On the evening of August 29, Baghdad switched the war zone. There were clashes throughout the city between supporters of Sadra Muktada and militants of the Council of Coordination. Sadrists besides attacked government troops defending the alleged Green region (government divider in Baghdad). The fighting lasted all night, and not only rifles went into motion, but besides anti-tank grenade launchers, mortars and rocket launchers. Is Iraq moving towards civilian war?
Elections and consensus
The context of current events is important. To realize it, we must go back to autumn 2021 erstwhile parliamentary elections were held in Iraq. They were won by the group Muktada Sadra, which is 1 of the most colourful figures in the Iraqi political scene. Coming from a well-known household of Shiite scholars (the Shiite is 1 of the 2 major sects of Islam), Sadr gained his popularity after 2003, creating the alleged Mahdi Army and fighting the business forces.
After winning the election, in autumn 2021. Sadrists attempted to make a government in a coalition with Sunni and Kurdish parties, eliminating from the puzzle Shiite rivals Sadra – in peculiar erstwhile Maliki Prime Minister (whose Sadr truly hates due to the fact that Maliki, along with the Americans, crashed the Mahdi Army in 2008). Trying to make a government without the participation of another Shiite parties, Sadr thus broke the alleged consensus principle, which has been the foundation of the Iraqi political strategy since Saddam's overthrow in 2003.
The rule of consensus is that politicians are trying to get as many parties as possible into the government coalition. As a result, the subsequent Iraqi governments formed after 2003 included most of the parties that were then in parliament. This rule ensures a strong inclusion of governments, but besides creates a blurring of work and a deficiency of strong parliamentary opposition.
The consensus rule is increasingly being attacked by young Iraqis who consider it a symbol of the collapse of the Iraqi political system. Before Sadr began questioning her in the autumn of 2021, the alleged "Oct Movement" – a young environment that was formed on the basis of protests from 2019 to 2020, spoke against the rule of consensus.
Muktada SadrAll against Sadrow
The attempts to overthrow the rule of consensus by Sadra led to the creation of the alleged Coordination Council whose main nonsubjective was to prevent Sadrah from forming a government. The Council is frequently referred to as pro-Iranian, but this is besides much simplification. In fact, it consists of, for example, pro-Iran Fateh, but at the same time there is besides a pro-American Nasr, erstwhile Prime Minister of Abadi, who is hard to fishy of pro-Iranian sympathy.
The Coordination Council must be seen, first and foremost, as an organisation whose aim is to defend the position quo, to defend the current political strategy of Iraq, which is being undermined by the actions of Sadr. And there is something to defend, due to the fact that the Iraqi system, even though it is stiff and inefficient, allows Iraqi elites to have a very comfortable life – Iraq is an highly corrupt country and 1/4 of public funds are embezzled.
In the end, the activities of the Coordination Council led to the blocking of all Sadra initiatives aimed at creating a fresh government. In this situation, in June 2022 (more than six months after the election), Sadr ordered his men to resign their parliamentary seats.
As a result, the majority in the parliament won the Coordination Council, which proposed for the fresh Prime Minister Mohamed al Sudani, a trusted man Nuri Maliki (the mentioned enemy of Sadr). That was adequate to bring Iraq to the brink of civilian war.
Nuri Maliki, Prime Minister from 2006 to 2014Attack on Parliament
At the end of July, Sadrists entered the Green region (government divider) in Baghdad and occupied the parliament building. In the following days, they entered the Green region respective times, organizing demonstrations against Sudan and Malik.
As a result, Parliament's activities were suspended. Acting Prime Minister, Mustafa Kadhimi, tried to resolve the dispute between Sadrists and the Coordination Council inviting all Iraqi parties to the “round table”. However, Sadrists boycotted Kadhim’s attempts at mediation. Sadrists were the only organization not to participate in the talks. As a result, the crisis continued.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa KadhimiMarja and Sadr
Meanwhile, in late August, Sadr had to face another, this time rather unexpected, threat. On Sunday, August 28, Ajatollah Kadhim al-Hairi announced his resignation from the position of Marjah (the highest position in the hierarchy of the Shiite clergy). At the same time, Hairi criticized Sadr for occupying the Green region and called on Sadrists to be faithful to Iran's ultimate leader, Ayatollah Ali Chamenei. This – as it might seem – small crucial event had a major impact on the course of events.
