The global Defence manufacture Exhibition is starting next day in Kielce. On this occasion, in the editorial board “Polish Armed Forces” we talk to Damian Ratka and Łukasz Wyszynski about the priorities of modernization of the Polish Army and about the request to strengthen the national defence industry.
Investments in defence were very limited after 1989, which was affected by both the economical situation of the country and the long-standing conviction, which is besides present in another European countries, that there is no hazard of open armed conflict in our region. This conviction fell along with Russia's large-scale aggression on Ukraine. In consequence to the increased threat, Poland accelerated the method modernization of the armed forces. What were her priorities?
Damian Ratka: Since the systemic transformation, we have neglected defence, and the unresolved problems of modernization have been established. For almost 3 decades only single large acquisition programs were launched, including F-16 aircraft or wheeled armored transporters. Thus, at the outbreak of the war in the east in 2022, almost everything was a precedence in the context of method modernisation.
However, the most to be done was in the ground troops as the largest kind of armed force. What are their most crucial hardware needs?
Damian Ratka: surely the most felt is the deficiency of modern combat infantry cars. The precedence is so to replace BWP-1 with badgers and, in the long term, to introduce heavier vehicles into service.
Let us remind – that something needs to be done about BWP-1, was discussed in the 1990s.
Damian Ratka: I believe that a mistake was made somewhere during the creation of modernisation plans. Well, Huta Stalowa Wola and the American company Delco proposed to upgrade BWP-1 by replacing the tower system. The military was offered a modern tower at the time, which was mounted on the British BWP Warriors bought by Kuwait or the LAV-25 wheeled U.S. Marines. Importantly, after this exchange, BWP-1 could inactive swim and transport an eight-man landing. It wasn't done due to the fact that it was a manned tower, and individual insisted on unmanned. The cost of specified modernization proved to be very advanced compared to the results achieved, and the program collapsed.
Of course, BWP-1 has outdated, inefficient weapons, but our military likes its tiny dimensions, which let it to easy hide, and its mobility.
Damian Ratka: Indeed, the field courage has a very good, but its dimensions are a problem today, due to the fact that BWP-1 was not designed to transport soldiers with equipment presently utilized by them, specified as bulletproof vests. There's no area for equipment. The problem is the door to the landing compartment alternatively of the ramp. So today's precedence is Badger.
There's a gap in the BWP, buying it. American Abrams M1A1 and M1A2 and South Korean K2 We solved the problem of retrofitting the tank park. Korean car we want to produce under licence in Poland. However, there has been a charge of multiplying types of tanks in the army, which complicates logistics and training. Did breaking orders make sense?
Damian Ratka: The plan was to reduce the number of types of tanks to two, meaning only Abrams and K2. It is known that constructions from the Warsaw Pact will vanish from the army. Besides, most T-72 and part of PT-91 have already passed on to Ukraine, where in time the another cars of these types will besides hit. The leopards were to be preserved until the K2 number was increased.
Nevertheless, it is criticised to keep 2 types of tanks due to training and logistics costs. Critics mention western European NATO members who have 1 kind of wagons. I am not certain that this example is correct, due to the fact that it is about countries that have led to the unification of armored equipment through drastic reductions. As a result, they kept in line within 150–300 tanks only the latest type.
Damian Ratka: In Poland, the decision on 2 types of tanks stems from the unwritten doctrine of their use. Our military decided that we request dense and average tanks, although specified a formal classification does not be present and both Abrams and K2 are basic tanks. Personally, I think we should buy any Abrams. This heavier kind of tank with greater survival, but requiring more logistical support, should be equipped with 2 divisions called the armored ones. K2 should go to the mechanized division.
In the case of the K2 order, the key presumption was to start production in Poland. Should we proceed this program?
Damian Ratka: I think that if we have already decided on the K2 tank, we should proceed this program, due to the fact that stopping it and starting everything over means delaying modernization. Unless we go back to the Americans and take more Abrams – they resume the production of these tanks, so their availability will grow.
What about leopards 2, any of which are modernized? It costs billions.
