Since the establishment of the North Atlantic Alliance in 1949, France has played an crucial function in its operation. For 75 years Paris retained its ability to straight influence the institution's development. French decision-makers, however, stay critical of changes or their deficiency of NATO, as well as of decisions by associate States that can straight affect the Alliance's coherence. French representatives have openly criticised, among another things, the way the institutions function, the passiveness of the another associate States, or the excessive attachment of European states to American defence thought, and the deficiency of adequate improvement of their own military capabilities by the associate States. France, due to its attitude, is so liable for many changes in the improvement of NATO and resulting in strengthening the structures and capabilities of the Alliance.
Strategic autonomy as a basis for French defence policy
The French Republic is among the 12 founding countries of the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO's first office was in London, but due to the improvement of institutions and the request for more space in 1952, the office of the Alliance were moved to Paris; first to Palais de Chaillot, and in 1960 to the building built at Porte Dauphine. Another change of office resulted from the withdrawal of France from participation in NATO's integrated military structures (1966). Since 1967, NATO office have been located in Belgium.
By the end of the 1950s. In the 20th century, General Charles de Gaulle openly advocated the affirmation of France's full independence, primarily from the US, as well as the NATO reform, expressing a separate opinion from the United States on the direction of the Alliance's development. De Gaulle's peculiar protest sparked a imagination of the integration of military structures, claiming that France must hold full control of its defence.
Some European countries have sought, and proceed to seek, support from the US for global safety and peace, which in the long word has led to difficulties in creating a European common defence thought. In its subsequent creation, France had a crucial influence.
France's decision to retreat from NATO's military structures, announced by Charles de Gaulle in February 1966 and the beginning of the alleged Atlantic crisis[1], resulted from de Gaulle's gradual distance from NATO. This was, among another things, the consequence of changing the geopolitical situation from the time of the Alliance's establishment, the end of the Algerian War, the reluctance to participate in a war that would not concern France (eventual war between the US and Russia) and the creation of a French atomic triad[2]. As de Gaulle explained in his speech to the French, "the law, treaty or alliance must be adapted to the fresh situation; if this does not happen, the texts will be devoid of content and [...] will become nothing more than useless archival documents"[3]. However, the first phase of multi-stage withdrawal had already begun respective years earlier, in March 1959, with the decision to retreat the presence of the French fleet from the Mediterranean.
However, the decision to retreat France from military structures was not tantamount to a complete departure from NATO structures. The state remained a associate of the Alliance, active in its political sphere, in collective defence and participating in military exercises with the another associate States. French armed forces participated, among others, in Operation Allied Force (Balkans, March-June 1999) and in the mission in Afghanistan, despite Paris' deficiency of engagement in military structures.
Return to NATO military structures
From 1966 to 2009, relations between France and NATO were alternately characterised by phases of approximation and subsequent tensions.
In the 1980s, then president François Mitterrand began the process of returning France to the military structures of the North Atlantic Alliance; this process was continued by his successors, Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy. As examples of turning towards the Alliance, delight indicate:
- French approval of the strategical concept in 1991, despite the deficiency of engagement of the state since leaving military structures in 1966;
- seconded by Chirac the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to attend the NATO Military Committee gathering in 1995;
- the requests made by Chirac for a greater Europeanisation of NATO, namely strengthening the position of European states in the structures of the Alliance and taking work and part of the activities carried out by the Alliance on the European continent from the US.
The appels of Paris did not have the support of all NATO European countries, including Germany. Moreover, they met with US opposition. France so considered that the conditions for bringing the state closer to NATO were not met.
The authoritative return of France to NATO's military structures occurred in April 2009 at the summit of the Alliance in Kehl (Germany) and Strasbourg (France), held on the 60th anniversary of the Alliance's establishment. This return was previously announced in the previously published French White Paper of Defence and National safety (fr. Livre Blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale), and at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, erstwhile president Nicolas Sarkozy stated "we request NATO and European defence. [...] This opens the door to France to a strong renewal of relations with NATO”[4].
