Are we doomed to russophobia?
Jerzy Karwelis 17 January, entry No 1391 journals
I've late caught any kind of escapism. Well, it turns out that I am increasingly moving distant from events in theoretical considerations, but based in reality on the definition of circulating concepts or phenomena, especially erstwhile their meaning is deconstructed. Concepts and phenomena are now given fresh meanings, which confuses the audience. The authority over the language confirms the thesis that "how to control definitions, there is no request to take care of facts."
That's why I'd alternatively take care of the dissection of meanings and phenomena from time to time, due to the fact that in these times of confusion with confusion (and not at all spontaneous) It is worth to break down many conceptual machines into parts, not only to see how the cogs work, but to scope the spring that drives the full mechanism.
Today I would like to deal with Polish rusophobia, which, supposedly more than anti-Semitism, we are expected to suck with mother's milk. It is simply a phenomenon that has historically been subject to evolution, and present it is utilized for manipulation purposes, and it is so much so that, for example, 2 opposing camps blame themselves for russophobia besides tiny a level, which leads to embarrassing bidding and politicians, and their acolytes.
Short course of historical rusophobia
Historically speaking, Russia's rivalry with Poland as regards dominance in our region (for Russia 1 of many, which is not meaningless) is any destiny that weighs on our fates here. The attitude towards Russia shaped our geopolitics, was a mention to many political movements, or only one, but crucial one, due to the fact that a revolutionary Polish patriotism factor. The shadow of Russia has hung, and it has hung, over us for centuries, and its strength has a large impact on our fates. At first, our attitude towards Russia was more pragmatic, it became more romanticist erstwhile we lost this regional rivalry. Before the defeat, it was hard to announcement in our national ethos any larger layers of rusophobia, namely – another country with which we fought wars for dominance in the Inter-Mediterranean. Then, erstwhile we lost in reality, this aversion began to manifest itself in a phobic dimension, frequently an irrational mixture of disgust and fear.
In the national ethos in the symbolic dimension, rusophobia was expected to be a convenient chance to look at our faults and disasters, due to the fact that it created Polish past from Russia of the Black People, whose ruthless and culturally bare strength trampled on the beautiful Polish inflorescence. Finally, culturally, though the Slavs, we lay on 2 other sides of the scales. Koneczne quincunx – we Slavs are immersed in Latin culture, versus Russians – Turkish Slavs, with a large cultural context of Asia, in the release of a “boot” mix of Russian delusions and complexes. A hell of a fight, with insoluble conflict potentials.
During the period of partitions, the first phenomena have already appeared, dividing applicable Polish policy into 2 camps of relations with Russia – premise and rebellion, with a tiny break into their mixture which became positivism. The nature of the dispute was the attitude towards Moscow: any thought it was essential to adapt, defend the national substance, others called for the escalation of active resistance. Even then – on the rebellious side – emotional excesses appeared (also enhanced with literature), which can be called rusophobia today.
This was a legitimate consequence to the loss, simultaneously reinforced by the disinvolvement of the Kremlovian occupiers. These were in varying degrees urging the accommodative movements and the horse with the order of who would decide present "who started", or Polish romantics or the imperial occupiers, who did not want to make any exceptions to imperial politics for Poland. "God Something Poland", an anthem sung present in Polish churches, was a welcome song, even a thank-you song for Tsar Alexander, written and sung by a grateful nation visiting the King of Poland.
Then the russophobia went smoothly. The partitions clearly confirmed the hellish act of Russia in Polish history, and the identity foundation of the fresh II of Poland became a victory, this time over Bolsheviks, Russia. Russia's power was seen, but – after the triumph in 1920 – there was no mention of greater rusophobia, and any savages went beyond the east border and in the event of "W" we could manage them. This changed a lot after September 17, but later – during the Yalta betrayal of the West – it turned out that we had to choose a forced premise again, the size of which showed a trace revolt of hopelessness in the form of the Cursed Soldiers.
Behind the Polish People's Republic, russian Russia has again become the Black People of Polish past the latest, easy bushel to separate Poles between “our” and those “imported to Poland on Russian tanks”, who have become the liar-elite of the fresh Poland. But it was more derisive russophobia, overwhelmed by the context of mocking the primitive calmuks, the pathetic satisfaction of the cultural ostracism defeated in reality. Of course, there were a fewer moments erstwhile Poles in the Polish People's Republic had reason to fear russian intervention, but alternatively the superior indulgence reigned here.