First, we request to explain who Marja is and who Hairi is. There is simply a very extended hierarchy of clergy in the Shiites. The highest dignity is the function of marja. There are many marjas, and they are all equal “degree”. For example, ajatollah Chamenei (the highest leader of Iran) or ajatollah Sistani of Nadzafu (the Iraqi marja which enjoys the highest respect among Iraqi Shiites). Theoretically, each neck should have its own marjay, its “spiritual guide”. This spiritual guide to Sadrists was Kadhim al-Hairi.
We must be aware that, if the Muktada Sadra is presented as the founder of the Sadrist Movement, that is simply a misconception. The roots of the Sadrist movement date back to the 1970s, with Muhammad Bakir as-Sadr (Muktada's father) and Mohammad Sadik al-Sadr (Muktada's father) being the most crucial in its uprising.
According to the will of Mohamed Sadik al Sadra (died in the 1999 bombing), Sadrists were obliged to “follow the teachings” of Kadhim al Hairi. As a result, between 1999 and 2003, Hairi was the top authority for Sadrists. The situation changed after 2003, erstwhile the 29-year-old Muktada created the Mahdi Army and began to fight the Americans.
Muktada's opposition as the “political leader” of the Sadrist Movement is not disputed, but his opponents frequently point out to him the deficiency of adequate spiritual education – Muktada originates from a household of large scholars, but itself stands comparatively low in the Shiite spiritual hierarchy.
In this way, Hairi's resignation from the function of Marja and his criticism of Muktada's warch, straight hit Sadr's legitimacy to further lead the Sadrist Movement. The blow was all the more severe that Hairi called on Sadrists to be faithful to Chamenei (leader of Iran).
In consequence to Hairi's resignation from the Marjah function, Muktada Sadr announced a day later that he was withdrawing from politics. It was this decision that Sadra became the direct origin of the clash in Baghdad between Sadrists and supporters of the Coordination Council, which rapidly spread to another cities of the Shiite south.
Muktada Sadr (inside) with his father Mohamed Sadik al Sadrem (on the left)Power demonstration
In my opinion, the clashes in Baghdad were primarily a demonstration of strength from Sadr. For most Sadrists, spiritual matters are secondary. They consider themselves primarily “Muctada soldiers” alternatively than “Hairi's men”. However, that does not mean that issues of legitimacy have no meaning for Sadrists.
Sadr wanted to show that nobody – even Hairi – could undermine his power over the Sadrist Movement. It is not excluded that Sadr will now effort to make himself as the spiritual guardian of Sadrists – but it will be problematic adequate that Sadr stands comparatively low in the spiritual hierarchy.
At the same time, fighting in Baghdad was to be a informing to the pro-Iran part of the Coordination Council. According to Sadra's colleagues, Muktada believes that it was the pro-Iran faction in Iraq that forced Hairi to resign.
The full substance of Sadr's withdrawal from politics and clashes in Baghdad was in my opinion directed by the Sadrists. Muktada wanted to show that he had large support, and that in his defence he would spontaneously stand the full Shiite south of the country. The clashes in Baghdad, however, were in no way spontaneous. Sadrists were well organized and knew well both the weaknesses in the defence of the Green Zone, as well as the poorly occupied militia facilities associated with the Council of Coordination. The deficiency of spontaneity of Sadrist actions is besides supported by the fact that the full action went beyond Baghdad – militia office in the south of the country were attacked and oilfields were invaded. In a fewer weeks, Sadr will announce that he is returning to politics (he has already announced his “political retirement”) respective times.
The fight in Baghdad lasted only 1 night. However, 30 people died as a result. In the morning Sadr called on his supporters to end the fighting and shortly later the situation calmed down. However, it is hard to say whether the demonstration of force by Sadr was a complete success. While Sadr had previously attempted to make himself as a folk stand, a defender of Iraqi statehood, he now clearly acted as an anti-state element. Paradoxically – the night of September 29 – are pro-Iran militias and not Sadr sided with the Iraqi state.
After comments from Iraqi politicians, it is evident that Sadr's ravenry did not just like the Council of Coordination, but even Prime Minister Kadhimi, who had previously been comparatively affirmative towards Sadr (most most likely thanks to the support of Kadhim Sadrists so easy occupied the building of parliament in July). The next weeks will so most likely be equally tense and the Coordination Council will proceed to push for the establishment of a government – even if Sadr opposes it.
Sadrists on the streets of BaghdadNow what?
