Every self-respecting state, starting with the large powers, tries to publically declare its objectives and interests towards another states and positions towards the main problems.
This is served by authoritative papers announcing concepts, doctrines and strategies of abroad and safety policy. There is no single pattern or work to print specified posts. They frequently take a dispersed form and require attention to a number of enunciations that are situational and ad hoc. In any countries, the alleged white papers are rather a typical form, presenting the attitude of the government or organisation afraid to a peculiar case, for example in the case of the British brexit, i.e. the UK leaving the European Union.
Poland does not have a tradition of publishing authoritative posts either in general or in circumstantial matters (except for the yearly exposé of the Minister of abroad Affairs). This may be the consequence of nonsubjective systemic conditions – the deficiency of continuity of state institutions, as well as peripheral location towards global strength centres and a complex of subordination. It may besides consequence from a deficiency of thought and knowing for the importance of global issues, as well as the specified immatureness of ruling elites and weaknesses of analytical teams. In current politics there is frequently no time for deeper reflection, but there are various excesses, causing confusion not only among rulers but besides common people.
Subsequent celebrations of the anniversary of the outbreak of planet War II showed, for example, how immense a thought mess there is among Polish politicians towards Germany, especially with respect to war reparations. Similarly, president Nawrocki's visit to the United States exposed misunderstandings over the implementation of 1 coherent abroad policy, especially its implementation levers. Various blunders and explanation errors, specified as with respect to the President's powers of authority, are explained by authoritative ignorance and exuberant ambitions. Meanwhile, this is to the detriment of the state and the seriousness of its image.
Without a coherent doctrine
It seems that the causes of this state of affairs lie primarily in the deficiency of a coherent doctrine of abroad and safety policy, in a expected mature political thought. If there were one, changing public officials would have inspiring diagnosis and recommendations for achieving vital goals and national interests. They would gotta learn coherent terminology and disciplining their logic, as well as gain an analytical cognition of many problems before they begin to talk publicly, let alone making liable decisions.
For diplomats, the doctrine of abroad policy is an crucial origin of inspiration and background for circumstantial instructions, how to explain in communication with global partners the ideological and axiological preferences of Polish policy, how to specify goals (what do we want to achieve?) and explain interests (why do we care about something?). knowing existential, co-existential and functional interests is simply a textbook request for insight into the global game scene. This should be served by regular briefings organised under the direction of the president and the Head of Diplomacy for the heads of Polish diplomatic missions. However, they do not fulfil any of these functions, as for respective years there has been a conflict between the centres of power in relation to the cast of ambassadors.
In the Polish political scenery we are dealing with specified a situation, as if all time after the entry of a fresh actor into politics the full process of learning from zero, reviewing all erstwhile findings and assumptions and questioning or disproving achievements of predecessors. It is even worse erstwhile arrogant novices feel that they don't request to learn anything due to the fact that they know everything best and start all over again. This cannot be done by a consistent and, above all, effective global policy.
The doctrinal assumptions and rules for conducting abroad policy find in subsequent parliamentary and presidential terms the conceptual continuity and implementation consequences of global activity of the state. They attest to the intellectual maturity of ruling elites, their cognitive and creative abilities. In addition to elected politicians for circumstantial terms, learning crafts and acquiring experience, there is simply a professional abroad service (official apparatus) in each country, which is liable not only for substantive continuity, but besides for following procedures and rituals that find the cognition of diplomatic culture. Hence, diplomatic practice is an highly crucial origin of learning and learning. It decides on a pragmatic way of carrying out tasks, regardless of political divisions.
The nominees for authoritative posts are supported by professional abroad policy experts as well as media observers. Unfortunately, there is no independent investigation at present, nor a valuable global publicist, since the place of independent specialists was taken by serviceable acolytes of power and propaganda. There is simply a deficiency of a "transmission belt" between decision-makers and the public opinion, which is hard to realize the secrets and meanders of global life. Social media play a function in gathering the cognitive needs of citizens, but they are incapable to replace the function of specialised expert, advisory and analytical centres. And these were mastered by any inexplicable inertia, passivity, and above all ideology and servillism. All you gotta do is visit the websites of Polish think tanks to find out about the publication mizeria and the pathetic level of analysis.
The doctrines of abroad policy are developed in the processes of lengthy debates, obfuscation, exchange of views and consultation. It may be that they are made up by political leaders whose names are a sign of their views. frequently these are just slogans or slogans that do not have extended descriptive and explanatory forms, yet they are guidelines for crucial decisions in abroad policy. Especially in the United States, many presidents have given their names to doctrines that have defined the U.S. positions on crucial issues specified as doctrine James Monroe of 1823 in defence of “younger American sisters” against the interference of the Old Continent states, or doctrine Harry Truman of 1947, associated with holding back russian and Communist influences.
