Belarusian authorities held elections[1] presidential a fewer months before the end of the five-year word of President. The erstwhile vote was held on 9 August 2020. His results were widely regarded as falsified, and lengthy mass protests were suppressed.
This time the home of Representatives (lower Chamber of the Belarusian Parliament) set the election deadline for 26 January 2025.[2]. However, the qualified could vote throughout the week preceding election Sunday in the alleged early vote. This is simply a popular solution in the political systems of east Europe and Central Asia, on the 1 hand, giving the authorities a wide scope of possibilities to manipulate voters and public opinion, on the another hand, facilitating the possible falsification of voting results. Furthermore, the winter deadline did not support possible protests.
Situation in Belarus for elections
The vote fell on a hard period of global isolation for Belarus. It follows from the regime's pacification of post-election protests after August 2020 and the provision of territory and facilities for Russian full-scale aggression against Ukraine since February 2022. Lukashenko himself is not formally recognized as the head of state by most Western states, which are the only legitimate typical of the Belarusian people to recognise Swiatlana Cichanouska – his counter-candidate in the 2020 election. Both he and his closest associates are subject to individual sanctions.
The interior situation of the state is determined by the efforts of the authorities to strengthen authoritarianism utilizing methods characteristic of this kind of systems, and even approaching totalitarian aspirations. Belarus has indeed become a police state after 2020 with a crucial degree of both individual and group repression. An immanent feature of the strategy is the authority of the order and peculiar services and the full submission of judicial power to the executive powers, in practice to the President.
The legislative solutions adopted are aimed at facilitating the prosecution of those who argue the authorities today, but besides in the past, especially during mass protests from 2020 to 2021. In administrative and criminal proceedings, more and more prison sentences, stay in penal colonies and cumbersome fines and property forfeiture are ruled. In addition, non-criminal repression measures specified as dismissals, relegation from universities, or the prevention of taking up work or training in a circumstantial field are being applied.
This applies not only to widely understood opponents, but besides to those who erstwhile participated in actions of peaceful opposition. Very often, the repression and application of various forms of force besides affects "suspected" families. It should be stressed that in Belarus the number of political prisoners is inactive at around 1,300. Although any 300 were released during the pre-election period, at the same time preventive arrests were made, including even inactive opposition activists.
The Belarusian economy is facing problems. After 2020, Belarus was subject to Western sanctions limiting both exports and imports, especially dual-use goods. The sanctions were tightened erstwhile the country supported Russian aggression against Ukraine. The authorities effort to underestimate the problem, and Lukashenko himself calls the “fascist” sanctions. However, the regulation results in the break-up of cooperation ties with the EU countries and the almost complete focus of the economy on cooperation with Russia and the Eurasian economical Union countries.
The scale of the search for fresh non-European outlets is symbolic and does not compensate for any losses. In formal terms, Belarus maintains economical growth, but authoritative data should be treated with large distrust. It is besides worth asking what part of GDP production is for the Russian military-industrial complex, due to the fact that this in no way contributes to the real improvement and increase in the standard of surviving of citizens.
A more severe failure than the failure of trade opportunities with the West is the mass emigration of citizens. According to various data after 2020, Belarus has left from 250,000 to 600,000 people[3].
They are the most entrepreneurial individuals, curious in development, frequently students or private business owners. This process has weakened the rapidly developing IT industry, which has benefited Poland among others[4]. The authorities effort to counter this process, among others, by denouncing the agreement on the designation of education with Poland, which makes it importantly hard for Belarusians to proceed learning on the Vistula River.
Emigration besides reduces labour supply. Belarus is an unattractive marketplace for migrants from Central Asia, which causes shortages of workers, especially for the most hard jobs, specified as construction. The situation is besides not favoured by a crucial weakening of the Belarusian ruble, which in the period from 2020 amounted to 27 percent against the dollar, to around 19 percent against the euro, and to 23 percent against the euro. It is worth noting that the effort to estimation the state of the Belarusian economy and demography is importantly hampered by the secrecy of data on, among others, population statistics[5].
