Nebel des Krieges (‘the fog of war’) is simply a concept introduced into military literature by Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz. It refers to the uncertain situation in and around the theatre of war activities. He describes a state that is simply a scourge of leaders and commanders of the fighting army, besides annoying to external observers of conflict cut off from decision centres and front lines. In strategical computer games, we see “the fog of war” as obscured parts of the board underneath which... What, an enemy group? The fortification system?
For the sake of order, let us add that “the fog of war” is not only about physical phenomena. It besides includes planning and decision-making processes. And he doesn't gotta deal with strictly military issues. For example, unknown fumes may contain information about the capacity of the industrial base essential to sustain the war effort. Nebel – like its atmospheric signal consisting of ice crystals – can bring relief, for others it will be a trap, from which a deadly threat will abruptly emerge. Therefore, all country active in the war does its best to make the fog wraps up the actions of the opponent at least dilute. It is no different in Ukraine.
For centuries, the request for information rested on people, or “personal intelligence”, as it was called erstwhile another possibilities arose. Today, cognition needed in the field of combat acquires and processes equipment (satellites, airplanes, radars, etc.) and provides computer programs utilizing artificial intelligence algorithms. This aspect of cyberwar (one of many, of course) would not have been possible without the Internet—the apparent attribute of everyday life for years serving primarily for entertainment, though created erstwhile for the purposes of war. besides highly useful for civilian analysts, who do not gotta sit in the heads of war commanders to get useful information.
Many data are at your fingertips through the Internet, which is besides a origin of cognition and a tool for obtaining it. A single image taken for an illustration of an event usually contains an additional data package. Elements of residential construction, including interiors of houses and captured didascale, urban infrastructure from road signs to large structures (such as bridges), natural objects, symbolic structures and many another details let to identify the location and time of the photograph. In geolocation, the angles of falling light or the nature of clouds are helpful. erstwhile accessing meteo databases, where circumstantial types of cloud clouding for a given region are observed, an innocent cloud background in the sky can decide on the accuracy of the indication.
The Ukrainian military vehicle passes by the burning ground after a bomb detonation in the village of Chasiv Yar close Bachmut, 14 March 2023, during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. photograph Aris Messinis/ AFP
Why is it so important? The front in the East is not transparent in information. The apparent wealth of videos does not change that (it is mostly selected material). Both parties are not media-friendly, although they usage propaganda services present on the front line. This leads to a situation where we sometimes do not really know where this front is going or where the armies of 1 side or the another have gone. External observers, therefore, are uphill, but are not condemned to just authoritative propaganda reports. For example, FIRMS – a global satellite surveillance strategy that records fires on Earth – comes to the aid. Through it, you can about find lines of front or military contact or short circuit points. In specified places there is simply a large cluster of fires.
FIRMS revealed its analytical usefulness in the spring of 2022. At that time, the Russians utilized the “artillery fighter” strategy – they fired 40–60,000 missiles a day (Ukrainians even 10 times less), thus trying to crush the defenders' positions. Each detonation is simply a possible fire, which must have resulted in “walls of fire” with specified a large usage of combat measures. And specified walls have seen NASA satellites working for FIRMS. Registered fire outbreaks were reported on maps, and those updated on an ongoing website of the American Space Agency.
Fire Information for Resource Management strategy was developed at the University of Maryland in 2007 with NASA financial support. It is simply a free platform for monitoring forest fires. The satellites of the strategy are placed in a heliosynchronous orbit, so everyone flies over the same place on Earth at the same time each day. Each satellite crosses the equator from north to south and from south to north 12 times a day. This allows FIRMS to display fire locations in almost real time.
But like everything else, so is this tool not without faults, looking from the position of military analysts. Its usefulness is straight related to the period of the year and the nature and strength of the war. simply put, it's easier to start a fire erstwhile you have something to burn and it's something to light. In the late summertime of 2022, the number of fires in the fighting area in Ukraine began to decrease, and this process continues until today. The front remains static where the Russians have late achieved any successes, which means they have pushed the Ukrainians respective or respective kilometers away. In practice, this means that the direct contact line has shifted at most to the erstwhile direct fronts, and thus to the erstwhile "worked" by artillery. So what was expected to burn spectacularly there was already on fire. And in the fall or winter, it's harder to start a fire.
But these are secondary issues. The most crucial thing is to change the way we fight. Today, both sides usage artillery to shoot much little frequently than in the top of the artillery waltz or Ukrainian storms from the days of the Zaporozh offensive. An crucial part of the harm to each another is the consequence of mass usage of drones, which are more effective than classical artillery ammunition. Drones which are not as many as missiles (not utilized regular for respective dozen, but "only" respective 1000 pieces) and which usage smaller loads, and which are intended for point strikes, very frequently in individual soldiers. The large fires are much harder.
