Tripartite format Poland-Romania-Turkey as a bridge between the east and confederate flank of NATO

Note:This text is simply a translation of an article originally written in English.

Author: Uğur Can Özkan

Substantial supervision: Jędrzej Błaszczak

Introduction

The tripartite format covering Poland, Romania and Turkey has evolved since the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, transforming into a key framework of cooperation for strengthening regional safety and communication between the east and confederate flanks of NATO.

Since institutionalization at the level of abroad ministers in 2016, this format has gained strategical importance, especially following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It presently serves as an crucial platform linking the 3 countries whose geographical location and military possible are crucial for the defence stance of the Alliance and the stableness of the wider Black Sea region (Chuchak & Oleksy, 2023; MFA of the Republic of Turkey, 2022).

This article states that the strategical importance of the tripartite format is not due to achieving full convergence of views among likewise reasoning allies, but to the ability to manage and reconcile fundamental strategical disparities within NATO.

While Poland and Romania see Russia as direct – and even existential in the case of Warsaw – a threat requiring hard deterrence and enhanced transatlantic coordination, Turkey applies a balance policy. It combines deterrence with selective cooperation and dialog with Moscow. Therefore, the trilateral mechanics functions as a circumstantial ‘strategic shock absorber’ inside NATO, mitigating the possible gap between the east flank’ and the more flexible confederate flank (Chudiak & Oleksy, 2023).

By analysing this dynamics, the article shows the tripartite format both as a geopolitical stabiliser and a laboratory of pragmatic cooperation combining different strategical cultures. It besides assessed how concrete defence and infrastructure projects – specified as the Task Force on Action against Mines in the Black Sea (MCM Black Sea Task Group) and north-south transport corridors under the Tri-Sea Initiative translate the political dialog into measurable regional resilience.

Despite the differences in geopolitical orientations and safety priorities, Poland, Romania and Turkey show a unique strategical complementarity that binds NATO's east and confederate flank. The reasons for their cooperation lie not only in geographical proximity, but besides in the common interest of balancing deterrence and dialog within the Alliance (Chuchak & Oleksy, 2023; Rusanda, 2025). However, as regional and organization dynamics evolved after 2022, managing these strategical divergences has become a more critical challenge than simply identifying common threats. This analytical position provides the ground for knowing how the tripartite format functions as a platform for agreeing on various national agendas within the framework of NATO's common objectives.

Table: Chronology of Tripartite Format Poland-Romania-Turkey

(Chuchak & Oleksy, 2023; Rusanda, 2025; TVP World, 2025; MFA of the Republic of Turkey, 2022)

Managing strategical divergence as the main analytical framework

The tripartite format of Poland-Romania-Turkey derives its unique strategical importance from the way it combines states with a fundamentally different perception of threats and different strategical cultures. Unlike another NATO coordination platforms, specified as the Bucharest Nine, which brings together mostly likewise reasoning allies of the east flank, this trilateral mechanics functions above the dividing lines within the Alliance. Its value is not to make consensus, but to enable structured dialog and applicable cooperation between partners who approach Russia, regional safety and alliance commitments from different perspectives.

Poland and Romania as a hard deterrence axis

For both Poland and Romania, Russia is simply a central – and even existential – safety challenge that shapes their national strategies. Historical dominance experiences and a sense of geopolitical sensitivity translated into an uncompromising stance defining Moscow as the main opponent. Consequently, both countries are in favour of strong deterrence, enhanced defence integration with the United States and the permanent presence of NATO forces in their territories.

Warsaw leadership in initiatives specified as Bucharest Ninth and its function as the main logistics centre for military support Ukraine demonstrates commitment to keep a strong transatlantic alliance. Similarly, Bucharest's emphasis on NATO's defensive presence (forward defence posture) and expanding military cooperation with the United States item the country's determination to safe the Black Sea as an integral part of the Alliance's east defence line. From their perspective, the tripartite framework offers the way to place these safety priorities in a wider regional structure, ensuring consistency between the Baltic and the Black Sea Theatre (Chuchiak & Oleksy, 2023).

Turkey as a balancing and autonomous actor

Turkey approaches the tripartite format with clearly different strategical considerations. Being an active NATO member, Ankara pursues a policy of strategical autonomy that combines deterrence with selective commitment to Russia (Rusanda, 2025). alternatively of taking an openly confrontational stance, Turkey seeks to preserve channels of communication and economical interdependence with Moscow (especially in the energy and commercial sectors), while contributing to NATO's defence efforts in the Black Sea.

This ‘balance’ or, as any analysts call it, a ‘cooperative rivalry’ policy aims to defend Turkey's regional influence and prevent the conversion of the Black Sea into an arena of direct confrontation (Isachenko, 2023). The Montreux Convention gives Ankara a crucial leverage over the movement of naval forces, and its balanced application during the Russian-Ukrainian War reflects the preference to keep balance. As part of the tripartite structure, Turkey uses its diplomatic flexibility to mediate between supporters of hard deterrence and those who like strategical caution, thereby ensuring that cooperation remains functional despite hidden discrepancies ( Vodka, 2023).