Social opposition against the authorities has been broken. There is no organised opposition in Belarus that can be a viable alternate to the regulation of Lukashenko. Moreover, after massive protests in 2020, the authorities powerfully tightened the policy towards NGOs. Their operation is strictly regulated and monitored. This besides applies to spiritual unions, especially the Roman Catholic Church. It is worth mentioning that in December 2024, Fr Henryk Okolotowicz, who served in Wołoszyn, was sentenced to 11 years of penal colony for “the state's legacy”[6]. In fear of repression, writers were forced to leave Belarus to print their works, among others, Alhierd Bacharewicz[7]. While by 2020 it was possible to talk about the alleged soft Belarusian-Belarusionalization for building the distinctness of Belarus, after this date symbols specified as Pogon's coat of arms or the white-red-white flag, as related to the opposition, became banned in public space. Cases of detention have been reported for having patriotic tattoos, which are now considered extremist.
Electoral run and vote
In the context of elections, the objectives of the authorities should be asked. Undoubtedly, Alaksandr Lukashenka was looking for a way to renew his legitimacy importantly breached by the events of the summertime and autumn 2020. Elections that were carried out in its entirety and reinforced by an intense propaganda message about “unity” will in a sense obscure the image of years ago. It should be mentioned that the vast majority of Belarusians proceed to usage conventional media as the main sources of information. These are full subordinate to power, and all day they establish propaganda.
The elections besides attempted to renew the social contract violated by Lukashenko in February 2022, erstwhile the territory of Belarus utilized the Russians to carry out aggression against Ukraine. Most likely, the Belarusian leader was not informed by the Kremlin of the scale of the usage of its territory and airspace. Thus, both the authorities and the average Belarusians were confronted with the war at their borders, which was in clear contradiction with Lukashenko's repeated slogan "No more war!" The communicative of the authorities changed as shortly as it declared that it was not active in the conflict. In fact, Lukashenko did not cross this border: no Belarusian soldier officially participates in the ongoing conflict.
At the same time, the organisation of the next electoral run and the vote itself was intended to service to delegate the opposition abroad, especially Swiatlana Cichanouszska. In Lukashenko's logic, politicians who stay outside are not opposition. He accuses them of implementing Washington, Brussels and Warsaw policies for the money of these countries. It is worth mentioning that both Cichanouska and many of her colleagues received advanced sentences in Belarus for anti-state and extremist activities[8].
Candidates with no charisma, political background, and the real will to win in elections stood in a circumstantial race with Lukashenko. They were:
- Aleh Hajdukiewicz – president of the Liberal-Democratic organization of Belarus, Lieutenant-Colonel of the Militia at rest, subject to western sanctions;
- Hanna Kanapacka – a licensed oppositionist, sometimes criticizes the authorities, but remains only a fig leaf of the authoritarian system;
- Sergei Syrankou of the Communist organization of Belarus, postgraduate of the Academy of Management at the president of the Republic;
- Aliaksandr Chizhniak of the Republican Labour and Justice Party.
All these candidates are participants of the power strategy harmless from the position of the political regime's sustainability. They did not run a real election campaign, and any of them, like Syrankou, openly supported Lukashenko's demands. All the time in Belarus, oppositionist Yuri Hubareevich, president of the Freedom movement, was not even allowed to collect signatures enabling registration of his candidacy[9]. From the point of view of rational assessment, this selection of counter-candidates was intended to make an alternate vote for the incumbent president. In addition, compared to his counter-candidates, Lukashenko seemed to be the best choice.
