HALYNA HYCHKA: Let’s get consecutive to the business. Could you delight narrate Slovakia’s journey to EU membership and the importance of government regarding number rights within that context?
ÁBEL RAVASZ: The 1990s marked a challenging period for national minorities in Slovakia. During this time, the Mečiar governments (disclaimer: Vladimír Mečiar was the Prime Minister of Slovakia 3 times, from 1990 to 1998 with short breaks in 1992 and 1994, ruled Slovakia during the collapse of Czechoslovakia, and was known for his authoritarian, populist and anti-Western kind of governance) adopted comparatively nationalistic policies, which included rolling back any of the number rights that Hungarians and another number groups had enjoyed since the socialist era.
One of the most crucial rights under challenge was the right to parent tongue education. The government introduced a highly restrictive education law aimed at banning Hungarian-language schools in Slovakia, which numbered around 700 at that time (disclaimer: the cultural Hungarian population of Slovakia at that time amounted to more than half a million people). This decision triggered considerable local opposition from the Hungarian community and besides became a point of contention during Slovakia’s EU accession negotiations (disclaimer: these negotiations began in a meaningful way only after Mečiar lost power, erstwhile Slovakia was stuck in the last carriage of a train moving along with the another Visegrad countries).
It was 1 of the demands of the European Union that Slovakia would fix its number policies and fundamentally it is what they did. They enacted government aimed at securing number rights, peculiarly concerning education and the right to learn in one’s parent tongue.
There was a grand strategy for number culture. Importantly, discriminatory laws targeting national minorities were abolished. With Slovakia’s accession to the EU in 2004, there was overarching optimism among Slovakia’s minorities that the EU would oversee the process and guarantee their protection.
However, after the EU had admitted Slovakia, it became evident that the EU’s proactive engagement in safeguarding number rights fell short of expectations.
We in Ukraine are facing a bit of a different problem. For instance, concerning our European integration, addressing number rights and completing this work beforehand is crucial, as it constitutes 1 of the obstacles, so to speak.
It was the same with us. After the first shock of the Russian attack on Ukraine, I contacted my colleagues at the investigation institute I directed, the Inštitút Mateja Bela, to emphasize the request to collaborate with Ukraine to address number rights issues. Given Ukraine’s aspirations to join the EU, it became evident that any neighboring countries might block their accession due to concerns over number rights. Hence, it was clear to me, as well as to my colleagues, that this would become a crucial issue. due to the fact that that was the same in Slovakia – you had to fix it before you joined.
However, upon joining, the territory becomes comparatively free as the EU’s ability to enforce rules diminishes. Essentially, countries must cross the threshold, after which they are required to study periodically, but overall, the situation remains manageable.
I believe it is besides a substance of fundamental right for countries to grant comparatively generous number rights. These rights not only adhere to EU standards but besides contribute to stabilizing the loyalty of number communities toward the state. Thus, it is simply a substance of good policy, not solely influenced by EU pressures.
Was there opposition to this process in the Slovak case? I mean, did it become a subject of political quarrels and manipulated propaganda in Slovakia? What was the stance of the majority of society?
It is specified a good question. 1 aspect I didn’t previously mention, but which you are aware of, is the representation of Hungarians in the Slovak parliament and their political organization – in fact, there were several, but following 1994, any of the Hungarian parties consolidated into a single bloc and yet a single party, the Hungarian Coalition or Strana maďarskej koalície (komunity), emerged. From then until 2020, a organization consistently held seats in parliament.
Initially, they served as opposition to the Mečiar government and the nationalists. However, erstwhile Mečiar was ousted in 1998, it led to the formation of a coalition government that included the Hungarian party, thus ensuring Hungarian representation in government, which correspondingly solidified its stance on national number issues.
Throughout this period, there was a clear divide between the Coalition, which included the Hungarian party, and the nationalists. While nationalists advocated against Hungarian separatism and pushed for school closures, the Coalition, peculiarly under the more liberal Mikuláš Dzurinda, took a pro-Hungarian stance.
During the crucial period from 1998 to 2006, which encompassed the EU accession process, having the Hungarian organization as part of the government proved immensely beneficial. Despite attempts by any actors to exploit the subject of number rights, the government maintained a pro-Hungarian position, which greatly aided the situation.
The challenge we face present in Ukraine (dealing with is the mission of our institute navigating it in Zakarpattia) involves a perception among certain segments of Ukrainian society that the EU is imposing changes through what feels like blackmail, Hungarian blackmail. This sentiment extends beyond just nationalism, as any view it as an interference in Ukrainian affairs driven by the interests of organizations like the Venice Commission, the EU and so on. However, this viewpoint is puzzling and illogical because, in striving for a healthy society and democracy, it’s essential to heed the voices of minorities due to the fact that they are citizens of Ukraine. And now it is truly a crucial part of ongoing politics, with various actors attempting to gain popularity through it. Was it possible in Slovakia, for example, to make a national consensus on this issue utilizing civilian society and influential figures who supported so to talk more rights for Hungarians and would assert that it is okay, emphasizing that it is not about politics but about democracy? How did the situation appear from within Slovakia?