In the Polish political space, fewer copyright views earned the title of doctrine. Among the most celebrated and frequently instrumentalized by the rulers in III Poland was the concept of editor and author of the “Culture” of Paris, called “the doctrine of Giedroycia-Mieroszewski“ referring to the empowerment of relations with Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus (ULB) to balance Russia’s influence.
Doctrines are attributed to political perpetrators. They are a justification for concrete actions in political practice. Meanwhile, “Culture” was only visionary and professional, and the rulers in Poland treated it selectively and inconsistently. For example, the call for liberation against Russia from the "complex of sacrifice", the rejection of psychology of Western civilization's "premature" and the acceptance of a friendly imagination towards Russia as a "eastern branch of European civilization" have never entered into a set of doctrinal assumptions of Polish abroad policy.
Forgettable Skubiszewski
Of the only abroad ministers of the III Republic Krzysztof Skubiszewski He has earned the title of the creator of a coherent doctrine, whose assumptions stay valid to this day. In fact, he had in his technological achievements the fundamental reasons for Poland's right, especially in relation to the Polish-German border ("West Polish border in the light of treaties", the Western Institute, Poznań 1975). He opposed geopolitical and historical determinism, reorienting Polish policy from east to west. As a consequence of these processes, Poland was established in western structures, but became a "club state", limited to activities in 2 communities: the European Union and NATO. There was no imagination that in the event of conflict with Russia, Poland would be stuck in the anachronistic function of the “front State” of these communities, exposed to many threats and problems. The events of fresh years have confirmed this.
Skubiszewski's merit was undoubtedly the restoration of neighbouring stableness with neighbouring countries through treaty regulations. The treaties concluded between 1990 and 1994 established territorial stableness in the region, but did not aid solve many problems, specified as the common protection of national minorities. In many places these regulations are dead, and in the case of Russia and Belarus, the treaties have practically expired without notice.
The Skubiszewski Doctrine made Poland a hostage of Western ideological mission, aimed at expanding the western region of democracy and expansion of Western turbocapitalism into the russian area. This has melted with the traditions of Polish prometeism and rusophobia, thus limiting the anticipation of logically utilizing geographical position in the implementation of roles intermediated in the Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian systems. The interests of Poles in the east, especially in Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, were devoted to the altar of ideological principles. A policy of searching for what links us to the usage of Resentimants was abandoned to build an institutionally concrete fear of Russia.
In the context of today's conflict with the Polish political scene against the background of conceptual cohesion and implementation of abroad policy, it is crucial to give designation to Skubiszewski for his reasoning shared almost all political groups, which allowed to build a cross-party consensus. He played an crucial function in consolidating systemic changes in Poland. He besides allowed Poland to be established in the integration processes of the West.
Client of America
It turned out rather rapidly that it was servily oriented towards decision centres The Western ruling elites, regardless of political and ideological provenience, are ready to engage Poland in interior games between Europe and America and between the collective West and Russia. Poland did not know how to separate interests between strengthening integration processes and becoming dependent on the US. It has not only become a submissive client of America, but has besides lost its assets to the state erstwhile most pro-European of the "late-coming" from east Europe. Climate change in regional relations in Central Europe has reduced the function of typical of squad interests within the European Union. Taking on the function of the most zealous protector and uncritical supporter Ukraine in its war with Russia effectively weakened Poland's chances of participating in processes of restoring peace and stabilising continental ties.
The increasing problems in the Western community, as well as the deficiency of area for manoeuvre in abroad policy, are the origin of various frustrations of Polish political elites. For this reason, they have been seeking an antidote in the "Doctrin IV of the Republic" for years. On the 1 hand, the extremist anti-systemic trend, which is sovereign and nationalist in character, on the another hand, the will for extremist change advocates the "truely patriotic" movement, which, however, adheres powerfully to the "Lord's doorknob" and competes for consideration as not the American protector, is German. Within these forces, represented by Confederate and post-Pistan clans, there is now a conflict to rebuild the patriotic-national ethos, which orders the liberation of abroad policy from the geopolitical engineering dictated by Germany and the US. However, the readability of interior divisions within these groupings presents much to be desired.
The doctrine, contrary to false interpretations (it should not be confused with doctrine), does not impose dogmatization or fanatical attachment to the truths long used. On the contrary, it is simply a dynamic way of justifying rational choices on the global stage, a creative explanation of existing rules, and a matching of forms and ways of conducting abroad policy to changing circumstances and challenges.
