Chinese investments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 2023 to 2025

Xi Jinping's 3rd term, which began in 2023, is characterised by an always clearer emphasis on Chinese presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. China has been building its influence in Africa for a long time, but for respective years there have been expanding initiatives in key sectors for economical and security, specified as mining, transport or logistics. This allows the PRC to strengthen its position in the global supply chain of natural materials essential for the energy transition and the gradual independency from fossil fuels.

To support the energy transformation towards clean energy, China acquires the mineral resources essential to produce advanced technologies specified as lithium batteries, electrical vehicles and solar panels. With the Belt and way initiative, Beijing increased investment in countries rich in natural materials, driving the extraction of these natural materials, with peculiar emphasis on low and medium-income countries. Over the last 2 decades, the PRC has financed the acquisition, improvement and operation of many copper and cobalt mines worldwide, with peculiar emphasis on mining activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo[1].

Since the start of Xi Jinping's 3rd term, it has been committed to replacing the long-term rule of "reform and opening" with self-sufficiency and the request to reduce China's vulnerability to external threats. His words: "The essence of the fresh dynamics of improvement is to accomplish a advanced level of self-sufficiency" emphasize the clear continuation of Chinese policy[2]. It is believed that, in line with current policy in the future, the pursuit of economical improvement may be little crucial than political, safety and social issues, and Xi is willing to sacrifice economical growth for political purposes[3]. We can see clearly that these objectives coincide with the directions of Chinese investment, as they let them to safe the essential natural materials and to become independent of competition.

When discussing Chinese investments in the DRC, it is impossible not to mention the relation between the 2 countries. China's relations with the Democratic Republic of Congo date back to the 19th century. In 1887, representatives of the Free State Congo established contacts with the Qing dynasty manor. The diplomatic relations between the 2 countries were established in 1961. In fresh years, especially since the beginning of the 21st century, the relation between the 2 countries has gained importance through Chinese investments in the DRC, as well as exports from that country to China, which is rapidly increasing. An crucial minute of the relation was the annexation of the DRC to the Chinese Belt and way initiative in 2021. At the same time, China besides decided to cancel the DRC debt of US$28 million and besides provided aid of US$17 million.[4]. In 2025, the debt of the DRC to China could be up to $2.9 billion[5], and as much as 45% of external sovereign debt is drawn in China[6].

The DRC is an highly crucial country for Chinese investment on both the African continent and the world. This country is even described as an "epicentre of Chinese investments in Africa". As the world's largest cobalt maker (70% of planet production)[7], which is simply a key component for the production of batteries for electrical vehicles, smartphones, laptops, as well as rising prices and request for this natural material, this country is crucial for securing supply chains. The mining sector in the last 2 decades has been ranked 3rd in terms of Chinese investments on the African continent (the transport sector was the first and the energy sector was the second).[8]. China is the world's largest consumer of cobalt due to the developed manufacturing sector. Most of the cobalt mined in the DRC goes to China. Moreover, most cobalt mining in the DRC is controlled by the Chinese side[9]. In addition to cobalt production, the DRC is besides a crucial copper maker (approximately 11% of planet production)[10], and lithium[11].

According to data from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), ZIB flows from China to the DRC amounted to 160 million dollars in 2023 and 274.13 million dollars in 2024. The Chinese cumulated ZIB (foreign direct investment) in the DRC amounted to $3.914 billion in 2023, and 4.269 billion in 2024.[12] These values show that these investments are crucial and are characterised by a growth trend. akin trends are seen in data on Chinese investments in the DRC from 2023 to 2025 according to the China Global Investment Tracker report, developed by the American Enterprise Institute. However, it is worth mentioning that both sources disagree in the way data is collected. Data China Global Investment Tracker collected by The Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute are sourced from corporate sources, usually Chinese participants, but besides abroad partners, if available. Transactions can be disclosed by companies, then corrected, and data is verified all 2 years. Moreover, GCIT data only covers transactions worth over USD 100 million. MOFCOM data are compiled on the basis of a direct location (as a result, a large share of Chinese investments is located in taxation havens specified as Hong Kong or the Caribbean). Furthermore, MOFCOM publishes only aggregated monthly and yearly data[13].

