Author: Veronika Barankovych crucial support: Prof. Mirosław Sułek, Ernest Szymala
The Tri-Sea Initiative (3SI), launched in 2015 by Poland and Croatia, is simply a format for cooperation between thirteen European Union countries located between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Sea. Its main nonsubjective is to reduce the long-term improvement gap in Europe by expanding transport, energy and digital infrastructure and strengthening the region's economical integration. The diversification of energy sources and the simplification of vulnerability to Russian influence are besides of peculiar importance, which makes the initiative crucial both for EU policy and for the safety of the east flank.
The Trimorn has no ambition to replace the European Union – on the contrary, it is intended to strengthen its coherence by improving the resilience of the countries of Central and east Europe. In order to measure the real position of the region, it is essential to align its possible with the 2 key actors: Germany, which is the EU's largest economy, and Russia, which remains the primary military threat to the countries of the Trimor and the main force affecting their defence priorities.
The comparison with these 2 countries allows us to capture whether the Trimorum is building its own economical mass, whether it strengthens military capabilities and how its safety profile is shaped against the German and Russian models. Therefore, this analysis uses a quantitative approach based on powerful indicators to compare long-term economical and military trends independently of current political declarations.
Methodology
The methodology presented is rooted in the achievements of the explanation of global relations and geopolitics, with the support of cybernetics and praxeology.
The part model allows to calculate, among others, 2 key types of power of the state applicable for this study:
Economic power is simply a synthetic expression of the collective capacity of a given population in a given time and space. Its value is determined in relation to the global strategy of forces, which makes it comparatively "free". This is due to the fact that economical power reflects the balance of power, shaped in a long historical process, which gives it a feature of advanced inertia. As a result, it is not possible to make a extremist change in the short word (except for the global earthquakes specified as war). For this reason, economical power is 1 of the most nonsubjective indicators that de facto politicians have limited influence over the short term. Thanks to this stableness it is possible to forecast comparatively reliable changes in the global power strategy even in the long run.
Economic power is operated through management results measured by gross home product (GDP), supplemented by demographic (population) and spatial (area).
The military power, which is the second key expression of the power of the state, is closely linked to the economical power which can be considered as its foundation. In another words, military power is simply a militarized form of economical power. It has a dual dimension of militarisation: economic, resulting from the decoupling of military spending from GDP, and demographic, linked to the allocation of part of the population to military service. The military burden may be significant, during peacetime military spending usually amounts to 1% to 10% of GDP, and the participation of military personnel in the population from 0.1% to 1.5%. During times of threat of war, and especially during wartime, these indicators are expanding significantly.
Military power is more subjective than economical power due to the fact that it is straight dependent on political decisions. These decisions, although not arbitrary, are subject to various restrictions, specified as public opinion, alliance commitments or available production capacity.
Because military power is part of economical power, it should be much little than economical power. It is indeed. However, in the analysis we adopted a convention according to which both types of power mention to the world, i.e. that both the world's general power and the world's military power equals 1,000.
In terms of military power, 3 groups of countries can be distinguished. The first are countries with akin economical and military powers. The second is countries that have clearly greater economical power than military power. The 3rd group are countries with much higher military power than economical power – they are heavy militarised countries
Military power includes military-economic factors (military spending as part of GDP), demographic-military (number of active service soldiers) and spatial (area of territory).
Indications:
Pe – economical power; Pm – military power; GDP – gross home product;
L – population; a – territory; WW – military expenditure; S – number of soldiers in active service.
This model is easy to realize and apply, besides for non-specialists. It is based on a essential and adequate number of constant factors in past inherent in the existence and functioning of human groups, including political units. As such, the model's author considered: people operating in a peculiar space and at a certain time, representing certain organizational and production skills or the ability to collective action, i.e. the social processing of matter, energy and information. due to the fact that people act, they have certain results. From the political unit's point of view, GDP (Gross National Product) can be considered a good synthetic result. another possible measures, specified as GNP (Gross National Product), may be considered, but this is not applicable at this phase of consideration. It cannot be excluded that in the future there will be a better indicator, more adapted to measurement the effects of humans. So the variables that we will consider are people, space, time and the results of collective actions.
In addition, we separate 3 types of militarisation: economical militarisation (also called "economic-demographic militarisation"), the militarisation of GDP (also called "production-service militarisation") and demographic militarisation. Militaryization indicators are dimensionless.
The indicators of economical militarisation are the ratio of military power to economical power, or:
It can besides be interpreted as mobilisation rate, as it shows how much of the resources were allocated (mobilised) for military (defensive) purposes and as an indicator Defense preparedness. It is the product of 2 indicators, which is illustrated by the following formula:
After simplification, the pattern will take the form of:
In another words, this is the product of 2 indicators. First indicator (mGDP) expresses the militarisation of GDP, while the second (m)d) — demographic militarisation:
We number militarisation of power in 3 forms: economical militarisation as a share of military power in economical power, militarisation of GDP as a share of military spending in GDP and demographic militarisation as a share of the number of active service soldiers in the general population (with appropriate power exponents – according to the model). In all 3 cases, the rate of militarization of the planet is 1. We treat countries with militarization greater than 1 as powerfully militarized; little than 1, as poorly militarized.). This militarisation is of a comparative nature, as it refers to the militarisation of the planet (world=1).