Damian Ratka: The Leopardy 2A4 had to be upgraded, not only due to the fact that they are obsolete tanks, but besides due to the fact that the issue of limited spare parts availability has come to pass. In the long term, erstwhile fresh tanks are growing, they will be decommissioned from active operation and likely to enter the reserve, or possibly sold. Nevertheless, the leopards will stay in the Polish land troops for at least a decade or longer, so their modernisation is justified.
The already mentioned slowdown in the BWP modernisation programme gained artillery. It was decided to introduce to the Polish Army a self-propelled drum in the Natov standard, or 155-millimeter. utilizing abroad licenses, developed Crabwho entered production. Is it so justified to acquisition in the Republic of Korea very akin to it self-propelled barrel K9?
Damian Ratka: possibly the acquisition of K9, as planned, or over 600 copies, was besides large. However, erstwhile orders of crabs were besides tiny for Huta Stalowa Wola to be able to afford to increase production capacity. Therefore, it would not be possible to rapidly increase supplies to fill the gaps in the arsenal after troops transferred to Ukraine. Another issue is possible cooperation with South Korea, due to the fact that K9 and Krab are very similar, utilizing different variants of the same chassis. possibly we request to think about developing a fresh tower strategy together.
But there was no controversy erstwhile purchasing rocket launchers in both the US and South Korea. Acquired HIMARS systems and K239 Chunmoo are similar, but not identical.
Damian Ratka: The South Korean launcher is based on an American project. From what I can tell, the mechanical interface to the transport-start containers is the same as in the original. The problem is just software. However, the interests of the producers of both systems make it hard to agree on compatibility. Both launchers have their advantages. K239 are equivalent to the M270 MLRS caterpillar and can carry more missiles than HIMARS. This 1 is more mobile. Americans are besides developing fresh PrSM missiles with a much larger range, up to 1000 km, and possibly even more. If we bought them, that would be the value added to the rocket artillery.
In addition to dense weapons, an crucial area of modernization of land troops is the equipment of individual soldiers. fresh helmets and bulletproof vests have been purchased for years, which has been affected by experience with abroad missions, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, where we had to carry out combat activities. However, these purchases were limited and fresh equipment was received by selected units. What fresh equipment should be introduced as shortly as possible?
Damian Ratka: Needs for fresh individual equipment are not limited to helmets, bulletproof vests or uniforms. There is besides a large request for weapons sights, and I am not talking about advanced electrooptics, but a good optical sight, which is irreplaceable erstwhile it comes to the customs focus of fire. It besides allows the soldier to identify the target.
So far, the focus has been on alleged military-wide protection measures. And the military lacks peculiar models for vehicle crews. What should individual protection look like?
Damian Ratka: erstwhile it comes to protecting the crews of combat vehicles, we request to have an approach like another modern armies, specified as American or Israeli. In these, each crew associate has a helmet with a ballistic core, not a soft helmet. A vest is needed in a variant adapted to the needs of the crew of the combat car, and it cannot only be soft ballistics, hard inserts are needed, due to the fact that you request to defend the delicate parts of the body from shrapnels that can appear inside the combat car in case the armor breaks. The crew may besides be forced to evacuate the vehicle and then request individual protection.
Our tankers got fresh suits from hard-wired material, but in olive color, distinguishing them from the remainder of the soldiers, so after leaving the vehicle they can automatically become targets. Many another armies usage camouflage suits. Shouldn't we follow in their footsteps?
Damian Ratka: possibly printing on utilized masking material the same as on uniforms would consequence in an amazing increase in costs and that is why it was abandoned. If not, the soldiers themselves must measure whether they request camouflage suits. Finishing the subject of individual protection for crews, there is besides a request for fire resistant ski masks and gloves and goggles that defend the eyes, and not only outside, from dust while driving. As far as all soldiers are concerned, it is crucial to defend your hearing, due to the fact that this 1 can harm even shooting from a simple automatic carbine. That's why the U.S. Army is slow moving towards each weapon having a sound suppressor, and possibly we should start reasoning about that too.
Now let's decision on to the Navy, which was our pride erstwhile we entered NATO, due to the fact that she was the first to cooperate with fresh allies. What is her current role?