Rusophobia in the III RP
The most interesting rusophobia developed in the 3rd Poland. It waved absolutely – from strong influences at the beginning of the transformation, but after being pressed by the West polarizations changed. It was no longer a choice between Russia's influence in sorrow and the West. Russia left (it turned out that not for long), while in Poland a small romanticist conflict for souls, pockets and land of Poles between the USA and Germany took place. Its worst manifestation was the moments erstwhile both of these factors, German and American, contained a pact of common interest, in which Berlin was operating and, strategically, Washington. Russia disappeared for a long time from the Polish strategy, which was a grave sin of the Polish abroad policy, due to the fact that turning completely to the West, in a time of “the end of history”, the umbrella of NATO or the Union exposed the rear for us, and in the Polish case the east policy became a terrible example of fulfilling the lost tactics for us.
After Putin came into being, the issue of russophobia, if 1 can point to the unity of this concept, began to play the function of 1 of the factors distinguishing Polish politics. Unfortunately, the attitude of Polish politicians to Russia was a consequence of external factors. Also, a people who trusted 1 of the 2 tribes were drawn to various fairy tales, frequently replacing the roles of the Wolf and the Red Riding Hood. During post-communist rule, the issue of relations with Russia was somewhat shifted by both sides (the governing left, and even then in a unified post-solidarity part) to a second plan. They were red, not flaunting their connections with the Russians, already looking at another reds in Brussels, while the Styrofoam opposition had something different on their head – swallowing their own failures.
The most interesting issue of managing rusophobia was in the days of COPIS, especially in the performance of the Tusk Party. At the time, the argument of rusophobia was accused of Kaczyński as a origin destabilizing the formation of "serious states" in a sustainable Europe. With Russia smitten with money for natural materials, in hope – ferocious as all hopes of liberals – that money will civilize Russia, they will make a Russian mediate class that will naturally weigh towards democracy. It is worth reminding Tusk at the time tv clips, all media lines showing the Ducks (because it was before Smolensk) as unreasonable rusophobes, who do not realize fresh times and to the detriment of Poland itself blow up trains of fresh order in the war on dismemberment resentations.
So the PiS placed, or actually indirectly was cast, in the function of the chief rusofob, which was a charge at the time, although present is the subject of competition – who is more. At the time, the Tusk movement, it was the execution of German interests directly. The finalization of the large deal of Russia and Germany was coming, and there will be no “palician” messing around, playing with a bunch of cards in the war, erstwhile a subtle bridge takes place here. In Poland there was expected to be peace in this respect, and let Poles be glad that Germany did not give Poland to the Russians at all. They're inactive talking back to you. And Donald was expected to clean up here. And he did the best he could.
Russia and Ukraine
After the Second Ukrainian War everything changed. But here is evidence of the phenomenon of the controllability of external Polish rusophobia. This 1 did not start at all in 2014, erstwhile the First Ukrainian War began. Nothing like that. Why? However, at the time, after 2014, Germany hoped that it was a (understanded) Russian "work accident", which did not halt Germany's strategical plans to govern Europe in close cooperation with Russia. The pipeline of Nord Stream I continued to flow oil, the Union was arming the Kremlin, the war in Ukraine did not prevent investments in Nord Stream II. The troops fought, occupied, but Business continued ace user. So in Poland with rusophobia it was quiet, due to the fact that it was expected to be quiet. Everything changed after the start of the Second Ukrainian War in 2022. It changed with Polish rusophobia due to the fact that Germany changed with narrative.
Putin, erstwhile a hard friend, became the Black People of European salons. But only for the benefit of the small ones, due to the fact that for the elites (European, or actually EU) the situation is completely different. It is now in Europe like... in Poland for partitions: the attitude towards Russia is simply a fundamental origin that separates good from evil, traitors from fiery adherents of free values. Putin became a busole of European narration for the needs of a sovereign, as if he were to forget in 1 minute who was spinning a crank with whom he opened pipelines of pragmatism and declared cooperation “with Russia as it is”. Putin is drawn as a final argument, a journalist, if he doesn't know what to ask, asks about the attitude towards Putin and woe to you if you don't give an even more escalating declaration of hostility. It's for the people. All the more reason for the Polish people, due to the fact that we, as newers in all European political fashion, are always late, so we must make up for our commitment.
It is besides not that the Germans are taking revenge on Putin, due to the fact that this 1 has ruined their beautiful plan and now needs to stitch up another tracks in public, feeding the frog their own lost strategy. The Germans may of course be angry at Putin due to the fact that his war movement was completely illogical to them. But it is different – they, erstwhile they force the people on the Black People of the Kremlin, actually dream of returning to the old business as user.
