A 1000 bites versus a wall of drones. Who wins in Ukraine?
The 4th year of war is coming to an end, which did not bring a breakthrough on the Ukrainian–Russian front. There have besides been no revolutionary changes in the field of combat, both in tactics and in arms," writes Colonel Rez. Piotr Lewandowski.
(Part 1)
This does not mean that specified changes did not occur; the front line, though slowly, shifted. besides in the art of conducting war, evolution continued, peculiarly noticeable at lower levels of command. In the article, the author will discuss respective areas concerning the Armed Forces of Ukraine at strategic, operational and tactical level.
Strategic level
The changes at strategical level afraid not so much the change in the objectives set for themselves as the way in which they were implemented, due to the constraints on the resources available.
In the case of Ukraine, the Government of Kiev and the Armed Forces Chief Command Ukraine remained in the position of recovering the lands lost as a consequence of Russian activities after 2014. But it was almost postponed. only for policy activities, due to the fact that in military terms the Ukrainian armed forces have not been able to reproduce the capabilities that would let the strategical initiative to be restored in the field of combat.
The deficiency of the anticipation of taking land offensive action at a level higher than tactical (local), Ukrainian armed forces tried to compensate for long-range unmanned air strikes and naval drones, including submarines. In 2025, Kiev importantly expanded its capacity to destruct the strategical depth of the Russian Federation in terms of both the search for gaps in the Russian airspace defence strategy and the number of resources utilized and their technological advancement. The targets of long-range drone attacks, including jet propulsion, were primarily refineries and large-area fuel storage, but besides air force bases or manufacturing facilities for Russian armed forces. presently Ukraine is able to carry out massive attacks on distance Over a 1000 kilometers, at the same time over 300 long-range unmanned workers.
Kiev besides made efforts to get western long-range rocket systems, Especially the Tomahawk maneuvering missiles. So far, the actions have failed. At the same time Ukrainians began producing their own Sapsan ballistic missile, but its usage was sporadic.
Ukrainian peculiar services have seen crucial successes in conducting unconventional activities. These include an attack on bomber bases in operations The web or the penetration of an underwater unmanned man into a war port in Noworosyjsk and Attacking a Kilo II submarine.
Ukrainian efforts to strengthen its own air defence (and support for allies) have proved inadequate against Development of Russian quality and quantity capability of air damage. As a result, the Ukrainian State suffered severe losses in 2025 in energy, heating and industrial infrastructure.
New reality, fresh solutions
Kiev has taken steps to centralise the supply strategy in unmanned vehicles, but does not quit the bottom-up model, which has developed in consequence to the needs of soldiers in the field of combat. The centralised system, based on national framework contracts with both national and abroad counterparties, is intended to let for greater standardisation of drone types and to enable production planning and stocking for planned operations. However, the centralised strategy prolongs the time to respond to current needs, hence Kiev granted nearly 700 military units budgetary resources to make purchases straight from producers.
In addition, purchases of drones for circumstantial military units may be financed by local government. Avoiding the formal procurement chain provides direct contact between the maker and the user, which provides greater flexibility and reduces the time needed to get the types of drones needed, but prevents coordination at higher levels of command, prevents standardisation and is corruptive due to deficiency of financial supervision. Currently, the offer to the Ukrainian military includes as many as 550 types of drones, many of which are not integrated with designation and demolition systems.
Ukrainian Ministry of Defence sacrificed a lot of attention to cutting red tape, which was powerfully complained to by the tactical commander. In their opinion, even 70 percent of the time had to be spent on office work. The Ministry of Defence has introduced the Mobile Army+ App to the general public (more than 800 000 users). The encrypted strategy allows soldiers to submit reports and applications in electronic form, based on template forms.
In land troops, shrinking passenger reserves and deficiency of equipment reserves make it possible to supplement losses to a limited extent, while do not supply an army expansion to the estimated 1 million soldiers. Etatowo Armed Forces of Ukraine number 1 million soldiers, with the analysis published on the web pages of recruitment announcements showing that The real numbers of the Ukrainian army never exceeded 750 thousand. Another problem is the level of motivation to fight recruits, many of whom were forced into the army, as part of a universal mobilization involving men aged 25 to 60. This translates straight into an expanding number deserters and soldiers voluntarily leaving ranks for respective to respective days.