Łukasz Wyszyński: The Navy is part of the Armed Forces of Poland and a tool for shaping state policy. In the past Poland took part in the Warsaw Pact, which led to quite a few activities in the land direction alternatively than in the sea. Now we are part of the North Atlantic Alliance, which is the largest organization of maritime states, which gain their wealth and gross home product or global position primarily by controlling and stabilising maritime areas. This includes the United States, Britain, France, Spain, Italy and many others.
Meanwhile, Poland is simply a land country with access to the sea.
Łukasz Wyszyński: Yes, but never in Poland's past our economy, GDP was so dependent on exports, imports of goods by sea, passing through Polish and European ports.
After joining NATO Finland and Sweden, there was an opinion that the Baltic had become the interior sea of the Alliance and that costly investments in the Navy were unnecessary. Did military threats truly vanish here?
Łukasz Wyszyński: On the basis of the analysis of the published strategical papers of the Russian Federation, I can see that it has changed the classification of the military importance of the Baltic Sea to a lower one, but does not want to leave NATO exclusive in any way. Economically, militarily and politically, the Baltic is needed by Russia. The conditions and possibilities for its impact in the region have changed. We will so most likely face political destabilisation, actions below the war threshold, threats to critical infrastructure and maritime transport. The Baltic is 1 of the most heavy utilized communication routes in this part of the world, and this gives the Russians a very large field to negatively affect Western countries by raising safety costs. Therefore, the Polish Navy is to be primarily ready to operate in the Baltic Sea, due to the fact that this is our region of responsibility, which is due to our interests, allied obligations and global law. In this area, the Navy must guarantee safety at sea and more widely in the region, working with another types of armed forces and services of the Polish Republic. We must besides be ready and have the appropriate capacity to interact with the allies in the Baltic Sea region and in a broader position on waters outside the Baltic Sea, which are crucial for the security, improvement and global position of Poland and our allies.
How does Poland's membership of NATO, but besides in the European Union, affect the tasks of the Navy?
Łukasz Wyszyński: surely the area of our strategical interest has grown and, consequently, besides our actions. In the past, we have focused mainly on the Baltic Sea, and now, together with our allies, we must be able to stabilise the situation in the Mediterranean, the North Atlantic, the Horn of Africa or around the North Pole. It may happen that our ships within the wider NATO teams or in any another alliance will should be present in those parts of the planet that are liable for energy and commercial safety not only of Poland, but besides of the European Union as a whole. In order to carry out specified tasks, we must have the essential capabilities that modern ships, aviation and logistics can provide. I mean, like, frigates ordered in the “Meaner” programme, to any degree min destroyers in Cormoran II, as well as essential logistics, rescue and submarines.
When the first requirements for the Sword were set, there was a fierce discussion as to how much it would only be an anti-aircraft frigate, or to arm it with rocket systems capable of damaging ground targets.
Łukasz Wyszyński: Frigates are universal units. For many marine forces, mostly those without destroyers, are called working horses. Their buoyancy, and hence the capacity of the hull, allows to place many sensors and effectors on them, which, depending on the configuration, let to accomplish the desired capabilities. As a general rule, frigates, including ours in the program "The Sword", should have systems to monitor the airspace and defend the ship or a wider fleet of ships from air raids, including aircraft and maneuvering or ballistic missiles. In this sense, it is simply a mobile anti-aircraft strategy which provides protection from the sea not only to the marine forces, but besides to land infrastructure. Moreover, specified vessels, peculiarly in the Baltic Sea and in the area of operation of NATO's maritime forces, must be capable of detecting and possibly destroying submarines. The capabilities of the ZOP are reinforced by interacting, for example, with marine aviation and submarines. Further capabilities to be held by the frigate "Wicher" and subsequent ships in the programme "Meter" are the anticipation of destroying the opponent's water units. Additionally, there are universal artillery weapons and a large scope of sensors to observe airspace, sea and underwater. Today's ships are modular. They can be specified to any degree within a single series of ordered ships. More importantly, this besides allows for modernisation over time, which will further respond to the needs of the future battlefield and the tasks performed during peacetime. Let me stress again – frigates are universal units. And this makes them a very useful tool in the navy and more widely in the full armed forces. Their equipment with universal launchers and the susceptibility to modifications does not close the way for the improvement of the expected capabilities to a greater degree than is presently the case.