Within the Alliance's structures, the atomic Planning Group, a body established in 1966, within which associate States address issues related to the atomic doctrine of the Alliance. The group regularly reviews and introduces the essential changes to NATO's doctrine, ensuring, inter alia, the overall effectiveness of deterring the atomic Alliance. Whether they have atomic weapons or not, all allied state belongs to the Group. France is the only ally not belonging to the atomic Planning Group. In this way Paris, erstwhile again, ensures its independence. NATO atomic Planning Group remains a point of mention for atomic weapons among European allied states.
The atomic state...
The decision to retreat from military structures did not weaken NATO and even strengthen it. France developed its military possible during its absence in structures, peculiarly in terms of atomic capabilities[5], as confirmed in the 1974 Ottawa Declaration[6] stating that the atomic forces of France and the United Kingdom are playing a deterrent role, straight strengthening NATO's deterrence capabilities. This evidence legitimizes French atomic forces, so widely criticized during the presidency of John F. Kennedy.
The independency of French atomic deterrence has besides been recognised in NATO's strategical concepts. For example, the 2022 concept explicitly states in point 29 that "independent strategical atomic forces of Britain and France play a deterrent function and make a crucial contribution to the Alliance's overall security"[7].
France is comparatively transparent about its arms-related activities, frequently publically revealing the size of its stocks and details of all atomic activities.
Among the 9 countries with atomic weapons[8], France is the 4th in terms of the number of atomic warheads held (following Russia, the US and China), the second in NATO. Russia and the United States have nearly 88% of the full number of atomic weapons.
And although the numbers of atomic warheads that individual states have are state secrets, according to estimates, of the full number of atomic warheads 12 121, about 9 585 are active—that is, they have not been withdrawn or dismantled—in the stocks of military states which have them, small more than 3 900 are deployed in the operational forces, with about 2 100 warheads in the Russian, American, French and British troops being on advanced alert.[9]
For France, atomic weapons are of strategical importance, as a consequence of the defence of its "living interests", including European security.
... seeking closer European cooperation
In 1994, François Mitterrand called on Europe to clearly agree on common vital European interests[10]; in 2006 Jacques Chirac adopted the concept of coordinated deterrence[11], supplementing the EU's common safety and defence policy. Subsequently, in 2008, French president Nicolas Sarkozy suggested "an open dialog on the function of deterrence and its contribution to our common security"[12]. François Hollande besides referred to French deterrence in his 2015 speech, stating that French deterrent measures go hand in hand with strengthening the European defence[13]. In April 2024 president Emmanuel Macron expressed his desire to debate "the Europeanisation of [French] atomic deterrence capabilities"[14].
More French presidents thus linked French atomic deterrence targets to the European community. French cohesion and strategical reasoning are so visible in the European context.
The issue of French participation in the defence of Europe, resulting from the state's atomic capabilities, has remained in public debate, especially in France, since the 1960s. Emmanuel Macron, however, took the most far-reaching position.
France in NATO after 2009
Since returning to military structures France has 1 of the highest positions in NATO's military hierarchy, which owes, among another things, its military capabilities and its arsenal.
Paris is constantly strengthening and developing its military capabilities, which is linked to an increase in arms spending. In 2023, French defence spending amounted to US$61.3 billion, representing 2.1% of the GDP of the state[15].
President Emmanuel Macron referred to NATO de Gaulle's legacy and observations from the turn of the 1950s and 1960s mentioned earlier in 2019, stating in an interview with The Economist about the "brain death of NATO" in the context of US policies, relations between European associate States and the US, and calling for an increase in the military spending of European allies states, officially doubting the functioning of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty[16]. Although it has been 5 years since the interview, the president reiterates the issue of strengthening the US-independent European defence strategy and expanding arms spending, peculiarly in connection with Russia's aggression into Ukraine.
Conclusion
France is 1 of NATO's most influential associate States, while remaining the main interior protesters of individual decisions that frequently consequence from persistent conceptual differences between Washington and Paris.
Since Barack Obama's presidency, the trend has been seen to limit American strategical engagement in Europe (and the mediate East), and to focus on the situation on the Asian continent and the Indo-Pacific region. This is due to Washington's designation of China as a strategical rival. The United States does not so quit unilateral action if their interests are at risk. This is what France, active in European affairs, is primarily about common security.
