2020 and the Belarusian diaspora
The year 2020 saw the largest mobilization of people in Belarusian history. Hundreds of thousands of Belarusians went to protests across the country to show against another falsified election and in support of democratic change in the country. These protests were met with harsh repressions from the safety forces. Despite fresh releases of political prisoners, repressions and human rights violations continue. People are prosecuted, fired and detained for likes and comments on social media, or are sentenced in absentia in show trials which appear to be bringing back the times of the russian Union.
This highly repressive environment forced many Belarusians into exile. Along with another waves of emigration, and with at least 200,000 people moving distant since 2020, the Belarusian diaspora is now at about 1.5 million people. crucial centres can be found in Georgia, Russia and the EU. And while the legal situation for Belarusians in the EU is difficult, and the situation of democracy in Belarus is dire, a democratic Belarus and democratic Belarusians are here to stay in the EU.
The Belarusian democratic forces since 2020
With the protests crushed, people in prison and repressions expanding in severity, the democratic forces faced a choice: be jailed or go into exile. Over the course of winter and spring from 2020 to 2021, many chose exile. With this move, the democratic forces established 3 structures: the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, functioning as a “Presidential office” – as she has won, in all likelihood, the elections; the United Transitional Cabinet, which can be seen as a government in exile, with representatives addressing issues from the economy and abroad affairs to education and social policy; and lastly the Coordination Council, which was originally established to handle a peaceful transition of power but is going through a process of democratization in exile. Following online elections in May 2024, it functions as a “proto-parliament”, where Belarusian (civil) society is represented.
These elections provided an alternate to the Belarusian home of Representatives, which is part of the government in Belarus. In total, voted, about 0.01 per cent of possible Belarusian voters. While this is simply a tiny number of votes, the fact remains that despite cross-border repressions and a delayed campaign, these elections were free and the result is undisputed, unlike elections inside Belarus. Furthermore, the Belarusian government seemed tense about them, as it opened . Most of all, it is an example of the ongoing democratization of the democratic forces.
Meanwhile, the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya has settled in Vilnius and works to keep Belarus on the agenda with political leaders in Europe and beyond. The Cabinet is present in Warsaw, and diplomatic missions of the democratic forces have sprung up in Estonia, Czechia and Belgium. This ongoing and deepening process of institutionalization, bringing together different voices and political streams within the diaspora, means that the Belarusian democratic forces are amongst the best organized diasporas. The 3 structures supply an alternative Belarus to Lukashenka’s government and their visibility is significant. As such, they besides service as an example for another diasporas facing repressions, specified as the Russian opposition in exile. But it is not only the political process that continues in exile. NGOs and previously politically active people keep making their mark, both within Belarus and in exile.
The Belarusian NGO sector has besides been in flux after 2020. Where before 2020 there was a comparatively “open” environment for Belarusian NGOs in the country, this civilian space has been almost completely closed. This means that there are 3 types of NGOs now active around Belarus: organizations that stay in the country, which undertake tiny activities if they are inactive legally registered, or engage in small-scale, underground activities; NGOs that operate full from exile; and those which operate in a mixed format with activists inside and outside Belarus. These NGOs are complemented by an organized Belarusian diaspora, which set up infrastructure in Central Europe, specified as in Poland or Lithuania, but besides in Germany and the Netherlands. It is these NGOs and diaspora organizations which besides function as 1 of the bridges between those in the EU and those in Belarus.
Furthermore, there is cross-fertilization between NGOs and the political structures as people who leave the political structures of the democratic forces proceed their efforts in circumstantial fields. 2 fresh examples come to head here. First, this can be seen with regards to Olga Gorbunova, the erstwhile typical for social policy. She left the United Transitional Cabinet but continues to work to bring attention to the issue of political prisoners in Belarus, of which at least 1300 inactive stay behind bars according to the Belarusian human rights organization Viasna. Similarly, Valery Kavaleuski the erstwhile typical for abroad affairs founded the Euro-Atlantic Affairs Agency to focus on Belarus’s transatlantic future. In sum, this means that Belarusian democratic political life is continuing, developing and branching out, reaching out to fresh partners and into fresh initiatives.
A European alternate for Belarus?
Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the Belarusian democratic forces have sided powerfully with Ukraine. This is present not only in political statements but besides in actions of solidarity with Ukraine. There are besides Belarusian volunteers fighting on Ukraine’s side. At the same time, the democratic forces have opted, alongside this strong support for Ukraine, for a European way for Belarus, advocating for the future membership of Belarus in the EU. alternatively than remaining neutral between Europe and Russia, the EU is seen as a safe space where Belarusian society can prosper, as evidenced by Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the de facto occupation of Belarus by Russia.
This engagement with the EU is not a one-way street. Although the EU is not in a position to full embrace Belarus as a future member, it does engage with the Belarusian society and does embrace it as a European people. It has redirected funds previously available to Belarusian local and regional government to urgent needs and medium-term support of citizens, civilian society and the democratic forces. Due to this, it fosters links with the Belarusian “alternative”. The launch of a Consultative Group, which functions as a high-level platform for exchanges between EU representatives and Belarusian democratic forces and civilian society, is simply a case in point here. Furthermore, there is EU4Belarus, which is specifically aimed at Belarusian students and academics to survey and do investigation in the EU.
The European Parliament has been an active forum as well, with many resolutions, speeches by MEPs and MEPs “adopting” political prisoners under the slogan WeStandBYyou, which was launched by the German NGO Libereco. Finally, the last Council Conclusions on Belarus powerfully emphasize Belarusians’ conflict to live in a democratic country that is part of a peaceful Europe. With these statements, support programmes and concrete actions, the EU and its associate states are engaged in keeping the democratic movement alive, as well as providing the framework for it to make in a democratic way within the EU. The elections further the interior institutionalization of the democratic forces and increased ties with EU institutions offer an example of that process.
Furthermore, the EU and Belarusians in the EU together engage in addressing any of the most pressing issues for Belarusians, specified as the mobility of people to the bloc, the situation of political prisoners – specified as support for people who were released but are at hazard of re-imprisonment – and the legalization of Belarusians’ residency in the EU. The EU and Belarusians share a goal in Ukraine as well. The Belarusian government is complicit in Russia’s invasion, with Belarus being utilized by the Russian army as a field infirmary and workshop. Lukashenka’s fate, many believe, is thus tied to the result of the war, as he cannot hold on to power without financial and military backing from Russia. This has aligned the goals of the EU and the Belarusian democratic forces: a triumph for Ukraine, which in the perfect script would make momentum for democratic change in Belarus.
Belarus and Belarusians in the EU: here to stay
Despite the hardships faced by Belarusians to get visas to the EU, which is clearly laid out in a fresh article on this platform, the fact remains that hundreds of thousands of Belarusians now reside inside the EU, alongside the Belarusian democratic forces which proceed to be active and make their structures. And they are here to stay.
Looking at the continued EU support for Belarusian NGOs and human right defenders, plus the redirected funds from the Belarusian authorities to the civilian society sector, backing remains in place. While the full-scale invasion of Ukraine took the spotlight away, programmes of support continue. Considering that the goals of the democratic forces and the EU – at least in a declarative sense – are similar, specified as a democratic Belarus free from Russian influence and a Ukrainian victory, creates an additional reason for continued support and the creation of a safe harbour for Belarusians in the EU. And while the democratic forces go further by preparing the phase for a future Belarusian accession to the EU, Belarus and its people cannot be overlooked and excluded from a possible future in which they are part of the EU, just as we can see Ukraine being part of the EU.
The very presence and activities of the Belarusian diaspora, supported by the EU, mean that the democratic forces and democratically-minded Belarusians are here to stay – first in their fight against dictatorship in Belarus, and possibly in the future as EU citizens. It is up to the EU, its associate states and its people to supply support and open their arms to a people and a country which started to open itself to them since 2020.
Wicke van den Broek is simply a PhD candidate at Maastricht University, researching EU democracy promotion in Belarus within the framework of Horizon 2020 task ‘EMBRACE’. For more information on the investigation project, see https://embrace-democracy.eu/. Previously, Wicke studied at the College of Europe in Natolin, and worked as a trainee at the European Border and Coast defender in Warsaw.
“We suport the Belarusian Awakening’24” is simply a task co-financed by Solidarity Fund PL within the framework of Polish improvement cooperation of the Ministry of abroad Affairs of the Republic of Poland in the amount of PLN 230,000.
This publication expresses the views of the author only and cannot be identified with the authoritative position of the Ministry of abroad Affairs of the Republic of Poland.
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