What is the future of transatlantic relations, if any? What is the current position on Europe's sovereignty in the context of Donald Trump's presidency? What should we know about the “new, wonderful order of the world” proposed by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney? Should Europe strive to keep cooperation with the United States as long as possible or to mobilize against them? Is Europe ready for war on many fronts, given the interior challenges and the current aspirations of Russia and China? Leszek Jażdżewski (Foundation of Liberte!) talks with Olaf Osica, a postgraduate of the European University Institute in Florence, erstwhile manager of the Center for east Studies (OSW) and a publicist of the "Wizny Tygodnik".
Leszek Jażdżewski (LJ): Can we talk about European sovereignty towards president Donald Trump on Greenland and its subsequent withdrawal from this thought following Europe's response?
Olaf Osica (OO): Everything looks good so far. I would like to be optimistic and believe that this Greenlandic minute will continue. On the another hand, knowing the past of transatlantic relations and the number of crises we have experienced over the last 7 years, we must stay realistic in the sense that Europe has always tended to very emotional and spontaneous reactions.
The US started a policy that was not in line with Europe's expectations and was to any degree directed against it. The last crucial example was the 2003 Iraq War debate. At the time, we could observe a kind of "European moment" erstwhile people took to the streets and there was a constitutional minute of European integration. 20 years later, we find ourselves in a more or little akin situation where the United States is openly pursuing a policy contrary to the interests of Europe.
The fresh thing in this situation is that we're dealing with an argument inside the family. We are not talking about a wide-ranging intervention like Iraq, but about NATO members. We are talking about the founder of the NATO alliance, which suggests that he will do everything in his power to take over Greenland, which is part of the territory of another NATO member. That's what makes the situation special.
Even if this time it is not just an emotional appeal or an emotional policy on the part of the European public, I do have any hope on this issue. This is simply a much more structural approach in the sense that people are asking whether we can let the United States behave this way. However, it will only be revealed how long this Greenlandic minute will last. Let us hope that it will yet change this European approach to America.
LJ: What do you think was the decisive origin in Donald Trump's decision to change his position on Greenland? Do you consider this a temporary pause, or alternatively a strategical withdrawal? What is more, do you think that European solidarity and the support of the main countries for the European Commission on possible duties were a decisive factor, or alternatively interior factors specified as the US military or markets?
OO: That's a very good question. Honestly, I don't know. The fact that Europe's consequence was so fast and determined, made Donald Trump and his advisors think twice about the possible costs of continuing this policy. On the another hand, there was besides a revision of plans for a final solution on the American side, and whether they want to send American troops to stand up against Europeans.
I do not want to belittle or undermine Europe's position due to the fact that it was decisive. However, I highly uncertainty that this is the end of the story. We saw NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte effort to find a common ground of agreement with the Americans. However, we do not know what actually happened backstage.
Apparently the Americans and Donald Trump themselves underestimated Europe's response; he most likely thought it would be easy to convince the Greenlandians or the Danish government to give him what he wanted. I do not know if the Trump administration was willing to simply impose its will on the Danish government to take over the territory. We are not talking about extending the treaty or maintaining military bases, but about taking over the full territory.
We don't know what's gonna happen, and we request more information. First of all, we gotta wait until the communicative is over, due to the fact that I feel like it hasn't happened yet. This is simply a fresh situation, especially if it is taken into account that on the another side of the Atlantic, Donald Trump is looking for an chance to distract public opinion from home affairs. I'd say everything's going well so far. We won that part of the competition, but we'll see what happens next.
LJ: Do you think Donald Trump was able to fundamentally transform transatlantic relations into purely transactional alternatively than American leadership-based relationships? Do you besides agree with the Davos assessment that this represents a kind of break-up of the erstwhile relationship?
OO: I think it's a breakup of this relationship, but if it is, it's not just Donald Trump, it's all about American politics. Of course, Donald Trump makes everything seem rather unusual due to his different style, behaviour and way of conducting politics. If it were just him, we could say that we should just wait until he is replaced by another president of the United States to return to normal.
However, I agree that this is simply a breakthrough. It's about how America changes in the interior arena. Even if we consider the future democratic administration, there are changes that we can consider certain. Although I do not imagine that the Democratic organization president would be willing to endanger Denmark, we are discussing the "de-Americanisation" of global policy and the Atlantic Alliance. The United States is so focused on its interior agenda that it withdraws from global affairs. In that sense, it is simply a breakthrough.
As for the meaning of all this for our relation together, I believe we are watching the end of the old alliance as we know it. People frequently forget that relations between the United States and Europe developed as an alliance after planet War II; they were earlier simpler relations between countries. If this is the end of an alliance as we know it, then we are entering a period of selective partnership. We can talk about trade, investment and political or military cooperation, but it is no longer an alliance in which we share values and interests on both sides of the globe.
Even if there is simply a change in America and a more democratic president appears, the interests of the United States and the European Union will be different. As we mentioned, in this fresh world, we request to make agreements and work with everyone. The Atlantic Alliance is no longer the only specified alliance on a global scale. We are observing a fresh structure of economical and political cooperation worldwide. The United States will be involved, but it will be much different from what we have known in the past. We are presently dealing with countries specified as China and India and the improvement of trade relations between countries specified as Canada and the European Union.
LJ: Before moving on to a deeper discussion about the speech by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, I would like to ask about the article you late wrote. You stated in it that the fight against force is 1 of the most crucial features of state sovereignty. What do you mean by that, and how can this be applied to medium-sized powers or smaller states in a planet where old liberal rules may no longer apply?
OO: Take, for example, the debate on the digital taxation and the presence of large technology companies in our society. I think sovereignty here means saying no to your partner and being able to last the consequences. We are talking about sovereignty not only in the context of ensuring social safety and border control; sovereignty besides means the impact on the information ecosystem in its own country.