According to the information published in the Ukrainian media, this affects at least 70 000 soldiers, while the problem has intensified in fresh months of the year and it can now be assumed that much more than 100,000 soldiers are involved. In addition, in many Ukrainian brigades, especially those formed in 2024 and 2025, the problem with enforcement of orders increased. According to Ukrainian company/plugon level commanders, often only 1 in 5 of the soldiers under their command are ready to take direct action against the enemy. The situation in Ukrainian personnel and volunteer units formed in 2022 and 2023 is importantly better. On their basis, Ukrainian command began forming corps. They are intended to address problems in the management of the battlefield at operational level.
Operating level
In the Armed Forces of Ukraine, there is simply a improvement of the command structures, the main nonsubjective of which is to improve coordination of activities between tactical unions (brigades) and troops (panels) and types of troops. In 2022, the Ukrainian army was based on brigade and regimental structures which were straight under regional command.. There were so no indirect operational unions in the chain of command, specified as a division or body (armia). While respective structures called the corps were created, they only had administrative form. As a result, Ukrainian command and control have had problems since the beginning of the war.
Regional Command was subject to respective units, which importantly hampered the organisation of cooperation, combat safety and logistics. In addition, direct management of the fight in specified a large area in the absence of indirect levels of command led to a deficiency of situational awareness among staff officers and elder commanders.
In specified a situation Brigadier Command was forced to take over powers of command at operational level on individual sections of the front. The staff of 1 brigade, most frequently composed of professional soldiers, veterans fighting back in 2014, commanded respective brigades. This was due to the authoritative dedicating of these powers by regional commanders or to grassroots initiatives. An additional problem was the frequent changes in the deployment of individual brigades, which were not able to assemble within a single operational union. In addition, many brigades fought in dispersal — battalions from their lineup were deployed on sections of the front any a fewer 100 kilometres away. This situation led to multiple disruptions in the chain of command, which resulted in interference by elder superiors, frequently from the level of the chief command.
The problem is addressed by the introduction of the corps level. It should be noted that the Ukrainian "corpus" differs from the "corpus" in NATO structures. In NATO, the corps usually consists of 3–4 military divisions and independent brigades (e.g. rocket artillery or helicopters), while divisions from 3–4 brigades and regiments of military types (artillery, defence of plots, engineering, reconnaissance, command, logistics, etc.). Composition of Ukrainian Corpses The brigades enter without the divisional level, and are noticeably little than in the Natovian corps.
Ukrainian land forces are expected to number from 18 to 20 corps resembling alternatively natovian divisions. The base of their formation is most experienced Ukrainian brigades with the most efficient staffs. Currently, 12 corps staffs can be identified in the structures of the Ukrainian army, but many of them do not seem to have achieved operational capabilities yet. 2 corps formed from the National defender are already in operation: they are the 1st GN Corps based on the 12th GN Brigade (Azov) and 2nd Khartyjski Corps based on the 13th GN Brigade (Chartia). Air-desant troops have a 7th fast consequence Corps (functioning even before improvement as a formation of military types) and 8th Air-Sturm Corps, and the marine infantry is grouped as 30th Marine Corps.
Ukrainian mechanized brigades, armored (heavy) and artillery divided between 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 Armies. Additionally, sub-units of unmanned forces, combat and logistics security, as a rule, were assigned to the corps. At the end of the year, a full of 4 battalions of the global Legion subject to the Land Army are to be dissolved. The individual battalions are to be part of Ukrainian assault units, including the 475th Assault Regiment. The restructuring does not concern global battalions subject to Ukrainian military intelligence.
In addition to changing the command structures of Kiev, he created a fresh kind of army. It's about Assault troops, which are to constitute the next step after the creation of the SHU Unmanned Systems Force in 2024 in adapting tactics to requirements dominated by battlefield drones.
for: Evolution under pressure. Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2025
(Part 2)Tactical level
In 2025, the saturation of the battlefield of unmanned systems, including fiber-controlled, radio-electronic-resistant systems, grew. It seems that the Russians have begun to take advantage, especially in front sections, where individuals belonging to the Centre of Advanced Unmanned Systems "Rubikon" are fighting.
On the Ukrainian side, 414 are the most effective. The Independent Strike Brigade of Unmanned Air Ships, called “Madzer Birds”. In 2025 the transformation of the 59th Mechanized Brigade into a drone unit subordinate to the Unmanned Systems Force began.
Currently, all Ukrainian and Russian units from the battalion level, and frequently companies, have permanent or ad hoc teams utilizing drones for diagnosis, combat and logistics security. any of the Ukrainian brigades are able to supply transportation to the first combat line of 20-30 tonnes per day only utilizing transport drones.
