An endless debate on the large and frightening scale of victims is obvious. However, from the clear supporters of the armed act, which was taken on August 1944, as well as his inferno opponents, we have the right to anticipate cognition on even an simple level. And besides a small sense of logic and at least a small decency.
The Warsaw Uprising is simply a very complex subject, to be assessed – not so easy. And possibly that is why so many give evidence that the subject is intellectually and morally beyond them. Stanislaw Tyszka, for example, made his assessment worse than the simple, highly trivial and simply stupid, proved that for the individual his format – this is simply a subject far besides complicated. As you can see, you can finish respective courses of study, work at a university, sit in the Presidium of the Sejm and Europarlamenta and at least have nothing to say about any subjects – virtually nothing. And yet, to “pull to the aphis” along with his baboon composed exclusively of wicked androns.
In the 1970s, erstwhile the scariest wounds after bleeding Warsaw did not yet heal (despite colossal investments and the influx of hundreds of thousands of capitals was far from pre-war population size) and Poles had 3 decades of hurricane criticism of the Uprising – prof. Henryk Zieliński conducted an interesting experiment. The value of this experimentation was besides significant, that it took place at the Institute of past of the University of Wrocław in times erstwhile historical studies meant absorbing cognition in quality and sizes much better than today. To the 4th year students prof. Zieliński (the last associate of the PZPR, the alleged "honest party", far from the uncritical affirmation of the armed conflict of the AK in 1944) handed out cards with 1 question. "You are General Tadeusz “Borem” Komorowski. It is the end of July 1944. Do you announce “W Hour”? The people to whom he asked this question knew well all “for and against”. They knew very well all the contexts and circumstances and, of course, the effects of the decision taken by “Bora”. Everyone, frequently very many times, had studied the subject thoroughly before, discussed it, frequently – had long-term disputes. In a group of tens who knew the subject well, there were about as many women and men. Test result: In addition to 1 girl (who belongs to Jehovah’s Witnesses), everyone replied: YES.
What causes could it be that those who were most aware of the result of the Warsaw Uprising considered it right? No uncertainty this view was the consequence of an answer to a question that anyone capable of reasoning had to ask themselves. The question of the consequences of not giving orders to start a fight in Warsaw in August 1944. And the answer to that question is that the deficiency of an order to start the uprising would not have prevented catastrophic effects anyway. 1 can only argue about which disaster would be greater – whether the 1 that actually happened or the 1 that would end with the failure of the "W hour" order. I propose a brief description of respective options for the course of events. 1 would gotta realize itself.
First – the uprising does not explode, so Germany decides to usage Warsaw as a fortress stopping or slowing the Red Army march. This is highly likely, that in the last days of July Germany demanded men surviving in Warsaw to appear for large construction works. What else could they have been after, not digging trenches, anti-tank ditches, building dams and bunkers? The Germans took a akin maneuver in many cities. For Belarusian Minsk this ended with losses comparable to Warsaw in people and not little in urban tissue. As fortresses Germans besides utilized cities from the 3rd Reich area and primarily inhabited by Germans. For everyone – this ended in a disaster, dividing the destiny of Warsaw. In late 1944, Wrocław, whose population was filled with prisoners and refugees, had more than 1 million inhabitants. The fight in it caused the death of at least eighty 1000 civilians (it may be that much more, it is hard for precise numbers frozen during the winter evacuation) and the scale of harm in the building was akin to Warsaw.
The second variant – alternatively of the creation under the command of the AK, there is simply a emergence to which in July Warsawians called for Polish-language radio stations broadcasting from Moscow. As a result, the uprising has a smaller scale. It is attended by pro-Soviet troops of the People's Army, part of the inhabitants of the city, and possibly groups of young, rebellious arkers. This improvement could have ended in 2 ways. In the first Germany, they take over the situation within a fewer days, after which they treat the full city as they treated Wola in the first days of August. The effect – the slaughter of the vast majority of the city's inhabitants and the argument in Stalin's hands that "the AK is only a group of Hitler's collaborators and, in a military sense, a full fiction". However, this could have ended, and it could have been people from AL-u, PPR-u, assisted by russian commandos, that the key points of Warsaw are mastering and will receive the support of the Red Army immediately. Effect: an effective “provide to the world” that “AK are Hitler’s collaborators”. As a result, without a word of opposition from the Allies – everyone associated with the Polish Underground State is exported to Siberia. And they are not called upon – nobody.
