Written by Ksawery Stawiński, Adam Jankowski
7.11. U.S. seemingly diversifys energy supply in Hungary
Like most European countries, Hungary has its own atomic electorate – "Paks", built in 1982. Budapest is presently expanding its power plants with 2 additional reactors. The finalized project, called "Paks II", will make it possible to cover Hungary's electricity request through the atomic power plant complex increase from 50% to 70%. In 2014, the extension order was granted, without a tender, to Russian Rostatom. The culmination of Hungary's preparations to make Paks II is the start of its construction in the first 4th of 2026.
The recently created reactors were to be yet fueled from Russia, just as so far it has been with "Paks I". One, Hungary has taken a course to diversify its energy sources, which means limiting Russia's function as its main supplier. On November 7, Viktor Orban met with Donald Trump in Washington, D.C. where both leaders signed a contract to acquisition fuel for Paks I reactors. This is the first specified transaction between both countries, which amounts to $144 million. However, the US will not full replace Russia as a atomic fuel supplier. In addition to Moscow and Washington, Hungary will besides supply fuel imported from France. The presidents agreed that in addition to fuel for the Budapest power plant, they would buy $600 million in LNG from Washington, thus limiting their energy dependence on Russia. In addition, Hungary was exempted from the sanctions on Rostnief and Łukoil.
However, the Trump administration has not seriously undermined Russia's impact as the main energy supplier in Hungary. The amounts presented in line with the country's yearly budget are very small, and Hungary has maintained a trend since the beginning of the second invasion to increase the volume of imports from Russia. This dependency is best seen in the example of Russian oil, whose share of Hungary's import increased from 61% from the pre-invasion period to 92% this year. The question remains whether an agreement with the Americans is simply a one-off move, or a prelude to greater engagement of the US in Hungarian energy.
10.11. End of Sudan-Russian cooperation
With the collapse of Bassar Al-Assad's government in Syria, Russia lost its only military naval base established outside the country. The end of the lease of the port in Tartus marked the fiasco of Russian efforts to build an impact in the mediate East and the Mediterranean. Ersatz of the Syrian base was to become a port in a Sudanese city called Port Sudan. specified a solution would carry the mediate of the Russian commitment from the mediate East to the Red Sea, further from Russia, but would fulfil the Kremlin's ambitions of having a naval base south of Bosfor and Dardanela.
Moscow made efforts to establish a Russian base in Port Sudan as early as 2017. As a consequence of Sudan's deficiency of political stability, plans to build the port were late while subsequent governments were rising and falling and Moscow's alliances with Sudanese factions were changing configuration. Despite the adversities, at the beginning of this year Sergei Lavrow and Ali Yusuf al-Sharif agreed that the Russians could start stationing in Port Sudan.
After 10 months of the agreement, Andrei Chernoval, Russian Ambassador to Sudan, announced, "stopping" a joint initiative due to ongoing conflict in the African country. 1 case, as the advancement Center for Policies maintains, the decision to suspend cooperation was made by Khartum, not Moscow. According to this narrative, Sudan is to conduct a policy of balancing influences in a country between the countries affecting it. In this case, moving distant from Russia would consequence in the demolition of America and, consequently, Israel.
Khartoum may play to normalize relations with Tel-Aviv and return to the table of talks under Abraham's Agreements, which are an initiative launched by Donald Trump during his first term. In 2021, this maneuver resulted in measurable benefits for Sudan as it was struck off the list of terrorist states by the US. However, the signed contract was never implemented by Khartum.
12.11. A sharp fall in Russian oil prices
According to Kommersant (and behind it most news portals nch): oil Urals – the benchmark of Russian oil, is sold with a evidence discount on the planet price of Benchamrku – Brent oil.
The current discount is around $20 per barrel of oil exported from Russia. This is not the biggest simplification Kremlin has decided to offer to its contractors during the second invasion of Ukraine. The real evidence fell in the second 4th of 2022 and the first 4th of 2023 erstwhile Urals was cheaper by about $30 compared to Brent oil. However, at the time the planet benchmark prices were definitely higher – around $110 in 2022 and about $80 in 2023. Currently, Brent's barrel of oil costs about $63. If the Kommersant calculations are hit, this would mean about 30 percent discount.
Russia's Central Bank announced in late November that the authoritative discount on Urals oil was 23%. This represents an increase of six percent points compared to the erstwhile month.
