Don't move. Poland cannot afford to uncertainty the usage of "non-humane" weapons

Unable to manoeuvre

In any areas of the Zaporosian region, the density of mines set by the Russians was among the highest since planet War II. The first line of dams was not meant to halt “for ever” – its task was to force Ukrainians to make engineering subdivisions, to usage trawls, elongated loads, to make narrow passages. Each specified corridor became automatically a "sleigh of fire" – the opponent of the Russians entered a space perfectly recognized by drones and covered with artillery. And he became an easy target.

Moreover, erstwhile the Ukrainians tried to exploit the formation of the breach, the Russians reached for a miner – from artillery or distant dam setting systems. fresh mines fell into the breakout area, closing the corridor, disorganizing the attack, forcing the mines to be mined again under fire. And so “in the vicinity of Maciej”. As a result, even tiny shifts of front lines were occupied by dense losses – people and equipment. Not due to the fact that the West "did not give adequate weapons". due to the fact that without breaking the engineering dams, no army can make the maneuver.

And this is the essence of the minefield in modern war: it is intended to take distant the pace of the opponent. And an army that loses pace, loses initiative and loses in time.

This is not a “arm of aggression”

In the public debate, mines – especially anti-personnel ones – are frequently presented as blind, primitive and out of control weapons. The problem is that this is what they say about mines in isolation from military context. In fact, the minefield is not a chaotic explosive. It's part of the combat system, coupled with reconnaissance, artillery fire, anti-tank weapons, and maneuvering debris.

Under the conditions of defence of their own territory, mines buy time – for mobilisation, for waste disposal, for the improvement of long-range artillery, yet time to enter the fighting of allied support forces. Without engineering firewalls, defence turns into continuous retreat. With dams – it becomes a fight for all kilometer in which the attacker pays for all metre of progress.

Therefore, mines are not "a weapon of aggression". They're a classical defence tool for the territory. A country that resigns voluntarily gives up 1 of the cheapest and most effective methods of stopping the enemy. And that's why Polish decision to leave the Ottawa Convention – prohibiting the usage of anti-personnel mines – is not a political whim. It is an adjustment to the realities of war with an opponent who will effort to flood us with quite a few equipment and people.

A imagination that discourages an attack

Poland signed the Ottawa Convention in 1997, ratified it in 2012. At the time of accession to the treaty, the Polish Army had more than a million anti-personnel mines – mainly the kind of POMZ and PMN, i.e. the construction of the Warsaw Pact. They were destroyed according to the agreed timetable, and we formally fulfilled our commitments. In the political dimension, we have entered into the dominant imagination of safety at the time: a Europe "after history", in which the full-scale war on the continent is an academic scenario.

Except the planet of 1997 or even 2012 no longer exists.

Russia has not only invaded Ukraine – present it is conducting a position war on demolition in which engineering dams and mines play a leading role. Furthermore, it is not a organization to the Ottawa Convention itself, it is not restricted by any standards. The effect? Ukraine, which was a signatory to the treaty, had to suspend its application in war conditions, due to the fact that without mines it was incapable to effectively defend itself. That's the point. Disarmament treaties only make sense erstwhile all players are in force, otherwise they become a unilateral restriction.

This consciousness accompanied the authors Tarcza East project, which assumes the construction of a strategy of fortifications, dams and defence infrastructure along the east border of Poland. The planners knew well that a dam without mines would be half-measured. due to the fact that anti-tank ditches can be buried, concrete obstacles can be bypassed, barbed wires cut. This takes time, but does not halt the enemy for longer. It is only the combination of the field dams and minefields that creates a real barrier that cannot be overcome “from the march”. This awareness has besides been instilled in politicians. As a result, we are building a “Tear East” that will not only be a political signal but besides a real deterrent component. Thanks to the mines, a possible aggressor knows that the first fewer twelve kilometers will cost him quite a few equipment and people. specified a imagination may discourage the attack.

War distant from civilians

What about the humanitarian arguments? After all, anti-personnel mines kill besides after the war, mostly civilians. adequate to look at the experience of Afghanistan or the Balkans to realize the scale of the problem.

It's true. classical mines from the 1970s and 1980s remained active for decades. They were cheap, mass and frequently placed without accurate records. After the conflict ended, they became a silent threat to the civilian population.

But this does not mean that all usage of mines is morally and strategically equivalent. Firstly – Poland does not plan to mine another people's territories or to conduct an expeditionary war. We are talking about defending our own state, in our own area, under conditions of full control of the mine system.

Secondly, modern mine systems are different from the plan from half a century ago. Mines may be equipped with self-destructive or autodeactivation mechanisms after a specified time. They can be recorded with a digital location register. They can be integrated into distant dam setting systems, allowing you to control the time and place of their activity. This is not a “disposal” of explosives. It's part of combat space management.

Thirdly, it is worth asking a question that seldom falls into public debate: what is the alternative?

The deficiency of dams means a faster breach of defense, that is, fighting in densely populated areas. And urban warfare generates multiple civilian losses than a controlled minefield in the forefield. We saw it in Mariupol, Bachmut, Awdijiwka. Destroyed quarters, thousands killed, infrastructure destroyed. If mines are to halt the enemy respective or respective twelve kilometers from large urban centres, paradoxically, they can reduce the scale of damage.

Humanity is not about disarming one-sidedly against an aggressor. It involves preparing the defence so that the war, if it comes, will be as short as possible and will be as far distant from civilian life centers as possible.

A more susceptible country

Furthermore, Poland does not operate in vacuum. NATO front states – especially those bordering Russia – are investing intensively in the expansion of dam systems, fortifications and engineering capabilities. Finland, which has over 1,300 km of border with the Russian Federation, has for years maintained a strong territorial defence component based on the prepared territory. The Baltic states build fortification lines, make the ability to rapidly mine and mine. All these countries are at different stages of exiting the Ottawa Convention.

This is an adaptation to a war that is already in advancement in Ukraine and which can decision on. erstwhile Russia showed that it was ready to lead a full-scale conventional conflict, the strategical calculation changed. The ability to halt the first strike is the essence of defence preparations. And the first blow in the Eastern-European script will be manipulative-tank, supported by artillery and drones. In specified a scenario, the deficiency of dams is an invitation to decision rapidly into the country.

In 2023, under Zaporozh, mines defended Russian positions. It's an uncomfortable fact, but it's a fact. They stopped the attack, forced the opponent to fight on terms of the defender, and were yet 1 of the key factors for the Ukrainian counteroffensive defeat. We may not like it, but we can't pretend that this lesson wasn't there.

In the planet before 2014, 1 could believe that the conventional war in Europe was unrealistic. In the planet after Bucha and Mariupolu, specified religion is simply a form of strategical naivety. And yes, mines are not “pretty” weapons. But defence war is not an aesthetics contest, but a conflict to last the state. And a country that gives up on tools that actually increase its chances of endurance is not more moral. It's more vulnerable...