Information operations, impact operations, or alleged active means is simply a reasonably circumstantial aspect of cyber activities. It would seem that this is simply a completely different issue from cyber espionage or sabotage. However, due to the importance of the Internet, social media and another forms of digital communication, often it is the 3 intelligence teams who are active in tracking and analysis. More specifically, this is due to the fact that the creation of infrastructure, the usage of communication channels, or the creation of reliable forms mostly coincides with the metrology of activities in classical cyber operations.
Previous post We were dealing with the French doctrine of offensive operations. This time we will look at a newer document, which deals with IT-driven impact operations (Lutte Informatique d’Influence, in short L2I). The paper published in October 2021 Public Elements of the Influence Operation Computer Doctrine (Éléments publics de doctrine militaire de lutte informatique d’influence (L2I)) focuses on this area. The publication of the paper was announced during a press conference attended by the then head of the Ministry of Armed Forces Florence Parly and Chief of General Staff General Thierry Burkhard. Disinformation and attempts to influence public opinion are tools that clearly associate with authoritarian alternatively than democratic countries and an open confession to this kind of action was thus controversial. On the another hand, Parly stressed the strength and importance of information activities, even stating that they can let “win without a fight”. So how did France deal with the dilemmas of engaging in disinformation efforts while trying to decision along in the order of global law and the principles of liberal democracy? Let's look at the paper itself.
The preamble to the doctrine clearly defines information activities as an integral part of the military strategy, which is due to the necessity to prevent hostile influence operations and to make its own narrative. Further, the function of social media and related opportunities for fast dissemination of information, and hence the anticipation to inspire assassinations and undermine assurance in institutions operating in times of crisis.
The doctrine concerns IT impact operations, so in the preamble we will besides find a mention to the close link between information and cyberspace operations that I mentioned at the very beginning of the post. The authors emphasize how cyberspace properties and the associated availability of information distribution means translate into an increase in the number and strength of incidents motivated politically and financially. Therefore, the paper implements the assumptions of the 2017 strategical Defence and National safety Review and the 2021 strategy Update and gives the Ministry of Armed Forces tools to counter the fresh kind of threats. In the further part of the preamble, we will again find a mention to the concept of "winning war before war" and a mention to the request to limit specified operations to military activities.
The correct content of the doctrine begins with a description of cyberspace, with a peculiar function of social media, as an informational combat environment. In fact, France treats social media almost as synonymous with the information space – the infographic contained at the very beginning of the chapter presents statistic showing how much activity takes place within a minute in peculiar means of communication:
As we see, e-mails that could have been identified with the basic means of digital communication a while ago have become only 1 of many communication channels. Additionally, the doctrine emphasizes that content transmitted through popular social networks is not just a dry transfer of content created by users. Algorithms form what content is promoted, which affects the visibility of individual ideologies and communities, and as a consequence can influence the decision-making of the recipients.
In this part there is besides a message crucial to the functioning of the doctrine – war is not only a clash of armed forces, but besides a conflict between the disputed rations. We read here that at all phase of the conflict, the fighting parties effort to impose their will on each other, and the information conflict is simply a method of building support for their own efforts and undermining the support of rivals.
The doctrine lists six characteristics of the cyberspace information layer:
- The fast spread of information and independency from borders and geography.
- It is impossible to remove the erstwhile widespread information due to the ease of copying and storing the content.
- Methods of creating, storing, and disseminating information are constantly being improved.
- The anticipation of anonymous dissemination of information.
- Anyone can make content and print it without any external control.
- The application of established law is difficult, de facto service administrators make their own regulations.
The challenges faced by the French Armed Forces in the field of information conflict are then described. Since 2015, France has been seeing increased propaganda from terrorist groups that recruit and call for violence. Additional attacks on the morale of French soldiers and the dissemination of false information are observed in order to impede military action. The paper besides lists 2 types of entities active in hostile operations:
- Other countries aimed at destabilising, weakening, and undermining the authority of state authorities.
- Criminal groups, terrorist groups, and another quasi-state organizations utilizing information operations for propaganda, fundraising, recruitment, and coordination.
On the another hand, it is pointed out that effective information activities are essential to guarantee an operational advantage. The activities of French forces are intended to prevent the formation of hostile communities in social media, prevent recruitment in areas of activity and advance support for French forces. Attention should be paid to the focus on terrorist groups and recruitment, which is most likely the consequence of the broad engagement of France abroad, especially in the African countries.