But the situation in Slovakia is indeed very different, as you besides mentioned. I’ll supply an answer, but let me take a minute to look back. It’s very different erstwhile you have a situation where a fewer individuals either support the government or not, compared to a script where a organization has one, three, or 4 coalition partners in the government. If any of these partners vote against, the government fails, leading to importantly different negotiating positions. So, that structure is very different from the situation in Ukraine. erstwhile it comes to the situation of Hungarians in Slovakia, I don’t believe there was always a national consensus.
It was highly contested, but a majority of MPs in parliament supported the essential measures, even though they lacked moral advanced ground. They might be saying “This is the right thing to do.” But the bottom line was “We request to do this to get to the EU.” A crucial change occurred in 2016, more than 10 years later, erstwhile the Hungarian organization formed a coalition with the Slovak National Party. This coalition was born out of necessity alternatively than willingness to cooperate, as neither organization initially desired collaboration, yet they yet joined forces. For many Slovaks, this coalition marked a turning point erstwhile they saw that now that the nationalists were okay with the Hungarians, so most likely the Hungarians were good.
Additionally, this period coincided with the return of Viktor Orbán, who began advocating for pro-Slovakia policies. alternatively of escalating tensions, Orbán aimed to foster affirmative relations and engage in mutually beneficial endeavors with Slovakia. These 2 different waves formed a very good calm sea: Slovak National organization now has Hungarian friends, Orbán is regarded as a friend of Bratislava and that has created the consensus, albeit 12 years after European accession. Nowadays, I believe there is no longer any dispute regarding the rights of Hungarians to keep their institutions and benefit from economical advancements in regions where they constitute the majority.
Let’s jump to a very short question. What is the primary concern facing the pro-Hungarian number in Slovakia presently?
Economic development. It parallels Zakarpattia rather closely.
Are you facing waves of migration?
Somewhat, primarily toward Hungary. There is this very unhealthy dynamic that if you have a Hungarian organization in the government, then they are trying to push out investments into confederate Slovakia where the Hungarians live. erstwhile a Hungarian organization holds government positions, investments flow into the confederate regions. Conversely, in their absence from government, backing for these areas ceases. And it’s very peculiar due to the fact that even though the Hungarian parties are part of the government half of the time, the time they are there, the confederate regions get as much as the another regions, but they don’t get anything erstwhile they are not part of the government.
Consequently, maintaining the same standard of improvement becomes untenable, leading to longstanding grievances within the Hungarian communities regarding the mismanagement of the confederate regions. erstwhile prosperous, these areas are now witnessing economical decline. Now people don’t talk about east Slovakia as a mediocre region. They say “Eastern and confederate Slovakia” instead.
This predicament exacerbates the core issue. Assimilation and migration are surely concerns, but without fostering robust economical structures, people will search better opportunities elsewhere, even outside the country. Gradually, economical vitality has emerged as the paramount issue. I can say it in a different way. Instituting essential reforms — education, cultural funding, political representation — is pivotal. However, erstwhile these foundational institutions are established, economical prosperity takes precedence.
Notably, Slovakia erstwhile had an interethnic party, the Bridge organization (disclaimer: Most–Híd), comprising both Slovaks and Hungarians. There was a notable synergy between the aspirations of Slovak residents from the confederate regions for improvement and the desires of number communities in the same areas. Regarding the Zakarpattia issue: I wonder how increased economical improvement for Hungarians in the region can detrimentally impact Ukrainians? On the contrary, specified improvement fosters local structures and benefits the full community. Given the comparatively tiny population in this compact region, the influx of funds contributes to the region’s overall prosperity. Thus, this presents a compelling rationale for fostering coalitions and collaborative efforts.
A question regarding borders: erstwhile Slovakia and Hungary joined the EU, you besides became part of the Schengen zone, eliminating borders. Did this aid alleviate tensions and make a calmer atmosphere, peculiarly for Hungarians who no longer faced restrictions erstwhile traveling to Hungary? due to our shared border, we anticipate that EU membership will benefit local Hungarians, facilitating increased connections.