Such a sharp and abrupt fall in the income of the Russian Federation is due to the actions of the American administration, which decided to introduce sanctions on Rostnief and Łukoil – the main Russian oil exporters. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, sanctions were imposed as a consequence of Russia's deficiency of serious commitment to Ukraine's peace talks." The circumstantial nonsubjective of the US sanctions is to degrade the Kremlin's ability to get gross that would be utilized to feed the Russian war device and support the weakened Russian economy."
18.11 Chinese and Indian retreat from buying Russian oil
The imposition of sanctions on Rostnief and Łukoil resulted in a decline in request for Russian oil in India and China. erstwhile contractors fear secondary sanctions, which the US administration announced in October to impose on traders with 2 Russian giants. As a deadline to put an end to existing cooperation with these 2 companies, the Americans chose November 21. True, the Russians proceed to offer their oil to Beijing and fresh Delhi, both on an authoritative basis and with the aid of a fleet of shadows and another intermediaries who let them to avoid sanckje. This second kind of oil is no longer as attractive as the 1 brought in by authoritative channels due to the fact that it is almost as costly as Brent oil. However, its price besides fell, from 2 to 4 dollars below Brent's price. In addition, it is bypassed due to the time-consuming, complex and risky procedures required to stay ,,in appreciation’.
According to Washington's expectations, the largest Indian refineries stopped imports of Russian oil without signing a contract to buy natural material for December (the oil acquisition agreements are re-signed from period to month). 5 Indian refineries decided to take this step, which together account for as much as 60% of imports. From this block the state giant – Indian Oil Corp., decided to buy Russian oil from intermediaries, but not straight from Russia. The second non-responsive company is Nayara Energy Ltd., which is half controlled by Rostnief anyway. Indusians effort to cover marketplace request by subsidizing Russian oil from the mediate East, and of course – America.
The Chinese are following the Indians. Beijing did not decide to decision as dramatic and immediate as fresh Delhi, but the companies of the state centre besides restrict their relation with Russian kerosene. The most crucial oil refineries that abstained from import (by sea) include PetroChina, Sinopec, CNOOC and Zhenhua Oil. In total, they account for about half of the manufacture concerned. The another half is controlled by tiny refineries called "cups".
It is crucial to clarify what kind of oil Chinese giants and cups will not buy. It is Urals benchmark oil – exported mainly from ports in the west of the country (it is the main kind of oil coming to India). By land road, east, China flows through ESPO oil pipelines, satisfying most of Chinese oil request imported from Russia. ESPO, unlike Urals oil, is not so powerfully discounted to scope a akin price, although inactive lower, to Brent's marketplace price. The difference in price is due to the infrastructure and supply chains already built, as well as to the better grade of ESPO oil compared to Urals oil, and the quality that is easy to refine.
No less, China limits the acquisition of Russian oil. The product coming from its northern neighbour accounts for 45% of China's full oil imports, with a full request of about 12 million barrels per day. China's elimination of Urals oil alone is simply a major failure to Russia.
20.11 Attack on the Polish Ambassador to Russia – St. Petersburg incidental and Warsaw reactions
There was a dangerous situation in St. Petersburg involving the ambassador of the Republic to the Russian Federation. While walking down the city's main street, fresh York Prospect, it was surrounded by a group of demonstrators who first directed offensive shouts towards it and then attempted a physical attack. Thanks to safety intervention, the ambassador avoided serious injuries. A spokesperson for the Polish Ministry of Diplomacy confirmed that the group of protesters had banners with anti-Polish and anti-Ukrainian slogans. The action was well organized, which, according to the ambassador, indicates that the incidental was not accidental.
The diplomat sent a protest note to the Russian authorities demanding explanations. The reaction of Polish authorities was immediate in addition to the authoritative protest, the full event was sharply criticized. According to erstwhile Polish Ambassador to the USA Mark Magierowski, the attack was an “unacceptable act” and a clear violation of diplomatic standards. In turn the head of the Polish Ministry of abroad Affairs, Radosław Sikorski, reminded that the host state, or Russia, is liable for the safety of accredited diplomats. The Russian side, as informed, adopted a protest note, declaring that "this kind of event should not take place". Despite the assurances, the incidental importantly deepened tensions in Warsaw's relations with Moscow.
