CSIS report: The war losses of the Russian Federation scope a million people, including 250,000 deaths

The Center for strategical and global Studies (CSIS) is 1 of the world's most influential think tanks dealing with abroad and safety policy analysis. It has been operating since 1962 and is based in Washington DC. Since its inception, CSIS has focused on examining global relations, geopolitical rivalries and the future of the American global role. His experts include erstwhile diplomats, military, intelligence analysts and academics with many years of experience.

The importance of CSIS reports is that they are prepared not only for academic environments, but above all for decision-makers – in the Pentagon, the White home and Congress. CSIS does not impose a single political vision; its analyses are frequently cited by politicians on both sides of the political scene. Think tank has a reputation for an independent and nonsubjective origin of information that can service as a basis for real strategical decisions.

CSIS reports, including those concerning the war in Ukraine, influence the form of US abroad policy and decisions on military aid, sanctions or diplomatic dialogue. Therefore, they are worth reading not only as analytical documents, but as part of a wider global policy puzzle.

Purpose and context of the study on the war in Ukraine

Report "Russia's Battlefield Woos in Ukraine" (Russian war losses in Ukraine) were created erstwhile the war in Ukraine lasted for more than 2 years. After the first surprise and success of Ukrainian defence in 2022 and the failed Russian offensive in the winter of 2023, 2024 brought any kind of stalemate. Although fighting continued, the front moved very slowly, and losses grew on both sides.

CSIS decided to look first of all at the situation on the Russian side – its military capabilities, losses and effectiveness of war activities. The intent of the study was besides to overthrow any myths circulating in the information space, especially the communicative of Russian propaganda about Putin's "unstopped march" troops.

The political context is besides crucial – the study was published at a time erstwhile there were heated debates in the US on the further backing of assistance to Ukraine. In Europe, however, conflict fatigue grew. In this situation, the CSIS paper was designed to show that the war was not a triumph for Russia, and the West has a real impact on its further course.

Analysis of Russian losses – human and hardware

One of the most powerful points of the study is the analysis of Russian losses – both in people and in equipment. According to estimates provided by CSIS, by mid-2025 Russia had lost more than 1 million soldiers – counting killed, wounded and those who were permanently eliminated from the fight (e.g. by desertion or intellectual injury). This is simply a number that outweighs the combined losses of the russian Union in the Afghan War, the First Chechen War, the Second Chechen War, the War against Georgia and the intervention in Syria – together.

Equally shocking is the number of equipment lost. The study estimates that Russia lost:

• 1 865 tanks,
• over 3,000 combat infantry cars,
• over 1,100 armored transporters.

By comparison, this is more than the full armored equipment of any NATO countries. Russian troops, despite mobilization and attempts to increase war production, neglect to keep up with the replenishment of losses. As a result, outdated tanks from the times of the USSR, frequently in mediocre method condition, and untrained reservists and prisoners, are included in the service.

Russia's losses are besides disproportionately greater than Ukraine. CSIS indicates that the failure ratio may be between 2:1 and even 5:1 against the Russians. This means that Ukraine, with the aid of Western armaments and asymmetric strategy, is inflicting far more harm on the aggressor than it itself is suffering.

Territorial advancement of Russia – scale and importance

One of the key myths the CSIS study exposes is the conviction of Russia's large territorial advancement in Ukraine. Contrary to the communicative presented by Moscow, real prey is very limited. Since January 2024, Russian troops have occupied only about 5,000 km2. In comparison, this is about the area of the Opole state – and this represents little than 1% of the territory of Ukraine.

The study states that even these tiny advances have been ransomed by immense losses. The Russians take the area virtually a metre by the subway. In the Kharkiv region, the rate of attack was average... 50 meters a day. In the conditions of modern battlefield, with a numerical, technological and artillery advantage, specified a consequence is devastating to the reputation of the Russian army.

Moreover, many of these territories have no strategical value. The villages and towns occupied are frequently destroyed, depopulated, and their maintenance requires a constant commitment of forces – which further burdens the logistics of the Russian army. CSIS indicates that Russia has not won any major city since the conflict of Bachmut, and there besides the triumph was alternatively Pyrrus – the area was occupied, but at the price of thousands of killed soldiers from Wagner's units and regular army.

Operational and logistical errors of the Russian Army

CSIS besides examines in item the reasons why Russia, despite being outnumbered, is incapable to accomplish a swift and decisive victory. 1 key origin is operational errors, which systematically undermine the effectiveness of Russian activities.

Above all, Russia has failed to accomplish an adequate level of coordination between different types of troops. Aviation operates in isolation from land forces, artillery does not always support infantry, and communication between command frequently fails. This leads to chaos at the tactical level and in effect to failures at the front.

Another problem is logistics. The CSIS study stresses that Russia has tremendous difficulties in delivering ammunition, fuel and food on the front lines – especially in more distant areas. Ukrainian precision strikes in warehouses and supply lines only make the situation worse. There are cases where Russian troops must operate for respective days without artillery or air support. There is besides the quality of soldiers. any Russian units are poorly trained reservists, mobilized without prior preparation. Others are erstwhile prisoners incarcerated in assault troops, frequently sent to the front as “gun meat”. specified practices weaken morale, lead to desertion and increase interior chaos.

CSIS besides notes that the command strategy in the Russian army is highly bureaucratic. The commanders are afraid to make their own decisions and anticipate detailed orders from above – which makes their reaction to the dynamic situation on the front very slow.