Lukashenko's election run was conducted with momentum and with the usage of the full state apparatus, which is characteristic of authoritarian regimes. The erstwhile president attended many meetings and rallies where he met elected representatives of various social groups. Mass events combined with artistic performances were besides organized. It is worth noting actions on social media – they are created for bottom-up initiatives by young activists or employees of the state administration. They supported the main candidate and assured his support. The full run ran under the slogan “Truth!” (rus. “Надо!”) which was a mention to an interview for Russian television, in which Łukshashenka confirmed that it would run in elections if citizens found that “it needed”[10]. It should be noted that the Belarusian public media are in fact submitting to the President's administration. All news services begin with a review of the activities of the head of state. Belarusian “Belt” Press Agency prepares the “President’s Week” weekly service[11], frequently a fewer hours.
The vote itself was divided into 2 stages. The first, on 21-25 January, included an early vote in which – according to authoritative data – 41.81% of the eligible people participated. In the main vote on 26 January, attendance reached 85.70 percent.[12]. As reported, voters could usage 5325 polling stations.
During the vote, there were fresh restrictive rules concerning the behaviour in the polling station prohibiting, among others, the shooting of ballot cards. Belarusian citizens could not participate in the elections. They were not attended by OSCE observers. The organization itself was only informed of this event 9 days before the end of the vote, which prevented the organisation of the mission[13]. The electoral process was to be supervised by alleged independent observers from Lukashenko-friendly countries and environments, and their credibility should be considered questionable[14]. Among them were Polish citizens[15].
According to the announced results, the candidates achieved the following results: Aleh Hajdukiewicz – 2.02 percent; Hanna Kanapacka – 1.86 percent; Alaksandr Lukashenka – 86.82 percent; Siarhi Syrankou – 3.21 percent; Alaksandr Chiżniak – 1.74 percent. The option against everyone was to choose 3.60% of voters[16].
The commentators agree that the results announced do not reflect the real support for Lukashenko. At the same time, it should be noted that this year's elections were most likely falsification of results, but it was not essential for the already mentioned deficiency of a real alternative. authoritative winners were congratulated by Russian leaders, Central Asian countries and respective another countries with which Belarus maintains good relations[17]. The Polish Ministry of abroad Affairs issued a communication stating that elections cannot be considered free or democratic[18].
In the opinion of Kamil Kłysiński of the OSH and authors of the study of the Analyst Group "Belarus-Ukraine-Region", the elections were of the nature of a "special operation"[19] or ‘specifications’[20]. It can be agreed that this was an event involving crucial forces and funds of the Belarusian State to make the undemocratic electoral process credible, which would, at least partially, reconstruct the legitimacy of Alaksandr Lukashenko as president of Belarus. However, the usage of the word ‘specification’ or ‘special operation’ in the analysis of this event appears to be an activity for growth.
Post-election perspectives
Further developments in Belarus and its immediate global environment are hard to predict. Nevertheless, the readers below will find a forecast for both the interior situation and the external neighbour of Poland.
With respect to Lukashenko herself, the analysis should be started with individual factors. On August 30 this year, Alaksandr Łukshenka will turn 71. Given the standards of Belarus, he has already exceeded the average life expectancy of a man (69.8 years). From the available materials it is clear that he no longer enjoys specified wellness as he enjoyed a fewer years ago. No uncertainty his wellness was affected by fear of physical safety during the 2020 events and, nevertheless bad it may sound, by directing further waves of repression.
Lukashenko is increasingly tense in her dealings with coworkers and his subordinate officials, and these are not just attempts to make an image in front of tv cameras. Moreover, over the years, the dominant autocreation of a "strong man" is becoming increasingly uncommon in the face of apparent overweight and prolonged wellness problems, among others, with advanced airways, which made it importantly hard for a politician to participate in regular duties. Lukashenko himself tried to minimize the ailments and unequivocally denied any reports of mediocre health. However, his comments may sometimes feel a sense of fear for the future.
As the seventh word of office itself is to be his last as president. The issue of consequences remains so open. Lukashenko clearly denied the thought that 1 of his sons could win him. In this context, the youngest Mikalaj ("Kola") was most frequently mentioned, but this year he is 21 years old, so he is 19 years short of constitutional passive electoral law in the election for president of the Republic. I'm certain your father doesn't have that much time. The president himself announces the choice of a successor from among the most capable officials. He will most likely personally point to him, leaving for example the position of president of the Bureau of the People's General Belarus Assembly.