According to the definition of IT impact operations contained in the doctrine, this concept concerns military operations conducted in the cyberspace information layer to detect and counter attacks, support strategical communication (StratCom), supply intelligence support and usage trickery, independently or through another activities. The definition is based on the previously described information layer, which translates into the fact that L2I will trust on the dissemination and promotion of content in digital communication channels. It can so be assumed that the characteristics of the information layer specified as the velocity of dissemination of information, the anticipation of anonymous publication or the deficiency of regulation will be full utilized by the French troops to maximize the effect achieved. It is besides interesting to classify activities by 3 categories: observation, defence and activity. reflection includes recognition of hostile operations, and analysis of intentions; defence is resisting hostile actions and limiting their effects, and activity is assisting the actions of the armed forces, hitting the credibility of enemies and supporting kinetic actions by trickery. Let us halt for a minute in the last category, due to the fact that it may contain possibly controversial elements, as is the direct dissemination of false information by France. In the examples mentioned in the doctrine, we will find support for the armed forces on social media, influencing the decision-makers in crisis situations, verifying false information distributed by the enemy and utilizing deception. While social media promotion and the fight against fake news are acceptable to all, the impact on decision-making and deception operations can rise doubts. Military Of course, he uses deception and deception as long as there is war., however, in this context it will mean spreading content that will necessarily scope civilians, possibly on a global scale.
However, the paper clearly states that impact operations are subject to the norm of national and global law. These activities, therefore, are to be without prejudice to the rule of non-intervention and to the principles established by the United Nations Charter. They are besides subject to a legal government circumstantial to the activities of the armed forces. The conflict measures are intended to be without prejudice to the law of armed conflicts, and, like kinetic operations, must respect the rule of differentiation, necessity and proportionality. Any usage of the measures in question is besides to be preceded by the creation of rules for combating political, operational and legal circumstances. France has so decided that information measures will be subject in rule to the same rigor as kinetic operations. This highlights the seriousness of the situation and the approach to the problem that actually treats information and propaganda efforts as possibly as severe as "classical" military activities. However, it may state how strictly the rule of distinguishing targets can be respected when, by its very nature, cyberspaces are to immediately distribute content regardless of geographical constraints. It is possible to imagine methods limiting the scope of impact, specified as: the usage of popular language only in a circumstantial area, or the manipulation of algorithms for regional content promotion. However, unless we are talking about propaganda distributed in closed groups, the content will be accessible to and consumed by 3rd parties. Therefore, it seems that the most crucial will have specified a matching of content that it does not affect decision-making by people who are not the mark of the operation – let us remember that decision-making is 1 of the assumptions of L2I.
As has been the case with cyberspace activities, 1 of the challenges facing France's forces is recruiting specialists and gathering staff needs. It is worth noting that, due to the interdisciplinary nature of the information activities, the scope of skills required is indeed very wide. On the 1 hand, we have contact points with the conduct of offensive and defensive cyber operations, on the another hand, all cognition needed to effectively make propaganda materials that affect the recipients. Of course, it is not essential to find people with all these skills at the same time – in the end, CNO teams besides consist of a number of different specialties specified as developers, analysts, implant operators, administrators. However, the information elements add another brick to a scope of required roles, and what is more, a specialist focused on the intellectual and propaganda side of the actions is most likely further to the cyber operator than, for example, the infrastructure admin for the tool developer. uncovering this kind of staff that will be able to decision on both levels can so be a problem for France. However, the doctrine assumes an additional EUR 1.7 billion to be allocated to L2I capacity.
Like the doctrine of offensive action, this paper besides powerfully highlights the function of cooperation with allies in defence of information operations, as well as support for NATO and EU initiatives in this area.
Although a controversial issue may be the usage of manipulation and propaganda by state services, the approach taken by France seems more appropriate in this respect than avoiding the subject in public space. The doctrine adopted by aligning information activities with another types of military operations incorporates them into a legal government which assumes the principles of proportionality and the request for measures to be taken, as well as the discrimination of objectives. specified an approach underlines the importance appropriate to the consequences that may consequence from them, as we see on a regular basis in the context of subsequent Russian "active measures" aimed at the European countries. The specificity of the operation of the impact makes the French Armed Forces likely to gotta measurement with many dilemmas regarding the methods utilized – specified as the indicated problem of distinguishing objectives. However, this may be the driving force behind the improvement of a framework for information activities by democratic states.
