The negotiations for the end of each war take into account various forms of halting combat. The first and most apparent step is simply a truce.
It is the catalyst for the transition from war to peace, a essential but insufficient condition. In all real conflict situation, truce is simply a makeshift phenomenon, and its character depends on different conditions both on the battlefield and in the minds of the leaders fighting parties. The tradition of truces and associated temporary ceasefires dates back to the days of ancient Hellada. Under the name “ekecheiria” appeared as part of the cult of the goddess Eirene from the temple of Zeus in Olympia. It has patronized the thought of a “peace of God”, announced for the duration of the Olympics, in order to guarantee safe travel, immunity of participants and the sanctity of the place. This was the first time in 884 B.C.E., erstwhile King Elida – Iphitos, King Sparta – Likurg and ruler of Pisa – Gemenes made an arrangement guaranteeing peace during the games.
Modern olympism refers to this tradition. According to the Olympic Charter, it calls for a social truce, called the "Olympic Peace" for both the summertime and winter Olympic Games. Despite the United Nations' support for this idea, it has not become a common practice. The 2008 Russian-Georgian War, annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, as well as Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, are examples of failure to account for the then ongoing Olympics and Paralympic Games.
In the state of feudal anarchism of the mediate Ages, attempts were made to spread the institution of truce under the auspices of spiritual power. Announced by Popes and Bishops of the Catholic Church "Pax et treuga Dei" (the peace and truce of God) since the 11th century, it has become the regulator of "slaughter of knights" (synod in Toulouse in 1027). Gradually, the number of days a week was reduced erstwhile armed actions could be carried out. The radicalism of bishops in extending bans has led this institution to absurdity. erstwhile the number of days in a year banned exceeded 300, war instincts proved stronger than the humble restraint of godly knights. Not without reason, Thomas of Aquinas (XIII century) argued that the state has the right to wage war for the defence of its community even on holy days.
An interesting historical lesson, flowing from medieval military truces were the beginnings of civilian protection during armed action. Individual categories of people (spirituals, monks, women, children, old people, merchants, pilgrims) as well as associated property (churches, monasteries, homes, cemeteries, merchant goods, public equipment) were subject to obligations related to immunity. From that time besides comes the institution of truce (arbitration), held by popes and their envoys.
The temporary suspension of the conflict was conducive to the creation of a peculiar "social space" in which soldiers fighting sides stopped attacking. The Christmas ceasefire ("Christmas Truce") of 1914 on the Western Front of planet War I was memorable. French, British and German soldiers on the front line spontaneously (without the approval of the commanders!) stopped fighting to meet and talk on “no one’s ground”, exchange tiny gifts, play ball or sing carols together. It was specified a strong experience that German command issued a ban on “fraternization” with the enemy on December 29, 1914. These symbolic “moments of peace” proved the existence of a rudimentary respect for humanity, despite war atrocities.
The ceasefire and truce...
are known institutions of war law (ius in bello). all day they are treated synonymously, but actually there are subtle differences between them. The ceasefire refers to an agreement concerning temporary ceasefire throughout or part of the war area. Combating parties can then take concerted action, impossible to carry out during attacks, specified as gathering bodies of fallen soldiers, evacuation of wounded, exchange of hostages or release of prisoners.
The truce besides takes the form of an agreement, but alternatively refers to the permanent cessation of fighting throughout the war area. It offers an chance to work out a peaceful solution, involving the stakeholders themselves, or with 3rd parties (states, global organisations, peculiar envoys, etc.). However, it does not warrant a permanent cessation of force as it always leaves the hazard of returning to war.
The persistence of ceasefire and truce is frequently the consequence of coincidence and, most importantly, the force of enforcement authorities. This was the case with the 1953 Korean truce, which took on a permanent character that had lasted for over 70 years. Its characteristic feature is the demilitarized region between 2 hostile Korean states, which for rival powers – USSR/Russia, China, USA and Japan – execute buffer functions. As long as the existing position quo and the global supervision of the truce correspond to the interests of the "removing" powers, the truce is maintained.
In the absence of a decisive resolution of the conflict in the battlefield, both ceasefire and truce can either be considered a failure or make an unnecessary pause to replenish resources or regroup opposing forces. utilizing Johan Galtung's terminology, the creators of professional peace research, the truce leads at most to a alleged negative peace, consisting in the cessation of direct warfare. Only a change of ties between the enemy parties to at least neutrally introduces the conditions of a "positive room" – a change of attitude, openness to proposals for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and solutions acceptable to each of them.
