W Tetragon released a very interesting item: “From the position of Paris. Selection of sources for the military past of the alliance of France and Poland in 1939". The election and improvement of papers was made by well-known military historian Wojciech Mazur.
This is most likely the first collection of specified documents, translated into Polish, concerning the alliance relations between France and Poland in 1939. Polish past is dominated by the Polish point of view, and French papers are very seldom analysed, which is due to the fact that fewer Polish military historians talk French. This publication allows us to read the French view of how this website saw allied cooperation in the event of a war with Germany. The paper presented 22 papers relating to Polish-French relations in 1939.
The selection of papers was preceded by the author's introduction, in which he characterized briefly the Polish-French alliance concluded in 1921, as well as discussed the papers presented in the study.
The author pointed out that in the second half of the 1920s, especially after the conclusion of the Locarne Agreements in 1925, guaranteeing the inviolability of the French border by Germany, while the deficiency of specified guarantees for the German-Polish border, the importance of the alliance for both parties has weakened considerably. On the 1 hand, the Polish-German rapprochement, which resulted in the signing of a declaration of non-violence in 1934, has contributed to the further relaxation of the alliance, and on the another hand, the reluctance of the Polish side has caused France to step up cooperation with Moscow and Prague, with which Poland had not had the best relations.
The author besides notes that France's first effort to reconnect with Poland in 1936, after Germany's remilitarization of Rhineland, was not successful. Nor were the French able to force the appeal of the Polish abroad minister Józef Beck in Paris. The only effect conducted in 1936 was that France granted an arms debt to Poland.
Another origin affecting the cooling of Polish-French relations was the attitude of the Polish authorities in 1938 regarding the Czechoslovakian crisis. Voices began to appear over the Seine demanding an alliance breakup. As W. Mazur writes, at first the head of the French General Staff shared this position Gen. Maurice Gamelin. In the end, however, the view prevailed that at the time of the failure of the Czechoslovakian ally and due to the uncertain attitude of the USSR, the Polish ally should not be disposed of. Warsaw besides began sending conciliation signals to Paris in the face of the German threat.
Another crucial origin affecting the cooling of Polish-French relations in the second half of the 1920s, which the author does not compose about, was the fact that France treated Poland as a "junior partner". Sanation after coming to power began to conduct a “powerful” policy and demanded equality in Polish-French relations.
Turning to the papers presented in this work, it should be noted that the first step to improve Polish-French relations was to resume method discussions on possible aviation cooperation. These talks were held in February 1939 in Poland. The officers sent to Warsaw were prohibited from making explicit promises of assistance. The French guidelines stated: "Continue the staff talks undertaken under the French-Polish method convention signed in Paris in October 1937, avoiding full commitment so as not to give Polish Staff certainty of cooperation by French, which could be contrary to our abroad policy". This reluctance to make unequivocal declarations on the part of French will mark further discussions with the Polish side.
However, prior to the beginning of subsequent talks with Poles, the French held staff talks with the British on 24 April – 4 May 1939 and as we read in the paper "the entry of Poland into the fight alongside the United Kingdom and France can only be full valuable if it leads to the establishment in the east of a broad, solid and capable front". So then our Western allies did not consider Poland a full-value partner, able to halt Germany.
In May 1939, the most crucial staff talks were held from the Polish point of view with the participation of the Polish Minister of Military Affairs General Tadeusz Kasprzycki General M. Gamelin. As a consequence of the staff talks, a final protocol was created, which, in Poland's opinion, clarified France's commitments in the event of German aggression against Poland. This paper has already been cited many times in Polish historiography. From the Polish point of view, the most crucial point of the final protocol was: "As shortly as the main German effort against Poland is marked, France will start offensive action against Germany (starting on the fifteenth day) [I]". – ‘I’ meant after the first day of French universal mobilization.
Commenting on the introduction to the book, this W. Mazur points out that according to Gen. Gamelin's French side has retained flexibility regarding its actions. Only air operations were to be undertaken immediately and 5 bomber squadrons were to be sent to Poland, which was besides not implemented. The pretext was the fast failure by Poland of the territories in which airports for French aircraft were to be located. According to the papers cited in the book, they were initially to land in Wielkopolska to replenish fuel and yet to station in the Radom region. As is known, the importance of the final protocol was besides undermined by the reservation that it would enter into force only after the political agreement was concluded, which took place only on 4 September 1939.
In the preliminary study, W. Mazur besides writes an unpopular thing in Polish historiography, namely that in the summertime of 1939 Polish staff members judged that French aid could only be felt after a fewer months, and until then the Polish army should halt the Wehrmacht itself.
French papers already created during the September campaign, discussing the course of the fighting and evaluating the decision of Polish chief military authorities, are besides interesting. In this part of the work we will find reports of the head of the French Military Mission in Poland General Louis Faury General M. Gamelina, head of the French Aviation Mission in Poland General Paul Armengaud to the commander of the French Air Force and the French military attaché in Poland General Felix Joseph Musse. Interestingly, the observations of the French generals on German tactics, and especially the mass usage by the Germans of aviation and armored weapons, were not utilized by the French command in planning a further war with Germany.
Very interesting material is the paper entitled “Conclusions of the first gathering of the Abbeville advanced Alliance Council on 12 September 1939” Among another things, the paper states: “in the first phase of war, allied armies must not take large-scale offensive action on the western front; the Allied Air Force must temporarily refrain from attacking targets located in Germany due to the hazard of causing civilian casualties." These provisions were in flagrant contradiction with France's assurances of providing us with assistance.
In the last study addressed to Gen. M. Gamelin in 9 X 1939, Gen. Faury summed up the run as follows: "I believe that before we show harshness we must realize the surprise the power of German aviation has caused."
In conclusion, the Polish reader gets another very crucial position regarding our relation with the French ally. The papers presented show that despite the written assurances there are no guarantees that they will be implemented. Up-to-date words remain, which Frederick the large wrote in his 1767 political will. "The soys are good, but their own forces are even better."
Jacek Marczyński
Wojciech Mazur, “From the position of Paris. Selection of sources for military past of the alliance of France and Poland in 1939", Tetragon, Warsaw 2025, p. 198.
Think Poland, No. 43-44 (26.10-2.11.2025)