The statistic utilized in the analysis come from respective sources, the number of which was sought to be kept to the minimum necessary. Data on population, GDP by currency exchange rate and area of territory of the countries come first from the planet Bank (WB) database. Data on the number of soldiers in active service and military spending in US dollars were taken from the "The Military Balance" yearbooks published by the London global Institute for strategical Studies (IISS). The missing data from these sources were supplemented by data from the following sources according to the hierarchy: the global Monetary Fund (IMF), the Stockholm global Institute for Peace investigation (SIPRI) and the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Economic power of Trimorz against Germany and Russia
So let's start with the economical power shown in the graph below, due to the fact that it is the foundation of each of the another dimensions of the state's strength.
Figure 1. economical power of Trimorz, Germany, Russia
Source: own development
After 2016, i.e. since the launch of the Tri-Sea Initiative “The 3 subjects analysed are starting to get closer. Germany, which has dominated the economical region in erstwhile decades, is entering a stabilisation period of just above 25 mM. Their earlier decline, as seen on the illustration before 2016, was due to the demographic downturn, EU convergence processes and the increasing position of the economies of Central and east Europe.
Russia, although in the past utilized the natural material boom of the 2000s, gradually loses part of its economical power in the period after 2016. Another wave of sanctions, limited access to technology, structural stagnation, and rising costs of war are affected. As a result, the Russian Pe descends and enters a level akin to Pe Germany and the Trimorese states. It is worth noting that the economical power of this country is very unstable. After rising in 2022, the decline continued.
However, the trend of the Trimor is the most dynamic. Since the creation of the initiative in 2016, the region's collective economical power has steadily grown. This increase drives both the improvement of the largest economies and the extension of cooperation to another country – Greece – in 2023. As a result, Pe Trimorza, although inactive a fewer years ago importantly lower than Pe Germany and Russia, practically equals them at the end of the period analysed.
Figure 2. State participation in the economical power of the Trimor, year 2024
Source: own development.
The interior structure of the 3 Seas shows that it is not evenly distributed. Poland in 2024 is liable for 28.1% of the economical power of the full Trimorz, so it clearly dominates as the largest economy of the region. The second place is Romania with 13.4%, then Austria (12.5%), Czech Republic (9.8%) and Greece (8.5%). another countries, including the Baltic States, Croatia, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Hungary, form the collective category ‘rest’, representing a full of 27.7% Pe Trimorz. So we are presently dealing with an arrangement in which 1 large economy (Poland) and respective medium-sized economies (Romania, Austria, Czech Republic, Greece) build a hard core of the block, and smaller countries – including the key countries from the NATO front – stick their power to the aggregate mass, utilizing the effect of the scale of the full region.
From the position of balancing Germany and Russia, this means that the Trimorum is not only a loose collection of peripheral economies, but it is becoming a real equivalent of 1 large Western economy with respective strong “assisted engines”. This economical mass can, at least potentially, be transformed into a tough military power, which is depicted on a lower chart.
Military power and regional deterrence structure
Figure 3. Military power of Trimorz, Germany, Russia
Source: own development
Military Power (Pm) after 2016 shows a much stronger differentiation between the analysed entities than the economical power. As we can see from graph 3, Russia enters this period as a state already heavy militarized, and then – despite sanctions, costs of war and hardware losses – further increases its Pm. From 2022 to 2024, a peculiarly violent leap is seen, bringing the Russian military power to levels exceeding 50 mM and approaching 60 mM. This means that Russia not only maintains its military capabilities, but systematically expands them, transforming the economy into a war model.
Germany presents a completely different profile. Their earlier decline in military power – seen in long data series before 2016 – resulted from a policy of consistent simplification of defence spending and safety base on NATO and economical advantage. After Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022 we see a reflection, but it is gradual and moderate. In 2024 Germany's p.m. remains clearly lower than Russian and even allows the Trimorese states to outrun themselves. This confirms that the declared “Zeitenwende” is only beginning to translate into real military capabilities.
The trim, however, has undergone a long and qualitative change since 2016. In the first years of the block's military power initiative has remained at about 17-20 mM, reflecting a reasonably stable, moderately militarized profile of the region. The situation begins to change after Russia's full-scale aggression of 2022, which causes leap growth. The military power of the Trimorz clearly flows out of the erstwhile scope and grows to about 30 mM between 2022 and 2024. This means that the block as a full is militarily ahead of Germany, and the dynamics of growth makes it 1 of the most actively expanding military capabilities of the regions of Europe.