The 2020 elections and subsequent repressive waves, as well as mass emigration, have exhausted the possible of Belarusian opposition. The society is dominated by passive individuals and focused on ensuring a adequate standard of surviving in an unfavourable economical environment. There is besides a group of active supporters of authorities who in de facto A non-ideoic government should be classified as conformists curious in building a career in state structures.
In this situation, anti-presidential protests or another forms of universal protest of the existing political order should not be expected in the close future. possibly the absence of protests and the inauguration of the fresh word of office for Lukashenko will be an excuse for utilizing the "carrot" society in the form of even partial relief of repression and dismissal of political prisoners. This can be done in the form of amnesty towards shorter sentences. In the case of the most crucial convicts, it is likely that a request for the application of the law of grace will be a condition of possible dismissal, and hence designation of Lukashenko's legitimacy as head of state. In order for this kind of action to happen, the new-old president must feel assured again in his position. 2 weeks since the election, that's what it is.
The analysis of the global situation of Belarus should definitely start with its most powerful neighbour - Russia. In the coming years, the dominant state in Belarus will stay in all dimension. The Belarusian economy, including the military-industrial complex, will stay integrated into the Russian war economy supply chain. The close unions of the armed forces and safety authorities of both countries will besides be nurtured, with the actual submission of both spheres of the safety policy of the Russian Federation.
There has been a trend that can strengthen Russian influence and at the same time have a very negative impact on Western perception. It is about reversing the trend of selection of abroad education by Belarusian students. Last year, for the first time in years, most of them chose an east neighbour, not Western European countries[21]. Maintaining this is convenient for both Minsk and Moscow. From their perspective, young people will not be exposed to the influence of “enemy” propaganda. Remember, these people will in the future decide the destiny of their homeland and its relations with their neighbours.
The erstwhile USSR countries co-participating with Belarus in the Organization of the Collective safety Agreement and the Eurasian economical Union will most likely be closest to Russia. Without comment, they accept the political staus quo existing in Minsk, anticipate the same and focus on favourable economical relations.
Relations with Western countries will be much more complex. Belarus and its authoritative authorities stay under the government of Western sanctions and, so far, there is no indication that this situation is to be changed. For Lukashenko, the hope of getting out of isolation may be to start discussions on the cessation of armed actions in Ukraine. Firstly, starting a dialog with Vladimir Putin – liable for violating global law and the death of thousands of people in Ukraine – will be a precedent for the question of the legitimacy of Lukashenko's isolation. His government has a much narrower scope of charges (although they are besides violations of global law, which was undoubtedly to make the territory available for aggression against the neighbouring country). Secondly, a possible agreement on Ukraine could be a pretext for Western European countries to return to politics Business as user. Belarus can besides benefit from this approach, mainly as a transit area. China will surely be curious in specified developments, which despite the hard geopolitical situation in Central and east Europe have not abandoned the concept of developing Belt and way initiatives.
As reported by the planet media in mid-February Minsk visited Assistant Secretary of State for east Europe Christopher W. Smith, who was to talk to Lukashenko and head of the Belarusian KGB Ivan Tertel[22].
The visit active the release of 3 political prisoners, including a U.S. citizen. The most final discussion was besides the anticipation of leniency in exchange for the release of opponents and even partial relaxation of ties between Belarus and Russia.
In the context of Minsk's relations with the confederate neighbour Ukraine, the chances of Minsk playing a function akin to those of the 2014-2015 talks should be considered questionable. This function will be aspired to by countries not compromised on the global phase (e.g. Turkey), and thus acceptable by the participants in the negotiations. In the event of a truce or peace agreement, Lukashenko will be most curious in the destiny of the Ukrainian independent armed groups. The optimal solution for him would be to disarm and demobilize them. However, for Kiev they stay a valuable argument in all talks with Belarus.
