This year it is 50 years since the authoritative relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC, China) and the European Communities and the European Union (EU) after 1992. However, there were no fireworks, nor was there a bigger celebrity. Yes, the Chinese side tried to organize something in September, but a fresh image of the leader, or alternatively the sole ruler of China, Xi Jinping, surrounded by Vladimir Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, was not the best invitation for Europeans. Many, including the undersigned, have resigned from their journey to Beijing for anniversary events. This proves that we now have problems in our relationship, which will not vanish quickly.
A half-century EU-China relation is now more a reason for reflection than a celebration – a symbolic minute erstwhile the erstwhile dialog gives way to distance and distrust on both sides.
Trade and dense networks
After the dissolution of the USSR and China's entry into globalisation after 1992, with the beginning of the immense marketplace there, the EU and the PRC built a dense network of bilateral relations. Since 1998 – with tiny breaks – are organized, alternately, by one, the another side, yearly summits. The number of alleged sectoral dialogues reached 60, which meant that contacts were maintained in practically all the most crucial issues that connected us, and even in those that shared – for example human rights.
Relations, mainly commercial and business, but besides personal, became even closer after China (at the end of the last decade of the past century) turned into a planet production tape. Like yeast, fresh supply chains were born, starting in China.
In our bilateral relations, however, there has been a chronic problem rather rapidly – a persistently high, negative balance in trade with China, both across the EU and its associate States. For the full Union, in 2024 it amounted to EUR 305.8 billion with a full turnover of EUR 732 (785 per Chinese side) billion, by 1.6% little than in the erstwhile year. However, in relations with Poland the deficit reached EUR 45.6 billion with a turnover of EUR 49.2 billion, which means a immense imbalance. Meanwhile, according to CSO data, in the first half of this year our imports from China increased by 13,5%. We are so heavy dependent on China, both as the EU and as individual associate States. It is besides worth remembering that China is the second partner of the Union, after the US. Which is crucial and meaningful.
Despite expanding signals that we are besides heavy dependent on China in trade, comprehensive cooperation continued to make and common contacts strengthened. This was besides evidenced by strategical papers on the deepening of ties. On the EU side it was adopted in 2013 a paper The EU-China 2020 strategical Agenda for Cooperationcalling for the improvement of cooperation in all areas – for "peace, prosperity, sustainable improvement and individual exchange". In this document, China negotiated a "territorial integration" (read: Taiwan issues), in return supporting the improvement of integration on our continent.
The economical interdependence between the EU and China for decades has been a driving force for globalisation, but it is becoming increasingly a trap today. The increasing dependence on Chinese imports shows how hard it is for Europe to separate trade interests from strategical ones.
The European strategy emerged at a time erstwhile China proposed 2 further cooperation initiatives for Europe. In April 2012, the then Prime Minister Wen Jiabao proposed in Warsaw a 16+1 formula, akin to that applied to the countries of the global South, covering 16 post-communist states of our region (17 with Greece). In the autumn of 2013, fresh leader Xi Jinping proposed – in 2 separate speeches – a task called in Chinese Yidai, yiluwho yet accepted the name Belt and way Initiatives (Belt and Road Initiative – BRI).
Strategic rivalry alternatively of commitment
Both of these bold projects offered European partners major infrastructure investments (bridges, tunnels, highways, ports, etc.), loans and financial assistance, and even full credit lines. This reflected the fact that China had become an exporter of not only goods but besides capital since 2015. However, Chinese companies active in the implementation of these projects rapidly showed that they have 2 main objectives: to gain the top possible control over investments and to take as much European as possible know-how and fresh technologies (in Germany, the acquisition of KUKA, a company specialising in industrial robots, was a prominent example).
At a time erstwhile it seemed that, despite the informing signals, everything was going well, especially for China, the obstacles that grew over time began to appear. The first of them was the outbreak of armed action in Donbasa in the summertime of 2014, which China did not condemn by taking Russia's side. In response, respective countries covered by the 16+1 format – from Baltic countries to Poland to Romania – began to approach China more from a safety policy position than purely business calculations. Others, specified as Hungary and Serbia, continued to focus on strengthening economical cooperation with the PRC.
In this way, European unity in the approach to China has broken down – this state continues to this day. Following the withdrawal of the Baltic States from the 16+1 formula, we are dealing with its gradual disappearance, even hibernation. In addition, any countries in the region, specified as Lithuania or even the Czech Republic, began to focus more on Taiwan than on the PRC. Meanwhile, China is effectively exploiting this deficiency of unity on our side, frequently acting according to the rule of "share and rule".
The geostrategic proposals of the BRI "awakened" yet the United States, which in the first word of Donald Trump, at the turn of 2017/2018, changed its strategy towards China, replacing the earlier commitment to "strategic competition", since then steadily increasing. In March 2018, the U.S. added to this a trade and customs war that was never cancelled, and was further reinforced in 2025.
China with its investment partner has become a systemic rival for Europe – able to tempt investments at the same time and undermine Western unity. alternatively of mutually beneficial cooperation, present we have a game of interest in which Beijing is increasingly exploiting European divisions.
At this time, the EU, and above all the most active in the Chinese market, reacted more slowly. However, in the next March 2019 programming document, the European Commission defined China successively as: a cooperation and negotiation partner, but also, for the first time, a "competition" or even a "system rival". akin logic was adopted in the German strategy for China published in the summertime of 2023 (the EU and Poland, unfortunately, do not have specified a strategy to date).
