Victor Orban was an untapped possible for Polish politics. We did not conduct a policy calibrated to Budapest under our Polish business. It is worth considering what we lose after the defeat of Orban, so that we may possibly win Peter Magyar.
A fewer reservations must be made to begin with. Firstly, I am not amazed by the naivety and inability of Polish politicians, who almost always position themselves as supporters or opponents of individual political options on the occasion of elections in countries associated with Poland. This is most likely due to the desire to delight 1 of the large “sponsor houses” of Polish politics – Brussels or Washington. The same was of course the case in the case of elections in Hungary: Tusk's squad following Ursula von der Leyen and the company supported Peter Magyar and Karol Nawrocki – most likely urged by Washington – supported Victor Orban.
I don't gotta add that it was completely unnecessary. Hungary Magyar may inactive request Poland, just as Poland was needed in any cases Victor Orban, about which in a moment.
Secondly, Peter Magyar himself remains a large unknown. I feel that Brussels has supported him more in accordance with the rule that "a common enemy unites" than with enthusiasm for his views. Magyar – if you effort to translate it into Polish politics – is simply a reasonably conservative politician, in the kind of Mateusz Morawiecki, or not necessarily Euroenthusian, although someway digestible for Brussels. The Hungarians chose it not due to the fact that it is Orban's antithesis, but due to the fact that it seems to them to be a better Orban – a more modern, free from corruption and guaranteeing in any way the exchange of elites without a thorough change of political vectors. It is besides to deliver Hungarian EU financial drip. However, both in terms of migration policy and attitude towards Hungary's commitment to war in Ukraine, Magyar's views are not peculiarly different from those presented by Orban.
Magyar is so a certain unknown. Does this mean that his choice is neutral for Poland?
Not necessarily. True, we do not yet know precisely what we can anticipate from him. On the another hand, we know what we are losing as a consequence of Victor Orban's loss, although I have the impression that many Poles – and surely Polish politicians – are either unaware of it, or have been manipulated by messages from the hostile capitals of Europe. From the point of view of the transmission of the current Polish authorities, the Prime Minister's seat in Budapest slows down pro-Russian politicians, fiercely fighting Brussels. However, if we reject the ideologicalized glasses, through which politicians like to look at politics collectively Polish politicians and publicists, we see Orban somewhat differently. And it's crucial to realize better that Magyar will be able to get any concessions if we approach it transactionally.
The leader of Fideshu primarily supported us in possibly blocking any of the madness of EU policy. Indeed, blocking Brussels has long been a very hard matter, requiring influential partners and broad coalitions, but it is better to have 1 coalition than less. Of course, Orban was never a guarantor of good cooperation between Warsaw and Budapest, but his Euroscepticism was useful. If in Spain or France there is simply a change in power to critical parties towards the current direction of the European Union, it may have been even more useful in the future. But is Magyar a Euroenthusian? It proposes a policy of resettling and mainstreaming Hungary, although it besides mentions defending Hungary's interests in the EU. He besides has a debt to Brussels for his support and we are not certain how much he is obliged to pay.
Another thing is Ukraine. Our relation with Kiev has been very hard for a long time, despite the spells Karol Nawrocki tries, ensuring a tougher course towards Zelenski's team. These relations have been poorly set by Poland since the beginning of the conventional war between Ukraine and Russia. So far, it has not truly been possible to correct them according to the Polish interest. present Ukraine effectively marginalises Poland as an ally, clearly focusing on Brussels and, as far as possible, Washington. In our imagination, we were expected to be a link in these relationships, but we turned out to be at most a useful subcontractor.
Orban, with his reluctant attitude to Kiev – it is not actual that he did not aid Ukraine, as many Polish journalists present say – could be useful to us. For example, to check Ukraine in the European Union with his hands. We, of course, did not request to croak against Zelensk, but it would be a signal for Kiev to enter into a tactical alliance with Orban in any cases, that there are inactive issues that Poland can trade with Kiev. The biggest pain in Polish-Ukrainian relations is the fact that Kiev considered us a full ally, 1 for which sympathy should no longer be sought. And this – given that we truly care about the triumph of Ukraine in the war with Russia – seriously limits our area for manoeuvre.
Although Magyar is distant from Ukraine, he sees a place for her in the European Union. Nor does he want, like Orban, to balance between Brussels and Moscow, he powerfully prefers to bet on the former, which will force a alternatively open attitude on him towards Kiev.
And finally, the last case is Russia. Orban has good relations with Vladimir Putin, which Poland could usage if needed. We can already see the first swallows of Russia's gradual integration into the Western global system, as announced by the American reset with Belarus. Warsaw – not always right – rapidly became a strong enemy of Russia, ready to “dump Putin into the ground”.
Yes, our interests are in extremist contradiction, and Putin was never peculiarly curious in maintaining good relations with Poland. However, if the West decides to reset in relations with Moscow, we will gotta think about any fresh diplomatic strategy, and here Orban could surely be of usage to us if, of course, he maintained power. Especially since the celebrated article of the 5th Washington Treaty ceases to be specified a strong warrant of our security, as it was a decade ago. Theodore Roosevelt's words about good diplomacy requiring a grin and a stick behind his back have not been as fresh as they are now.
So let's not cry for Victor Orban, due to the fact that we're not going to get much out of this, but let's think about it, and I'm going to make certain that with him gone, we lose our chances of pursuing a more ambitious global policy. It is crucial that we look at Magyar not in terms of his nobility or deficiency of it, but what he can offer us and how we can usage him if he becomes head of the Hungarian government.
Tomasz Figura