From the point of view of balancing possible in the region, there are respective key conclusions. Firstly, the Trimor is incapable to get close to the Russian level of Pm, which is increasing at a rate imposed by the war economy and the mobilisation of resources. Secondly, the difference between Germany and the Trimorese is steadily decreasing – and after 2022 it is the Trimorese States that increase their power faster and more consistently than Berlin. This means moving the military burden of the NATO east flank towards the countries of the region.
As a result, the military forces in Europe are clearly changing after 2016: Russia remains militaryly dominant, Germany is slow restoring its potential, while the Trimorum, as a collective block, is starting to service as a key, increasingly militarised pillar of European security.
Figure 4. State participation in the military power of the Trimorz, year 2024
Source: own development.
The structure of the p.m. Trimor is even more concentrated than the structure of the Pe. Poland is liable for 33.6% of the military power of the full block, so more than 1 3rd of the Pm. Romania contributed 13.1%, Greece – 12.6%, Czech Republic – 7.6%, Hungary – 7.3%, and the another countries – 25.8%. While Poland is the largest in the economy, but 1 of respective pillars, its dominance is clearer in the military sphere. Poland, Romania and Greece together make almost 60% of the military power of the Trimorz. In practice, this means that in the crisis scenario, the burden of regional deterrence and defence rests primarily with these 3 countries, while the rest, including the Baltic States, play mainly a complementary, albeit strategically critical geographically.
In the case of the Czech Republic, this is mostly due to the geographical situation – a country without external borders of the EU and protected by mountains does not experience the level of safety force as front states do. Hungary maintains a comparatively lower level of military investment mainly for political reasons: Viktor Orbán's policy, based on the balance between the West and Russia, results in a limited rate of defensive modernisation.
In contrast, Poland, Romania and Greece belong to a group of countries which are importantly more leveraged by the increasing economical possible for developing military capabilities. It is these countries that drive the growth of Trimorze p.m. after 2016, and especially after the Russian aggression of 2022.
Militaryisation of GDP as a measurement of defence effort
Figure 5. Billitisation of GDP of the Trimorz, Germany, Russia (World=1)
Source: own development
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the GDP militarisation rate from 1992 to 2024 for the 3 entities analysed: the countries of Trimorze, Germany and the Russian Federation. This indicator illustrates the ratio of defence spending to GDP and allows to measure the comparative burden on the defence economy.
Over the period considered, Russia has maintained the highest level of militarisation of GDP among the 3 analysed entities, with a sharp increase following 2022 due to the transition of the economy to the mode of military mobilisation. The Tri-Sea States are characterised by an intermediate level, clearly higher than in Germany, but consistently lower than in Russia.
After 2016, the Trimorz has seen a gradual increase in the GDP militarisation rate, which is further accelerated after 2022 and reaches the highest level in the full time series for the region in 2024. This indicates a sustained increase in the importance of defence spending in the GDP structure of the countries of the region.
Germany, on the another hand, has shown the lowest level of militarisation of GDP for almost the full period of analysis.
Summary
From a strategical perspective, there are 3 conclusions. Firstly, in the economical dimension of the Trimor as a block, it has already reached a mass comparable to Germany and Russia. This means that there is no sense in discussing the region's "peripherism". Secondly, in the military dimension of the Trimor is inactive incapable to match Russia on its own, but thanks to the surge in p.m. after 2014 and 2022 it begins to balance Germany and as part of NATO it becomes a key pillar of the Central-Eastern flank. Poland, Romania and Greece play the function of the main providers of hard force, while the Czech Republic, Hungary and any another countries keep a more cautious defence investment profile, both due to geographical conditions and political decisions.
Thirdly, the advanced and expanding militarisation of GDP in the Trimorz shows political readiness to bear safety costs. In conjunction with the increasing Pe, this means that the region is increasingly resistant to hybrid pressure: it has the resources to invest in anti-aircraft defense, cyber capabilities, the expansion of the arms industry, including drone and ammunition production, and dual-use infrastructure. In practice, the Trimor will not replace NATO, but it becomes its interior "hard core" on the east and confederate flanks.
To answer the question whether the Trimor as a block has the ability to balance Russia and/or Germany, 2 levels request to be separated. In the economy, yes, the region is already balancing both countries, and due to the dynamics of growth it can surpass them in the following decades. In the military sphere, he alone is incapable to match Russia, but thanks to his superiority in the militarisation of GDP, concentration of military power in Poland, Romania and Greece, and support of the US and Western allies, he can effectively restrict Russian freedom of action on the east flank of NATO. In relation to Germany, the Trimor becomes not so much a competitor as a complementary partner: Germany has 1 of the strongest industrial bases in Europe, while the Trimorese region has a higher readiness to bear defence costs. Combining these resources within the Common European Armoured manufacture could enable the Trimorze to decision from the function of a peripheral safety facility to the position of co-founder of a fresh safety architecture in Europe.