Paris maintains its key role, besides in the collective perspective, while remaining an autonomous NATO associate State. France, like any state, is primarily guided by its own interests. For Paris, independency is the basis.
Currently, the French armed forces at NATO level are primarily afraid with the fast consequence to crises.
Bibliography
[1] The Atlantic crisis occurred in 1966-1967. It was due to uncertainty about the future of the Alliance.
[2] The atomic weapons systems available to France as part of the atomic deterrence strategy. France is 1 of the 9 atomic weapons states; it is the 4th country, after the United States, the russian Union and the United Kingdom, to make atomic weapons.
[3] 7 mars 1966, la France tour le dos à l’OTAN, Institut national de l’audiovisuel, https://www.ina.fr/ina-eclaire-actu/7-mars-1966-la-france-tourne-le-dos-a-l-otane, accessed: 10.11.2024.
[4] Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur les liens de la France et de l’Union européenne avec l’OTAN, l’envoi de militaires français supplémentaires en Afghanistan et sur l’élargissement de l’Alliance atlantique à des pays de l’Est européen, à Bucarest le 3 avril 2008, Vie publique, https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/170253-declaration-de-m-nicolas-sarkozy-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-l, accessed: 13.11.2024.
[5] France began investigating atomic weapons in 1960. From 1966 to 1996, France carried out 193 atmospheric and underground atomic tests in French Polynesia. French Polynesia was then overseas in France; since 2023 it has been part of the overseas community of France. More about the relations between France and French Polynesia: https://ine.org.pl/future-France-in-region-indo-Pacific-in-relationship-infrared-independence-in-new-Caledonia/.
[6] Declaration endorsed and published by the North Atlantic Council at the Ottawa ministerial session on 19 June 1974 and signed by the heads of government of NATO States in Brussels on 26 June 1074.
[7] NATO 2022 strategical ConceptNATO, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf, accessed: 19.11.2024.
[8] atomic weapons have: Russia, USA, China, France, large Britain, Pakistan, India, Israel, North Korea.
[9] H. Kristensen, M. Korda, E. Johns, M. Knight, K. Kohn, Status of planet atomic Forces, Federation of American Scientists, https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/, accessed: 29.11.2024.
[10] Intervention de M. François Mitterrand, Président de la République, sur la politique de défense de la France et la dissuasion nucléaire, Paris le 5 mai 1994, Élysée, https://www.elysee.fr/françois-miterrand/1994/05/05/intervention-de-m-francois-miterrand-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-politique-de-defense-de-la-franche-et-la-dissuasion-nucleaire-paris-le-5-mai-1994, accessed: 30.11.2024.
[11] Déclaration de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, sur la politique de défense de la France, notation la dissuasion nucléaire, à Brest le 19 janvier 2006, Élysée, https://www.elysee.fr/jacques-chirac/2006/01/19/declaration-de-m-jacques-chirac-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-politique-de-defense-de-la-france-notamment-la-dissuasion-nucleaire-a-brest-le-19-janvier-2006, accessed: 30.11.2024.
[12] Speech by Nicolas Sarkozy, president of the French Republic. Presentation of “Le Terrible” submarine in Cherbourg, on March 21t, 2008, France Diplomatie, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Speech_by_Nicolas_Sarkozy___presentation_of_Le_Terrible_submarine.pdf, accessed: 30.11.2024.
[13] Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur la dissuasion nucléaire, à Istres le 19 février 2015, Vie Publisher, https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/193954-françois-hollande-19022015-dissuasion-nucleaire, accessed: 30.11.2024.
[14] Discourses sur l’Europe, Élysée, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2024/04/24/discours-sur-leurope, accessed: 30.11.2024.
[15] In 2014, in view of Russia's annexation of Crimea and the expanding instability in the mediate East, NATO associate States' representatives adopted guidelines on spending 2% of GDP on defence spending by individual states to guarantee the military readiness of the Alliance.
[16] Emmanuel Macrons Europe: NATO is becoming brain-dead, The Economist, https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-brain-dead