By nature, the truce focuses on temporary objectives, specified as providing humanitarian aid or facilitating communication. It may besides contain provisions that prohibit violations of human rights and humanitarian rights, the cultivation of hostile propaganda, espionage or the recruitment of kid soldiers. Examples of the 2005 Sudanese truce, or the 2025 Israeli-Palestinian truce in Gaza, confirm these observations.
The provisions of the truce may be part of the negotiated peace agreements, part of them or addition (introduction, annex). They free the desired intellectual climate, conducive to a settlement or compromise. They alleviate the hostility of the parties, limit distrust and make political space for substantive peace negotiations.
The most crucial indicator of success is the careful implementation of the truce. It depends on the fulfilment of a number of conditions, namely the establishment of an appropriate minute for the cessation of fire, the kind and level of cessation of violence, the geographical scope and duration. In addition, monitoring and verification mechanisms can be used. The paradox of implementation is the different suspicion of each organization that the truce may be a strategical trap to outsmart the another to begin another offensive.
Fragility of truces
The fundamental issue for maintaining the truce until the peace agreement is to keep the credibility of the commitments (ability to honour them). The point is to guarantee that neither organization breaks the agreement at a time erstwhile it will benefit it. In the mediate Ages, honor was a currency more valuable than money, so oaths on sacred relics were adequate to keep their obligations of refraining on certain days of the week and on spiritual holidays from participating in wartime activities. The reflection of various truces in past leads to the conclusion that intentional violations of conditions of ceasefire are alternatively the regulation alternatively than the exception.
Often the truces enter into force late, only a certain simplification in violence, not a complete cessation. For example, a truce in 2018 in the Yemeni port of Al-Hudajda was considered to be an effective regulation of fighting alternatively than their ending. Each truce is simply a test of restoring trust between conflicted parties. The negative side of specified partial solutions is the threat of escalation of force in areas not covered by the truce. The Minsk Agreements of 2014 and 2015 on the suspension of military activities in Ukraine allowed for a simplification in the level of militant violence, but did not lead to the withdrawal of troops or the demobilization of combatants.
The reluctance to make a truce is mostly due to intellectual conditions. The parties have no discernment in the actual military capabilities and the ability of the opponent to withstand further losses. Therefore, the top advantage of the truce is the disclosure of this information. By observing the position of the opponent, his mobility and reorganization of forces, building fresh reinforcements, rebuilding weapons stocks, and others, each of the fighting parties creates its own position of peace.
The most expectations about the effectiveness of the peace process now concern the conflict in Ukraine. large chances of stopping the war device and the ceasefire existed in the first months after the Russian invasion in the spring of 2022. Under external pressure, especially from the British and American sides, the Ukrainian authorities did not take this step. In the propaganda layer, calling for truce and peace was considered almost an aberration and betrayal of ideals, in the name of which broad circles of society were mobilised to fight the enemy (no substance how many million people leave). The truce became impossible due to the fact that there was no minimum assurance between the parties and the belief that they would be able to restrain their forces, especially on the Ukrainian side. After the period of shock, there was an emotional increase that prevented surrender, surrender, or giving up.
False awareness of objectives
Attempts to end the Ukrainian conflict on terms acceptable, without major casualties and destruction, did not stand a chance of success either due to perception errors and false awareness of the objectives. With Anglo-Saxon participation, it was created in Ukrainian elites that the heroic war with Russia is an chance to build a strong military, ideologicalized state that will deal erstwhile and for all with Russian imperialism with the support of the West. How many naiveties there were, and how many bad intentions, intrigues, and feelings, only fewer observers knew. 1 thing is certain that the public took sides with the authoritative narrative, and the Ukrainian rulers believed in their peculiar mission to effectively carry the state to the western side.
Strong determination to defend their rations, the detonation of nationalism and hatred of Russia and Putin make it the most hard condition to recognise and approximate the motivation of conflicted parties to this day. The objectives declared by each of them and the actual actions are divergent and due to the saturation of disinformation hard to identify. Neither organization is ready to self-limit, and external factors in the form of Western powers, the US, NATO and the European Union are inconsistent in their concepts of the peace process.
As the war in Ukraine has been the origin of various benefits and benefits for supporting players, there has not yet been a clear reassessment of its costs, justifying the interruption. Ukraine has another tranche of multilateral aid and the promises of an intrepid reconstruction, while Russia wants to prove its tenacity not only with its rations, but besides with its affirmation of the position of large power. Ambition goes hand in hand with the interests of manufacturers of fresh weapons and the implementation of weapons technologies, toughening forces in the field of combat, shifting economies to war.