Yes, but the border was never as hard as this one. I am 38, and erstwhile I started attending university, I commuted to Budapest while residing in Slovakia. all week, I crossed the border, where passport checks took simply 5 seconds. After 2004, both countries were part of the EU, and while there were border checks, they were not stringent, focusing little on smuggling and deliberately slowing down travelers. With the advent of Schengen, border controls simply evaporated, creating a liberating feeling. I vividly callback the celebrations at the border. This improvement importantly revitalized local economies on both sides. Especially in regions where the border isn’t delineated by the Danube, specified as in the western part of the country, where the Slovak-Hungarian border runs along a river.
There’s the same amount of border crossings and bridges, but in the east part of the country now you have a lot more local border crossings that you can use. This improvement has undoubtedly contributed to economical growth as well as it helped symbolically for sure. I believe that adopting a strategy akin to Romania’s, where EU membership is maintained without full Schengen integration, would represent a crucial improvement. This approach starkly differs from the current Slovak experience. Slovaks only come to Ukraine out of necessity or for circumstantial purposes, like if they want to make any money on cigarettes or something like that due to the fact that nobody in their right head wants to wait for hours on the border.
They besides come here for dentistry. It’s very popular.
Fair point.
Have you had the chance to review the situation in Ukraine regarding number rights and our process of initiating negotiations bilaterally with Hungary, as well as with the EU? How would you measure the progress? possibly you could offer any advice on this matter?
Yeah, I realize that part of Putin’s justification for the war includes the Russian cultural number in east Ukraine. It is truly challenging in this climate to talk about the necessity for tolerant number policy. However, I firmly believe it’s the only way forward. I admit efforts to de-Russify certain institutions and processes in Ukraine. Nevertheless, if this results in neglecting existing number rights, peculiarly in education, it’s impractical policy. Ukraine undeniably requires loyal citizens, including those from number backgrounds. Those people are not to blame either for being born in this country, which was not their choice, or for the actions of another countries that they might be affiliated with, be it Russia or Hungary. Citizens have the right to education and culture in their homeland. If coupled with affirmative economical developments, they will have no incentive to support any country another than Ukraine. Conversely, abolishing established rights and neglecting regional improvement would supply neighbouring countries’ propaganda with ample ammunition to turn these people against Ukraine.
At the onset of the war, there was widespread speculation that east Ukraine would full support Putin due to its Russophone population. However, this did not materialize as anticipated. While there may be isolated instances, the majority of Russian speakers in Ukraine have demonstrated unwavering loyalty to their country, with many making the eventual sacrifice on the front lines. In light of this, should the reaction be to close schools, or should it be to cultivate goodwill by implementing a tolerant number policy?
Is it possible that we have a akin problematic situation with Slovakia regarding the rights of the Slovakian number in Ukraine? Are there any indications from the Slovak minority?
While the Slovak community in Ukraine has been comparatively little developed institutionally compared to the Hungarians, it does be and has its own institutions. We have received communication from them signalling concerns about legal changes and expressing dissatisfaction with the ways things are developing. The citizens of Ukraine from the Slovak community are not as politically active as, for example, the Hungarian communities. I believe the Slovaks are not profoundly considering their position in this conflict; they are pro-Ukraine and have always been. Strengthening the school strategy for these individuals would be a affirmative step towards Slovakia. As a Slovak citizen, I feel arrogant that Slovakia has been a loyal friend to Ukraine during this war, not only at the governmental level but besides through the grassroots efforts of individuals volunteering and offering support. Therefore, reciprocating by bolstering Slovak institutions in Ukraine would be a cost-effective way to express gratitude and guarantee the happiness of these individuals in the future. The Slovak community around Uzhhorod is comparatively small, but this motion would inactive hold crucial value.
Do you see merit in the rule of mirroring rights situations, legislation, and bilateral cooperation with Slovakia and Hungary?
The notion of reciprocity and mirroring has frequently been invoked to justify the reluctance to grant additional rights. It has been peculiarly prevalent in Hungarian-Slovak relations, with the Slovak side citing the situation of Slovaks in Hungary as a reason for not extending further rights. However, I don’t find this approach peculiarly constructive. Instead, I believe it’s more beneficial to focus on how we want to treat our own minorities and to set an example based on our values. We can say, “Listen, we have implemented these measures to support your community, if you want to aid ours, delight do that.” But let’s not usage reciprocity as a weapon and say “You’re not doing this to the Ukrainians in Hungary, therefore, we are not doing this for the Hungarians in Ukraine.”
The publication was prepared within the framework of the Re:Open Ukraine project, implemented with the support of the global Renaissance Foundation. The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not reflect those of the global Renaissance Foundation.
Ábel Ravasz is simply a Slovak sociologist and politician of Hungarian nationality. From April 2016 to March 2020, he served as the Plenipotentiary of the Slovak Government for Roma Communities.
Halyna Hychka is a Ukrainian journalist.
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