And we entered the 3rd summertime of a full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war (although let us remember that according to the east custom, the warmest of the seasons began with June). In 2022, at the beginning of the summer, there was a conflict for Donbas, and the Russians had the initiative. respective weeks later, with amazement and admiration, we observed the advancement of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkivszczyz. In turn, a different operation of the Ukrainian armed forces took place a year ago – in Zaporozh. At the time, we did not know that it would end in failure; optimism and hope prevailed among Ukrainians and conflict observers. And what will the summertime of 2024 bring us?
Optimism and hope are little present than a year ago. The Russians managed to hit Ukrainian energy hard. They were helped by the collapse of Ukraine's anti-aircraft defence, resulting in the country suffering from a serious energy deficit (the needs are met in 30%). A colleague from Odessa sent me a image of 1 of the main streets of the city – almost all building was a working generator. In the summertime of misery, power shortages are not so annoying. But they will be specified in autumn and winter, which could origin a further decline in social sentiment.
Will the energy strategy be able to patch up by then? Nope. However, it is essential to effort and this is the most serious civilian challenge for Ukrainian authorities and their abroad allies. But it is besides a military challenge – after all, it is essential to supply a protective umbrella for reconstructed objects. due to the fact that the Russians will not let go and there will be further attacks on power plants and transmission networks, that's beautiful sure.
On the front, aggressors inactive have the initiative, but they have not yet been able to make it a major success. Yes, in fresh months they have taken any Ukraine, but it has happened at the price of terrible losses. Their effect is simply a crucial decrease in the capabilities of the combat invasive forces. Most front units have at their disposal at most 40-50 percent of the scheduled tanks, dramatically missing combat cars, increasingly being replaced by... motorcycles and tiny quads (under contract called golf carts). Russian Army in Ukraine is strong above all the weakness of your opponent; nonsubjective analytical-military criteria make it comparatively low.
Two Russian T80 tanks captured Ukrainian soldiers in Bachmut, Ukraine, on 21 June 2024.
Ukrainian Army recovered from Ammunition crisisWho's been digesting her since last fall. The comparative abundance of means of combat allowed most front lines to be stabilized, and it makes it easier to defy Russian attacks on Donetsk. However, I don't think he's going to translate into anything more in the summer. It is worth remembering that Ukrainian armed forces Still suffering from a deficiency of surviving power – The fresh recruits will only scope the front in the autumn. Which leads me to conclude that the hot months will flow in the realities of the position war, in which the Russians will stay more active.
At the same time, account should be taken of the fact that Putin continues to increase its Ukrainian quota quantitatively. In mid-June this year, 700,000 Russian soldiers were active in the "special military operation", 3.5 times more than in February 2022. This increase is not accompanied by an adequate level of equipment, which is due to 2 reasons. Firstly, the nominally powerful Russian arms manufacture is not able to “handle” a full-scale war, and secondly, the “renta after ZSRS” is already ending, or crucial russian supplies, erstwhile collected for the occasion of the NATO war. The Russian leader – like his russian predecessors – is trying to bridge the quality deficit with human mass. Or to proceed the war? How about to end it?
Among military analysts, thesis is popular, according to which personnel changes in the Russian Ministry of Defence – the surrender of MON to economists – aim to “optimize” the defence sector. To compression as much out of the army and manufacture as possible, with the intention of exploiting this possible in a "last chance hit". After which Moscow will do anything to return the good old times of economical and political cohabitation with the West. Only that these "Russian Ardens" (foreseen as a successful operation) should not be expected sooner than early autumn.