In this sense, I think that we in Europe – in Poland, France and Germany – must be able to organize our infosphere as we would like, alternatively of relying solely on social media or large technology companies from America. Of course, there is simply a price to pay. As Mark Carney mentioned in his speech, this is simply a political price, but if we are serious about being sovereign liberal states, then we must be able to pay it.
We should openly say that we would like to work with America on a number of issues. I think the worst that could happen is an effort to build European integration in opposition to America – doing something just due to the fact that we want to be others than the United States.
We request to find a affirmative way of doing business, saying, "We will make our own newssphere, our own clouds and our own artificial intelligence models." This is how sovereignty is built – it is not built in opposition to a partner, but due to the fact that any kind of safety is needed. You cannot trust solely on your partner's technologies or regulations. That is how I realize the debate on what is presently needed to be a sovereign liberal state in Europe.
LJ: How does the speech of Prime Minister Mark Carney – and specifically his metaphor regarding the illusion of the liberal order of the planet – mention to European countries and global relations in general?
OO: Firstly, erstwhile Prime Minister Mark Carney talks about "middle powers", the question arises who qualifies for them. I do not think that Europe is an average power in this sense, but Canada, Brazil, India and South Africa are surely a power. Whether Germany can be considered an average power besides raises any doubts.
Nevertheless, many of the issues raised by him apply to medium-sized countries specified as those in Europe. The first lesson we can learn from all this is not to defend the old order due to the fact that it is no longer there; the Canadian Prime Minister suggests alternatively that we start reasoning about how to make a fresh planet order. This applies to many European debates, including those presently held in Poland. We realize that America, China and the full planet have changed and that the multilateral strategy is in crisis or no longer exists. But we inactive act like we believe we can keep this model. It is so very crucial that we start discussing how we see the future, not how we can save the past.
The second point concerns sovereignty. As I have already mentioned, sovereignty has its price; 1 cannot pretend to be a sovereign state without defending this sovereignty. This applies not only to our relations with the United States on digital issues, but besides to China. We cannot defend our sovereignty over the digital divide or the influx of Chinese products that flood the European marketplace and cost us many jobs.
The 3rd issue is simply a serious problem for many people in Europe: we must halt reasoning of the planet order as being based on Europe or the West, due to the fact that the West as we know it no longer exists. We request to be open, look for fresh opportunities and connect with different countries to find our interests. Of course, this leads to a debate on our values, which Mark Carney did not mention. It is easy to say that the old order has ceased to be and that we must be open to cooperation with everyone, but then the question arises: what will happen to our values?
What does it mean to be a European liberal in a planet where democracy does not have much support? erstwhile you look at the present world, you can see that authoritarian tendencies are good, besides in Europe. So the question is, how can we be part of this fresh planet order without giving up our basic values?
Mark Carney focused on how to last the rivalry of the large powers, not to mention how to keep separate from another countries. I inactive believe that there is simply a European lifestyle and certain standards that are European or Western. However, it is not easy to answer the question of how to face this fresh planet by keeping to these values.
LJ: Do you think that the European Union can meet the challenges of Russian presence in Ukraine, economical challenges from China and expanding tensions in relations with the United States? In addition, how can Europe cope with these external tensions while tackling interior problems with populist nationalists who argue the European project?
OO: There's a paradox in that. The debate on European strategical autonomy – the thought that we request to make something of our own alternatively of relying solely on the United States – is simply a very long story. Since the end of the Cold War, many people in European institutions and capitals have advocated a planet that is not dominated by 1 power. Now we're at this point, but it turns out we're not prepared for that. This is the minute of truth.
Secondly, I believe that the origin of Europe's strength is that we are not threatening anyone. Europe has no imperial ambitions. Although it could be argued that our association agreements are a form of "soft imperialism", this does not mean that we are threatening others. We no longer aim to export our system; instead, we believe that we request to consolidate and focus on our own problems. This is simply a crucial difference compared to American politics, which is imperial in a very old-fashioned way, or the actions of Russia and China. As a power in itself, Europe remains very attractive to another countries. It is no coincidence that agreements with India are moving forward – both parties believe that Europe can play honestly.
As regards the question of populism, the key problem of liberal democratic order in Europe is that we talk a lot about values, but we do not supply public services specified as housing, safety or economical growth. This is simple and hard at the same time: the only way to consolidate Europe around liberal democratic values is to halt talking about these values and start implementing them. As Prime Minister Mark Carney believes, we should halt talking about who we are and just do what we believe so that people can see the results.
In the context of European integration, the worst script would be to launch another constitutional debate or debate on amending the treaties and introducing a qualified majority in abroad policy. any believe that if there is simply a problem with European democracy, then we should talk about institutions. I think we request to focus on all the promises made to our citizens. This will not happen overnight, but little talk and more action will convince people that European integration is of value.
In spite of all these problems, public opinion polls show that the majority of people support European integration due to the fact that they see that it brings benefits. In Poland, the younger generation is in a better position than the younger generation of their parents. This is simply a unique phenomenon due to the fact that in many Western countries specified as Spain and Germany, the younger generation is in a worse situation. We must focus on economical growth and the provision of public services. I think this is the only way forward.
This podcast was produced by the European Liberal Forum in collaboration with the Movieno Liberal Social and the Liberté Foundation!, with the financial support of the European Parliament. Neither the European Parliament nor the European Liberal Forum are liable for the content nor for any usage of this podcast.
Podcast is besides available on platforms Sound, Apple Podcast, Stitcher and Spotify
Dr. Olga Łabendowicz translated from English
Read English at 4liberty.eu
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