Tripartite mechanics as NATO shock absorber

By combining these opposing strategical logics, the tripartite format functions as a NATO shock absorber – a mechanics to mitigate interior friction between the east flank hawk and the balancing confederate flank. His main contribution is not to align positions towards Russia, but to keep operational coordination and prevent strategical cracks within the Alliance. In this respect, the Polish-Romania-Turkey triangle is simply a critical experimentation in the management of intra-Societal diversity, offering a flexible framework in which different safety doctrines can coexist, interact and bring applicable results in the field of defence, infrastructure and regional stableness (Rusanda, 2025; Chudziak & Oleksy, 2023).

Specific dimensions of cooperation

The tripartite format of Poland-Romania-Turkey is not just a diplomatic platform for dialogue; its strategical value is most evident in tangible projects that translate political coordination into operational results. These circumstantial dimensions show how this format reconciles different perceptions of threats while strengthening NATO's regional attitude (Tringham, 2024; Chudziak & Oleksy, 2023).

Military cooperation as a strategical compromise

An excellent example of pragmatic military cooperation is the Task Force on Action against Mines in the Black Sea (MCM Black Sea Task Group), launched in January 2024. This initiative responds to the urgent request of Romania and Bulgaria in the field of maritime safety, while respecting Turkey's emphasis on regional work (Regional ownership) and compliance with the Montreux Convention, which limits the presence of the forces of NATO non-coastal states (Tringham, 2024; Isachenko, 2023).

The Task Force shows how the tripartite format enables countries with different strategical operational coordination approaches: Poland and Romania prioritise the immediate objectives of hard security, while Turkey ensures that these actions stay in line with wider regional stableness considerations. The MCM Task Force thus illustrates the capacity of the format to turn diplomatic dialog into concrete safety outcomes while balancing competing national interests.

Infrastructure as security: 3SI-NATO link

In addition to military operations, tripartite cooperation extends to the improvement of critical infrastructure under the Tri-Sea Initiative (3SI). These projects service the dual objectives of promoting economical communication and expanding NATO's strategical mobility. 2 key examples illustrate this:

1. Via Carpatia: This north-south road corridor connects Lithuania with Greece, creating a key land road for the fast deployment of NATO forces along the east flank. Its improvement in tripartite cooperation highlights the intersection of economical and defence objectives (Opriș-Sîrca, 2024).
2. Rail-2-Sea: The connecting Polish port in Gdańsk with the Romanian Constanca railway line provides an alternate corridor for military transport between the Baltic Sea and Black Sea. Rail-2-Sea shows how infrastructure projects can strengthen NATO's operational resilience while pursuing regional integration objectives (Luka, 2024).

By emphasising these dual-use initiatives, the tripartite format proves its effectiveness at the interface of diplomacy, military readiness and infrastructure planning. It transforms abstract political discussions into feasible, regional-shaping projects, thereby perpetuating the strategical importance of this platform in NATO's wider defence architecture.

Policy recommendations

In order to increase strategical effectiveness and resilience of the tripartite format of Poland-Romania-Turkey, the following steps are recommended:

Institutionalisation of expert working groups

Setting up permanent working groups focused on circumstantial challenges would guarantee continuity and operational follow-up after high-level meetings. precedence areas could include the safety of underwater infrastructure (such as pipelines and transmission cables), utilizing the regional experience of Poland and Turkey's strategical position in the Black Sea (Amadio Viceré & Sus, 2025).

Integration of 3SI projects with NATO planning

Poland, as the leading architect of the Tri-Sea Initiative (3SI), should advocate strategical adjustment of key infrastructure projects for NATO purposes. Initiatives specified as Via Carpatia and Rail-2-Sea not only increase regional connectivity but besides service as key dual-use corridors for military mobility along the east and confederate flanks (Grochmalski et al., 2021).

Extending trilateral industrial and defence cooperation

Joint improvement and purchasing initiatives can increase interoperability, make economical interdependence and strengthen NATO's industrial base. Areas of cooperation could include unmanned systems, marine platforms and ammunition production, based on erstwhile successful acquisitions specified as Bayraktar drones and armoured vehicles.

Formalising the parliamentary dimension

The establishment of an interparliamentary assembly would extend political support, guarantee cross-party commitment and strengthen the long-term organization resilience of the tripartite mechanism. specified a democratic "overlay" would besides aid to make the initiative immune to changes in national governments or political priorities.

In conclusion, to strengthen the strategical effectiveness of the format, actions should focus on organization continuity, operational coordination and integration of regional infrastructure into NATO objectives. It is crucial to set up permanent expert groups, to adapt the Tri-Morning projects to military mobility requirements and to deepen industrial cooperation. Together, these initiatives would establish the function of format as a applicable mechanics for managing divergent approaches and strengthening the integration of the East-South within the Alliance.

Conclusion

The tripartite format of Poland-Romania-Turkey has become a critical mechanics connecting NATO's east and confederate flank, acting not as a forum for full consensus, but as a platform for managing strategical divergences. The balanced approach of Turkey, combined with the attitude of hard deterrence of Poland and Romania, allows the Alliance to alleviate interior tensions while achieving regional safety objectives. Operational projects, specified as the MCM Task Force and the infrastructure corridors of the Trimorz, illustrate how diplomatic coordination translates into tangible resilience.

In future, decision-makers should focus on institutionalising working groups, expanding the integration of dual-use infrastructure and strengthening industrial and defence cooperation. Ultimately, the success of the mechanics will be measured by its ability to keep cooperation across different strategical cultures while strengthening NATO's comprehensive defence stance.

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