Iraq has been in a immense political, economical and social crisis since 2019. The current expression of government simply exhausts and the strategy breaks in stitches. The fresh tensions between Sadr and the Coordination Council are just the tip of the iceberg.
Above all, Iraq faces a immense demographic challenge. People under the age of 30 who account for 56% of the full population are highly dissatisfied with the situation in the country. Nearly 1 million Iraqis arrive each year and 500 000 people enter the labour market. Prior to 2015, most of Iraq's workforce was employed in the public sector (in 2013 71% of Iraqi labour was employed in the public sector). However, the collapse of oil prices in 2015 led to the collapse of Iraqi eldorado and the suspension of the creation of fresh public sector jobs. As a result, successive years entering the marketplace are increasingly hard to find a job. And so while unemployment in Iraq is around 14%, among people aged 15-24 (active jobseekers) unemployment is about 27%.
It is those under the age of 30 who have not been "implemented" into the strategy due to the collapses in 2015 that are most disappointed and competition the position quo. These individuals were the main "recruitment base" for protests from the turn of 2019 and 2020 that led to the collapse of Prime Minister Mahdi's government and the setting up of early elections. These protests would likely have achieved even more if it had not been for General Solejmani's assassination in Baghdad in January 2020, which threatened the American-Iran confrontation and put out the protests.
It is besides a problem for young people to protest the current political system. This is not only about the rule of consensus already mentioned, but besides about "muhasasa ta’ifia" (arab strategy of sectarian nominations), which aims to guarantee equal representation of individual cultural and spiritual groups of Iraq (sunnics, Shiites, Kurds). Among young Iraqis there are more and more voices about the request to make a modern state that will reject cultural and spiritual divisions.
As of 2019, Sadr has been attempting to introduce himself as the leader of this young protest movement, but the environment of the alleged “October Movement” (the 2019-2020 protest leaders), is questioning his leadership.
The biggest challenge, however, is the divisions in the Shiite community. In Saddam's time, Sunni people dominated Iraqi politics. However, 2003 changed everything. From now on, the Shiites dominated Iraq. Now, however, this “Sichite house” is divided as never before in history. The line of division among the Shiite is everything – the attitude towards the PMU (militions that do not want to submit to the state), the attitude towards Iran, the rule of consensus, muhasas ta’ifia, or the wilayat al-Faqih (the alleged power of the muslim jury, part of the Iraqi Shiite communities want to introduce theocratic governments akin to Iran). The fresh clashes between Sadr and the Council of Coordination are just an example of how far divisions in the Shiite community have gone.
From left: Ayatollah Ali Chamenei (highest leader of Iran), Muktada Sadr and General Solejmani (leader of the elite forces of Al Kuds in the Iranian muslim Revolutionary defender Corps, killed at the hands of the Americans in 2020 in Baghdad)The fall in oil prices, financial problems, the emergence of nationalist sentiments and divisions among the Shiite, origin the current position quo to burst into stitches. At the same time, there is simply a deficiency of a "danger valve" that could lead to deescalation – in particular, the Iraqis do not believe in elections as a way of changing the strategy (which shows consistently falling election turnout). Attempts to "repair the strategy from within" besides bring limited benefits – the central government is besides weak and the Shiite (who dominated politics after 2003) besides divided. The current Iraqi political strategy is insurmountable and is heading to an end. However, the question remains whether the improvement of the strategy will be peaceful or not. The fresh clashes in Baghdad propose that the "revolution" may be bloody.
Finally, I will point out that Sadr is not a affirmative hero in this story, the “new Mahdi”, who is trying to save Iraqi statehood. Sadr instrumentally uses a wave of nationalist, anti-Iranist, and discontent with the economical situation to make himself into a folk tribune, “a defender of the injured”. However, its aim is not necessarily to make Iraq a strong and rich country. The Sadrows are primarily afraid with taking as much power as possible for themselves. any people effort to defend Sadr, claiming that he is Iraq's last defender against Tehran's influence, but that is not entirely actual either. Sadr has extended contacts with Tehran, and does not attack Iran as such, but more pro-Iran militias that spread lawlessness in Iraq. On respective occasions Sadr even asked Tehran to aid fight the pro-Iran militia. Iran's attitude, on the another hand, is highly ambiguous on the whole. And for example, Tehran did not side with the Coordination Council – and any reports even propose that Tehran is willing to deal with Sadr, at the expense of any pro-Iran militia.
The situation in Iraq is so very confusing, and fresh clashes in Baghdad make this political puzzle even more complicated.