In fresh months, more than 5 000 drone attacks (including both sides of the front) have been recorded in the area of direct action daily. The phenomenon of "field transparency" has led to further dispersal of combat groups in the direct firing region of FPV drones, which presently covers about 15–20 kilometres from the military contact line. The contact line itself has besides been redefined, and the so - called no man’s land region that divides the fighting sides reaches up to 5 kilometres.
Moreover, the first line of defence is more like a covert belt than an armed defence or assault. The concentration of forces in the area of direct action, both to the attack and to the defence, is virtually impossible, unless weather conditions prevent image recognition. Detection by reconnaissance drones of force concentration larger than respective soldiers provokes artillery fire response, FPV drones, circular ammunition, and Russian aviation utilizing gliders. all vehicle detected is attacked, regardless of the type.
Such a functioning reconnaissance and impact strategy led to a curiosity situation in which the battlefield saturated with modern technology was dominated by infantry activities. However, infantry tactics had to be adapted to fresh challenges to be met by assault troops. Their domain is to fight in a profoundly dispersed group, assault groups of 2-3 soldiers supported by drone operators, with very limited support of armored vehicles and tanks.
The task of assault troops in explanation is to break down reinforced positions, destruct organized resistance, and make gaps in defence that can usage armored-mechanized divisions. In the case of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which have been on the defensive for years, the tasks of the assault units are different. The recently formed kind of troops presently consists of 5 assault regiments (1st, 24th, 33rd, 210s, 225th and 425th).
The troops are straight subordinate to the Chief Command and act as fast consequence forces utilized to counterattack the most endangered sections of the front. any of the Ukrainian National defender brigades are called assault guards, but this does not mean their formal membership in the assault troops.
The tactics of assault groups include respective successive steps, lasting 2–3 days per assault facility. The first is to identify an enemy combat group, the second – isolation through drone attacks and radio-electronic combat systems. Further include air strikes on detected support weapons positions, jamming systems and drone operators. The FPV drones then prevent the opponent from changing positions and coordinate artillery fire.
The next phase is simply a direct assault and elimination of the opponent and the seizure of the area. The course of combat is passed on by drones, both to the command post of direct superior and elder commanders, which allows to keep situational awareness in real time. The final phase is to consolidate forces under the shield of their own drones and radio-electronic combat systems in order to counterattack the opponent. At this stage, storm groups are frequently replaced by a "normal" infantry.
Summary
Last year, the Armed Forces of Ukraine demonstrated a advanced ability to respond and adapt to changes on the battlefield. In the first months of the war, this was a superiority to the powerfully formalized and so the rigid functioning of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The Russian army now responds equally rapidly and effectively to fresh challenges. The combination of penetration and usage of fire support in the form of drones both close and long scope and glide bombs allows the Russians to make very slow but steady progress.
Ukrainians importantly improved the creation of situational awareness at individual levels of command by digitizing designation and command systems (e.g. real-time streaming of the image is available at all levels of command). However, they inactive have problems with the deficiency of soldiers that can be sent to fight the enemy directly. This is due not only to mobilization problems, but besides to low morale and mediocre training of soldiers and commanders in any brigades.
The creation of corps will lead to improved command and control at operational level. However, it will be a slow and hard process due to the dispersal of the brigades of 1 corps, the deficiency of logistics and combat safety units and insufficient number of officers with staff education. The creation of assault troops allows for an ad hoc rescue of the situation on endangered sections of the front, but will not translate into the creation of offensive capabilities to regain the initiative at least operational level.
The Ukrainian concept of "drone wall", designed to compensate for shortages in the infantry and restrictions on the usage of vehicles, led, on the 1 hand, to the highest Russian losses compared to erstwhile years, but proved to be ineffective with the tactics of "a 1000 bites" of passing tiny assault groups through defensive positions. Ukrainian tactics have forced the Russians to act highly inefficiently if we compare the number of potentials active to the results achieved, but SHUs do not have their own possible to usage this situation to take over the initiative.
The ongoing digitisation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, both in the field of combat and public procurement or administration, should be considered a success.
Colonel Piotr Lewandowski – Graduated from the College of Officers of the Rocket Army and Artillery, Kazimierz Wielki University in the field of pedagogy and postgraduate studies in crisis management. He commanded a platoon, company and independent battalion distinguished as the leading branch of the Polish Army. He besides served as head of the training department and head of the regiment recognition. Seven-time combat mission associate outside the country, where he performed (among another things) the duties of a CIMIC officer, deputy battalion commander of a combat group and base commander. He ended the military service as commanding officer of the base/command of the safety battalion in Redzikow.