Table 1 Chinese investments in DKR according to China Global Investment Tracker from 2023 to 2025

Source: American Enterprise Institute and Heritage Foundation, China Global Investment Tracker, July 2024, https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/ (accessed 18.09.2025).

The above figures clearly show that the inflow of Chinese capital to the DRC has remained unchangeable in fresh years. The mining sector plays a leading role, but transport projects that improve access to mines and ports are besides important. It is worth noting the immense investments of China Molybdenum – a full of over $3.7 billion over a fewer months 2023 – confirming the crucial importance of cobalt and copper imports in Chinese industrial strategy.

When discussing Chinese investments in the DRC, the Sicomines task (Sino-Congolese mining). The agreement was signed in 2008 between the Government of the DRC and a group of Chinese investors who gained a 68% share in the joint venture for cobalt and copper mining. In return, the Chinese declared, among others, the construction of roads and hospitals. The agreement was even referred to as the "contract of the century" and was to be a symbol of exemplary cooperation between countries[14]. After years, however, public opinion in the DRC questioned the profits of the task for the country. To this end, an analysis was carried out which showed an uneven distribution of capital to the detriment of the DRC, underestimation of copper deposits, and failure to meet the contractual conditions in the context of the promised construction of critical infrastructure facilities. The analysis besides showed that China gained $10 billion on the deal, while the DRC obtained infrastructure worth only $822 million. As a consequence of the analysis, discussions were held on renegotiating the terms of the agreement, which became a turning point in the relation between the 2 countries. In 2023, DRC president Félix Tshisekedi went to China. utilizing the increasing request for cobalt and copper, the DRC government negotiated around $324 million in yearly infrastructure funds until 2040, as well as expanding the full infrastructure investment pool from $3 billion to $7–7.5 billion. For China, this means maintaining unchangeable access to strategical minerals and for the DRC, more resources for roads, power plants and transport[15]. Investments were besides linked to copper prices[16].

In parallel to the renegotiation, a series of large investments have begun, which illustrate the pace of Chinese engagement. Zijin Mining and CITIC metallic are further Chinese companies, actively investing in the DRC metallic industry. As a consequence of long-term contracts signed with the Canadian company Ivanhoe Mines, they secured 80% of Kamoa-Kakula steel production, whose launch was scheduled for September 2025. This deadline has been respected, while plans for the years 2026-2027 have been revealed.[17]. This complex, thanks to investments, is expected to become the world's largest natural material mining centre in Africa and the world's 3rd (it is expected to even take second place). It is besides worth noting that in 2023 the DRC became the second planet maker of copper (Chile is the first). As a consequence of these investments, exports of copper from Congo to China increased by 71% year-on-year, reaching 1.48 million tonnes[18].

Investments frequently face barriers to regulation introduced by the DRC government, but this does not slow down investment dynamics. An example is the increase in coal mining in Congo by the Chinese company CMOC, despite the export ban introduced to reduce oversupply on the market, which caused prices to fall.[19].

Another major task within the metallic sector was announced on 3 July 2024. The Chinese battery maker Dowstone Technology announced the construction of a copper mill worth $165 million. This hut is expected to produce 30,000 tons of copper cathodes per year. In 2024, imports from the DRC accounted for 36% of Chinese imports of this natural material. This is simply a crucial increase from only 10% in 2020[20].

As regards infrastructure investments, a crucial task is among others. construction of the Kinshasa bypass, whose construction began in 2024. It is simply a 63 km long of road to reduce traffic jams. Moreover, within the renegotiated Sicomines agreement, regional roads and the 240-megawatt Busanga hydro power plant were besides planned.[21], whose construction was completed in October 2023. These investments show that Chinese companies are not limited to mining alone. These projects not only facilitate the transport of natural materials but besides bring real benefits to local communities.