Turning to Polish-Belarusian relations, it can be said that they will depend on the Western's overall relations with Russia. Belarus will proceed to specialize in intelligence and disinformation activities in the Polish direction, which will be supported by the many Belarusian and Ukrainian diaspora in Poland and Poland in Belarus and geographical proximity. We should anticipate constant professionalization, which will manifest itself in expanding media attractiveness and availability of published disinformation and propaganda materials in Polish.
Lukashenka will proceed to usage force on the Polish number as an argument in relations with Warsaw. Interestingly, during a fewer hours of press conference held on electoral Sunday, he noted that he had the means to influence the May presidential election, but did not intend to usage it. He besides accused Poland of militarism manifested, among others, by buying Korean tanks[23].
At the same time, he stated that he wanted to normalise bilateral relations. From the speech of the statement, it is clear that the Belarusian president fears the increase in military possible of Poland. His only chance of balance remains to strengthen his cooperation with Russia, including the usage of its atomic umbrella. Support for Belarusian emigration politicians remains an crucial argument in possible negotiations with Minsk. It is crucial that it is utilized in accordance with the Polish national interest.
In the non-European sphere, Belarus will proceed its policy of multi-vectority. Pending the possible abolition of sanctions, it will be an economical chance for it to implement trade and rise capital from, among others, arabian countries. Lukashenko has taken up dialog with the fresh Syrian authorities[24]. Good relations will proceed with Iran and Venezuela as well as African countries, in peculiar Zimbabwe.
In conclusion, the analysis should be concluded that the January elections pertrify the current situation in Belarus. From the position of the authorities, they have planned and propagated to prove the “right” of the chosen direction. In the coming years, the bottom-up movements that could endanger Lukashenko's power are not to be expected. Any possible weakening of his position may consequence from decisions taken in Moscow.
Bibliography
[1] The word ‘elections’ in the definition of the PWN Dictionary of the Polish Language means ‘action to appoint suitable candidates for circumstantial functions by voting’ (https://sjp.pwn.pl/search/election.html, accessed: 28.01.2025). Both in Polish media and in the survey circles in relation to this year's presidential elections in Belarus, the word appears in quotes. In my opinion, this procedure, which is intended to item the undemocratic nature of the process itself, is, of course, acceptable, but not necessary, so in the remainder of the article, this noun appears without quotation. Similarly, it is done by examining elections in the period of the Polish People's Republic. Lt. M. Sitko, No choice. Voting to the Polish Parliament (1952-1989), Warsaw 2018.
[2]The election of the president of the Republic of Belarus will take place on 26 January 2025, (https://ies.lublin.pl/comments/Presidential Elections-Republics-Belarusi-odbeda-sie-26-January-2025-r/, accessed: 27.01.2025).
[3]Sociologist: Since 2020 more than half a million people have left Belarus, (https://www.bankier.pl/news/Sociology-From-2020-year-from-Belarusi-exit-over-pol-million-people-8742694.html, accessed: 2.02.2025).
[4]Poland is clearly the most attractive country for Belarusian IT specialists, (https://www.gov.pl/web/govtech/Polish-clearly-attractive-country-for-Belarusian-specialist-it-to-effect-government-programme-poland-business-harbour, accessed: 2.02.2025).
[5] K. Kłysiński, Depopulating country. The demographic situation of Belarus (https://www.osw.waw.pl/publications/comments-osw/2023-10-17/depopulation-situation-demographic-bilorusi, accessed: 2.02.2025).
[6]A steadfast priest sentenced in Belarus. He was the first to celebrate Mass in Katyn, (https://www.rp.pl/community/art41630511-unpleasant-priest-sanctioned-on-bialorusi-as-first-declared-mush-in-catin, accessed: 1.02.2025).