It is confirmed that the war, which determines the destiny of empires, is in the sphere of calculating and shuffling resources, ensuring access to natural materials, restructuring and marketplace control. The stake is not only to plunder Russian state assets located in Western countries. It is primarily about implicating Ukraine through a strategy of various reparations loans into specified a debt loop that for long decades it is simply a inexpensive operating resource. It is simply a form of “new colonization” which, under cover of solidarity with the victim of aggression, enslaves a cynical and ruthless nation unaware of its fate.
The war in Ukraine is of an identity character, i.e. it is at the level of the opposition, hostility and hatred of Russia and the Russians. In the atmosphere of sacrifice, suffering and fear, an integral nationalist ideology is forged, based on primitive atawizmes, compromised bander heroism, fierceness and tenacity. In specified a situation, the transition to a truce and then to a peace agreement, requiring sacrifices, can be seen as treason. specified situations are known from the past, for example during the war in the Balkans between 1992 and 1995, erstwhile nationalist rhetoric on each side prevented a compromise.
Western Double Game
In the process of laborious peace-building in Ukraine, on the 1 hand, the U.S. President's mixed mediation function and the brake roles of the “coalitions of willing” under the aegis of Paris, Berlin and London strike. On the another hand, Russia's deficiency of symmetrical participation in seeking an agreement is bad for the future peace. If the creators of the "retirement package" believe that they will impose on Russia their conditions as an aggressor, but not a defeated state, they are mistaken. Moreover, despite the demonstration of solidarity and sympathy with Volodymyr Zelenski, the treatment of his state, which remains at the mercy of Western donors, prevails. It is known that “your grace rides on a horse’s spur”. What's favorable today, next day due to a whim may change. erstwhile the donations run out, Ukraine will plunge into anomalous and anarchy, which will be just as dangerous to peace.
The propaganda of zealous supporters of Ukraine does everything to Russia to refuse to search a peaceful solution to the conflict. It is known in advance – so the authoritative commentariat says – that Russia has further war intentions, not only to occupy Ukraine, but besides to strike in a predictable position in Western countries, among which Poland and the Baltic republics will go first. The cynical disproving of the intentions of 1 organization to the conflict creates an atmosphere of distrust, but besides undermines the sense of future negotiating decisions.
In a realistic tradition of reasoning about global relations, it was strong to believe that wars were coming to an end erstwhile their participants agreed to establish a certain balance of power. With respect to the relation of forces between Ukraine and Russia, despite the advantage of the latter, it may feel threatened not only by maintaining an 800-thousand, well-trained and armed Ukrainian army, but besides as a consequence of the deployment of abroad military quotas of undetermined position over the Dniepre. Not without a sense of Russian certainty will besides be the social sentiments in Ukraine, causing rematching, rewinding and revisionist tendencies, which can provoke advanced tensions and uncontrolled attacks shortly after peace is concluded.
This has to stop.
Regardless of all obstacles and difficulties, the search for truce and the way to peace in Ukraine again shows that a war destroying each side cannot last forever. Many nonsubjective and subjective factors are involved. The “limit of endurance” of supporting parties is besides ending. The United States refers to proven war law institutions as they have achieved their intended goals and further support for this senseless war threatens with unnecessary chaos in their arrangement with China and Russia. Therefore, they are most likely to force concessions on both sides, which will end the hot phase of the conflict.
Following the attack on the Venezuelan leader, it is increasingly apparent that the U.S., ignoring the recognised rules of the game, are ready to scope for precedental problem solving utilizing unconventional methods (some call them gangsters). The instrumentalisation of global law related to this does not bode well for the future truce. It may well be a means of peace, as well as a mask for the officially dedeceded and ruthless policy of force (power politics in discourse), unrestrained expansion and escalation.
As a result, combat actions can be expected to be suspended between war and peace. Against the background of the unresolved territorial issue, there will be a history-known climate of paralysis and cold, which will extend for decades. The Korean case may in any form repeat itself in Ukraine. The scepticism about the chances of restoring peaceful stableness in east Europe is justified by the entry of the global strategy into a period of permanent tensions, the top resonator of which will become Ukraine for many years.
Prof. Stanisław Bielen
Think Poland, No. 3-4 (18-25.01.2026)
