Author: Veronika Barankovych crucial support: Prof. Mirosław Sułek, Ernest Szymala
Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the global strategy of forces has undergone gradual but lasting transformation. The collapse of the russian Union and the short-lived dominance of the United States created conditions for the improvement of a strategy with unipolar features, but it began to be eroded in the early 21st century. This process was mostly a consequence of the fast economical growth of developing countries and the comparative slowdown in the dynamics of Western economies. As a result, the global "economic mass" shift towards Asia, the mediate East and parts of Africa is increasingly marked.
One of the most visible manifestations of these changes is the increasing importance of BRICS format, which initially included Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. In 2024, this block was formally expanded to include Saudi Arabia, the United arabian Emirates, Iran, Egypt and Ethiopia.[1], which importantly increased its combined economic, demographic and natural material potential. However, this extension does not mean the automatic creation of a coherent political actor, but is an crucial origin in changing the proportion of the global strategy of forces in the structural dimension.
In parallel, the United States and the European Union keep advanced institutional, technological and financial stability, but their participation in global economical power is gradually relativised. This phenomenon is not due to the fast collapse of the West, but to the fast growth of another centres and long-term demographic, production and improvement trends. The 2008 financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic and the global supply chain disruption further highlighted these processes, accelerating structural changes in the global economy.
In this context, it is appropriate to usage analytical tools to quantify changes in the power of states and blocs in the long term. Powerometric analysis, proposed by Mirosław Słałka, allows synthetic measurement of economical power in relation to the planet as a whole, taking into account both the scale of resources and their structural conditions. Its application enables the recognition of persistent trends in the global strategy of forces beyond short-term fluctuations.
Methodology
The methodology presented is rooted in the achievements of the explanation of global relations and geopolitics, with the support of cybernetics and praxeology.
Model Piece[2] allows to calculate, inter alia, the 2 key types of power of the State applicable for this study:
Economic power is simply a synthetic expression of the collective capacity of a given population in a given time and space. Its value is determined in relation to the global strategy of forces, which makes it comparatively "free". This is due to the fact that the economical power reflects the balance of power, shaped in a long historical process, which gives it a feature of advanced inertia. As a result, it is not possible to make a extremist change in the short word (except for global earthquakes specified as war). For this reason, economical power is 1 of the most nonsubjective indicators that de facto politicians have limited influence over the short term. Thanks to this stableness it is possible to forecast comparatively reliable changes in the global power strategy even in the long run.
Economic power is operated through management results measured by gross home product (GDP), supplemented by demographic (population) and spatial (area).
The military power, which is the second key expression of the state's power, is closely linked to the economical power that can be considered as its foundation. In another words, military power is simply a militarized form of economical power. It has a dual dimension of militarisation: economic, resulting from the separation of military spending from GDP, and demographic, linked to the allocation of part of the population to military service. The military burden may be significant, in peacetime military spending is usually between 1% and 10% of GDP, and military personnel in the population from 0.1% to 1.5%. During times of threat of war, and especially during wartime, these indicators are expanding significantly.
Military power is more subjective than economical power due to the fact that it is straight dependent on political decisions. These decisions, although not arbitrary, are subject to various restrictions, specified as public opinion, alliance commitments or available production capacity.
Because military power is part of economical power, it should be much little than economical power. It is indeed. However, in the analysis we adopted a convention according to which both types of power mention to the world, i.e. that both the world's general power and the world's military power equals 1,000.
In terms of military power, 3 groups of countries can be distinguished. The first is countries with akin economical and military power. The second is countries that have clearly greater economical power than military power. The 3rd group are countries with much higher military power than economical power – they are heavy militarized countries
Military power includes military-economic factors (military expenditure that is part of GDP), demographic-military (number of active service soldiers) and spatial (area of territory).
Indications:
Pe – economical power; Pm – military power; GDP – gross home product;
L – population; a – territory; WW – military expenditure; S – number of soldiers in active service.