Power position dialogue
The situation in our relations became even more complicated after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and after the Chinese-Russian Communication of February 4, 2022, which outlined the imagination of a new, multipolar planet order – and especially after the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Since then, both sides have been on other sides of the barricade: China to Russia and the EU to Ukraine (although not without divisions).
By the time of these 2 turning points, China stressed that the EU had been their main trading partner for 15 consecutive years, from 2004 to 2019 (latest place was taken by ASEAN countries) and at the same time exposed the function of the Union as an crucial partner "in building planet peace". However, after 2020, and especially after 2022, they changed the line and approach to the EU, recognising that "systemic competition could be sustainable" due to the fact that "the perception of each another has changed". Chinese authoritative papers admit that there has besides been a "strategic rivalry" in relations with the EU, not only with the US, whose main reasons are seen in the "Ukrainian crisis" (without the usage of the word "war") and in the expanding tensions between China and the United States.
Meanwhile, the inventory of disputed points and problems in EU-China relations is rich and is constantly increasing. The most crucial are:
- Taiwan problem (requires separate analysis),
- a different approach to Russia and conflict in Ukraine,
- adopted under force from outgoing Chancellor Angela Merkel Investment protection agreement (Comprehensive Agreement on Investment – CAI), set aside in the European Parliament to suck,
- growing misunderstandings in the field of advanced technology (including higher customs duties on Chinese electrical cars, adopted inadvertently in June 2024),
- anti-dumping and reciprocal duties (EU on Chinese steel, China on European pork, as well as the problem of semiconductors, which Dutch Nexperia is simply a clear example),
- Permanently on the agenda of the EU human rights issue.
Dialogue between the EU and China is increasingly taking place from strength alternatively than in a partnership atmosphere. The pandemic, the Ukraine War and the US-China Trade War have made Europe aware that Beijing is no longer just an economical competitor but a global player willing to usage technological and natural material advantages as tools for political pressure.
A completely fresh dynamics in EU-China relations has brought the second word of president Donald Trump in the US. The additional duties imposed by him made China behave as a power for the first time, utilizing its carefully built monopolistic position in the field of uncommon earth metals. On 4 April, 2 days after Trump introduced fresh customs duties, Beijing halted exports of 7 out of 17 uncommon earth elements, and on 9 October added another 5 to this list. At the same time, it was announced that from 1 December 2025 a strategy of licensing exports of all these elements would be introduced if they came from China (65 percent of planet production) or were refined there (more than 90%). Meanwhile, modern F-35 aircraft request up to half a ton of specified elements, and modern corvettes and ships – even a fewer tons. These elements are besides essential in the production of smartphones and laptops, common in everyday use.
At the time of writing these words, the substance remains valid, and the opinions that “China has utilized the atomic option” do not seem to be exaggerated. Although this step is formally aimed at in the US, its effects hit the aviation sector, fresh technologies and the arms manufacture – including the EU and NATO. As a result, we are dealing with a Chinese blow across the West, not just in the United States. Therefore, the strategical rivalry between China and the EU in fresh years will increase alternatively than weaken.
Europe needs to learn to talk to China from a subject alternatively than a dependent position. A common technological policy, a coherent strategy towards Beijing and the simplification of excessive economical dependence are now a prerequisite for safety – not only economical but besides strategic.
Our Challenges
- It can be expected that the approach to uncommon earth metals will further polarise Western countries and EU members towards China. Meanwhile, the Common Technology Policy should become the overarching nonsubjective on our side.
- China sees the weakness of the Union and can exploit it. The best example was to decision the last bilateral summit from Brussels to Beijing, as Xi Jinping did not want to come to Europe. According to its tradition, Beijing prefers to cultivate relations with individual associate States alternatively than with the Union as a whole, playing for our polarity and fragmentation. The antidote could be a common EU strategy for China, but in the current situation it is hard to expect.
- At the same time, the Beijing authorities proceed to call for dialogue, consultation and avoiding confrontation, encouraging "avoidance of misconceptions and prejudices". At the same time, however, they effort to separate the EU (Europe) from the US – its main rival. However, as China will not give us security, we should not engage in specified a game, although dialog itself should be maintained.
- At this stage, Germany cannot afford to lose a very intractive Chinese market, and Poland has a powerfully related economy. It is so crucial to follow closely what decisions Germany and to any degree France and the United Kingdom will take in relations with China. Hungary, Greece, and late even Spain have clearly advocated maintaining close ties with China.
- In our relation there will be no Business as user as long as there is simply a war in Ukraine. It is besides crucial to observe how China will want to invest in Ukraine after the war – due to the fact that already they openly send specified signals.
- Poland, with the current level of trade and dependence on Chinese goods (and more frequently technologically), cannot afford, like Germany, to rapidly break these relations. However, we request to gradually decision distant from excessive commodity dependence on China and change the structure of our trade (they – technologies, we – natural materials, specified as copper, agri-food products or late – products and services from the gaming sector).
- Today, China needs to be treated completely differently – like the large power, with all the consequences, not so far: as a large supplier of goods and an intact market. In contact with them we should not only keep Małaszewicze, but – as experience teaches – do not stay passive montility for the massively incoming products. Without specified fresh activities we will inactive be in a losing position.