Hard landing
And the challenges towards Polish abroad policy are mainly due to the request to open fresh ways of interpreting phenomena and processes that have taken on the character of dogmas in the Western perspective. Many observations indicate that humanity is now entering the era of state-imperial and anti-liberal vector of development, and so in the coming decades it will be essential in abroad policy to combine the tendencies of the passing era of Western primacy with fresh opportunities and opportunities to meet their own needs and interests in the multipolar world. We will gotta say goodbye to the naive imagination of universal democratization and reconcile with the influential publicists' "self-cracy concert" (leading China and Russia). He will decide (whether we want it or not) about more or little optimistic scenarios of civilizational development. In the expanding rivalry of powers and economical blocks for influence in different regions, those countries that can make multi-vector policies will win so as not to say "turnover". It is about following pragmatism to accomplish the top benefits by beginning up to activity on many azimuts.
It is clear that the best way to organise in the modern planet is to have a free and flexible approach to allied affiliations for countries placed in terms of rank outside of large-power status. The crisis in the Atlantic alliance due to the revision of American policies and strategies makes weaker countries feel frightened and confused, especially erstwhile they have set themselves on unilateral dependence in the field of economy and security.
In the Euro-Atlantic bloc, 2 tiny countries, Hungary and Slovakia, whose policies are stigmatized as though they do not have the right to sovereign choices of their orientations, have perfectly understood this risk. Meanwhile, they first understood that submission to liberal contamination led to a trap of unilateral addictions and so increased hazard in the event of a change in patronage or leadership crisis. An even better example is Turkey, which, due to its geopolitics, history, possible and leadership ambitions, can maneuver well between the most crucial players of the global scene, for the benefit of its position and interests. someway no 1 in Poland attacks Turks that they are engaged in creating a global anti-Western front.
A fresh view of the doctrinal assumptions of state abroad policy must take account of the changing function of the United States in the global system. Their deconstruction of the hegemonic strategy and the doctrinal revision of the assumptions of the erstwhile commitments, in peculiar towards European allies, requires deep reflections and reassessments, not an infantile rebuttal of the US President's further declarations that it will not take "its military toys" from the Vistula River. These séances of foolish mystification performed by successive Polish presidents, paying tribute to “the Emperor of America”, make confusion and embarrassment.
Depreciating the importance of drastic changes in the US strategy towards the Atlantic alliance or the orientation to "waiting for Trump" may prove deceptive. Repeating the mantra on the safety of Poland by an increasingly tighter alliance with America, especially in the military field, and giving the initiative for common safety to Brussels bureaucrats means giving work for the destiny of Poland to abroad decision-making centres.
Time for a serious debate
For these reasons, a general political debate is needed with all the crucial forces in society on vital existential interests. possibly a good chance to do so would be to focus on the courageous, though not very real in the current situation, proposal of the president of Nawrocki to initiate preparatory work on the improvement of a fresh constitution of the Polish state. Many of the negative experiences of the current regulations of the applicable sphere of abroad policy and integration objectives with the West require critical reassessments and regulatory changes.
In the modern world, there is simply a request to reconcile national egoisms with universal values, peculiar interests with the team. Lessons should be learned from the changes to date, specified as the sense of moving towards multiculturalism, and the question of where are the limits of inclusive solidarity if it interferes with the existential interests of the nation and the Polish state. Similarly, we request to learn lessons from “carcase” pro-Americanism and harmful Ukraine, which led further governments and presidents to a dead end. Stubborn adherence to the current position makes Poland incapable to realize the cardinal structural changes (new hand) in the global system.
Following the lead of an influential analyst and visionary of Indian origin, Paraga Khanna (‘Conectography. Mapping the future of global civilization", Warsaw 2022), we request to rethink the old geopolitical dilemmas and focus on conactivity, i.e. combining efforts to effectively control economical unions and supply chains and beginning as many communication channels as possible. In the face of increasing competition from transnational corporations and addictions in cyberspace, climate, resource exhaustion, the search for fresh energy sources, etc., there is simply a request for more knowing for co-operative and accommodative strategies. So far, in the reasoning of Polish politicians, the military attitudes and strategies prevail. Getting ready for war with Russia is evidence of irrational madness and destructive instincts of the ruling, although no 1 among the conscious citizens of the Republic gives them approval to do so.
Prof. Stanisław Bielen
Photo: Polish MFA building (wikipedia)
Think Poland, No. 37-38 (14-21.09.2025)