This model is easy to realize and apply, besides for non-specialists. It is based on a essential and adequate number of constant factors in past inherent in the existence and functioning of human groups, including political units. As such, the model's author considered: people operating in a peculiar space and at a certain time, representing certain organizational and production skills or the ability to collective action, i.e. the social processing of matter, energy and information. due to the fact that people act, they have certain results. From the political unit's point of view, GDP (Gross National Product) can be considered a good synthetic result. another possible measures, specified as GNP (Gross National Product), may be considered, but this is not applicable at this phase of the consideration. It cannot be excluded that in the future there will be a better indicator, more adapted to measurement the effects of humans. So the variables that we will consider are people, space, time and the results of collective actions. The statistic utilized in the study come from respective sources, the number of which has been tried to be kept to the minimum necessary. Data on population, GDP by currency exchange rate and area of territory of the countries come first from the planet Bank (WB) database. Data on the number of soldiers in active service and military spending in US dollars were taken from the "The Military Balance" yearbooks published by the London global Institute for strategical Studies (IISS). The missing data from the abovementioned sources were supplemented by data from the following sources by hierarchy: the global Monetary Fund (IMF), the Stockholm global Institute for Peace investigation (SIPRI) and the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Changes in economical power in the global system
Figure 1. The economical power of BRICS, BRICS-extended, United States, European Union (World=1000)
Source: own development
Figure 1 illustrates something that the figures themselves do not show so clearly: the United States has maintained power at an almost flat level of about 150-157 mM for 2 decades. The European Union has besides been oscillating around 119 mM for years, without a visible upward trend. Meanwhile, BRICS rises almost geometrically. This is no longer a correction of proportions – it is simply a change in the structure of the world. While the West was an economical hub for the global strategy in the 1990s, present it is not a dynamic but an organization and technological advantage. The United States remains stable, but their growth is flat and their position is maintained not by the scale of the economy, but by the strength of institutions, technology, innovation and the function of the dollar.
In 2023, BRICS owned 269,485 mM, already ahead of both the US and the EU. However, the breakthrough occurred in 2024 erstwhile Saudi Arabia, the United arabian Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia and Iran joined the block. As a consequence of this extension, BRICS increased to 298,744 mM, and in an extended option, covering countries that have declared their want to join up to 330,013 mM. It's the biggest economical leap of any block in the 21st century.
The decline in the economical power of the European Union is peculiarly evident erstwhile we look at the countries that have been of its strength for years. It is the biggest and historically strongest economies that endure the biggest losses today. The figures show that Germany, France and Italy, among the “lost” are the 3 countries that have decided on the economical form of Europe for decades. Germany lost as much as -17.20 mM, making this decline the largest in the full EU, and Italy and France reduced their power by -13.40 mM and -11.98 mM respectively. Even medium-sized, unchangeable economies specified as Finland and Austria have recorded crucial declines, respectively -0.98 mM and -1.41 mM. This list besides includes Greece, whose decline is reflected in the long-term effects of the debt crisis.
Against this background, BRICS is increasing into the world's largest economical bloc in terms of economical power calculated utilizing the Slek method. At the same time, it is worth remembering that although the BRICS mass grows faster than the West, this block remains politically inconsistent. It is simply a coalition of countries with frequently conflicting interests, without a common decision centre and without institutions that could mobilise its possible as a single force. In another words, BRICS has economical power, but it does not yet have the capacity to usage it uniformly.
Summary
All these processes form a larger picture: the planet is clearly moving towards multipolar order. Western domination does not vanish due to the fact that the US or the EU is rapidly weakening, but due to the fact that others are increasing faster. The proportions change not due to crises, but due to structural trends. BRICS gains mass thanks to demography, resources and emerging markets growth. Europe is losing its share due to the slowdown and ageing of the population. The United States remains stable, but is no longer the centre of the economical mass of the world.
If current dynamics continues, global balance will take the form of 3 strength centres: the US as a technological and organization state, the EU as the largest integrated marketplace and BRICS as a block with the top economical weight. The planet will economically start to match a more equalized arrangement than always since the end of the Cold War. BRICS will become the largest economical actor in terms of power, while the US and the EU will keep their position not by scale but by structural advantage. Data from 1992-2024 indicate that it is simply a long-term process, not an episode – and that the global strategy of forces entered a fresh phase of balance.
[1] Wikipedia. (2024). Member states of BRICS. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Member_states_of_BRICS
[2] Salads, M., & Szymala, E. (2024). State Power 2025: Powerometer Rankings. fresh Europe Institute.