However, the Government of the DRC expressed concern about the advanced dependence on investment from the mediate East. The fact that up to 80% of mining operations are carried out by Chinese investors poses a threat to the economy[22]. Moreover, Chinese companies operate repeatedly in conflict regions specified as confederate Katanga or Kivu. Chinese companies are frequently unregulated or illegal, which exacerbates local tensions[23]. Consequently, we can observe the increasingly assertive attitude of the DRC government. An example is the effort to suspend the agreement between Trafibra's partner, Chemaf, and the Chinese Norinco in 2024. The State mining company of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gecamines, made a symbolic offer of $1 million to acquisition the assets of the cobalt and copper producer, the Chemaf mining company, to prevent China from expanding control of critical metals in that country.[24]. This resulted in a US$1.4 billion stake in Norinco's offer, including debt repayment and expansion of Etoile and Mutoshi mines, made in June 2024. This deepened the deadlock, which further complicated lobbying by American officials against Chinese dominance in a mineral-rich central African copper strip[25]. As a consequence, Norinco proposed in March 2025 to increase the participation of the DRC government in the venture from 5 to 15 percent, offered it a proportional share in metallic production and committed to an investment of $500 million, but despite these concessions, Gecamines maintains opposition, seeking to keep state control of strategical natural materials. Chemaf, supported by the Trafigure Group, informed creditors that the proposed acquisition by Norinco Group would not take place as the transaction did not get the essential approvals of the Democratic Republic of the Congo[26]. The situation can besides be defined by a possible triumph for American efforts to loosen Chinese control of mineral supply chains.

Although we see a crucial increase in investment dynamics, the increasing presence of Chinese companies frequently creates tensions. Social organisations point to the continuing limited transparency of contracts and the dependence of investment financing on fluctuations in copper prices. Environmental problems and incidents involving local armed groups are noticeable in mining regions. The deficiency of effective civilian protection and weak mechanisms for the supervision of investments by the State allows Beijing to keep control of mines, despite ongoing interior conflicts in the DRC[27]. Moreover, although infrastructure projects are impressive, a large part of the profits inactive go mainly to abroad corporations. Recently, considerable controversy has besides sparked the case of 3 Chinese citizens sentenced to 7 years in prison and a fine of $600,000 for illegal exploitation of mineral resources[28].

The partnership between China and the Democratic Republic of the Congo reflects a wider transformation in North-South relations, offering an alternate to the conventional approach of the West and giving African countries, including the DRC greater freedom of action, as opposed to the conditionality of frequently attributed Western aid. Furthermore, China strengthened its position in the DRC erstwhile Western companies withdrew or could not compete with Chinese funding. Tshisecedi, however, tries to exploit the rivalry of the US and China, offering Washington access to resources for military and political support[29]. There are besides attempts to improve management in the mining sector, specified as the suspension of illegal Chinese mines, as well as the Lobito project. However, these attempts cannot win without clear government support in Kinshasa[30].

Although investments make jobs, the hazard of Dutch illness is increasingly highlighted. Although mining generates 89% of exports, it employs only 2.3% of the home workforce. Consequently, despite the increase in government revenue, structural dependence on exports of natural materials can reduce long-term economical diversification. There are besides concerns about resettlement, environmental degradation and social unrest resulting from insufficient community involvement.[31].

In conclusion, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not only a origin of key natural materials specified as cobalt, lithium or copper, but besides a pillar of presence on the African continent within the Belt and way initiative. The increase in investment in peculiar since 2023 shows that Beijing has consistently implemented a strategy for safeguarding interests in the DRC, peculiarly in the mining industry.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo can be identified as 1 of China's most crucial economical partners in Africa, which has been increasingly noticeable in fresh years. Events specified as the renegotiation of the Sicomines Agreement, the inflow of fresh investments in both mining and infrastructure sectors, as well as the increasing trade with the DRC underline that the country is at the heart of the African continent strategy. Although the economical cooperation of both countries is not without challenges, risks and controversy, Beijing nevertheless sees the DRC as a key partner on the way to maintaining its lead in electronics, green transformation and electromobility. Without minerals specified as lithium or cobalt, it would not be possible to produce lithium-ion batteries that drive electrical cars, laptops or smartphones. Without copper, China would not produce electrical wires, transformers and energy infrastructure, including for transmission networks and electromobility. Furthermore, these natural materials are essential in the arms industry, which underlines their importance for military security. In conclusion, without cooperation with the DRC Beijing, it will be highly hard to accomplish its economical objectives, and China will surely strengthen its influence in both the DRC and all of Africa, while trying to keep its dominant position in the region, especially in the context of its rivalry with the US.

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