In fresh years Finland has undergone a extremist transformation in the area of defence policy. Defence spending was only 1.6% of GDP in 2020. Since then, this percent has steadily increased — 2.1% in 2021, 2.5% in 2023 and planned 3 % in 2029. This direction is the consequence of both the force from Russia's war against Ukraine and Finland's increasing function in NATO structures after joining the Alliance.
The Ministry of Defence has officially announced that the government's nonsubjective is to keep a advanced level of expenditure of at least 2.5% of GDP for the next 4 years and then scope 3 % in 2029. It is worth noting that Finland is at the top of the NATO countries present in terms of the strength of defence investments. By comparison, most associate States are inactive aspiring to 2% of GDP.
The leap in the defence budget is besides reflected in absolute figures. In 2025, Finland will usage more than half a billion more than a year earlier to defend EUR 6.5 billion. This expenditure includes not only the current operational costs of the armed forces, but besides the acquisition of fresh equipment, the improvement of command systems and the crucial modernisation of the land army. A gradual increase to around EUR 8.5 billion is besides planned in 2029.
Importantly, according to the approved draft budget, the yearly purchasing rights of troops will increase from EUR 0.4 billion to as much as EUR 6 billion, or 15 times. This is simply a historical leap, which confirms that Finland is not only upgrading the army, but is actually preparing for a possible conflict with Russia. The government leaves no illusions. The east neighbour's threat is no longer considered a theoretical scenario, but a real threat requiring immediate preparedness.
New investments and modernisation programmes
The largest single acquisition in the fresh past of Finnish defence is the acquisition of 64 F-35A fighters under the HX Fighter program. The value of the agreement concluded with Lockheed Martin exceeds EUR 8 billion. transportation will begin in 2025 and last until the end of the decade. The aircraft will replace the ageing F/A-18 machines and will be a key deterrent in the Baltic Sea region.
The modernisation of the Finnish Navy is no little important. 4 Pohjanmaa-type corvettes, built as part of the 2020 Squadron Project, are expected to enter service by 2029. These units, designed to act in hard Arctic conditions, will increase Finland's capacity to defend the coast and respond to hybrid threats.
In addition to major hardware purchases, the government besides invested in the improvement of military infrastructure and digital systems. The "Puolustusvoimien kehittäminen 2025" programme includes the improvement of intelligence capabilities, modern means of communication and cyber defence. Expenditure for this intent will amount to over EUR 400 million between 2025 and 2029.
The government's decision to rise its purchasing powers to a evidence of EUR 6 billion per year, starting with the budget for 2026, deserves peculiar attention. By comparison, this level did not exceed 0.4 billion in erstwhile years. This represents a fifteen-fold increase that will let for parallel implementation of many modernisation projects and strategical purchases. This is not just a correction in funding, but a complete change in philosophy. Until now, the army was expected to be ready to respond. Now the mark is full combat readiness. Prime Minister Petteri Orpo and defence Minister Antti Häkkänen openly say that the army is to be prepared in case of aggression not in 10 years, but at any time. In this context, the expenditure leap is not a luxury, but an existential necessity.
Social and economical consequences
The increase in defence spending is not without impact on another areas of state policy. The Minister of Finance, Riikka Purra, openly acknowledged that “national defence is the biggest burden on the budget” and that is why cuts are being made in another areas, including housing, innovation, business subsidies and social support for migrants.
The state budget for next year provides for a deficit of EUR 8.7 billion. gross was estimated at 81.6 billion, while expenditure is expected to amount to 90.3 billion. In this situation, the government tries to find savings wherever it can, but it does not quit military spending — considering it strategically necessary.
On the another hand, the analysis of the Bank of Finland suggests that intensification of defence spending can have a affirmative impact on economical growth, especially if a large proportion of purchases are carried out within the country. Depending on the scenario, real GDP could increase by 0.3–0.6% by 2028. However, experts emphasise that public debt will increase at the same time.
The social perception of these changes is mixed. According to the polls cited by Iltalehti and Helsingin Sanomat, any Finns support government decisions, considering them essential in the light of Russia's aggressive actions. Others criticise drastic cuts in social programs and the increasing deficit. There is besides much controversy about Finland's withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention, which allows for the re-storage of anti-personnel mines. Finnish media, including Iltalehti, compose explicitly that the current draft budget is simply a “war budget” and that Finland is preparing not only for deterrence but besides for possible conflict.
Tough Neighborhood
The relations between Finland and Russia have been tense for over 2 centuries, dominated by imbalance of forces, geopolitical force and conflict for independence. Since 1815, the period after the Vienna Congress, Finland has functioned as an autonomous Grand Duchy under the sceptre of the Russian Tsar. Although formally she had her own institutions and constitution, in practice she was strictly subordinate to the Russian Empire. Carska Russia treated Finland as a strategical buffer region towards the West — and this way of reasoning survived until the 21st century.
In 1917, on the wave of the Bolshevik Revolution and the chaos in St. Petersburg, Finland declared independence. The ZSRS initially recognized it, but as early as 1918 tried to interfere in the interior conflicts of the young state, supporting Finnish communists during the civilian war. Although unsuccessful, this was the first effort to undermine the Finnish sovereignty by Moscow — and the announcement of what would come.
In 1939, the russian Union attacked Finland, starting the winter war. Despite the vast advantage of the Red Army, the Finns managed to halt the invasion and keep their independence, though they lost crucial territories — including the Karelian Pass. 2 years later, during the Continuing War (1941–1944), Finland tried to reclaim the lost land by cooperating with the 3rd Reich, which after the war was utilized propaganda against it.
After planet War II, Finland fell into the shadow of the russian sphere of influence, although it formally maintained neutrality. This process was called finlandization — a policy of inter-West and the USSR, consisting of preserving interior independency in exchange for full caution in abroad policy. Finland did not join NATO, did not criticize Moscow and avoided any action that could trigger the Kremlin's reaction. In practice, this meant political and economical self-censorship of the USSR.
This hard vicinity has left a lasting mark on the Finnish strategical identity. The distrust of Russia has become part of the national instinct, and defence policy has become a substance of survival, not just a government decision. This is the communicative that makes today's military budget increase not a shock to the Finns, but a logical consequence to a familiar, dangerous signal from the East.