25.11 fresh U.S. peace proposition to Ukraine and criticism from Republicans
The US administration presented a fresh proposal to end the war in Ukraine, which immediately sparked strong reactions not only in Europe, but besides inside the political camp in the US. The talk of a peace plan by the Donald Trump government, which included, among another things, the simplification of Ukraine's armed forces, the resignation of Kiev from its aspirations to NATO membership and the transfer of parts of the east territories of Ukraine heavy fortified and presently under combat under the control of the Russian Federation. The proposal was to be presented as a possible way to ending the conflict, but its terms were rapidly criticised besides by Trump organization members in Congress. Among the harshest voices of criticism was Senator Mitch McConnell, who compared the plan to “capitulation” and expressed the belief that ordering Ukraine to yield to an aggressor would not lead to lasting peace. besides president of the legislature Armed Forces Commission, Roger Wicker, assessed the paper as full of serious flaws, doubting that it could always bring about a unchangeable ceasefire.
MP Brian Fitzpatrick in turn called the plan “Russian propaganda” and appealed to reject it as “unserious”. Critics point out that the conditions set out in the proposal to weaken Ukraine's defence, abandon NATO and surrender territories are actually conducive to the interests of the Kremlin alternatively than bringing real peace. According to many commentators, alternatively of putting force on Russia, Trump's offer can be taken as a reward for aggression. Meanwhile, the U.S. administration, along with the Ukrainian delegation and European allies, discusses a possible revision of the plan. The Parties declare their willingness to negociate further, although points have not yet been disclosed which will be changed.
27.11 Russia liquidates the Polish Consulate in Irkutsk – a consequence to the closure of the FR Consulate in Gdańsk
The Russian Federation abroad Ministry announced that it intends to close the General Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Irkutsk. The facility is to halt operating on December 30, 2025. At the same time, a typical of the Polish diplomacy of the ambassador to the Moscow MFA was called. Moscow's decision, as stated in the answer to the earlier closure of the Russian consulate in Gdańsk by Warsaw, was, according to the Russian side, an "enemy and baseless" action. For Poland, this decision was not a surprise. A spokesperson for the Polish Ministry of abroad Affairs stated in the communication that although they accept the decision of Russia, they have no legitimate reason to liquidate the consulate.
He besides stressed that Poland does not engage as the Russian MFA claimed in any acts of panic or sabotage in the Russian Federation. The liquidation of the facility is simply a classical example of diplomatic retaliation. The consulate in Irkutsk played a peculiar function including the care of descendants of Poles sent to Siberia. For many people there was a place of maintaining communication with Poland. The current situation may consequence in any documents, as well as memorial sites specified as graves, being unattended.
28. 11 Merkel withdraws from the words "Poland and the Baltic States bear no blame for Russia's aggression"
Angela Merkel referred to the explanation of her earlier statements, which sparked a broad discussion both in Germany and in Central and east Europe. The erstwhile Chancellor clearly stated that she never held Poland or the Baltic countries any co-responsibility for Russian aggression against Ukraine. She stressed that the reports that propose the other were the consequence of misinterpretations and the removal of her words from the context.
Merkel explained that the memories of her diplomatic activities in 2021, erstwhile she and France proposed talks at the level of the European Union as a full with Russia, were presented in a way incompatible with her intentions. At the time, Poland and the Baltic States opposed dialog with Moscow, considering that specified actions could be perceived as weakening the common position towards the increasing aggressive policies of the Kremlin.
However, Merkel stressed that this was not the responsibility of these countries, but the difference of opinion concerning the way abroad policy is conducted within the Union. The erstwhile Chancellor pointed out that the full work for causing the war rests with Russia and its authorities, and the decision to attack Ukraine was a unilateral action of the Kremlin. In her opinion, no European country, including Poland or the Baltic countries, is to blame for this aggression. Merkel besides criticised the way any media presented her position, indicating that false interpretations led to unnecessary tensions and misunderstandings. In the countries of Central and east Europe, they initially reacted with concern, receiving media descriptions as an effort to shift work for the improvement of the situation in the East to states informing against Moscow's imperial policy for years.
29.11 Massive attack on Kiev and Ukrainian critical infrastructure
The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported that 600,000 people in the Kiev Oblast were deprived of power after an attack on the region's critical infrastructure by drones and ballistic missiles of the Russian Federation. about 36 rockets and 600 unmanneds were launched in targets throughout Ukraine. Ukrainian energy has now become the main mark of the attacks, due to the winter season. Apart from energy installations, housing buildings in Kiev have besides become targets.
