Two years after the civilian Coalition took power, the 3rd Road and the Left, it can be seen that Donald Tusk's government was stuck somewhere between the ambition to repair the state and the temptation to keep the position quo. It was expected to be settlement, reform, fresh quality. It came out as usual – quite a few words, small consequences, and even little courage.
The top success of this government – the removal of the Law and Justice – was besides the beginning of its problems. Tusk won with emotion, not program. He united against Kaczyński, but could not combine people with highly different views in 1 government. The coalition was from the beginning a negative task based on a common enemy. erstwhile the PiS disappeared from the front line, the binder was missing. Today, PSL and Poland 2050 defend the conservative electorate, The Left demands the fulfillment of world-view promises, and the Platform tries to pretend to be an arbitrator – increasingly in the function of a helpless mediator.
Tusk's problem is besides that from the beginning he misread the consequence of the 2023 election. This was not the triumph of the Coalition, but the failure of the Law and Justice—the fundamental difference. Kaczyński's social fatigue and his kind of governance created an opportunity, but not a fresh worldview majority. However, Tusk acted as if he had a permanent mandate, as if Poland had clearly chosen his vision. Meanwhile, it was a negative decision, forced by the request for change, not a belief in a circumstantial offer. The disregard of this fact became the beginning of political complacency—the belief that the Law and Justice were yet defeated. present you can see that this delusion could cost him power.
The first months of government brought spectacular staff decisions and loud announcements "to reconstruct the state to its citizens". But it shortly turned out that Tusk had no long-term plan. alternatively of organization reforms, it's a cleanup. alternatively of politics – managing the image crisis. alternatively of a imagination – a series of press conferences at which the Prime Minister resembled a commentator of events alternatively than their author.
In abroad policy, the Tusk government suffered 1 of the most severe failures. While the Prime Minister regained the position of a reliable partner in Brussels, the situation got out of control on the Warsaw–Washington axis. erstwhile president Nawrocki made direct contact with Donald Trump, Tusk was pushed to the side track. The Americans, seeing a more pragmatic talker in the Presidential Palace, began to prosecute a two-track policy towards Poland – government and presidential, the second being more effective. Tusk, who hoped that his European experience would warrant him a strong position in relations with the US, had to collide with the realities: the Trump administration does not realize either EU nuances or the liberal sensitivity of his government. Warsaw, alternatively of playing with 1 card, began to talk with 2 voices – and no of them was heard.
Tusk wanted to be a European leader, not a local player. In Brussels, he regained the image of a reliable partner, but in the country he ceased to be a politician close to people. His language – elegant but cold – sounds more and more like a translation of defeat. He promised to settle guilty violations of the law and impeachment of the state, but after 2 years no of the leading PiS politicians came to justice. Where the "restore of the regulation of law" was mentioned earlier, present we hear about "the request for dialogue".
In the economy – seemingly calm. Inflation fell, gold strengthened, resources from KPO began to flow. But energy prices, taxation chaos and costly credits make the average Pole no difference between the "Kaczyński era" and the "Tuska times". The Prime Minister is happy to show himself against the background of the European flags, but in the country he hears more and more that "Brussels is well, but Poland stands still".
In the background, there is besides a breakdown of social belief in the meaning of this change. erstwhile the “anti-PiS” was a powerful emotional impulse. Not adequate today. The rulers were expected to give people a sense of rebuilding the community, and alternatively deepened the division – only that now the another side feels excluded. They changed the speech of propaganda, but not its mechanism. Public tv was "renewed", but rapidly took over the function of government tube, only with another logo and another narrative.
Tusk made the same mistake he erstwhile accused Kaczyński – he believed in his own irreplaceability. After 2 years, it appears that his position is weakening, and the coalitions are increasingly reasoning about the future without him. Tusk's policy has become defensive: he avoids conflict, postpones decisions, tones emotions, as if he hoped time would solve problems itself. But time in politics does not heal – it alternatively exposes.
Two years after “the triumph of democracy”, Poland looks like a country suspended between disappointment and fatigue. The Law and Justice lost power, but not influence. The coalition won the election, but lost the initiative. Tusk was to be a politician of the fresh era, and became a symbol of returning to old habits: caution, calculation and endurance games. In this sense, Kaczyński is no longer his top opponent — he is himself.
→ I.R. Parchatkiewicz
16.10.2025
• title photo: Prime Minister Tusk at a gathering with voters in Piotrków Trybunalski, 15.10.2025, photo: KPRM
• more author texts: > Here.
• more about Tusk: > Here.