You mentioned your ability to fight submarines. Why is it necessary?
Łukasz Wyszyński: The Russian Navy cannot be compared to NATO's naval forces erstwhile it comes to water forces and aviation, but the Russians have always had a strong submarine fleet, which, in addition to the strategical dimension, means the ability to carry atomic weapons, was to destruct NATO aircraft teams and interrupt supply by sea. Even after the dissolution of the russian Union, submarine construction programs continued. Therefore, not only should our frigates be adapted to combat specified units, but we must besides have submarines capable of specified actions.
The “Orca” programme is bowed down, which is as if stuck on a shallow surface. Is the reason for the postponement of the decision to order submarines essential to acquisition them abroad, which means, among others, the costs of this program are high?
Łukasz Wyszyński: This may be 1 of the reasons, due to the fact that we know that we do not have the ability to build them ourselves. The costs of obtaining units, training crews, then utilizing in the long word prove to be actually high. However, all purchases for the Navy are spectacular and individually very expensive. That's how it is all over the world. This financial force makes signing a contract for her always affect many calculations, which is why decisions on the modernisation of land or air forces are faster. They can be implemented in any areas by lots. It is besides crucial to realize what the submarine is present as a component of the naval and Polish armed forces in the full northern direction. It is not only utilized during war. It operates in the sea primarily during a time of peace or crisis, leading, among another things, to the recognition of areas crucial to us and allies. Moreover, the specified possession and usage of submarines must be taken into account and calculated before taking any action. The submarine performs key missions before any action exceeds the open conflict threshold. We can even talk about their deterrent function, especially if they are to be an additional component of the strategy allowing land strikes into the territory of a possible aggressor.
The frigates or submarines request support from auxiliary units that can be built in the country, as confirmed by the deliveries of fresh tugboats. What are the units we request most?
Łukasz Wyszyński: The list is comparatively long. Next to the already built radioelectronic designation units We will request a ship that protects the operation of the maritime forces from the logistics side, which is besides utilized to transport troops, coordinate the activities of the marine forces and secure, for example, humanitarian missions. The acquisition of fresh hydrographic vessels, tanker, rescue ship and demagnetisation station is besides needed. The Polish maritime manufacture is able to cope with the supply of these units. If necessary, part of the technology can be acquired from partners or created in global cooperation. A fresh training ship would besides be useful in the long term. We must remember that the Navy is not just ships. We're expanding. coastal earth-water rocket systems. We request to make aviation. Two Saab 340 AEW&C early informing aircraft and four fresh AW101 helicopters They're optimistic. However, the needs are greater. In order to accomplish the required capabilities and to be able to implement them effectively, you gotta think about mark reconnaissance aircraft, more helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft, and the ZOPs, rescue helicopters and those operating from ship decks. We must not forget the modernization, but besides the improvement of logistics facilities for the Polish Navy, which is crucial not only during the threat of conflict, but besides during peace and in cooperation with allies.
Numerous modernization programs are besides implemented in the air force. We're waiting for the first. Multipurpose aircraft F-35 and others FA-50 light combat machines. Since in the foreseeable future we will not be able to produce combat aircraft on our own, should we not join a multinational program? Even the rich of us join forces, due to the fact that to make another generation of combat aircraft, we request to lay out monstrous money.
Damian Ratka"I would point out here how specified a multi-national programme is constructed, due to the fact that I announcement 1 correctity – the European joint venture programs either ended in a spectacular flop, or 1 or respective countries exited the task and followed their own path. A large example is the plan of the Eurofighter fighter aircraft, in which the French were initially involved, but they resigned and developed Rafale themselves, which sells better than Eurofighter. On the another hand, we besides have joint venture programmes, where there is simply a leading state, which has a decisive impact on the task and others only contribute financially. That's the F-35 program.
