Destroying blows to the Iranian fleet, anti-aircraft defence and military infrastructure, and even the death of many ruling class representatives – including Ayatollah Ali Chamenei himself – during the American-Israeli operation "Epicka fury", do not mean triumph over Iran. Tehran remains a powerful player, capable of utilizing painful retaliatory blows, not only against the enemy's armed forces, but besides in his economical interests. And the most powerful weapon he has is the ability to block the Ormuz Strait.
In a fewer days since Begin attacks on IranThe government has proven its resilience. Not only did it neglect after decapitating the country's leadership, it was able to carry out effective retaliatory strikes throughout the region. Iranian rockets and drones fell on military bases and critical infrastructure facilities in Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United arabian Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, and even Cyprus. any of the missiles were intercepted, but the scale of the attacks itself showed that Iran retained the ability to conduct military operations.
On March 2, Iran besides announced the closure of the Ormuz Strait, announcing that any ship that tries to cross it will be destroyed. Since then, there have been many reports of attacks on merchant ships in the region, and the blockade, at least temporarily, seems to be effective: traffic through the Strait has died. And even a short-term cessation of shipping can have serious consequences: around 20 percent of the world's transport of oil and natural gas, making it 1 of the most strategically crucial places in the world.
Drone strikes
Iran, of course, is not able to physically close the Strait, utilizing its navy to do this – this 1 does not have much chance in clashing with the U.S. fleet and aviation, and has besides been severely damaged at the very beginning of Operation Epicka fury. However, Tehran, aware of the disparity of forces, has been working for years on asymmetric methods of conducting a naval war, allowing paralysing maritime transport by creating a advanced level of risk.
When almost 10 years ago, in October 2016, an attack on the gas tanker Galicia Spirit occurred in the Red Sea, the event did not echo widely. Although the media reported an detonation close the ship, as no crew associate was injured and the gas tanker itself was not damaged, the case was rapidly forgotten.
Meanwhile, this attack, although unsuccessful, was the first trailer of the fresh asymmetric naval warfare tactics tested by Iran and its allies. It was carried out by Ansar Allah, an armed arm Huti movement, 1 of the sides of the Yemeni civilian War. It was besides 1 of the first recorded cases of usage against a civilian ship of a remotely controlled boat filled with explosive material or in another words: a sea drone.
In an attack on "Galicia Spirit Huti", supported by Iran, they launched a run to break the U.S.-Saudi maritime blockade of their controlled areas of Yemen. A fewer months later, in January 2017, they utilized a sea drone with more success: they struck a Saudi frigate with it, damaging the ship and killing respective sailors. Since then, attacks with drones or antiship missiles on merchant ships and warships in the Red Sea have become increasingly frequent, culminating after the war in Gaza. Most likely throughout this time the operation was supervised – and learned from it – by officers of the Iranian muslim Revolutionary defender Corps.
Since those first attacks a decade ago, remote-controlled boats on ships have changed a lot. First of all, the war in Ukraine caused the fast improvement of technology and tactics for the usage of drones – both sea and air. Small, comparatively inexpensive compared to classical unmanned anti-shipping systems, they are able to carry large explosives, decision over long distances and attack accurately. It would be naive to believe that another countries did not observe this improvement and did not effort to implement solutions that proved to be so effective.
In the first days following the start of the attacks on Iran, reports of drones and rockets being struck into commercial ships in the region, not only those passing through the strait, but besides those standing in anchorages or ports. The mining infrastructure was besides attacked, including the world's largest oil refinery in Ras Tanura on the east coast of Saudi Arabia. Not all information about attacks must be true; in war, especially in the chaos of her first days, disinformation is common. There is no doubt, however, that there have been attacks, and in fear of further commercial ships do not dare enter the Strait of Ormuz, and refineries hold off work.
This is the essence of this blockade: not the physical takeover of all unit that Iran is not capable of, but the creation of specified a sense of danger, that shipowners and captains themselves make the decision to halt shipping by the Ormuz Strait. precisely according to a script already rehearsed on the another side of the Arabian Peninsula: in 2019 and 2023 Huti attacks on merchant ships in the Red Sea caused many shipowners to choose to sail a much longer but safer way around Africa alternatively of risking swimming along the Yemeni coast.
Tanker close the coast of the city of Al-Djir on the Strait of Ormuz in the northern emirat of Ras al-Chayma, 2026.
In the case of the Ormuz Strait, however, the problem is that there is no alternate way in practice. Moreover, Tehran besides announced further attacks on land infrastructure. "We will attack the pipelines and we will not let even a drop of oil to leave the region," announced General Sardar Jabbari of the muslim Revolution defender Corps. "The price of oil will scope $200 in the coming days," he said.
The script in which Iran would be able to meet these threats in the long run and completely block exports of oil or gas from the Gulf is very unlikely. But there is equally small chance that the United States will win by raids alone to destruct Iran's possible for further attacks. Tehran is and in the close future will be able to make the transport of natural materials through the Ormuz Strait hard, affecting their availability and prices in planet markets. This would have consequences far beyond the mediate East.
Three scenarios
For the United States alone, the effects of the blockade, only from an economical point of view, would be comparatively limited. The American economy imports only a fewer percent of its consumption of oil from the Gulf, and natural gas increasingly exports itself. Washington allies, including those from the mediate East for whom exports of energy natural materials are 1 of the main sources of income and from Europe for which supplies from the Gulf region are an crucial component of diversification, peculiarly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The possible blockade will besides hit the economies of Asian partners of the United States: Japan, South Korea or India, which have just agreed to limit the acquisition of Russian oil, and 1 of its fewer beneficiaries would be Russia, which will benefit both economically and politically. The temporary cessation of supplies of natural materials from the Persian Gulf can not only bring India back to business with the Kremlin, but can besides increase purchases in Russia by China, the largest oil importer in the world. Beijing has so far met a large part of its energy request by transport from the mediate East.
Maintaining the roadway of the Ormuz Strait will so be 1 of the most crucial goals for the United States. Achieving it may require 1 of 3 scenarios: a political agreement with Tehran which would lead to the deescalation of the conflict; a complete collapse of the Iranian regime, however, which would affect destabilisation and chaos throughout the region or a long-term and costly military presence to defend shipping and mining infrastructure.
This second option would imply the request to defend hundreds of tankers and drilling platforms, tens of ports, thousands of kilometres of pipelines and many another possible targets. And this protection against a very dispersed threat – as long as it is comparatively easy to identify and destruct an extended conventional military infrastructure, attacks with inexpensive and tiny drones can be carried out by tiny and hard to detect cells, whether Iranian forces or allied organizations specified as Huti or Hezbollah.
Today, after only a fewer days of war, it is hard to foretell which of these scenarios is most likely. 1 thing, however, is clear: even if Iran is incapable to defy the power of the US in conventional war, it inactive has both the tools and the political will to disrupt the global economy and turn the local conflict into a global crisis.