Strategic proposals for Ukraine and the West

Analyzing the situation on the front and state of the Russian army, CSIS points out that despite the difficulties Ukraine inactive has a chance to reverse the war. However, it is crucial to keep support from the West – both financial and military. The study clearly states: Ukraine cannot win alone, but Russia can lose if the West keeps the pressure.

For Ukraine, the most crucial thing is to keep the coherence of the defence system, to further strengthen logistics and to make the ability of precise impact in the back of Russian lines. CSIS besides suggests investments in drone systems and electronic combat, which have proved crucial on the front in fresh months. For the West, the conclusion is clear: Russia is not invincible. Despite propaganda and violent methods, Russian armed forces are exhausted, underfunded and full of structural errors. Maintaining aid to Ukraine, the West can not only support the country in defending sovereignty but besides weaken the geopolitical threat coming from Moscow.

The study besides warns against false feeling of war fatigue – CSIS underlines that Russia hopes for long-term discouragement of the West. It is so essential to keep political determination, sanctions force and cooperation within NATO and the EU.

CSIS recommendations and possible war improvement scenarios

The CSIS study is not limited to the analysis itself – it besides includes circumstantial recommendations. Analysts believe that the West should proceed to support Ukraine in respective key dimensions: supplies of advanced weapons (including drones, air defence systems and far-reaching artillery), improvement of defence infrastructure, and support of Ukrainian intelligence capabilities and cybersecurity.

One advice is besides to proceed and intensify economical sanctions against Russia. According to CSIS, although Moscow partially adapted to sanctions of 2022 and 2023, its economy remains susceptible to pressure. Limiting access to modern military and civilian technologies can have long-term effects on the production capacity of the Russian arms industry.

Regarding the scenarios for further improvement of the war, CSIS mentions three:

• optimistic scenario: Ukraine, with the support of the West, stabilizes the front and begins local counterattacks. Russia loses its initiative and at the same time increases interior force – a society tired of losses begins to question the sense of war. As a result, Moscow agrees to the negotiations.
• pessimistic scenario: Western aid is weakening, Ukraine is losing its ability to defend, and Russia is utilizing a numerical and territorial advantage. The conflict turns into a devastating positional war, without a clear winner, but with large losses on both sides.
• intermediate scenario: the front line stabilizes, the war turns into a long-term frozen conflict, akin to the situation in Donbas after 2015. Both sides bear costs and the hazard of escalation (e.g. towards Moldova or the Baltic States) remains real.

The importance of the CSIS study to global policy

The “Russia’s Battlefield Women in Ukraine” study is not just a war analysis – it is simply a political paper in the broadest sense. His message aims to influence the perception of war in Ukraine among decision makers, public opinion and allies of the United States.

Firstly, the study serves as a counter-narration against Russian propaganda. Showing Russia's real losses and limited successes, CSIS refutes the story of the undefeated army and "an inevitable victory". This is crucial not only for Ukrainian morale, but besides for maintaining an global support coalition.

Secondly, this paper is simply a informing function for countries that may consider "normalising" relations with Russia. CSIS recalls that Russian aggression is systemic and its tolerance threatens to destabilise further regions. Maintaining both military and economical pressures is so crucial beyond Ukraine.

Finally, the CSIS study besides has an educational dimension. For many Western societies, the war in Ukraine has already become a distant conflict. The study helps to realize that the result of this clash will have long-term consequences, both for Europe's safety and for a global order based on global law.

Criticism and limitations of the study – what else is worth knowing

Although the CSIS study is reliable and based on reliable sources (including intelligence, satellite images and open-source analyses), it is not without limitations. Firstly, access to full data from the front is limited. Both Russia and Ukraine usage the tactics of controlling information, which is why many estimates are based on statistical models and interpolation alternatively than full figures.

Secondly, the study focuses mainly on the Russian side. little space was devoted to analysing the situation on the Ukrainian side – although it is known that Ukraine is besides suffering immense losses. From a military point of view, specified a focus may be justified, but for a full image of the conflict it is besides essential to analyse Kiev's actions and problems.

Another issue is the political context. CSIS, despite its declared independence, is an American think tank and its position does not always gotta coincide with European or global. For this reason, it is worth reading CSIS reports in comparison with analyses, e.g. from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) or the Center for east Studies (OSW), to get a fuller picture.

Finally, the study does not mostly examine social or intellectual factors that can influence the dimension and nature of the war: moods in Russian society, demographic situation, the function of misinformation. These are all elements that are besides of strategical importance.

Summary – main conclusions and further questions

The “Russia’s Battlefield Woes in Ukraine” study is simply a detailed and convincing analysis showing that Russian aggression against Ukraine not only did not produce the expected results, but ended in a series of costly failures. Russia suffers tremendous losses – human, hardware and moral – and its territorial advancement is minimal.

The West, if it maintains assistance to Ukraine, has the chance to play a key function in ending this conflict. At the same time, the war is not yet settled – Russia inactive has the resources to run a long-term campaign. Therefore, a long-term strategy is needed, not just a reactive one.

The CSIS study besides raises crucial questions:

• How long will Western societies be willing to support Ukraine?
• Can Russia scope for escalation, specified as cyber attacks or sabotage operations?
• What will Ukraine look like after the war – politically, economically, militarily?

There are no simple answers today. But 1 thing is certain: the CSIS paper is an crucial informing – and at the same time a tool – for those who want the global order not to be dominated by force but by law.