fact that with all summit at which Donald Trump demonstrates his commitment and makes concrete statements, it will be much harder for him to retreat from this process and possibly participate in his success. Therefore, the more active he is, the more he represents the Western collective position, even if only superficially.
Nevertheless, there is no precise common negotiating line. There are only certain points on which leaders have reached agreement.
LJ: How much do you think Europe is truly active in the peace negotiations process? What is the function of Europe and its leaders in this process? Or is she alternatively a passive observer of talks between Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenski?
PB: The function of Europeans is limited but nevertheless important. Of course, this depends mostly on Trump's strategy. As long as the United States wants lasting peace in Ukraine and a large peace agreement, Europe is important, has its means of force and can make effective usage of its assets.
However, European countries – and this is simply a sad truth, which is why their function is limited – are incapable to impose their will and position without cooperation with the United States. The reason for this is that this impact is besides limited due to the fact that it is apparent that if the Americans retreat from this conflict (they will halt supporting Ukraine, refuse to impose sanctions on Russia or even usage the threat of sanctions), then the strategical situation of Ukraine and Europe will be completely different.
The chance that Europeans are presently facing is that it may seem that Donald Trump is becoming increasingly active in a lasting solution to this conflict – or at least in seeking specified a solution – and that Europeans are a essential partner for him to accomplish this objective. This is mainly about safety guarantees and money. These are 2 crucial areas for which Europeans can and must take care to make advancement and yet bring about a peace agreement, due to the fact that without them and without these 2 support areas it is highly improbable that they will be able to influence the direction in which this process is going.
However, the fact is that there is simply a coalition of countries working on a European contribution to safety guarantees for Ukraine. Of course, we inactive have the financial resources to support Ukraine in the long term. For example, the Financial Times published a study stating that Ukrainians proposed to buy weapons from US partners worth USD 100 billion to be financed by Europeans. There are surely besides talks on this subject, and this is simply a bargaining chip that Europeans can use.
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Dr. Olga Łabendowicz translated from English
Read English at 4liberty.eu