Łukasz Wyszyński: There are many challenges. We are talking about the full process of implementing the F-35 into the air force and the wider armed forces, expanding the number of platforms available, in the long word most likely the next generation aircraft. It is besides crucial to modernise and make the logistics facilities essential to operate these types of aircraft. We besides request flying tankers that would completely alter the capabilities of our combat machines. Air reconnaissance aircraft connected to command centres are important. All these increasingly advanced platforms have this value, that they supply an advantage over the armies of the older technologically and with no possible for cross-cutting capacity multiplication. I think it is besides very crucial that these systems, which we frequently buy from different directions, are interoperable. For example, whether acquired weapons can be integrated into different types of machines.
As strategical partners in the accelerated modernisation of the armed forces, we have chosen the United States and the Republic of Korea, which has provoked criticism in any European countries. Is the allegation that we have turned distant from Europe correct?
Damian Ratka: Politics has an impact on the choice of partners, of course, but in Poland's situation it was crucial that the Americans and Koreans offered faster transportation dates of contracted weapons. specified opportunities were not available to the European defence industry, whose capacity was politically reduced after the Cold War. In Europe, a small more opportunities for the production of certain arms categories have been maintained by France, which is heavy export-oriented, especially in non-European markets.
The Americans and the Koreans had yet another asset for fast execution of orders – they could offer to transfer ready-made equipment from their warehouses, while in Europe they were reduced to virtually zero the reserve of equipment, ammunition and equipment that could be restored to service if needed. This problem was illustrated in organising military support for Ukraine erstwhile it was found that even older types of weapons were not available. This 1 survived mostly due to the fact that it had its own supplies of russian weapons. Russia besides has its resources. Of course, you can make jokes about sending a T-55 to the front, but an old tank is better than none. Therefore, the Americans do not violate their strategical stocks. And we in Europe should besides rebuild the reserves. For now Poland needs to focus on equipping fresh equipment of military units. But you gotta start reasoning about more buying to have reserves and supplies. It's a strategical necessity. due to the fact that erstwhile war breaks out in the country, then production on the place is impossible. That's why strategical partners are so crucial that they can supply a supply of equipment known to our soldiers who can operate and repair.
It is known that method modernisation of the armed forces is simply a process without end. We are presently focusing on the introduction of weapons systems that are tested in combat, but in what direction should we go in preparation for the long-term improvement plans of the armed forces? Undisputable investments in network-centricity, unmanned systems for action in different domains, the expanding usage of artificial intelligence. What else should we take into account to keep the modernity of our armed forces at a advanced level, and what impact can global safety developments have on this?
Łukasz Wyszyński: These areas are undoubtedly important. They're expected to give us an advantage on a network-centric and multi-domain battlefield. However, while reasoning about the challenges of the future, I would like to draw attention to another element. I mean, people. And there are 2 challenges in this field. The first is social changes in individual countries, which depend, inter alia, on cultural patterns, access to information and the education system. So we request to think about the education system, which will let us to build, on the 1 hand, a society conscious of global conditions and able to prosecute Polish interests in the global system. On the another hand, capable of critically moving in the information space, which has become a fresh domain of combat. Only then can we hope that this society will be prepared for the problems of the future and will take collective action in the face of danger. Another challenge is the strategy of training, command and support in the armed forces. It is up to training and the right attitudes and creativity of those serving at different levels of command that depends on the degree to which we will be determined to act and effective in the face of future threats. We must so constantly improve and make the strategy of training soldiers and improving their competence.
Damian Ratka: In the longer term, we should invest – first in cooperation with others and then, if possible, in vehicle drive units. The investments in combat vehicles themselves are besides very important, due to the fact that in any time we should have national primary tanks, combat infantry cars, armored transporters and specialised vehicles based on them. Worldwide, large amounts of money are spent in strategically crucial countries for the improvement of armoured weapons, hybrid propulsion, armor, active defence and weapons systems. And we should be investing in the improvement of weapons, both infantry and vehicles. specified investments should besides include the improvement of ammunition and its ability to produce ammunition.
The debate was conducted by Krzysztof Wilewski and Tadeusz Wróbel
