Error or strategy The fact is that the Kremlin has not announced and announced mass mobilisation

Indeed. Russia it has not introduced widespread mobilization so far – replenishment of losses and expansion of the invasive army in Ukraine is based on a voluntary haul mechanism. It is crucial to say that the motivations of "voluntarys" stay in the crushing financial majority (not ideological ones), which has certain consequences.

Minimum wage in Russia is presently just over PLN 900, at prices akin to Polish. On the "dubina" of the Russian province, specified a wage is simply a standard, fewer gain more. ArmyIn exchange for approval to go to the front, offers respective times higher salaries, to families who have died, for local conditions, compensation. So there are many willing to service — average monthly around 30-40 thousand. The Russians study to the barracks and then go to Ukraine.

Problem is, this is the solution. The Federation budget is heavy burdened (and budgets of individual regions) – and the rubber vault is not. And with the losses on the battlefield – and last year it was over 400,000 killed and wounded – most “new” only complements the losses; it is hard to accomplish a fast and crucial expansion of the quota. Meanwhile, “hawks” say – 1.5 million invasive army (two and a half times that now) would defeat Ukraine.

It would most likely be harder for Ukrainians to defend themselves if they had specified a large enemy before them – I do not want to discuss it with them. But is not announcing by Moscowuniversal mobilisation – Forced inclusion in the service of a large number of men no longer under financially attractive conditions – does it truly deserve the designation of error? Or possibly it's a conscious Kremlin strategy, chosen for economic, political and... racist conditions?

I am leaning towards the second option, aware that the one-off, short-term financial effort that Moscow would gotta take to put up a 1.5 million-dollar army only "on Ukraine" is too large for Russian budget.

Moving on – the Russian economy already feels present dramatic labour shortages, this applies even to arms, although this is treated as a priority. Labour marketplace pull more hundreds of thousands of men (2.5-3 million over the year with this scale of mobilisation and current failure rate) would aggravate the problem and endanger to collapse. A on Cream They can count.

So they besides know how much and what they would request a 1.5 million contingent. And here is another challenge, possibly – as they know in Moscow – unsurpassable. What? So far, the Russian army has supplemented material losses mainly thanks to “Retirement after USSR”, reaching for stored in russian times equipment. The estimation of this "rent" is simply a large mistake; external analysts operate on the basis of what is seen from space.

The satellite images show quite a few (under the cloud) magazines. If so, the ‘rent’ will end this year, at best at the beginning of the next. But possibly it's worse? possibly what's left is completely useless. Not on a mass scale. possibly it's just there would be nothing to arm these 1.5 million people with the stocks “out”And the manufacture is not demanding the production of fresh weapons? It's a hypothesis, but it's hard to defy the impression that it has a strong support in facts.

Uncontested for that he is overrepresentative participation of provinces in Russia's war effort. And as a substance of fact, the “dubbit” is mostly Russian. ethnic minorities – and it is their representatives who fight comparatively in Ukraine more than “white” Russians.

This is due to these economical conditions, but not only. From the Kremlin's perspective, loss of "less valuable" human material – traditionally unlistening to power and social respect – lowers the cost of war. It besides makes them acceptable to the large-town, "white" and Orthodox majority, choking its possible for rebellion. A rebellion that could detonate if Putin reached for the ethnically Russian demographic reserve, which would be a natural consequence of mass mobilization. Historically looking, for all power revolutionized Moscow and St. Petersburg carried the hazard not only of losing privileges, but besides of life. So it is better to avoid risks, and with a fragmented, little organized, overwhelmed by Russian element, the force apparatus will manage.

But there is besides something else that the social bourgeois people, for example, point to against draining the resources of their community. The work for the “wild Asian” war force serves Russian propaganda. In the future, it will aid to tell the planet and the Ukrainians that ‘Mongoloids’ have committed crimes, not “the Slavic brothers”. “The Real” Russians will keep face And the position of civilized people. Maintaining the “oriental” nature of the army will be helpful...

Marcin Ogdowski