The 3rd variant – neither the uprising nor the Germans are turning Warsaw into a fortress. As a result, the city occupies the Red Army, but immediately begins trial with the National Army. due to the fact that “he does not fight, so he is Hitler’s agent”. Without opposition from the Western Allies, everyone associated with the AK is either murdered or packed into trains and taken to Siberia. The Aquifers did not fight, as they believed Stalin's version, according to which they were Hitler's supporters, so no 1 claims them.
Only the last of these 3 options gives a chance to avoid catastrophic losses to the city's civilian population and its substance. For the Polish state – it would besides be a disaster. possibly Stalin would decide to include Poland in the russian Union as another russian republic at specified a time?
It is hard to talk precisely about the benefits Poland received from a two-month fight on the streets of the capital. Under the influence of specified a alternatively different course of events, a large part of the decision on the future destiny of Poland fell into Stalin's head. So it is hard to operate with adequate tangible facts. However, there are many reasons for making proposals. Unfortunately not irrefutable, but highly justified and simply – very logical. The first is that in the face of the scale of the military action in Warsaw Stalin could verify any of the plans in relation to Poland. We know that he later says that "introducing communism in Poland is like saddled cow". Communism was introduced in Poland, of course, and it was so brutal that life for this introduction paid 100 or possibly more than 1 100 and 50 1000 people. Eventually, however, the church and individual farms were completely destroyed. It is possible that it was the awareness of the scale of possible Polish resistance, specified as the Warsaw Uprising, that Stalin did not go to the largest genocidal methods in Poland. On the another hand, Stalin's decisions to decision the Polish western border even further after the outbreak of the Uprising were most likely motivated by the pursuit of an even larger, long-term conflict between Poland and Germany, to make an even greater danger in the Poles, and thus to enter the function of even more needed Poles to warrant their existence. It was after the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising that Stalin insisted that the confederate section of the western Polish border would run on the line Nysa Lužická. Not Nysa Kłodzka. The resulting difference was more than half of Lower Silesia, the full and not just east districts of Wrocław within the Polish state. No different – with a fragment of the island of Uznam, with the island of Wolin, with Szczecin and Świnoujście. Earlier – it was just about the border on Odra. So – without Polic, Świnoujście, without much of Szczecin. And for the half-cut Poland these were acquisitions of existential significance. It is highly probable that these compensations are due to the fact that after the large conflict of the Warsaw Uprising Stalin came out of the presumption that giving Poland more in the west – he will have a small more peace with Poles.
"For the killed Warsaw Germany will pay Poland in Wrocław" – this view has been expressed in almost all Polish political parties since autumn 1944. And it was those who began rebuilding Poland in its form imposed by Stalin who benefited from this idea.
The students of prof. Henryk Zieliński knew that even if General Tadeusz “Bór” Komorowski did not announce “W Hour” – to terrible losses in Warsaw and so would happen. It was highly probable – that they could be even bigger. Could they be smaller? fundamentally smaller – alternatively not... And how would everyone be treated in any way connected with the issue of Polish independence, which would be a 100 times easier to put on the mouth of German collaborators?
One in these considerations is almost impossible to question. specified that if it had not been for the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising, for eighty years we would have been taking up spitting in our beards, that "we could have saved our independency at the time, and we did not even decide to effort one." We would surely not discuss this in Wałbrzych or in Legnica, Jelenia Góra or in the vicinity of the Wrocław marketplace Square. due to the fact that if it were not for the Warsaw Uprising – this part of Poland would surely not belong to Poland.
Artur Adamski