Germany has no plan B in this regard. In fact, they have a plan A2 which is just a wait-out until everything is spread over peacekeepers, let's let's both seductive, bones. And in the meantime, as a forward-thinking state—not as we, looking back not so much, but looking back on what will bring us a gracious patron “The Germans want to play with Putin threatening an even better position on the way to the federalization of Europe under Berlin.
This tool is to be the fear that justifies strategical things for the Germans – the consent of the European people to federalization in the face of a Russian military threat conquered, the eradicating of the terrible mistakes of the EU elite, the eventual and formal hegemony of Germany over Europe, yet the reconstruction of the German manufacture transferred into military areas, for which all members of the “coal of the willing” will pay. And then so strong Germany will yet be able to equal with equal table with Putin and explain insignificant misunderstandings. And the horrified people will accept this with relief due to the postwar decline of tension and the increase in hope for eternal peace.
Rusophobia a la polacca
But we have moved distant from russophobia, which is an essential origin in this process, both its beginning and the essential component of its continuation. It's Europe, but it's even funnier here. With us, you must be a russophobe, as you are not a russophobe – you automatically become a Russian onus. There's nothing in the middle. You cannot clearly justice the imperial policy of Russia pragmatically – that is: think and consider publically why it does what it does, erstwhile it stops and how it can be helped and in what ways. This must not be done – as about Russia, it must be firing acts, emotions, hypocrisy of values, no pragmatism, a planet of black and white on a large plasma screen of Polish bida-narration. There's no another way.
This results in a pitiful bidding to increase russophobia. And the effect is comical, due to the fact that with constant tracking from all political-media side of the Russian spies, it turns out that real spies, including mostly agents of influence, can sleep peacefully. It's like Mrożek's erstwhile the police arrested each another – then villains can already mess with full impunity. So we have a showy russophobia, which is starting to get more and more confused. But opposition is besides expanding – realism in assessing our prospects of relations with Russia, not a phobia, which is seeing in everything the inspirations of the Kremlin, including the intellectual harassment, the imperatively one-sided assessment of all manifestations of reality – events which in their entirety either harm or favour Putin. Tertium non datur. And it’s that it’s all truly “tertium“ Putins live here like donuts in butter. And with specified a attitude of the full Polish politics to the reality, it is not amazing that we are not there – applicable rusophobes, not narratives – at any table of decisions.
What's it like with this Russia thing, due to the fact that it's a large deal? The answer to this question puts our future in a real context. Moscow has 1 feature – it only counts with strong ones, and all act of will of cooperation on the part of the weaker 1 reads as an act of subjection of weakness, unveiling of the abdomen, a manifest of submission. On the another hand, Russia reacts allergicly to Buncho, especially unsupported by real abilities, declarations of hostility. These frequently check, with not the best results for the checked.
So how do you live with them, Prime Minister? If we are soft with them, that “let’s get along”, they will think we are weak and they will scope us. If we stand up, they'll first show us to the West that we're the brawlers that start, and then they'll cry to the West, that "d..a. hurts" and that he'll get back at us. Secondly, they can do something to us due to the fact that the confused West won't do anything in our defense. So it turns out that if you don't turn around, it's the butt in the back. Soft – bad, hard – even worse. It turns out that there is no way out, you gotta fall into even counterproductive rusophobia, if there is no advice, then at least let us fight – like in paid horror, in the hope that the doors of this geopolitical cinema will open up and come out to the light of the world.
Tertium, however, dates
However, there is another, 3rd and pragmatic way out. Unfortunately, it takes time, which only shows how much we have slept in tribal disputes for the past 30 years. Since Russia (It appears present that she is not the only one) respects only strength, and according to this assessment shapes its attitude towards the world, it is essential to do 1 thing before we fall into the dilemma of “rusophobia or rusophilia” – become strong. Work on your own causative force, as far as we can. And we are weak today, due to the fact that in our state-genuine laziness, we have erstwhile set our alliances apart today. If we had our own power today, Russia, but besides the US or the Union would talk to us differently. They'd even talk.
In abroad policy, we would not should be driven by windy rusophobia, embarrassing fun for the small ones, from which nothing – but passiveness – results. It takes time to build strength, but – yet – possibly it is time to start? possibly we can, possibly we can't, but no 1 will say – like present – that we haven't tried.
In order to accomplish this, we request to take the first step – halt blackmailing people and policies forced by rusophobia, which distances us not only from the correct assessment of reality, but does not let us to take the first step on a hard way to our own late subjectivity.
He wrote and read Jerzy Karwelis
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