[7] See more: K. Drozd-Urbanska, In the religion of past – a man against the background of breakthrough events. Image of protests in 2020 in contemporary Belarusian literature on the example of selected stories from the volume "Ператрус у" Alhierd Bacharewicz, ‘Belarutenistic Studies’, No 17/2023, pp. 225-239.
[8]Belarus. Swiatlana Cichanouska sentenced to 15 years in prison, (https://www.rp.pl/world/art38073771-bialorus-lighten-cichanouska-disposed-for-15-years-incarceration, accessed: 4.02.2025).
[9] Belarusian election curiosity. The candidate for communists does not intend to compete with Lukashenko, (https://pl.belsat.eu/83384110/Belarusian-curiozum-electoral-candidate-communist-not-intended-to compete-with-lukashenka, accessed: 4.02.2025).
[10]Белорусы в один твердят: «!», (https://www.youtube.com/embed/IJrMQ39e3o8, accessed: 1.02.2025).
[11]Недела Президента, (https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL1UeOZO52PeScMe1UEJgPcX_zLSVTn3Uk, accessed: 4.02.2025)
[12]Election turnout in the presidential election of Belarus was 85.70%, (https://pol.belta.by/politics/view/election-in-election-in-election-president-bialorusi-upheld-8570-13166-2025/, accessed: 9.02.2025).
[13]Belarus invites OSCE observers to the elections, (https://en.belsat.eu/84565268/bialorus-invites-observers-obwe-on-elections, accessed: 2.02.2025).
[14]CKW: global observers highly assessed the President's elections in Belarus, (https://pol.belta.by/politics/view/ckw-international-observers-daly-high-value-election-president-on-bialorusi-13517-2025/, accessed: 4.02.2025).
[15]Former MPs have been taken advantage of by the Lukashenko regime. “This is simply a diplomatic betrayal of the state”, (https://www.rp.pl/politics/art41760941-ex-poss-dali-se-rezim-lukashenka-to-diplomatastic-stage-state, accessed: 9.02.2025).
[16]86.82% of voters voted for Lukashenko in the elections in Belarus, (https://pol.belta.by/politics/view/na-lukashenko-in-election-na-bilorusi-voted-8682-election-13169-2025/, accessed: 2.02.2025).
[17]Congratulations from colleagues, friends from Africa, closed borders and intellectual modernization. The President's week results, (https://pol.belta.by/president/view/Congratulations-from-colle-friends-from-Africa-closed-border-and-intellectual-modernisation-results-13464-2025/, accessed: 3.02.2025).
[18]Statement by the MFA on the presidential elections in Belarus, (https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/msz-dot-election-presidential-na-bilorusi, accessed 27.01.2025).
[19] Kamil Kłysiński, Belarus: farce alternatively of presidential election, (https://www.osw.waw.pl/publications/analysis/2025-01-27/bialorus-farsa-instead of-presidential elections, accessed: 3.02.2025).
[20]Report XII "Elections" Specification: the conclusion of the Belarusian electoral cycle, (https://by-ua-studium.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Report_12.pdf, accessed: 4.02.2025).
[21]Missing students from Belarus? They are hit by Lukashenko and Polish bureaucracy, (https://www.rp.pl/community/art41378161-none-students-z-bialorusi-derza-in-ni-lukashenko-i-polska-burocracy, accessed: 4.02.2025).
[22]A Quick, Quiet journey to Belarus Signals a Turn in U.S. Policy, (https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/15/world/europe/belarus-us-prisoners-diplomacy.html, accessed 23.02.2025).
[23]Лукашенко 4,5 часа ОТВЕЧАЕТ на вопросы! Самая ПОЛНАЯ ВЕРСИЯ!, (https://www.youtube.com/embed/Sdm6FAVgBVE, accessed: 5.02.2025).
[24]Ryzenkov: Belarus advocates maintaining Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity, (https://pol.belta.by/politics/view/risk-bialorus-de-re-preservation-scenes-and-integrity-territorial-syria-12979-2025/, accessed: 2.02.2025).
